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The first aim of the thesis is to set out the relationship of man to God, from the
moment of conception (when Tertullian believed that individual human life
began) to the completion of conversion to the Christian faith (defined as the first
admission to the Eucharist). The second aim is to investigate the extent to
which Tertullian expressed that relationship in the language of Roman law.
The study is in three parts. The first part examines the relationship from
conception to puberty. In refuting a variety of heresies, Tertullian gave his own
views on the relationship of the soul to the body and of both to God. Whether
the relationship altered during pregnancy and childhood is discussed in light of
Tertullian's teaching on abortion, the effect of Christian parentage and infant
baptism.
The second part looks at the relationship to God of the unregenerate adult,
and in particular the ways in which God made Himself known to man. Everyone
had the right to reject God, but rejection brought man under (future) judgment.
The best of paganism was inadequate to bring the natural man into a saving
relationship with God, but special consideration is given to the position of the
mentally retarded.
The third part covers the relationship to God of the catechumen, from
his first enquiry about the faith until his admission to the Eucharist. The
significance of the various ceremonies surrounding baptism is considered,
together with the relationship of baptism to paenitentia and of both to
the merits of Christ.
Every chapter includes a statement of how far Roman law appears to be
relevant for that area of the study, and re-examines the extent to which
Tertullian used Roman law to set out the relationship of mam to God.
(ii)
THE RELATIONSHIP OF MAN TO GOD, FROM CONCEPTION TO
CONVERSION, IN THE WRITINGS OF TERTULLIAN
PREFACE
Although many monographs, learned papers and doctoral theses have
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been published on the works of Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus, no one
seems yet to have analysed the way in which he expressed the relationship of
man to God, from the beginning of life until conversion to the Christian
faith. In the belief that a study of Tertullian's works can give valuable insight
into our present understanding of that relationship, the first aim of this thesis is
to set out systematically the words and the ways in which Tertullian described
the relationship, from the moment of conception (when he believed that
individual human life began) until the catechumen's first admission to the
Eucharist (which normally followed the baptismal ceremony and which marked
the completion of conversion to the Christian faith.) The second aim of the
No less than 479 monographs, 624 periodical articles and 62 doctoral
theses, devoted entirely or substantially to some aspect of Tertullian's works,
were noted during the preparation of this thesis. Most had no direct relevance to
the subject matter of this study, but all those cited, together with some not
cited although read with profit, are listed in the bibliography on page 4-^1+-. The
primary source of material for the study was, however, the works of Tertullian
himself.
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"Quintus" and Florens" are attested only by a tradition first recorded in
the 15th century by John of Trittenheim and Angelo Poliziano. Tertullian called
himself either "Tertullianus" - bapt 20.5.54 - or "Septimius Tertullianus" -virg
17.5.46-47. The only other possible reference by Tertullian to his own name is at
the end of de exhortatione castitatis, but the text is corrupt and the name does
not appear in the Agobardinus, the better manuscript. Most modern scholars
follow Tertullian himself in the spelling 'Septimius' but the editors of Corpus
Christianorum, series latina (the text quoted throughout the thesis) preferred
'Septimus'.
(iii)
thesis is to identify those places where Tertullian seems to have used the
language of Roman law to describe the relationship of man to God, and to re¬
assess the significance of that for his thought, in the areas under review.
This thesis is restricted to Tertullian's own era - no attempt is made to
investigate the corresponding relationship (in so far as Tertullian referred to it)
before or at the coming of Christ.* Furthermore, only passing reference is
made to the special relationship to God of ethnic groups, like the Jews, or of
occupational groups, like soldiers. The relationship of heretics to God is
examined in Excursus One, and the position of slaves in Excursus Three.
Tertullian lived during the finest and fullest development of Roman
2 3
jurisprudence, and was himself well versed in law. This has not only led a
In opposing Marcion, Tertullian had to emphasise that the God of whom
he spoke was the same God as the Creator of the world, the God of both the Old
Testament and the New. To that extent, the relationship between God and man
did not alter from one era to the next, but the coming of Christ meant a
fundamental change in both man's knowledge of God and man's approach to God:
"nemo Christianus ante Christum caelo resumptum, nemo sanctus ante Spiritum
sanctum de caelo repraesentatum ipsius disciplinae determinatorem." - pud
12.3.16-187"
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The "classical" period of Roman jurisprudence was from the beginning of
the second century A.D. to the middle of the third. The juristic development of
Roman law terminated abruptly when (and presumably because) the Emperors
discontinued the jus respondendi and legislated instead by decree giving
expression to their own will. When Roman law was codified, under the Emperor
Justinian, the five jurists whose views^to prevail over all others were Gaius (alive
in A.D. 178), Papinianus (executed in A.D. 212), Ulpianus (assassinated between
A.D.222 and 228), Paulus (contemporary with Papinianus and Ulpianus) and
Modestinus (last known to be alive in A.D. 244) - "the great lights of
jurisprudence for all time". There are, however, real difficulties in ascertaining
what the law was at Carthage at the beginning of the third century; the problems
are set out in Excursus Two.
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Whether Tertullian was a professional jurist or whether he was a lawyer
only in the sense that Cicero and Quintilian were lawyers (rhetoricians), is much
debated, but the contributors all agree that he was familiar with legal
terminology and made considerable use of it. (Tertullian himself nowhere stated
that he had studied law). This thesis is more concerned with Tertullian's
employment of Roman law then with the source of his knowledge of it, so
whether he was the juris consultus of the same name, mentioned by Ulpian and to
whom five excerpts were attributed in Justinian's Digest, is not discussed; the
literature on that up to 1930 was well summarised by Alexander Beck, Romisches
Recht bei Tertullian und Cyprian, (Halle: Max Niemyer, 1930) pp 4-5, 13-17 and
33-43 and the literature since then was reviewed in the introduction to the 1967
reprint of Beck's monograph, pp x-xi. Beck was in favour of identification, but
the opposite view was argued by Schlossman and by Fredouille who, for very
(continued overleaf)
(iv)
number of scholars to speculate on the influence of Roman Law on Tertullian's
theology, but has led some to state that Roman Law profoundly influenced his
expression of the relationship of mam to God. Examples of such claims - in
chronological order and with the authorship immediately appended, for easy
reference - are:
(a) Jedoch durch Tertullian, seinem friiheren Berufe nach Jurist, erhielten alle
christlichen Formen ein rechtliches Geprage. Er hat nicht nur Vieles aus der
Kunstsprache der Juristen in die Kirchensprache des Abendlands
ubergefiihrt, sondern auch alle Beziehungen des Einzelnen und der Gemeinde
zue Gottheit and umgekehrt.
Adolf Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, (4th ed.; Tubingen: Paul
Siebeck, 1910), part IU, p 15. (First edition was in 1888).
(b) Der Terminologie wie dem Inhalte nach hat Tertullian ein gut Teil "jus
Romanum" in die in seinen Schriften erhaltene Lehre eingefiihrt: Der
personliche,dreieinige Gott ist ihm der Lehrer des Gesetzes und zuglich der
Richter iiber dessen Erfiillung. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkte steht
vorwiegend die ganze Tertalliansche Auffassung vom Verhaltnissezwischen
Gott und Mensch.
Karl Hermann Wirth, Per Begriff des 'Meritum' bei Tertullian, (Leipzig:
Ackermann & Glaser, 1892), p 63.
(c) It is more owing to him than to any one that the relations of God and man
came to be regarded as legal relations, and sin, for example, as a kind of
legal liability, which might be dealt with in ways analogous to those with
which his profession had made him familiar.
James Denney, The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation, (London: James
Clark, 1959) p 45. (First published in 1902).
Footnote 3 continued:
different reasons, both concluded that Tertullian had received no legal training
beyond the general education accorded in the rhetorical schools of his day.
(S.Schlossman, in two articles entitled "Tertullian im Lichte der Jurisprudenz",
Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, 27 (1906), 251-275 and 407-430 and Jean-
Claude Fredouille, Tertullian et la conversion de la culture antique, (Paris:
Etudes Augustiniennes, 1972) pp 29ff, 221ff and passim. Another useful summary
of the debate was made by Joseph Kaspar Stirnimann, Die Praescriptio
Tertullians im Lichte des romischen Rechtes und der Theologie^ (Freiburg:
Paulusverlag, 1949) p 2-4, and the latest published contribution is by Timothy
David Barnes, Tertullian. A Historical and Literary Study, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1971) p 22-29. P. Vitton's much respected study, I concetti giuridici nelle
opere di Tertulliano (Rome: 1924) was reprinted in 1972.
(v)
(d) C'etait un avocat qui voyait avant tout dans le christianisme un fait et une
loi. Le fait, il fallait l'etablir et le comprendre: la loi, il fallait l'interpr6ter
et surtout l'observer. Dieu est, a notre dgard, un maTtre et un creancier:
nous sommes ses sujets et ses debiteurs. II est done juste, pour determiner
nos rapports avec lui, - e'est-a-dire notre attitude, nos rapports religieux, -
d'applicquer les principes des legislations humaines, et de porter dans cette
application la rigueur qui preside a la determination de nos dettes et de nos
droits civils: question de passif et d'actif qui se peut traiter avec
l'exactitude des operations de commerce.
Joseph Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes dans L'Antiquite Qiretienne, (7th ed.;
Paris:Victor Lecoffre, 1915) I, 333. (First edition was in 1905).
(e) He viewed the relation between God and man in the light of a legal
transaction and expressed it in terms of Roman law.
J.M. Lupton, Q. Septimi Florentis Tertulliani, De Baptismo, (Cambridge:
University Press, 1908) p xxvii.
(f) Tertullian regards God above all as the Lawgiver and religion as a discipline
ordained of God through Christ.
Robert Sleightholme Franks, The Work of Christ (London: Thomas Nelson
and Son, 1962) p 78. (Published in 1918 as A History of the Doctrine of the
Work of Christ).
(g) God is portrayed at length as a Judge, and the relationship of men to Him is
pre-eminently that of criminals to a Judge.
Robert Edward Roberts, The Theology of Tertullian, (London: Epworth
Press, 1924) p 28.
(h) One predominant characteristic of Tertullian's invention of a new
terminology, is his introduction of the use of designating the relationship of
man to God by menas of terms derived from Roman Law.
James Morgan, The Importance of Tertullian in the Development of
Christian Dogma, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1928) p 52.
(i) In fact all the relations between God and man are regarded by Tertullian as
having the character of legal transaction. His pages contain manifold
references to such terms as 'debt', 'satisfaction', 'guilt', 'compensation'.
Even his doctrine of the Atonement is viewed from the same standpoint.
ibid., p 9.
(j) Ein eigenartig ausgestaltetes Verh'altnis zwischen Gott und Mensch bildet
den Mittelpunkt der Religiositat Tertullians. Die verpflichtende Strenge
einer romisch gedachten, objektiven lex fidei bestimmt bei ihm
ausschliesslich und unverriickbar die gesamten Beziehungen zu Gott und
(vi)
Welt. Naher gekennzeichnet wird die Natur dieses Glaubensgesetzes
dadurch, dass es sozusagen eine religiose Privatrechtsordnuiig darstellt.
Alexander Beck, Romischer Recht bei Tertullian und Cyprian, (Halle; Max
Niemeyer, 1930, reprinted, Aalen; Max Niemeyer, 1967) p 20-21.
(k) Tertullian's outlook unites Old Testament nomism and Roman moralism and
jurisprudence. The result is a theology of merit whose influence on the later
history of Christianity was calamitous. The idea of retribution is central to
his interpretation of Christianity. Nothing, he says, can more become God,
as the good and righteous Judge, than to elect and reprobate men according
to their deserts. God simply cannot disregard man's merit; He cannot
condemn those who have not deserved it, nor refrain from reprobating those
who have sinned. The Law is thus the proper Way of Salvation.
Anders Theodor Samuel Nygren, Agape and Eros, (translated by Philip S.
Watson), (London: SPCK, 1954) I, 132-133; (Original (Swedish) edition was in
1930).
(1) He not only transferred the technical terms of the jurist into the
ecclesiastical language of the West, but he contemplated from a legal
standpoint all the relations both of the individual and of the Church, to the
Deity, and reciprocally, His relation to them.
William Phillips, The Influence of Roman Law on the History and Doctrine
of the Christian Church during the First Three Centuries, (Unpublished
thesis presented to the University of Edinburgh for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Theological Faculty, 26th March 1931) p 235.
(m) By means of the doctrine of justice a juristic relation to God was established
and a legal character given to all the relations between God and man.
ibid., p 181.
(n) The legal cast of Tertullian's mind is especially evident in his dealing with
the subject of Redemption. The foundation and framework of his doctrine
of salvation are legalistic. The relations of God and man are of the nature
of a legal transaction. This follows from his fundamental conception of
God; God is essentially a Judge whose will finds expression in forms of law.
ibid., p 194.
(o) Law permeated his representation of the relation between God and man.
Johannes Quasten, Patrology, (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press,
1964), I, 322. (First printing was in 1950).
(p) He looks upon God,not as the divine Father to Whom he has free access, but
as the sternly just distributor of rewards and penalties.
John Norman Davidson Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines,(4th ed.; London
Adam and Charles Black, 1968), 460. (First edition was in 1953).
(vii)
(q) Throughout his writings, Tertullian reveals as a central point in his religion
the concept of the legal relationship between God and man. He assumes a
rigorous rule, which is the lex or regula fidei. This law covers the entire
relationship of God and the world and His creatures.
Eleanor Russell Cate, Tertullian's Defence of the Christian Community; an
Apologist's Task and Method, (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, presented to the
University of Columbia, 1966), p 82.
Such statements may be justified for certain areas of Tertullian's
thought - for example, his treatment of post-baptismal sin, or his view of the
final judgment of the ungodly, or the exclusion of heretics by praescriptp. The
extent to which such statements are true, and the extent to which they are
misleading, for the years between conception and conversion, is the second main
concern of this study. The method adopted is therefore to narrate, as far as can
be ascertained from the text of Tertullian's writings, the ways in which he
expressed the relationship of man to God for the period under review. That part
of the work is essentially descriptive. The penultimate section of every chapter
then sets out the Roman law which appears to have been in Tertullian's mind for
that area, and the final section of every chapter draws conclusions from that
chapter, with particular reference to the extent which Roman law appears to
have influenced Tertullian's thought.
On further preliminary point should be made. While Tertullian insisted
(particularly against Praxeas,)^ that the name of God was proper to Father, Son
and Holy Spirit, he made clear that man could have no settled relationship with
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the Son or with the Spirit until after conversion to the Christian faith. Unless
the context requires otherwise, the word 'God' will therefore refer, throughout
this thesis, to the First Person of the Trinity only. Tertullian nowhere set out to
prove the fact of His existence, nor did he require to, because the error of his
e.g. "et Pater Filius Deus et Spiritus Deus, et Deus unusauisque" - Prax
13.6.42-43.
2
This is established in chapters Vm.6 and X.3 respectively.
(viii)
pagan contemporaries was not atheism but polytheism - "T.steht dem
eigentlichen Aifie ismusprob lem innerlich durchaus fern; einem richtigen
Atheisten ist er nie begegnet". ^ Tertullian's writings therefore assumed the
existence of God as a self-evident truth, to be recognised by all men ex
testimonio animae and/or by observation of the natural world.
The extent to which Tertullian's teaching on the relationship of man to
God for the period under review altered over the years, as he became influenced
by and then as he expounded Montanist doctrine, is examined in Excursus Four.
The opportunity is taken here of acknowledging with gratitude the help
and guidance given by Mr. David F. Wright, M.A. Senior Lecturer in
Ecclesiastical History in the University of Edinburgh, in the years during which
these ideas germinated and then developed into the thesis now presented.
Thanks are due also to the Librarian and staff of the New College Library for
their patience over these same years, not least for obtaining both printed
material and micro-films through the Inter-Library Loan Service for otherwise
inaccessible material on Tertullian.
Joseph Lortz, Tertullian als Apologet, (Munster: Aschendorff, 1927)
I, 246. As Tertullian himself put it, si quando coguntur deum
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All thirty-one of Tertullian's extant works have contributed to this
thesis. While it would be a study in itself to be specific about their chronology,*
it is desirable (in order to follow the evolution of his thought) to arrange his
works into at least broad groups and to indicate their approximate dates. This is
done below and the abbreviations used for them, throughout the thesis, are set
Rene Braun showed the extent of the debate and also summarised the
views of the twelve main contributing scholars by listing Tertullian's works in the
order which he himself preferred and setting out the conclusions of the others in
note form underneath: Rene Braun, Deus Christianorum, (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1962), Excursus One, pp 563-577. The list which follows
here is basically Braun's, but it introduces a category entitled "Persuading to the
Montanist viewpoint". The generally accepted pattern was challenged by Barnes,
who proposed a substantially different chronology and order: op cit., pp 30-35.
Bray provided an interesting summary of the efforts to establish a chronology for
the writings of Tertullian from the first serious attempt in 1848 until the
movement 'ran out of steam' at the end of the 19th century: Gerald Lewis Bray,
Holiness and the Will of God, (London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1979) p 17-
18.
(xiv)
out on the right hand side of the page. References to the text of Tertullian's
works throughout the thesis are to the chapter, paragraph and line^ of the
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editions collected in Corpus Christianorum, series latina, volumes I and II.
Where the text has been quoted, the semi-consonant "u" of the manuscripts,
reproduced in Corpus Christianorum, has been retained in place of the more
modern "v"; integration marks < } and half square brackets u ± (indicating
faded letters in the manuscripts) have been omitted unless the point is material
to the study. The typewriter used (a "word processor") could not conveniently
reproduce the "s p a c i n g" of Tertullian's quotations from the Bible, because in
automatically justifying the right-hand margin it treated every such space as a
new word and arranged the letters at irregular intervals.
The chronological table used in the thesis for Tertullian works is
overleaf:
For example V Marc 4.16.21-24 refers to the Fifth Book of the Adversus
Marcionem, chapter 4, paragraph 16, lines 21-24; but no less than three different
methods are used, within this one edition of Corpus Christianorum, for
numbering the lines of the text!
(a) In the first two works (mart and nat), every new page of the edition reverts
to the number '1', without reference to the text.
(b) The majority of the other works revert to '1' at every new chapter of the
text, without regard to the pagination of the edition, but
(c) Six of the works, scattered throughout both volumes of the edition, (Herm,
Val, scorp, idol, jej, and pud) follow the numbering of the C.S.E.L. edition,
from which they were reproduced, reverting to '1' wherever a new page is
reached in C.S.E.L.; this is indicated by 'V' in the margin.
Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani Opera, (Turnhout: Typographi
Brepols Editores Pontifici, 1954), Pars I (Opera Catholica. Adversus Marcionem),
Pars II (Opera Montanistica).
(xv)
Before any Montanist influence Abbreviated to:
A.D. 197 ad martyras mart
ad nationes nat
A.D. 197-198 apologeticum apol
de testimonio animae test
A.D. 198-200 adversus Judaeos Jud
de spectaculis spec
de praescriptione haereticorum praes
A.D. 200-206 de baptismo bapt
de patientia pat
de paenitentia paen




Tinged with Montanist influence
A.D.207-208 adversus Marcionem Marc
A.D. 208-211 de pallio pal
de carne Christi earn
adversus Valentinianos Val
de anima an
de resurrectione carnis res
de corona cor
A.D. 211-212 scorpiace ^ scorp
Placed here, although there is considerable force in Barnes' argument for
dating scorpiace at the end of A.D. 203 or the beginning of 204 - Timothy David





Persuading to the Montanist viewpoint
After A.D. 213 de exhortatione castitatis ex
de fuga fug
de virginibus velandis virg
Montanist viewpoint stated, not argued





THE RELATIONSHIP TO GOD OF EMBRYOS,
INFANTS AND CHILDREN UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE
CHAPTER ONE - THE BEGINNING OF THE RELATIONSHIP TO GOD
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER ONE
Tertullian taught, clearly and emphatically, that human life began at
conception - not a moment sooner, not a moment later.* He rejected the view
that the soul could have had a prior existence, and so a prior relationship with
God - the view taught by Plato, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and others.^ He
rejected also the view that the human soul entered the embryo at some point
3
between conception and birth - the view taught by Aristotle and others. He
rejected, equally emphatically, and for the same reason, the view that the human
soul entered the body at the first respiration of the child - the view of the
4
Stoics, the Roman jurists, and the Jewish rabbis. All these ideas are examined
in sections two and three of this chapter, together with how (and why) Tertullian
refuted them.
In section four, Tertullian's rejection of 'creationism' is explored, and an
introductory look is taken at his theory of propagatio animarum per traducem;
metaphors from viniculture and from agriculture illustrate his teaching that
Conception is now known to be a process, by no means instantaneous,
but in the absence of instruments of magnification, Tertullian could not have
known that.
2
Examined in section 1.2 below.
3
Mentioned in section X.2 below and then examined in chapter II.4.
4 The Stoic view is discussed briefly in section T.2 and the Roman
jurist's view in section 1.9; the view of the Jewish rabbis is mentioned in
chapter n.4 (p 62 below).
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every soul was descended from the soul of Adam. Section four
also sets out the three con^temporary theories of conception, and the use which
Tertullian made of them. Section five goes on to look at the potential of both
body and soul for some relationship with God, from the very moment when they
were joined together at conception. Since repeated reference will be made in
this chapter to the "two parts" of embryonic man, section six is devoted to
establishing whether Tertullian really believed man to be a dichotomy of body
and soul only or whether (as some passages suggest) he thought of a trichotomy
of body, soul and spirit. The relationship of the parts to each other is examined,
partly in section five and partly in section six.
That clarified, the study turns in section seven to consider the
implications of traducianism. Tertullian insisted that all mankind had inherited
sin - or at least a sinful nature - and the importance of that becomes apparent as
he contrasts the natural immunda of all men with the actual sins which they
later commit. Nevertheless, the original, rational and good nature of the soul
lived on, obscured but not eliminated; Tertullian would later use this residue of
God's goodnesss in the soul as his most powerful argument for some relationship
between every adult man and God. Meantime, however, the relationship of
embryonic life to God at the moment of conception is examined in section eight;
several texts are found to be important for this. Section nine then sets out the
Roman law which is relevant for this chapter, and conclusions are drawn in
section ten.
3
1.2 NO EARLIER THAN CONCEPTION
Although Tertullian stated plainly and on a number of occasions'' that
human life originated at conception, i.e. with the coniunctio corporis
2
animaeque , this did not logically exclude the possibility of a previous, separate
existence by one or other or both of the component parts of man, and so a prior
relationship with God. Indeed, some of his contemporaries, following Plato, did
teach that the soul came to the body from a prior, independent, transcendental
existence, where it had already known God - animae et innatae et in caelestibus
conuersatae et consciae diuinorum illic et inde delatae et hie recordatae
3
crederentur . The idea of psychic pre-existence has often, although not
necessarily, been coupled with the theory of metempsychosis - the
transmigration of souls. Tertullian encountered and dealt with both aspects, the
former in de anima chapters 23 to 24, and the latter in de anima chapters 28 to
35 (together with incidental references elsewhere in his works).
Chapters 23 and 24 of de anima contain his refutation of various (false)
ideas about the origin of the soul, all of which he traced back to Plato's theory of
) I
cX.vscp.y t]crn; . This claim, that Plato was condimentarius omnium haereticorum,
makes it clear that Tertullian's aim throughout the chapter (as indeed throughout
the whole book de anima) was the refutation of heretical ideas present in his own
time.
Doleo bona fide Platonem omnium haereticorum condimentarium factum.
Illius est enim et in Phaedone, quod animae hinc euntes sint illuc, et inde
hue; item in Timaeo, quod genimina dei delegata sibi mortalium genitura
accepto initio animae immortali mor tale ei circumgelauerint corpus; turn,
quod mundus hie imago sit alterius alicuius. Quae omnia ut fidei /






commendet, et animam retro in superioribus cum deo egisse in commercio
idearum et inde hue transuenire et hie quae retro norit de exemplaribus
recensere, nouum elaborauit argumentum, nA9no-tLf id est discentias
reminiscentias esse; uenientes enim inde hue animas obliuisci eorum in
quibus prius fuerint, dehinc ex his uisibilibus edoctas recordari. Cum igitur
huiusmodi argumento ilia insinuentur a Platone quae haeretici mutuantur,
satis haereticos repercutiam, si argumentum Platonis elidam. 1
Since, as Waszink remarked, "Hardly ever has the position of an adversary been
> / 2
combatted by Tertullian as Plato's doctrine of a(y<f*yf|<ri£ the details need not
be examined here. The important point for this study is Tertullian's insistence
that all theories of psychic pre-existence led to dangerous heresy. Presumably
his concern was to safeguard his teaching on the simultaneous origin of body and
3 4
soul and also his teaching on traducianism, both of which would have been
endangered if it could have been shown that the human soul lodged in man after
some earlier and separate relationship with God.
Chapters 28 to 35 of de anima deal with various aspects of the related
theory, (which Tertullian had mentioned briefly in chapter 23.2) namely the
transmigration of souls. Again he regarded Plato as the chief culprit, for
5
providing heretics with the materials from which to work, although this time he
blamed Plato only for transmitting the ideas, not for originating them.
Quis ille nunc uetus sermo apud memoriam Platonis de animarum reciproco
discursu, quod hinc abeuntes sint illuc et rursus hue ueniant et fiant et
1
an 23.5.20 - 6.35.
2
Jan H. Waszink, Quint i Septimi Florentis Tertulliani De anima
(Amsterdam: J.H. Meulenhoff, 1947)p 304.
3
Examined in section 1.3 below.
4
Examined in section 1.4 below.
5
Whether Tertullian was being fair to Plato is outside the scope of this
study. Plato certainly believed in the pre-existence of the soul, but he seems to
have avoided committing himself in his explicit teaching (as distinct from his
myths) to belief in reincarnation. His own hope, put into the mouth of Socrates,
was that his soul would return to its bodiless state in the realm of the gods, from
which it had come.
5
dehinc ita habeat rursus ex mortuis effici uiuos? Pythagoricus, ut uolunt
quidarn.l
Having demonstrated the errors of Pythagoras and of Plato in these matters, in
chapters 28 to 31, Tertullian turned, in chapters 32 and 33, to the even more
2
radical teaching of the "lunatic Empedocles" who believed in metensomatosis as
well as metempsychosis - that a human soul could enter the body of an animal
or even of a plant. Perinde igitur et hie dimicemus necesse est aduersus
portentosiorem praesumptionem bestias ex hominibus et homines ex bestiis
3
reuoluentem. Tertullian had already dealt briefly with the theme in the
4
apologeticum but in de anima he proceeded to refute Empedocles with no less
than five lengthy arguments. He recognised that no heretical sect had yet
5
adopted metensomatosis but nevertheless he felt it necessary to refute the idea
because of its link with metemjsychosis, which had already influenced certain
earlier heretics, whom Tertullian denounced by name - Simon Magus in chapter
34 and Carpocrates in chapter 35. The details need not concern this study, but
the principle at stake (enunciated by Tertullian himself in introducing chapter




"Empedoclis furor" as Tertullian described his teaching in an
3.2.15. Empedocles himself professed to remember being a boy, then a girl, a
shrub, a bird and a fish. Extracts of his works were collected by Heinrich Ritter





apol 48.1-4 (although there he attributed the theory to Phythagoras.)
^Nulla guidem in hodiernum dementiae huiusmodi sententia erupit sub
nomine haeretico, quae humanas animas refingat in bestias, sed necessarie hanc
quoque speciem intulimus et exclusimus ut superioribus cohaerentem, quo
perinde in pauo retunderetur Homerus sicut in Pythagora Euphorbus atque ita hac
etiam me temp sychosi siue metensomatosi repercussa ilia rursus caederetur
quae aliauid haereticis sumministrauit. - an 34.1.1-8.
6
Never adverse to making use of material which came his way, Tertullian
turned the pagan idea of metempscyhosis to his own advantage in de
resurrectione carnis. The heathen had no reason to mock at the Christian belief
in resurrection, he said, because it was no more contrary to reason than their
own belief in the transmigration of souls, especially if they were prepared to
accept transfers from men into animals and vice versa.
Satis est autem, si non minor sententia Pythagorae et Empedocles et
Platonici inmortalem animam e contrario reclamant, immo adhuc proxime
etiam in corpora remeabilem adfirmant, etsi non in eadem, etsi non in
humana tantummodo, ut Euphorbus in Pythagoram, ut Homerus in pauum
recenseantur.l
However, although he was prepared to utilise the pagan notion for the sake of
argument, he could not allow any real suggestion of metempsychosis. If the soul
could have migrated from body to body, Tertullian's belief in the resurrection of
2
the body, once only, would have been endangered. Furthermore, the idea of
descending and ascending by reincarnation, until the soul was worthy of heaven,
was the basis of dualistic heresies regarding divine punishment; by attacking the
basic idea that a soul which did not live in accordance with its original essence
during its time on earth would be punished by a series of reincarnations,
Tertullian hoped to safe-guard the Christian doctrine of judgement by God, once
only and at the resurrection.
To conclude this section, it should be noted that Tertullian nowhere
suggested the body could have had am independent existence, prior to conception;
accordingly the demonstration that the soul had no prior existence established,
beyond any argument, that man had no relationship with God, in any form, prior




In apol 43. 3 & 4, Tertullian made a clear distinction between the two
reasons, viz. safeguarding both the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the
body and also the judgment of God (which would be thwarted if the human soul
could be transferred into the body of an animal and thereby lose its
consciousness of its deserts), but he ran the two ideas together in the de amima
passage.
7
1.3 NO LATER THAN CONCEPTION
Tertullian faced two further challenges to his belief that individual
human life began coniunctio corporis animaeque.* These were:-
(a) the Aristotlean belief that the human soul entered the embryo at some point
2
between conception and birth, and
(b) the Stoic belief that the human soul entered the newly-born infant at the
3
moment of its first breath .
Another of Tertullian's fundamental doctrines was at stake here, namely his
belief that the soul, and with it the sin of Adam, passed from generation to
4
generation by the act of procreation. If the body could exist independently of
5
the human soul, hominisation could not be attributed to the physical




Examined in chapter II.4 below.
3
The Stoic philosophy of the soul is well set out by E. Vernon Arnold,
Roman Stoicism, (London: 1958) pp 238-272. To breathe is the first act
which marks the life of a newly born infant and to cease to breathe is the first
sign which tokens the extinction of life. It was therefore not unnatural to
assume that the principle which animated the body was a breath, which entered
it at birth and left it at death. Tertullian named the Stoics and Aenesidemus as
putting forward this view, and that sometimes Plato did - Hoc Stoici cum
Aenesidemo et ipse interdum Plato, cur dicit perinde animam extraneam alias et
extorrem uteri prima adspiratione nascentis infantis adduci, sicut exspiratione
nouissima educi - an 25.2.14-18. No other extant writing however attributes
this view to Plato.
4
Traducianism - examined in section 1.4 below.
5
The word 'hominisation', although not used by Tertullian, is here
preferred to 'animation', to denote the union of a human soul with a human
embryo because 'animation' does not necessarily mean the infusion of a human
soul. Aristotle taught that the human embryo received first a vegetative soul,
then a sensitive soul, and finally an intellective soul - as examined in chapter II.4
below. - so although Aristotle's followers could reasonably have claimed that the
embryo was animated from the very start, the soul which animated it was not for
them a human soul. For them, animation was immediate but hominization was
delayed. Aristotle, Generation of Animals (with an English translation by A.L.
Peck, London: Heinemann, 1943) book IT, chaps 1-4.
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fall.1 He therefore refuted, at considerable length, the teaching of various
contemporaries who claimed that the human soul entered the body after
conception.
In chapter 25 of de anima, he demonstrated to pagan philosophers and
physicians (who would not have accepted his 'proofs' from Scripture) that the
embryo was already alive before birth. He argued that mothers and pregnant
2
women knew perfectly well the embryo had a life of its own; furthermore, the
3
birth of some children, still-born, proved that others in the womb were alive; so
did the need for therapeutic abortion. Proceeding from there, he commented
5
on the resemblance of children to their parents , and on the practices of pagan
astrologers^ - all to demonstrate that the embryo was in possession of a soul, and
implying (without attempting proof at this stage) that the soul was present in the
embryo from conception. (The proof of that came in chapter 27).
As later Christian writers recognised; "Pour mieux combattre cette
heresie (i.e. que la vie et l'animation sont deux faits simultanes) les Peres latins
distinguerent entre la conception et l'animation: la conception est l'ouvre des
parents, l'animation est le resultat de la creation de l'ame par Dieu. lis firent
plus que les distinguer, ils les separerent chronologiquement, ils fixerant a
l'animation une date posterieure a la conception et ainsi disparaissait toute
possibility de traducianisme, lequel n'est conciliable qu-avec l'animation
immediate". From the article "Animation" by A. Chollet in Dictionnaire de
Theologie Catholique, (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1903) vol 1, col 1308.
^
an hi motus gaudia uestra sint et certa securitas, qucTjl its. infantem
et uiuere confidatis et ludere: an si desierit inquies eius, illi prius pertimescatis -
an 25.3.28-31.
3
Denique et mortui eduntur; quomodo, nisi et uiui? Qui autem
et mortui, nisi qui prius uiui? - em 25.4.40-42.
4
certi animal esse conceptum atque ita miserti infelicissimae huiusmodi
infantiae, ut prius occidatur, ne uiua lanietur-^25.5.53-55.
5
Vnde, oro, similitudine animae quoque parentibus de ingeniis
respondemus secundum Clean this testimonium, si non et ex animae semine
educimure? - an 25.9.87-89.
^
Cur autem et ueteras astrologie genituram hominis ab initio conceptus
dirigebant, si non exinde et anima est. - an 25.9.89-91.
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In chapter 26, to make the same point for the benefit of Christian
readers, Tertullian brought forward his 'convincing proofs' from Scripture - the
soul was present in the embryos of Esau and Jacob''' of Jesus and of John the
2 3
Baptist and of Jeremiah. Then Tertullian turned, in chapter 27, to the more
specific assertion that soul and body came into existence simultaneously, viz. at
the moment of conception: Iromo simul arobas et concipi et confici, perfici
dicimus, sicut et promi, nec ullum interuenire momentum in conceptu quo locus
4
ordinetur.
His proof of this proceeded in three parts -
(1) a syllogism, followed by
(2) an argumentum ex sensu communi, followed (as was his custom) by
(3) an argumentum ex scriptura sacra.
1. The syllogism (sections 2-3) can be paraphrased as follows.
(a) Vita pariter corpori et animae obvenit.
(b) Vitam a conceptu agnoscimus (nam exinde vita, quo anima, et animam a
conceptu vindicamus).
(c) Ergo vita pariter (i.e. in conceptu) corpori et animae obvenit.
5
The logic of this has been closely examined by Waszink and found to be
defective - not least because the conclusion omits the important words in
Ecce uiscera Rebeccae inquietantur et longe adhuc partus - an 26.3.6-
7; quid ille qui expectabatur, qui adhuc intus detinebatur et foris iam detinebat?
an 26.3.17-18.
2
sed et illi uiuunt in suo quisque utero. Exsultat Elizabeth, Johannes
intus impulerat; glorificat dominum Maria. Christus intus instinxerat. an
26X25^28
3





op. cit. p. 346-7.
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conceptu. However, what Tertullian was trying to say here, fortified by the
sections which follow, make clear beyond doubt that he believed uita = anima =
uita:
Porro uitam a conceptu agnoscimus, quia animam a conceptu
uindicamus; exinde enim uita, quo anima. 1
2. The Common Sense Argument (sections 4-6)
These sections contain a detailed examination of what takes place in the
act of procreation, when (according to Tertullian) body and soul were implanted
together in the womb. The text is only mentioned at this point, because it is
more appropriate to examine it in detail in the section on traducianism, 1.4
below. Tertullian wrote:
Nam etsi duas species confitebimur seminis, corporalem et animalem,
indiscretas tamen uindicamus et hoc modo contemporales eiusdemque
momenti. 2
Then following the common sense argument, Tertullian sought, as he often did,
to fortify it by reference to Scripture, in particular to the prototype of
procreation in Genesis 2:7, which is examined next.
3. The Scriptural Argument (sections 7-9)
Tertullian's argument, that the creation of Adam was both proof and
3
pattern of the simultaneous origin of body and soul, is a curious and suspect
argument - because there was a lapse of time between the creation of Adam's
4









e.g. in res 45.2.8-11. In I Marc 24.5.9-11 the very scriptural text used
in an 27.7.42 to prove that homo applied only when the body and soul came
together, was used to prove that only the body is entitled to the name homo.
Furthermore, Tertullian's use here of Genesis 1.28 (an 27.4.25) is very different
from the interpretation he gave to it in pud 16.9.21, mon 7.3.21-23 and ex 6.1.6.
11
it is not necessary to look here at the shortcomings of that particular
argument, because Tertullian used Scripture only to fortify what he had already
stated unequivocally to be his belief, and it is his belief, not the proof of it,
which is investigated here.
Two further passages should be mentioned. After a digression (chapters
28-35) to deal with the migration of souls, Tertullian felt it necessary to take up,
yet again, the simultaneous genesis of body and soul. Ostensibly his subject, in
chapter 36, was the sex of the soul; Apelles the heretic believed that the soul
already possessed a definite sex before it joined the body; others believed that
the flesh gave the sex to the soul; Tertullian argued that sex was established
when the semen of the body was fused with the semen of the soul - i.e. at
conception, no sooner and no later:
Si enim in seminibus utriusque substantiae aliquam intercapedinem eorum,
concpgtus admitteret, ut aut caro aut anima prior seminaretur, esset etiam
sexus proprietatem alteri substantiae adscribere per temporalem
intercapedinem seminum. 1
Chapter 36 gives an important emphasis to this subject, because it is clear that
Tertullian was not really concerned to discuss whether or not the soul had a
definite sex - he was determined to eliminate amy possible opposition to his
theory of the simultaneous genesis of body and soul. Because of rival theories,
like the one maintained by Apelles (the following section of the same chapter),
Tertullian turned his attack on to the Stoics, joining them with Apelles, not
because the Stoics ever attributed a definite sex to the soul, but because their
doctrine of the introduction of the soul to the body at birth might (in contrast to
the view of Apelles) have led to the conclusion that the soul received its sex
from the body. Chapter 36 is, therefore, not a discussion in its own right about




in chapter 27 about the simultaneous origin of body and soul.
While there are references to the same concept, outside of de anima,
e.g.
Atquin Adam nouus totus, et ex nouo uetus nemo. Nam et exinde a
benedictione geniturae caro atque anima simul fiunt sine calculo temporis,
ut quae simul in utero etiam seminantur, quod docuimus in commentario
animae. Contemporant fetu, coaetant natu. 1
Tertullian himself, as that passage shows, regarded de anima as his principal
argument for the genesis of the soul, with the body, no later than conception.
The other main passage in de anima is chapter 19, where Tertullian opposed the
view that the intellect and the mind can be introduced into the soul later than






Tertullian not only rejected the pre-existence of souls and the delayed
hominisation of bodies; these were not sufficient in themselves to secure his
anthropology. He rejected also the view - later to be known as 'creationism' -
that the soul was created by God, de novo and de nihilo, at the time of
conception.^ He advanced the theory known as traducianism - that the soul had
been created by God, when He made Adam, and that, once created, souls were
passed on by natural course from generation to generation. Adam was the root
2
from which came every propagating branch or 'layer' - tradux - hence the name
traduciansim. The word means the tendril or runner of a vine, passing from pole
to pole, which continues the life of the mother plant (matrix) independently and
which can also transmit it. Tertullian therefore regarded the soul as "breath and
cutting of the (divine) spirit", the underlying concept being /
According to 'creationism', the body alone was transmitted from parent
to child, and each soul was a direct, new creation of God, created at the very
instant in which it was joined to the body. Tertullian did not advance
traducianism in opposition to that theory - which he did not even mention - but
in opposition to Gnosticism. Chollet claims, in Column 1307 of the otherwise
excellent article "Animation" already cited, that later Latin Fathers taught
creationism in reaction to the views of Tertullian on traducianism. While it is
true that they distinguished conception caused only by the parents, from
'hominisation' caused by the creative intervention of God, and that in order to
emphasise the distinction between these two events, they separated them in
time, Chollet does not give any proof for his assertion that this was a reaction to
Tertullian's traducianism.
^
Tertullian frequently used the metaphor of tradux in conjunction with
the word anima. The three places where it refers specifically to his distinctive
theory of 'traducianism' are an 36.4.29, res 7.2.8 and test 3.2.13. He appears to
have taken the phrase tradux animae from the Valentinians, although he adapted-
it (a) to refute their doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, and (b) to safeguard
the equality of all human beings against the gnostic distinction of three classes
of men, the elite pneumatics (or gnostics), the middling psychics, the the lowly
hylics, the first being destined for salvation, the third for reprobation, and the
second oscillating between the two. Itague dum Demiurgus traducem animae
suae committit in Adam, (Val 25.3.1-2). T^ertullian's appropriation of the phrase
is noted by Heinrich Karpp, Probleme alchristlicher Anthropologie; Biblische
Anthropologie und philosophische Psychologie bei den Kirchenvatern des dritten
Jahrhunderts, (Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1950) pp 64-65.
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that a part of the whole was transmitted every time. As Rondet put it:
Dans la generation humaine, il se passe quelque chose d'analogue a la
premiere creation de Thomme. De meme que le souffle de Dieu etait entre
dans le limon pour en faire la chair d'Adam, de meme dans la generaiton de
l'homme, l'ame laisse dchapper quelque chose de sa substance. La chair et
l'ame sont donnees ensemble, elle grandissent ensemble les passions
s'eveillent lorsque l'homme prend conscience de la loi divine. II se passe en
tout homme ce qui s'est passe en Adam et Eve. 1
Creation as such was, however, a unique event, occurring once only at the
beginning of human life of earth: all other humanity was the offspring of Adam.
The implication of this, for the relationship of the embryo to God, is
examined in section 1.7 below. This section examines the extent to which
Tertullian taught the materialistic transmission of the soul from parent to
offspring by the physical, organic process of generation. It must, however, be
remembered that he believed spiritual qualities were transferred by propagation
as well as material ones. The concept of traducianism so dominated his thinking
that, because he could not discover in Scripture that Eve had been animated by
the breath of God (as Adam had been), he believed that she must have received a
tradux of Adam's soul, at the same time as her flesh was taken from Adam's
side. 3
Twice he used the metaphor of surcuius - once in de anima - "cuius
anima velut sur cuius quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta et
3
genitalibus feminae" and the other time in the contemporary treatise de pallio,
"ut inde uelut ex surculis et propaginibus populi de populis, urbes de urbibus per
4
ubique orbis pangerentur". Because propagation was implied as well as
H. Rondet, "Le peche originel dans la tradition Tertullien, Clement,








transmission, another appropriate metaphor was that of seed - seed present in
the sperm of the father and planted in the womb of the mother at the moment
of conception:
(Satanas) per quern homo a primordio circumuentus, ut praeceptum dei
excederet, et propterea in mortem datus exinde totum genus de suo semine
infectum suae etiam damnationis traducem fecit. 1
A primordio enim in Adam concreta et configurata corpori anima, ut totius
substantiae, ita et condicionis istius semen effecit.2
Constitueramus animam in ipso et ex ipso seri homine et unum esse a
primordio semen, sicut et carnis, in totum generis examen 3
and Tertullian closed de anima chapter 27, throughout which he had argued for
the simultaneous origin of body and soul at conception, by a reference back to
the creation of Adam, from whom there had flowed, together, two different
seeds; ever after the pattern had been followed pariterque insinuata sulco et
4
aruo suo pariter hominem ex utraque substantia effrutcent. Whichever the
metaphor, Tertullian's objective was plain - uti reddam, quomodo animae ex una
5
redundent, quando et ubi et qua ratione sumantur.
Tertullian taught (as will be examined at Section IV.3 below) that the
flesh followed the lead of the soul; it was the soul (alone) which carried the
vitium originis, the blemish, the taint which in due course would influence the
life and thus the relationship of man to God, and which would cause the flesh to
sin. Accordingly, although he made it plain (at least in de anima chapter 27) that
body and soul were transmitted together in the act of procreation, he
"endangered modesty in the interests of accuracy" by emphasising the













Denique ut adhuc uerecundia magis pericliter quam probatione, in illo ipso
uoluptatis ultimae aestu quo genitale uirus expellitur, nonne aliquid de
anima quoque sentimus exire atque adeo marcescimus et deuigescimus cum
lucis detrimento? Hoc erit semen animale, protinus ex animae destillatione,
sicut et uirus illud corporale semen ex carnis defaecatione. 1
It is outside the scope of this section to examine the relationship between that
passage and Tertullian's insistence elsewhere that the soul was simple and
indivisible. ^ If that was so, but if a seed was supposed to flow out of and be
separated from the soul of the procreator ex distillatione animae as that passage
says, there is surely some contradiction in Tertullian's point of view. (It must be
said, however, that he himself did not seem to be aware of any conflict.) What is
of more direct benefit to understanding Tertullian's traducianism is a short
statement of how he believed conception took place, and this is now examined.
There were, in Tertullian's day, three main theories of how conception
3
took place. They differed chiefly on the contribution which the female made to
the formation of the embryo. Tertullian adopted not just one of these theories,




e.g. an. 14.1.1-3 - Singularis alioquin et simplex et de suo tota est, non
magis structilis aliunde, quam diuisibilis ex se quia nec dissolubilis.
3
Two of the theories are mentioned briefly here. The third, which
Tertullian did not adopt, (although an 27.5 seems close to it) was taught by the
Stoics and the Epicureans. In contrast to the theories of Aristotle and Soranus
(mentioned below) the Stoic theory gave an equal place to male and female in
the procreation of the soul, and held that the body was provided by the father.
4
It is not correct to say that 'Tertullian moved from thinking of the
parents as equal to accepting a sire-centered view' - George Huntston Williams,
"Religious Residues and Pre-suppositions in the American Debate on Abortion",
Theological Studies, 31 (1970), 33, footnote 66 - because one view appears both
in the apologeticum and again in de carne Christi, while the other view appears
in de anima. The apologeticum is generally dated in the Autumn of A.D. 197,
and de carne Christi is either contemporary with, or even slightly later than, de
anima, both being in the bracket A.D. 208-211. Therefore Tertullian, far from
moving from one view to another, taught the "apologeticum view" not only in
A.D. 197 but also contemporaneously with, and perhaps even posterior to, the "de
anima view".
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investigated here because both theories (at any rate as Tertullian expounded
them) taught the transmission of the soul from the body of the father, and that is
the critical point for Tertullian's anthropology.
(a) Galen's theory of procreation
The most popular theory, in Tertullian's day, was the coagulation theory,
i.e. the formation of the embryo from the sperm of the father and the blood of
the K<rtT<*.pT;v>-<< of the mother. This had originally been expounded by Aristotle,"''
2
but it was due to the influence of Galen of Pergamos that it had become the
most popular theory in Tertullian's time. Tertullian adopted and expounded this
theory in the apologeticum, in de carne Christi and in adversus Marcionem, book
IV. In this theory, the soul of the embryo came from the father. Because of
Tertullian's emphasis on the significance of the soul in all this, it is unnecessary
e
to pursue here another aspect of the Aristotjlean theory, that the mother
provided the body, which came into existence by the sperm of
^
op. cit.jBook I, chaps. 19-20.
2
Galen welded together most of the biological knowledge of antiquity in his
voluminous works, written between A.D. 150-180. He had a very different
outlook from Aristotle, and by no means carried on all of Aristotle's teaching,
but on the contribution of men and women to procreation, he gave the same
answer as Aristotle. Tertullian never once mentioned Galen; this seems a
surprising omission, but d'Ales supposed that Galen was too nearly contemporary
with Tertullian for his books to be in Tertullian's library, (oarcitr; p 139). Not Clt(d mlilr
| p 4-ar, W.V.*
Nobis uero homicidio semel interdicto etiam conceptum utero, dum
adhuc sanguis in hominem delibatur, dissoluere non licet - apol 9.8.31-33.
humoris et sanguinis feoda coagula - earn 4.1.5.
Sicut terra conuersa est in hanc carnem sine uiri semine, ita et dei
uerbum potuit sine coagulo in eiusdem carnis transire materiam - earn 16.5.35-
38.
materiam seminis, quam constat sanguinis esse colorem, ut despumatione
mutatum in coagulum sanguinis feminae - earn 19.3.21-23.
lege substantiae corporalis ex sanguine et humore - IV Marc.21.11.1-2.
the father solidifying the K«-r*^r)vi< of the mother. Tertullian, at any rate,
seemed to find no incompatibility between the relevant parts of the Aristotlean
theory and the relevant parts of the Soranic theory, which is looked at next.
(b) Soranus' theory of procreation
Tertullian made use also of the theory popularised by Soranus,''' that the
father was the sole parent of the embryo, and that the uterus was no more than a
'depository' for the sperm of the male; here the mother contributed nothing
more than nourishment for the growth of the embryo - Anima in utero seminata
2
pariter cum carne. This idea (that the sperm of the father contained all that
was necessary for the reproduction of mam) accorded well with Tertullian's
doctrine of man - indeed, it accorded better than did the Aristotlean theory
mentioned immediately above - but the point is of little significance in light of
the common ground which he took from both theories. Whether the body of the
Soranus, who lived at Rome from about A.D. 30 until just before the
end of the first century, compared the act of procreation to sowing a field.
(Gynaecology 1.35.6, 1.36.1): As the farmer's seed drew nourishment from the
soil, so the male seed drew nourishment from the body of the woman.
2
an 36.2.7-8. Tertullian's argumentum ex scriptura sancta, with which
(as was his custom) he followed up the argumentum ex sensu communi briefly
quoted, was directed to Adam and Eve and clearly accords with the Soranic
rather than the Aristotlean view of procreation - Ceterum et ipsam dei afflatus
animasset, si non ut carnis, ita et animae ex Adam tradux fuisset in femina (an
36.4.27-29). The idea that the sperm of the father provided a corporeal
substance, viz. humor as well as a psychic one, viz. calor, comes throughout de
anima 27 - e.g. Et quando collocabitur corporis semen, quando animae? (27.3.l5-
17). Nam etsi duas species confitebimur seminis, corporalem et animalem,
indiscretas tamen uindicamus et hoc modo contemporales eiusdemque momenti
(27.4.17-21). Unico igitur impetu utriusque toto homine concusso despumatur
semen totius hominis habens ex corporali substantia humorem, ex animali
calorem (27.5.30-32). Hoc erit semen animale, protinuFex animae destillatione,
sicut et uirus illud corporale semen ex carnis defaecatione~T27.6.38-40) and so (as
in chapter 36) to a reference back to the exemplum primordii - the limus and
flatus (dei) were prototypes of the humor and calor which constituted the sperm
of the male and all human beings owed their entire existence to this sperm - ut
et nunc duo, licet diversa, etiam unita pariter effluant pariterque insinuata sulco
et aruo suo pariter hominem ex utraque substantia effruticent - an 27.8.47-50.
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child was derived from the body of one parent or of both parents, Tertullian's
writings are unanimous that the soul of the child came from the soul of the
father, which had been received from his father, and so back to Adam. Igitur ex
uno homine tota haec animarum redundantia, obseruante scilicet natura dei
edictum crescite et in multitudinem proficite. *
In other words, every individual soul was merely a detached portion of the soul of
Adam, the source and fountainhead of all human souls. The differences among
individual human souls referred only to accidentia - the real nature of the soul
was identical with the soul of Adam, as it had been created by God, and is it had
OL
fallen into sin. This will be examined in the following section, but mqhtime it
should be noted that it has the most profound implications for Tertullian's view
of the relationship of the embryo to God. A new creation would (by reason of its
source) be pure, whereas a surcuius cut from the parent-stem of Adam's soul and
planted out to grow as an independent tree, could (and did) transmit, through
father to child, the consequences of the fall of Adam.
The full implication of these texts, for the relationship of the embryo to
God, is studied in detail in Section 1.7 below. Before that can be done, two
further (preliminary) matters should be clarified, viz:
(a) that although the seed (or shoot) of both body and soul was passed from
generation to generation, it was not until they came together, at the moment of
conception, that 'man' was formed and a relationship between 'man' and God
could begin - this is examined in section 1.5 immediately following, and then
(b) that nothing of the essential nature of man was lacking, at the moment of
conception, requiring any new substance to be added, before a relationship with




1.5 THE POTENTIAL OF THE EMBRYO, FOR A RELATIONSHIP WITH GOD
Although it was basic to Tertullian's anthropology that neither body nor
soul was created de novo at conception, it would be wrong to conclude that no
new thing took place when the seed of the soul united with the seed of the body.
However complete they may have been in themselves, separately they were not
'man' - 'man' was the unique result of their fusion:
Porro nec anima per semetipsam homo, quae figmento iam homini appellato
postea inserta est, nec caro sine anima homo, quae post exilium animae
cadauer inscribitur. Ita uocabulum homo consertarum substantiarum duarum
quodammodo fibula est, sub quo uocabulo non possunt esse nisi cohaerentes. 1
Adeo nulla proprietas hominis in choico nec ita caro homo tamquam alia uis
animae et alia persona, sed res est alterius plane substantiae et alterius
condicionis, addicta tamen animae ut suppellex, ut instrumentum in officia
uitae.2
That this fusion took place at conception was illustrated and proved by Tertullian
by reference to the creation of Adam and the pattern which it set for the whole
human race:
Cum igitur in primordio duo diuersa atque diuisa, limus et flatus, unum
hominem coegissent, confusae substantiae ambae iam in uno semina quoque
sua miscuerunt atque exinde generi propagando formam tradiderunt, ut et
nunc duo, licet diuersa, etiam unita pariter effluant pariterque insinuata
sulco et aruo suo pariter hominem ex utraque substantia effruticent .3
That last clause - pariter hominem ex utraque substantia effruticent -
is of the utmost importance for this study. As soon as fusion had taken place
Tertullian could say - Homo est et qui est futurus; etiam fructus oronis iam in
4
semine est. While that particular phrase came as part of his repudiation of











present, Tertullian made the same point in other contexts. It was important
for him to establish that the union of body and soul, as soon as they were
implanted together in the womb, had the potential to develop into man.
Wer die naturliche Einheit der Seele festhalt, der muss auch darauf
bestehen, dass, sobald die Selle da est, sie alles das ist, was sie ihrer
Wesenheit nach sein muss, und kein substantieller Bestandteil spater zu ihr
hinzukommt. Kraft ihres Ursprunges ist die menschliche Seele flatus Dei
und tritt als solcher mit all ihrer Ausrustung ins Dasein. 3
No new substance required to be added either to body or to soul, before a
relationship with God could begin. Meeting the criticism that cripples would not
be able to take part in the resurrection, Tertullian stated that etiam si in utero
4
uitiemur, iam hominis est passio; prius est genus quam casus and, summing up
of the potential of the soul, concludimus omnia naturalia animae ut substantiua
5
eius ipsi inesse et cum ipsa procedere atque proficere, ex quo ipsa censetur .
It is worth examining, in a little more detail, Tertullian's teaching on the
potential of the two 'component parts' of man,^ i.e. body and soul, before
drawing the themes together and seeing, in conclusion, that everything which
Whether it is proper to read this text as referring to embryonic life
from the moment of conception, as opposed to the later stages of pregnancy
only, is examined at Chapter II.4 below.
2
e.g. the passage quoted just above concluded "Nihil mirum repromissio
segetis in semine" (an 27.9.57) - the future harvest was the human race; the seed
was the seed implanted at the moment of conception.
3
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Body and soul as the (only) two component parts of man aire examined
in the next section, 1.7.
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man was to become was potentially in the embryo from the moment of
conception.
(a) The potential of the soul
The soul, coming as it did from the breath of God, and possessing from
the beginning of its life all its natural faculties, did not alter its essential
substance, and no new faculty was added, even although it grew in size along
with the body.3 Tertullian drew the analogy of a nugget of gold or silver,
which, when beaten by a goldsmith, became larger, but without change in its
3
substance. So it was with the soul - as it grew, its lustre was enhanced, its
Modern science describes the newly fertilised ovum as 'zygote' for the
first fourteen days of its existence, then 'embryo' for a number of weeks, and
then 'fetus'. Soranus, from whom Tertullian drew much of his medical
knowledge, called the fruit ctt* e ? y-°c as long as the moulding was not
perfected, and after that assumed a stage denoted by (frocii; ,which in
course of time developed into the ^ u X n . Tertullian hinted as some
distinction when he accused Marcion's Christ of having bypassed the normal
processes of conception and birth - non caro habitus ante formam, non pecus
dictus post figuram, (IV Marc 21.11.2-3) - but this is examined in chapter II.4
below. The word 'embryo' is, in the meantime, used here for all stages of fetal
life.
3
The relationship of the soul to the body - described in one place by
Tertullian on the analogy of the air blowing through Archimedes' hydraulic organ
- is examined briefly at the close of this present section. Tertullian's concern to
establish the corporeality of the soul, which enabled him to use metaphors such
as beating out a nugget of gold, is not of direct relevance for this thesis. De
anima enumerates the arguments of the Stoics (which he adopted) in favour of
the corporeality of the soul (chapter 5), refutes the arguments of the Platonists
in favour of the incorporeality of the soul (chapter 6) and drives home the point
by the Scriptural story - not a parable - of the soul of Dives suffering, with
parched lips, in hell (chapter 7). Chapter 8 is devoted to special arguments
about the relationship of the corporeal soul to other bodies, to refuting the
arguments about the weight of dead bodies and to discussing the invisibility of its
corporeal substance. Chapter 9 deals with its shape which must (for the reasons
examined at the end of this section) be exactly the shape of the body which it
animates. For using the story of Lazarus to demonstrate the corporeality of the
soul, Tertullian was severely criticised by Pierre Bouedron in a thesis published
in 1861, Quid senserit de natura animae Tertullianus^Rennes: Charpentier, 1861).





shape was changed and with age it developed all its latent potentialities,^ but
without any change in the initial substance which it had received when God
2
breathed onto man at the beginning.
Tertullian had, earlier in de anima, developed the same theme in
opposition to those philosophers qui uel modico temporis uiduant animam
intellectu. Proinde enim uiam sternunt postea inducendi eius, sicut et animi, a
3
quo scilicet proueniat intellectus. Presumably he had Stoics in mind, because
it was they who did not credit man with all his faculties even at the moment of
birth; they asserted that young children possessed souls but not intellect and so
were not able to think. In support of their argument that not everything which
lived was capable of thinking, they referred to Aristotle's statement about trees.
Tertullian met them head on; he showed that even young trees had their own kind
of intellect, so a fortiori young human beings had intellect from the beginning of
4
life, although it was "necessarily concealed in the child." Tertullian did not, of
course, equate "thinking" in tree-life with "thinking" in man, because he often
emphasised that only man was rationis capax; nevertheless trees had more to
them than mere "uiuere" and he called their creative impulse "scientias et
sapientias arborurn ". Their thoughts were j
Ita et anima e crementa reputanda, non substantiua, sed prouocatiua -
an 37.7.48-49.
2
saluo substantiae modulo, quo a primordio inflata est, paulatim cum
carne producitur - an 37.5.35-36.
3
an 19.1.1-4. It was sufficient, for that particular argument, for
Tertullian to demonstrate the presence of intellect from the soul's "birth"
without reference to the earlier time of conception.
4
It was to establish this important point that Tertullian made his (much
quoted) reference to "Seneca saepe noster" - an 20.1.3. What he took from
Seneca was "insita sunt nobis omnium artium et aetatum semina magisterque ex
occulto deus producit ingenia" (anZo. 1.4-6, from Seneca de Benef. IV 6.6) and on
that Tertullian himself commented, "ex seminibus scilicet insitis et occultis per
infantiam, quae sunt et intellectus" - an 20.1.6-7
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not something external but something within them - uiuendi quam sapiendi
proprietate ; from the beginning they lacked nothing which belonged to their
essential being, and in this capability in the life of plants, Tertullian found an
argument for perfection in the embryonic life of man.
Warming to his theme as the chapter went on, Tertullian turned to
evidence provided by the human in fans. By greeting life with tears at the
moment of birth, the child not only proved that it had both sensus and intellectus
(section 7), but, tears being prophetic of the miseries of life, the child could
prophesy as well (section 8). Then, embellishing this "common-sense" argument,
he reminded his critics that children could recognise their mothers and wet
nurses, and that they could differentiate between people - so they must have
some kind of judgement (judicium) from the beginning and so an intellect:
Vnde illi judicium nonitatis et moris, si non sapit? Vnde illi et offendi et
demulceri, si non intellegit? Mirum satis, ut infantia naturaliter animosa sit
non habens animum et naturaliter affectiosa sit non habens intellectum. 1
Tertullian ended up triumphantly, as he usually did in such situations, with an
illustration from Holy Scripture :
At enim Christus ex ore lactantium et paruulorum experiendo laudem nec
pueritiam nec infantiam hebetes pronuntiatuit, quarum altera cum suffragio
occurrens testimonium ei potuit offierre, altera pro ipso trucidata utique
uim sensit. 2
These particular arguments are of course directed to proving that the
infant had its full complement of faculties from birth, but Tertullian himself
assumed that his argument was equally valid at conception. When he summed up
de anima chapter 19, he stated (in the words quoted earlier in this section): Et
hie itague concludimus omnia naturalia animae ut substantiua eius ipsi inesse et
3








when he returned to the same theme he could claim:
Quamquam autem et retro praestruxerimus, omnia naturalia animae ipsi
substantiae inesse pertinentia ad sensum et intellectum ex ingenito animae
censu, sed paulatim per aetatis spatia procedere et uarie. 1
It is true that Tertullian went on to say that children were not in possession of
2
sapientia before the age of fourteen but the significance of that, for the
relationship with God, will be examined in Chapter IV.5 below; for the present,
it can safely be concluded that the soul lacked nothing, at least in embryonic
form, of the properties which made it capable of a relationship with God.
Individual souls would undoubtedly develop in different ways, dependent
(as Tertullian stated in de anima chapter 20) on external influences - he
mentioned the variety of places of residence, the influence of bodily
organisation, temperaments, national characters, education and instruction,
passions, vices and free will. (The latter, according to Christian interpretation,
still stood under the influence of the mercy of God on the one hand and that of
3
the snares of the devil on the other. ) All these would produce that infinite
variety of talent and disposition which is observable among mankind, but such
influences could affect only the accidenta of the soul - its real nature was
identical with, and had descended from, the soul of Adam as it had been created
4
by God. On Tertullian's hypothesis, only those faculties already present in
Adam's soul could be regarded as naturalia animae and these, including the
capacity for a relationship with God, were passed from soul to soul and so










(b) The potential of the body
As metempsychosis compelled Tertullian to write a great deal about the
relationship of man to his soul, so false ideas on the resurrection compelled him
to write at length about the relationship of man to his body. Hellenic
philosophers and Christian heretics both regarded man as essentially a divine
being in bondage to matter, so that salvation was the deliverance of the divine
part from its captivity. Tertullian anwered with a remarkable eulogy of the
flesh and devoted no less than six chapters of de res^ur,ectione carnis to
vindicating the carnis dignitas. Although de anima is not without some teaching
on the flesh - Constitueramus animam in ipso et ex ipso seri homine et unum
esse a primordio, semen, sicut et carnis, in totum generis examen ^ - it was in
de resurrectione carnis that Tertullian set out to prove in detail that unless the
2
flesh was given the same rank and dignity before God as the soul, 'man' could
not properly be called 'man' -indeed the flesh had the prior right to that name
and had at least an equal expectation of his pj^rogatives.
Hominem autem memento carnem proprie dici, quae prior uocabulum
hominis occupauit: Et finxit deus hominem, limum de terra, - iam homo, qui
adhuc limus - et insufflauit in faciem eius flatum uitae, et factus est homo,
id est limus, in animam uiuam, et posuit deus hominem, quern finxit, in
paradiso. Adeo homo figmentum primo dehinc totus.3
(caro) quam deus manibus suis ad imaginem dei struxit, quam de suo adflatu
ad similitudinem suae uiriacitatis animauit.4
Accordingly, the properties of the human body, even at the embryonic stage,
^
an 36.1.2-4.
Caro, as Evans pointed out (Ernest Evans, Tertullian's Treatise on the
Resurrection, (London: S.P.C.K, I960) p 188) had, for the Latins, a less
exclusively materialistic sound than 'flesh' has in English. Corpus originally
meant a dead body, and hardly ever succeeded in losing all sense of inertness and







were important to Tertullian. Adam's body had been created by God de limo
(terrae)^ and Tertullian traced that limus from generation to generation, from
2
the 'seed-plot' to every new conception. Given time, the embryo would begin to
show human features, and in time it would grow into a man, without any new
substance having to be added to it. That precious jewel, the soul, needed a
suitably noble vessel to contain it, although the flesh was far more than a mere
receptacle of the soul - the two were throroughly intertwined and mingled
together. It was by means of the flesh that the soul would enjoy all its honours
and would exercise all its functions, so that whatever pre-eminence the soul
3
possessed should be shared by the flesh. If the embryo happened to be aborted,
it would be given, at the resurrection, the same angelic body as would be given
4
to every other resurrected human being. If it was not aborted, then body and
soul would develop together until birth - developing not in substance, which
remained unaltered, but in size and in shape: Societatem carnis atque aniraae
iamdudum commendauimus a congregatione seminum ipsorum usque ad figmenti
5
perfectionem. After birth, both would continue to grow together, and both
would reach maturity (together) at the age of fourteen. It appears then that
Tertullian believed the embryo to be homo from the moment of its conception -
homo est et qui est futurus. Homo was the fibula which bound together the two
constituent parts of man, body and soul. Both were important, even in






Evans, op cit. p 214. Whether they were as "inte^vined and mingled
together" as Evans sugests is explored at the end of this section.
4
Tertullian's understanding of future events is set out briefly as




the soul,describing the body as the house in which the soul dwelt, calix animae,
ttagina animae, oasculum animae; * at other times (against the prevailing
2
philosphical view) he emphasised the importance of the body; yet again, his
emphasis was on the novelty of the new being which came about by the union of
3
body and soul.
Related to the above, although it does not directly affect this study, is
Tertullian's rather curious understanding of the relationship between body and
soul. When God breathed the breath of life into Adam, that breath (he said) was
diffused through every part and member of his body, and 'set' like a jelly in a
mould, taking its shape from the body. Every soul therefore grew with its body,
eye by eye, ear by ear, tongue by tongue, finger by finger and even bosom by
bosom:
simulque diuina aspiratione densatum omni intus linea expressum esse, (sc.
flatum vitae) quam densatus impleuerat, et uelut in forma gelasse. Inde
igitur et corpulentia animae ex densatione solidata est et effigies ex
impressione formata. Hie erit homo interior, alius exterior, dupliciter unus,
habens et ille oculos et aures suas, quibus populus dominum audire et uidere
debuerat, habens et ceteros artus, per quos et in cogitationibus utitur et in
somniis fungitur. Sic et diuiti apud inferos lingua est, et pauperi digitus, et
sinus Abrahae.4
He described the body as domus animae in an 38.4.36, res 41.3.11,
and elsewhere; as calix animae in an 20.2.11 and elsewhere; as uagina animae
in res 9.2.8; and as uusculum animae, because it 'receives and contains the
soul' in res 16.3.10 and 11.45.
2
nec ita caro homo tamquam alia uis animae - an 40.3.14; corporis
quod et ipsum homo - an 51.4.25; ille scilicet limus, qui prior
titulo hominis incisus est - res 16.11.44.
^
For example, his description of man as carnis animaeque textu/m - res
34.10.45-46 - and the formation of these two substances into a new composition
quia duo unum efficiunt - paen 3.4.14.
4
an 9.7.61-8.69. Although only Vincentius Victor shared this view (vide
Waszink, op. cit. p. 177), it was left to Augustine to point out its inadequacy -
Quomodo implebit carnem, quam vivificat, nisi tanto rarior fuerit, quanto
grandius, quod animaverit? Timuit enim (Tertullianus) ne deficeret earn
minuendo, si cresceret, et non timuit, ne deficeret rareasendo cum cresceret (de
Gen ad litt. X,44.45).
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Elsewhere Tertullian had described the soul as diffused through the body,
pervading the whole frame, as air was diffused through the pipes of Archimedes'
hydraulic organ.''' This followed from his corporeal understanding of the soul,
and incidentally strengthened his case against the metensomatosis of
Cp 5*1
Empedocles, mentioned in o. previous section./' If the soul exactly fitted the
human body, how could it fill an elephant or be enclosed in a gnat? ^
Nevertheless, he apparently assumed that body and soul would remain as two
complete and independent substances, - dupliciter unus - which would exist
together, but which possessed no unum per se. The soul was able to permeate
the whole body without losing its definite individuality:
Ganz nach stoischer Weise nimmt T. die vollige Durchdringung des Leibes
durch die Seele an. Die Stoiker lehrten, dass die Seele in feinen
Luftstromungen sich durch den ganzen Korper hindurch und in alle Organe
hinein ausdehne. Die Verbindung beider wird von ihnen als , genauer
als }u,f is- zweier ihren Eigenschaften nach gleich bleibender Korper
betrachtet, welche sich ebenso durchdringen, wie die Welt von der Weltseele
durchdrungen wird. 3
On the other hand, Tertullian refuted the suggestion that two bodies
could be in the same place at the same time - following the teaching of the
Stoics and assuming a complete ty of body and soul. However, his writings
do not give a total picture of how he conceived of the presence of the soul in the
body, and since (as mentioned) the different viewpoints do not affect the
relationship at the embryo to God, further comment is outside the scope of this
Specta portentosissimam Archimedis munificentiam, organum
hydraulicum ... Sic et spiritus ... Non ideo separabitus in partes ... an 14.4.25-
26 and 29-30.
2
an 32.6 58-61. On the other hand, if the soul could not expand
or contract to fit various sizes of body without danger to itself (as Tertullian
here claimed) how could it grow with the human frame, as elsewhere he
insisted it did.?
3
Georg Schelowsky, Per Apologet Tertullianus in seinem Verhaltnis
zu der Griechisch - R6reT~jschen Philosophies (Igipzig: Oswald Mutze, 1901)
pp 48-49.
4 £For the of body and soul, described in Stoic psychology, and
the influience of this idea on Tertullian, see Gothard Rauch, Der Einfluss der
stoischen Philosophie auf die Lehrbildung Tertullians, (Halle: Buchdruckerei des
Waisenhauks, 1890) pp 27-29.
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enquiry. What is important is the potential of the embryo, because, consistent
with his traducianist understanding of the transmission of individual human life,
Tertullian showed how the unique, never-to-be-repeated individual homo, drawn
forth from one or both of his parents at conception, was already whatever he was
going to become, and his subsequent development was only a process of becoming
what in embryo he already was.
1.6 THE CONSTITUENT PARTS OF MAN
In the previous section, it was established that Tertullian believed 'man'
to be present, in embryonic form, from the moment that body and soul were
joined together at conception. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that body and
soul were conceived by Tertullian as two substantially different parts of the
human being; they were different substances according to their origin, their
essence and their essential characteristics.^ It was not until flesh (from the
limus) and soul (from the flatus dei) had been joined together for the first time in
Adam than 'man' was formed. The next point to clarify, before the relationship
of the embryo to God at conception is examined, is whether there was any other
constituent element of 'man' - either present then or to be added later.
The question can be briefly answered and amply illustrated. The nature
of man was single, but |\& was composed of two species, body and soul, which in
life were inseparably united. Tertullian did not believe in a trichotomy of body,
2
soul and spirit; man was composed of only two substances, body and soul.
Heresy compelled him to prove that they were distinct and not
3
interchangeable; other heresy forced him to investigate the nature of the soul
and to establish the resurrection of the body; many passing references make it
clear that these were the only two constituents or component parts of man.
E.g. res 14 (the whole chapter).
Tertullian used several synonyms for anima, which are investigated
J^ter *** this section. Until then, the quotations from his works are confined to
those where anima itself is used.
3
Heretical ideas, especially about the Person of Christ, compelled
Tertullian to establish that anima and corpus were distinct substances, not to be
confused nor interchanged - earn 10.3.20-21; earn 13.4.23-5.29. There was no
third substance in Christ's incarnation, only body and soul - Prax 27.12.68-73 and
Prax 27.13.75-84.
32
(i) his definition of the word 'homo'.
Hie cum ex duabus substantiis constet, ex corpore et anima, quaerendum
est, ex qua substantiae specie perisse uideatur. 1
Tam enim corpus homo quam et anima, ut non possit altera species
admittere aenigmata, altera excludere.2
id est nec altera ex duabus substantiis hominis, caro aut anima?3
dum homo sit, qua caro et anima 4
Ionam, cum incorruptus utramque substantiam, carnem atque animam.5
si totos, et interiores et exteriores, id est tam animas quam et corpora:6
Si enim et Christus, solus uere caelestis, immo et supercaelestis, homo
tamen, qua caro atque anima 7
Hie erit homo caro atque anima, 8
auferri omnia impedimenta prius, ut munda sit quae remanet domus, caro et
anima. 9
(ii) his comment that anything else was 'non homo'.
Of Lucanus, a follower of Marcion, Tertullian said sarcastically that he
apparently expected to be tertium quiddam resurrecturus, neque anima neque
caro, id est non homo.10 The whole assumption underlying the treatise de






















would be needed and nothing would be wanting, for the full redemption of man.
(iii) His references to the creation and reproduction of man.
After the body or flesh of Adam had been formed out of the dust of the
earth, God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living
soul. Adam then transmitted this nature complete, body and soul, to his
offspring; there were only two kinds of seed, a bod^y-seed and a soul-seed, and
all men were therefore composed of these two parts only - caro and anima..
Cum igitur in primordio duo diuersa atque diuisa, limus et flatus, unum
hominem coegissent, confusae substantiae ambae iam in uno semina quoque
sua miscuerunt atque exinde generi propagando formam tradiderunt, ut et
nunc duo, licet diuersa, etiam unita pariter effluant pariterque insinuata
sulco et aruo suo pariter hominem ex utraque substantia effruticent. 1
Nam et exinde a benedictione geniturae caro atque anima simul fiunt sine
calculo temporis, ut quae simul in utero etiam seminantur, quod docuimus in
commentario animae. Contemporant fetu, coaetant natu: duos istos
homines, sane ex substantia duplici, non tamen et aetate, sic unum edunt,
dum prior neutra est. 2
(iv) his reference to death as the separation of these two substances.
There are many references (not detailed here) to the interim fate of the
soul and the body, and no mention of any other part of man. On the separation
itself, Ita mortuum uocabulum non est nisi quod amisit animam, de cuius
facultate uiuebat; corpus est quod amittit animam et amittendo fit
3
mortuum; ita mortui uocabuletm corpori competit.
(v) his references to Christ's teaching.
Christ's reference to body and soul carries a reasonable inference that







"Nolite timere eos", inquit "qui occidunt corpus, animae autem nihil uale^f
facere, sed timete eum, qui et corpus et animain perdere potest in
gehennam. "1
Sed et praecipit eum potius timendum, qui et corpus et animam occidat m
gehennam, id est dominum solum, non qui corpus occidant, animae autem
nihil nocere possint, 2
ad quarum tolerantiam aedificans monet non eos timendos, qui solum corpus
occidant, animam autem interficere non ualeant, sed illi potius metum
consecrandum, qui et corpus et animam occidere et perdere possit in
gehennam. 3
(vi) Ms references to "half salvation".
Nam si caro quoque eius cum anima, quod pecus totum est, humeris boni
pastoris aduehitur, ex utraque utique substantia restituendi hominis
exemplum est. Aut quam indignum deo, dimidium hominem redigere in
salutem.4
alios Saducaeos ... ita dimidiam agnoscunt resurrectionem, solius scilicet
animae, ita aspernati carnem sicut et ipsum dominum carnis.5
scilicet anima tenus saluos, carne deperditos, quae apud ilium non resurgit.
Vnde haec dimidiatio salutis ...6
Is it too literalistic to suggest that the reference to "half-salvation" - as opposed
to "one-third salvation" or any other fraction - confirms the two constituent
parts of man?
The words which Tertullian used for the body - caro and corpus - present
no problem for this chapter, as it is clear to what he refers. It is less obvious,
however, that anima, spiritus, mens and animus all refer to only one other
'component' - namely "the soul" - and not to more than one other element in













For Tertullian's pagan contemporaries, anima had no necessary moral
religious connotation. It was the life-principle found in plants and animals as
well as in man. For Tertullian, however, the human soul was flatus dei (more
correctly, flatus ex spiritu dei factus), ^ and so he could, and did, describe the
soul as spiritus - not because of its substance but because God's Spirit had
breathed on it. The result was a spiritus in man - the human spirit - not to be
identified or confused (as "quidam" did) with the Holy Spirit of God Himself; He
2
was not given to man until baptism. This spiritus/anima of man could sin and
did sin, whereas the Spiritus of God could not; Tertullian had therefore to insist
that although God had breathed on Adam, He had not given the Holy Spirit to
him.
Inprimij; tenendum quod Graeca scriptura signauit, adflatum nominans, non
spiritum. Quidam enim de Graeco interpretantes non recogitata differentia
nec curata proprietate uerborum pro adflatu spiritum ponunt et dant
haereticis occasionem spiritum dei delicto infuscandi, id est ipsum deum. Et
usurpata jam quaestio est. Intellege itaque adflatum minorem spiritu esse,
ut aurulam eius, et si de spiritu accidit, non tarnen spiritum. 3
To avoid such confusion, Tertullian preferred in many contexts to call man flatus
dei rather than spiritus dei, although in other contexts he felt free to use anima
an 11.2.13 and 3.27; n Marc 9.7.3. Tertullian's view of the origin of
the soul of Adam, from the breath of God, is not explored here. He treated it in
detail in a work de censu animae, now lost, (an 1.1.1-3, 3.4.24-31), but there is
sufficient in de anima to state with certainty that Tertullian believed the soul of
man existed separately and apart from the Spirit of God. He did, however,
emphasise its origin ex dei flatus (an 1.1.02, 3.4.26, 4.1.02) as opposed to ex
materia (am 3.4.26) or ex nihilo.
2
Examined in chapter X.3. It is true that Scripture mentions the
Spiritus bestowed on man from time to time, and Adam prophesied through this
Spiritus, but these were occasional visits of the Holy Spirit, not a permanent
possession and not to all men. an 11.4.33-41.
3
II Marc 9.1.24-3.10. cf an 11.2.10-18 where Tertullian accused
Hermogenes in particular of reading "spritus" instead of "flatus" in the passage in
Genesis.
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synonymously with spiritus, ^ and he opposed certain philosophers who claimed
that there was a distinction of substance between them. According to these
philosophers, the soul was the vital principle, the principle by which man lived,
and the spirit only that by which he breathed. Anatomists, they said, taught that
moths and ants and gnats had no organs of respiration; they had the vital
principle without the breathing principle - and so these principles were distinct.
2
Tertullian did not accept such reasoning from insect to human life. The nature
of man, as the creation of God, made life and breath inseparable, and the
pretended distinction between anima and spiritus was only a distinction of words.
Kann nun die Seele spiritus (TTvcup.Bc) genannt werden? Ja, aber nur unter
der bestimmten Bedingung (certa conditione) dass man die Einheit der Seele
nicht aufhebt, und unter der bestimmten Voraussetzung, dass man nicht ihr
Wesen, sondern ihre Thatigkeit bezeichnen will. Gegeniiber einer Meinung,
welche als Prinzip des Atmens eine andere Substanz substituiert als die
anima, kann die Seele spiritus genannt werden, weil das spirare eine
Thatigkeit der anima ist. 3
Nevertheless, against Hermogenes, Tertullian did distinguish spiritus
from anima. The two were not identical as Hermogenes claimed - there was this
difference, that anima was the term of substance, spiritus was the term of
function:
e.g. he wrote about paradise both as interim refrigerium praebere
animabus iustorum - IV Marc 34.13.11-12 and as locum diuinae amoenitatis
recipiendis sanctorum spiritibus destinatum, apol 47.13.57-58. In de spectaculis
13, spiritus and anima are joined together and (unless the former is intended to
mean the breath) used synonymously - quae non intestinis transiguntur, sed in
ipso spiritu et anima digeruntur -spec 13.5.17-18. Bouedron, whose thesis is
hostile to much of Tertullian's understanding of the soul, went out of his way to
praise Tertullian for holding that "spiritus" and "anima" were two names for the
same substance, and not two separate substances, op. cit. p 50-52.
2
Tertullian distinguished between the vital principle in man, and in all
other created things. Denique arbores uiuere nec tamen sapere secundum
Aristotelen et si quis alius substantiam animalem in uniuersa communicat, quae
apud nos in homine priuata res est, non modo ut dei opus, quod et cetera, sed ut
dei flatus, quod haec sola, quam dicimus cum omni instructu suo nasci. an
19.2.6-11.
Gerhard Esser, Die Seelenlehre Tertullians (Paderborn: Ferdinand
Schoningh, 1893) p 92.
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Sed ut animam spiritum dicam, praesentis questionis ratio compellit, quia
spirare alii substantiae adscribitur. Hoc dum animae uindicamus, quam
uniformem et simplicem agnoscimus, spiritum necesse est certa condicione
dicamus, no~n~ status nomine, sed actus, nec substantiae titulo sed operae,
quia spirat, non quia spiritus proprie est....
i.e. it was not identical in substance with the Spirit of God.
Ita et animam, quam flatum ex proprietate defendimus, spiritum nunc ex
necessitate pronuntiamus. 1
If, therefore, the soul was to be named according to its essence ("ex
proprietate"), then the expression "flatus", sanctioned by the Scriptures, should
be used, because that excluded the materialism of Hermogenes and also the
2
spiritualism of the Valentinians: however, in more general contexts, either
animus or spiritus could be used for the life-breath of man, his human spirit,
because cum de anima et spiritu agitur, ipsa erit anima spiritus, sicut ipsa dies
3
lux. Ipsum est enim quid, per quod est quid .
Less need be said of the distinction between anima and mens and animus.
The soul included both the vital and intellectual principles, the latter called
4 . ... 5
animus or mens. They were properties of the anima, quo agit, quo sapit, so
Tertullian sometimes used these words by metonymy for anima itself but always
and only as synonyms for the second, never a third, constituent of man.
*






Proinde et animum siue mens est vou 5 apud Graecos, non
aliud quid intellegimus quam suggestum animae ingenitum et insitum et natiuitus
proprium, quo agit, quo sapit, quern secum habens ex semetipsa secum moueat in
semetipsa - an 12.1.1-4. Nos autem animum ita dicimus animae concretum, non
ut substantia alium, sed ut substantiae officium - an 12.6.38-40. Putabis guidem
abesse animum ab anima, si quando, nam ita effici, ut nesciamus uidisse quid uel
audisse, quia alibi fuerit animus. Adeo contendam immo ipsam animam nec
uidisse nec audisse, quia alibi fuerit cum sua ui, id est animo - an 18.9.72-75.
Porro apostolus interiorem hominem non tam animam quam mentem atque





Like spiritus they were co-existent and consubstantial with the soul, yet distinct
from it, being (in their case) the instrument by which the soul acted,
apprehended and moved. In common life, people said that a rich man fed so
many souls, not so many minds; a dying man breathed out his soul, not his
mind; Christ came to save the souls, not the minds of men.^ That in itself was
proof for Tertullian that the vital principle was in the soul, anima, not in the
mind, animus or nous.
With that clarification of the words used, it can quickly be established,
by a sample only of the available quotations, that Tertullian believed body and
soul/spirit to be the only two aspects of man:
Praestringere tamen non pigebit delictorum quaedam esse carnalia, id est
corporaiia, quaedam uero spiritalia - nam cum ex hac duplicis substantiae
congregatione confectus homo sit, non aliunde delinquit quam unde
constat -; sed non eo inter se differunt, quod corpus et spiritus duo sunt,
atquin eo magis paria sunt, quia duo unum efficiunt,... ut alterum altero
leuius aut grauius existimet. 2
Siquidem et caro et spiritus dei res, alia manu eius expressa, alia adflatu
ejus consummata; 3
Ipse homo, omnium flagitiorum auctor, non tan turn opus Dei, uerum etiam et
imago est; et tamen et corpore et spiritu desciit a suo institutore. 4
It is true that on occasion he wrote in a way which, taken on its own, might seem
to indicate a trichotomy, and at least one scholar has opined that Tertullian did
believe man to be more than body and soul, consisting (he said) of body, soul and
5 ,










Gunther Ludwig, Tertullians Ethik in durchaus objectiver ParstelluBg,
(Leipzig: 1885). (Although I noted Dr. Ludwig's unusual view when reading his
book in the Bodleian Library (ref 13111 T e 4), I unfortunately omitted to note
the page number).
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Tertullian had to prove that salvation and resurrection was for the whole main
and he wrote:
sed et sequitur: et integrum corpus uestrum et anima et spiritus sine
querela conseruentur in praesentia domini. Habes omnem substantiam
hominis saluti destinatam, 1
quomodo apostolus omnes in nobis substantias certis nominibus distinxit et
omnes in uno uoto constituit salutis, op tans, ut spiritus noster et corpus et
anima sine querela in aduentu domini et salutificatoris nostri Christi
conseruentur? Nam et animam posuit et corpus, tam duas res quam
diuersas. Licet enim et anima et corpus sit aliquod suae qualitatis, sicut et
spiritus, cum tamen et corpus et anima distincte nominantur, habet autem
anima suum uocabulum proprium, non egens communi uocabulo corporis, id
relinquitur carni, quae non nominata proprio, communi utatur necesse
est. Etenim aliam substantiam in homine non uideo post spiritum et
animam, cui uocabulum corporis accommodetur praeter carnem. 2
Even if (which is by no means certain) Tertullian here used language which
implies a three-fold distinction, because of his anxiety to show the salvation of
the whole man, his overall anthropology is so clearly dichotomous that these
passages, taken in that context and in the overall context of Tertullian's thought,
do not introduce a third 'component' into man as Tertullian understood his
essential nature before God.
Following conversion to the Christian faith, and the completion of the
baptismal ceremonies, the Holy Spirit came to live in the hearts which had been
prepared for him. Tertullian then (following Paul) wrote about the spirit in man
in a different sense - the spiritual man in contradistinction from the animal man.
Since, however, this study stops at the point of conversion, it would not be
appropriate here to investigate the relationship with God which followed the
coming of the Holy Spirit to the individual believer.
The final point to be noticed, at this stage, (although it is less relevent






close and intimate relationship of body and soul in the composite which made up
'man'. The body was not merely a resting-place for the soul but the latter was
"sown into" the body and mixed with it in such a close relationship that
Tertullian spoke in places about the body serving the soul and in other places
about the soul serving the body.^ Against the Hellenistic division of human
nature, Tertullian insisted on a totus-homo view - God had created the whole
man, body and soul; owing to the Fall, the whole man was lost; Christ had come
to save the whole man; and at the resurreciton, the whole man, body and soul,
would appear before God. A few quotations will illustrate the point.
(i) at conception
caro autem, ab exordio uteri consata conformata congenita animae, etiam in
omni operatione miscetur iHi. 2
(ii) during growth
Societatem carnis atque animae iamdudum commendauimus a congregatione
seminum ipsorum usque ad figmenti perfectionem; perinde nunc et a
natiuitate defendimus, imprimis quod simul crescunt, sed diuisa ratione.3
(iii) up to conversion (where this study stops)
Etsi sufficeret illi, quod nulla omnino anima salutem possit adipisci nisi dum
est in carne crediderit: adeo caro salutis est cardo. De qua cum anima a deo
allegatur, ipsa est, quae efficit, ut anima allegi possit a deo. Sed et caro
abluitur, ut anima emaculetur; caro unguitur, ut anima consecretur; caro
signatur ut (et) anima muniatur; caro manus inpositione adumbratur, ut (et)
anima spiritu inluminetur. 4
In addition, this theme was developed at length in de resurrectione carnis
chapters 14 to 15 and 40, and in de anima chapters 40,41 and 58:
In these passages he asserts that the soul acts in the flesh and with the flesh
and through the flesh. Even thought itself is an act of the flesh. The soul
has no activity apart from the flesh as long as it is in the flesh, and all that
^








the flesh does, it does in company with the soul.l
So then every new 'homo', implanted in the womb, consisted of body and soul and
no other. In the previous section but one, it was established that man
transmitted his nature complete, body and soul (or soul at any rate) to his
offspring. The implications of the transmission of corrupt human nature, from
one generation to the next, is examined now.
Waszink, op. cit. ,p 5TSS>.
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1.7 THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRADUCIANISM
As was established in section 1.4, Tertullian traced every individual soul
back to the soul of Adam, the source and fountainhead of all the human race.
This section goes on from there, to consider some of the implications of
traducianism, because the corruption of the soul by sin, and the transmission
of that corruption through procreation to every new soul, was a concept of the
highest importance for Tertullian. What is not so often mentioned by
commentators is the corresponding transmission of a remnant of the original
goodness of man, a reflection of the divine image, quod enim a deo est, non tarn
extinguitur, quam obumbratur.^ In chapter 41 of de anima, Tertullian was very
anxious to stress that the devil had not succeeded in destroying totally the image
of God in the human soul. What remained might be largely "obscured" by sin, but
it was never "extinguished" and occasionally it broke through, like light from a
2
lamp enshrouded with some dense impediment. (In man, the impediment was
removed by baptism.) This native goodness was also transmitted from generation
to generation, said Tertullian, in the same way as sin, and side by side with it.
The locus classicus of traducianism is in de testimonio animae
chapter 3:-
Satanam denique in omni uexatione et aspernatione et detestatione
pronuntias, quem nos dicimus malitiae angelum, totius erroris artificem,
totius saeculi interpolatorem, per quem homo a primordip circumuentus, ut
praeceptum dei exce_jieret, et propterea in mortem datus exinde totum




Potest enim obumbrari, quia non est deus, extingui non potest, quia a
deo est. Itague sicut lumen aliquo obstaculo impeditum manet, sed non
comparet, et tanta densitas obstaculi fuerit, ita et bonum in anima a malo
oppressum pro qualitate eius aut in totum uacat occulta salute aut qua datur




but Tertullian returned to the theme on several other occasions -
Homo damnatur in mortem ob unius arbusculae delibationem, et exinde
proficiunt delicta cum poenis et pereunt iam omnes, qui paradisi nullum
caespitem norunt. 1
Ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donee in Christo recenseatur,
tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur. 2
Adhuc in Adam deputabatur cum suo uitio. 3
per quam purgarem mortis a primordio causam in me quoque cum ipso
genere transductam. 4
From these texts it is clear that Tertullian believed all mankind had inherited sin - or
at least a sinful nature - his language might have been more precise if he had
5
lived after the Pelagian controversy. Traducianism linked every new soul
with the events of Genesis 3,^ and every new soul brought with it the
'infection' of sin; all were thus conceived with an 'Adamic' soul.
Tertullian was at pains to distinguish this pristina corruptio, the state of
corruptedness proceeding from original sin, from the actual impurity caused
later in every individual life by the influence of the devil and evil spirits,
examined in Chapter HI.2 below. It is a distinction of great importance for this
7
study. When Tertullian wrote Adeo nulla ferme natiuitas munda est, he was










The point was made by John Kaye, Bishop of Lincoln, The
Ecclesiastical History of the Second and Third Centuries illustrated from the
Writings of Tertullian?(3rd ed; London: Francis & John Rivington, 1845) p 306.
^
The responsibility for the original transgression was normally traced by
Tertullian to Adam, but in I cult 1.1.11-2.19 and in earn 17.5.31-36 he put the




did not apply to Christian children. Nevertheless, the children of Christian
parents too were immunda, because all human stock was tainted - by reason of
traducianism - ex originis uitio antecedit. ^ Every soul was not only sinful
through the influence of the devil, but also in consequence of original sin - as is
taken up in chapter HI.2 below. The evil which afflicted the soul (malum
2
animae ) was no mere superstructure, due to the accession of the evil spirit, but
was there already, ex originis vitio. On the other hand, how little Tertullian
regarded this original sin as guilt is apparent from his description of children as
3 4"innocent" and his advice to delay baptism. Tradux animae might carry tradux
peccati, but Tertullian made no attempt to state a case for original guilt.
"Cette vue materialiste rendait facile pour Tertullien la transmission du peche
originel (tradux animae, tradux peccati); mais on aurait tort, jy crois, d'en
/ 5
chercher la raison dans le desir d'expliquer cette transmission".
What did concern him was to demonstrate that the malum animae was
contrary to God's original intention for man. He therefore drew on the Platonic
division of the soul into rational and irrational elements, although he explained






Examined in chapter IV.5 below.
4
Examined in chapter III.5 below.
^
J. Bainvel, Article "Ame", in Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, vol
I, (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1903), col 991.
^
Tertullian's acceptance of irrational elements in the soul, (agreeing
with Plato) is found in an 16.1.1-2; his belief that the irrational came from the
devil and not from God and so (disagreeing with Plato) were not based in the
nature of the soul, follows in an 16.1.2-2.19. d'Ales put it very neatly: "Le
traite de anima decrit cette tare hereditaire de lhomme dechu, et l'auteur, sons
l'influence de reminiscences platoniciennes, a paru d'abord incliner a seinder
l'homme en deux parties: un element rationnel, qui vient de Dieu, et un eldment
(continued on next page)
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and in its original and natural state, was rational. Only the rational belonged to
the nature of the soul, because that proceeded from God. The irrational element
(not 'part') was a later addition, the irrational qualities being infused by the
devil, when he seduced Adam and Eve into transgression.
Inrationale autem posterius intellegendum est, ut quoct acciderit ex serpentis
instinctu, ipsum illud transgressionis admissum, atque exinde inoleuerit et
coadoleuerit in anima ad instar iam naturalitatis, quia statim in naturae
primordio accidit. 1
That overshadowed the divine element, which was the natural element, obscuring
and corrupting it; only at baptism was the curtain of primal corruption
withdrawn and the soul could perceive its true light. Since every individual soul
was, as it were, a surcuius, cut from the matrix of Adam and planted out to grow
2
into a separate tree, every individual soul contained in itself both of these
elements, the rational and the irrational, the good and the bad, sic £t in
pessimis aliquid boni et in optimis nonnihil pessimi....Propterea nulla anima sine
crimine, quia nulla sine boni semine .3
Because man was by nature both good and bad, and not wholly bad, sin in
the later life of the individual was always the result his own free choice, for
which he was accountable; too much emphasis on tradux animae, tradux peccati
would have led to determinism. It is significant that Tertullian did not attempt
to relate his teaching on traducianism to such Biblical passages as Genesis 5.3,
Footnote (6) continued from previous page :
irrationnel, qui viendrait da demon. Mais ayant fait reflexion que les memes
puissances naturelles, y compris l'appetit irascible et concupiscible, existent dans
l'ame du Christ, en qui tout est parfaitement rationnel et ordonne, il renonce a
cette psycb(^ologie et distingue plus sagement enQe la nature et le vice de la
nature. La nature, meme sensible, vient de Dieu: le demon n'a fait qu'y semer
He desordre, et porter les facultes sensibles a s'insurger contre la raison. Ainsi
tout homme natt enfant de colere, enfant du demon". Adhemar d'Ales, La




Examined at Section 1.4 above.
3
an 41.3.14-15 and 19-20.
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Psalm 51.7 or Romans 5.12; the stress by some modern commentators'1 on
traducianism in Tertullian as the transmission of sin may reflect the mind of the
commentator more than it reflects the mind of Tertullian. Of course all souls
were congenitally infected with sinfulness, inherited from the first man, but
Tertulllian was more concerned to refute the errors of the Gnostics than to
establish the status before God of the new-born child. The unity of humanity
was an important tenet for him in his struggle against the Gnostics and how
better could it be defended than by demonstrating the inborn, "natural" property
of every soul ex una redundans?
For the meantime, sufficient foundation has been laid to come to a
tentative decision about the relationship of the embryo to God, at the moment of
its conception, and this is now taken up.
e.g. "The soul shares in Adam's guilt and every man therefore is under
condemnation and is punishable for his inherited guilt quite apart from any
actual sins he may commit". Arthur Cushman McGiffert, commenting on
Tertullian in A History of Christian Thought [ (New York and London: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1933) vol II. p 18.
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1.8 THE RELATIONSHIP TO GOD AT CONCEPTION
One of the criticisms levelled at the theory of traducianism is that it
limits God's creative involvement in the realm of the individual human
personality. After the initial creation of the soul of Adam, He has no direct
concern (it is said) with procreation. Tertullian would not have accepted such a
view. Twice he referred to God's participation and activity at the time of
conception and as Althaus put it (defending traducianism) "Schopfung bleibt
Schopfung, auch wenn sie durch den naturlichen Prozess der Fortpflanzung
vermittelt."3 God controlled the very act of procreation, through a power
subservient to His will; Omnem autem hominis in utero serendi struendi fingendi
paraturam aliqua utique potestas diuinae uoluntatis ministra modulatur,
2
quamcumque illam rationem agitare sortita.
The participation of male, female, and God in generation was an idea of
3
great antiquity, and Roman superstition assigned special gods to the task.
Tertullian argued that Christians knew of no divine agencies other than angels,
and, furthermore, that they made a better job of it than did the pagan gods.
What stamps Tertullian's teaching (over against theories of delayed hominisation)
is his insistence that God was present from the outset. Immediately at
conception it was God who contributed the body, the soul, the life - it was the
breath of God in man which distinguished him from all other creatures: in
homine prn~ata res est, non modo ut dei opus, quod et cetera, sed ut dei flatus,
4
quod haec sola. As ever, Tertullian was ready to back up his argument with
Paul Augustus Wilhelm Herman Althaus, Die Christliche Wahrheit;






Scripture. When life was there, God was there; when God was not there, life
was not present. Commenting on the words which God spoke to Jeremiah -
priusquam te in utero fingerem, nouite * - Tertullian wrote:
Si fingit deus in utero, et afflat ex primordii forma: et finxit deus hominem
et flauit in eum flatum uitae. Nec nosset autem hominem deus in utero nisi
totum: et priusquam exires de uulua, sanctificaui te.2
Tertullian had grasped the central question - what takes place at conception? Is
the embryo an inanimate speck? No, he said - homo est et qui est futurus. Not
only had it a relationship to God, through a power subservient to God's will,
which controlled the conception, but the embryo, by virtue of containing the
spiritus of God (as defined in section 1.6 above) was in some relationship with
God from its earliest moment. Traducianism, as Tertullian understood it, did not
exclude God's creative activity in the genesis of every new life; God supervised
the production of every new body, just as much as He supervised the production
of every new soul. The individual was "opus Dei" (in contrast to the soul which
was only "flatus Dei"), a work of God of particular excellence, formed by the
highest artist in the most ingenious fashion; such is Tertullian's argument in de
resurrectione carnis chapters five to seven.
Traducianism did, however, mean that the sin, or at least the sinful
nature, of Adam was transmitted to all, through seminal solidarity. As
established in the previous section, the soul of the newly created embryo, like
every other soul, was immunda, subject to original sin: Ita omnis anima eo
usque in Adam censetur, donee in Christo recenseatur, tamdiu immunda, quamdiu
3
recenseatur ; on the other hand, Tertullian reacted against the suggestion that








judgement of God. The 'innocence' of infants, in their relationship to God, will
be studied in Chapter IV.5 below, but it is necessary to show briefly here that
early embryonic life was included in Tertullian's description of innocence.
Dealing with the objection from a (? hypothetical) opponent, that executed
criminals should not be granted the privilege of a place in Hades, Tertullian
wrote:
Alterum ergo constituas, compello, aut bonos aut malos inferos: si malos
placet, etiam praecipitari illuc animae pessimae debent; si bonos, cur idem
animas immaturas et innuptas et pro condicione aetatis puras et innocuas
interim indignas inferis iudicas? 2
If the soul of an infant, which had been subjected to satanic attack at birth, was
still 'pure and innocent', then a fortiori so was the soul of the embryo, which had
not known such an attack. There could be no question of any soul, even one
conceived of Christian parents, being entirely innocent of sin; up to baptism,
every soul was immunda -it was inherent in the soul, quite apart from any actual
sin - but such a soul was not under the judgement of God. While the theory of
seminal identity of the whole race with Adam led later generations to the
doctrine of original guilt, as well as original sin, Tertullian seems (as mentioned
in section 1.7 above) to have used originis vitium without the concept of original
guilt. Only in this way can his references to the deferment of baptism be
understood. The souls of those who by their age were necessarily pure and
innocent were in such a relationship to God in life that on premature death they
(even unbaptised) were 'worthy' of a resting place in the region of Hades reserved
for those in a right relationship to God. Later generations wrestled with the
problem of the destiny of an embryo which perished immediately after coijjeption
2
- believing that without baptism the soul would be damned forever. Tertullian
had no such problem.
an 51.8.61-66, and see chapter VI.4 (b) below for a brief




1.9 ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
The Institutes of Gaius contain not one single reference to embryonic
life. However, because Justinian's Institutes and Digest are (and were intended
to be) largely excerpts from the works of earlier jurists, some going back to
Tertullian's time, they give at least some idea of the law in force in Tertullian's
age. The first of the two features of Roman law to be noted in this section is
the legal status of embryos, which differed according to the status of the
parents. While Tertullian made no distinction in the relationship of the embryo
to God by reference to the legal status of either its father or its mother, Roman
law was very concerned to know whether the parents of the embryo were
lawfully married and whether they were slave or free.
In respect of the former, every child was conceived either 'lawfully' or
'unlawfully' and Roman law clothed the resulting embryo with very different
legal rights. A 'lawful' child was one born of a man and a woman united in
marriage according to the forms required by the law; an 'unlawful' child was one
born of a man and a woman not lawfully married. 'Unlawful' children were
further divided into naturales liberi or spurii, according to whether they were the
2
issue of concubinage or of promiscuous intercourse. Not only the status of
Footnote (2) from previous page:
2
This aspect so concerned Anselm, for example, that it drove him to the
conclusion that the embryo could not receive a rational soul from the moment of
conception, because if it were to perish then, it could not be reconciled with
Christ, quod est nimis absurdum. (Liber de conceptu virginali et originali
peccato 7 - J.P. Migne, Patrologia cursus completus, series latina. Paris: 1844-
1855, vol 158, p 440.)
1 °-
The difficulty of ascertaining Roman law for Tertullian s time and the
relationship between Justinian's works and Gaius' Institutes, are examined in
Excursus Two.
2
Concubinage, the more or less permanent union of a man and a woman
not united in marriage, was a recognised Roman legal institution, and the
children of such a union were regarded more favourably by the law than were the
offspring of casual relationships; that distinction is, however, of no relevance to
this study.
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the embryo, but also the point in time at which that status was applied, depended
on the child being conceived in lawful wedlock. Such children took their status
from the status of their father, and took it by reference to his status at the time
of conception; 'unlawful' children, whether 'natural' or 'spurious', took their
status from that of their mother, and they took it from her status at the time of
birth. The implications were enormous. If, for example, a lawfully-married
Senator died while his wife was pregnant, the posthumous child would have all
the rights and privileges of a Senator's child; if the parents lived in concubinage,
not only would the child's status in life be that of its mother, but the status of
the mother might have altered considerably for the worse between the
conception and the birth, consequent on her "husband's" death. ^
Furthermore, only if a child was born in lawful wedlock, and after the
2
182nd day, could its legal existence be reckoned from the date of
conception; even such a child had to be born alive, and capable of living, before
3
it was so recognised. Capacity for existence in Roman Law was not presumed
unless the pregnancy extended to the 182nd day, even although the abortus was
4
born alive. If the capacity for existence could be legally presumed, the child
There was, however, a tendency to adjust the rule to the point in time
most advantageous to the child, whether that was conception, birth or some
intermediate point. If, for example, the mother was a slave at the time of
birth, but if she had been free at the time of conception, or even at any time
during the intervening period, the child was deemed to be free-born.
^
This is not the place to enter into the debate about the significance of
the 182nd day. Savigny, a noted expositor of Roman Law of the 19th century,
argued at length that the 182nd day rule was concerned with paternity, this being
the shortest possible time for conception to come to live birth. Savigny's
argument is precised in Appendix m of W.H. Rattigan, Jural Relations; or, The
Roman Law of Persons as Subjects of Jural Relations; (London: Wildy & Sons,
1884), pp~284^301.
^
Justinian's Digest, Book 50,Title 16, Fragment 129. (= Digest 50.16.129.
The method of citing Gaius and Justinian is set out in detail Excursus
Two).
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was instantly clothed with the rights of man, even though it lived for only a
moment. Some jurists were of the opinion that the child must have been heard
to cry, but Justinian, adopting the view of the Sabinians (of whom Gaius was one
of the latest) enacted:
Si vivus perfecte natus est: licet illico postquam in terra cecidit, vel in
manibus obstretricis decessit: nihilominus testamentum rumpi, hoc
tantummodo requirendo, si vivus ad orbem totus processit, ad nullum
declinans monstrum, vel prodigium. 1
The underlying principle was to safeguard the inheritence of goods. If a
succession opened out during pregnancy, which, had the child been born, would
have descended to it, the child's right of inheritance had to be preserved until
the time of birth. This applied only to the lawfully married, because 'natural'
and 'spurious' children had no right of succession to their father; (they succeeded
to their mother, to the same extent as her lawful children). Because the child in
utero would inherit, provided it came to live birth, the same legal rights as if it
were already alive, a curator ventris was appointed where a married man died,
leaving his wife pregnant, and the portions of three children had to be set apart
2
for the nasciturus. The embryo itself had, however, no legal existence in
Roman law and no rights under Roman law while in the mother's womb; only
when born alive was its legal life dated back to the earliest period of its physical
ft3
existence:"Nasciturus pro jam nato habetur, quando de ejus commodo agitur.
The provisions of Roman law for the many complexities of life during
pregnancy, such as determining the legal status of the offspring of parents of
unequal status, need not be examined in detail here, because Tertullian gave no
indication that legitimacy or illegitimacy made the slightest difference to the
Code 6.29; likewise the Constitutions5.3, (for which see Excursus
2 Two.)
Bigest 5.4.3 and 4.
3
Digest 1.5.7.
relationship of the embryo to God, nor,on the principles adopted by him, could he
have made such a distinction. The position of slaves in Roman law is taken up in
detail in Excursus Three, but it is worth noting, at this stage, that Roman law
regarded slaves as devoid of legal existence and any child inherited the disability
of its mother. The unborn child of a slave was never more than a part of the
mother (mulieris portio),^ but Tertullian made no distinction - as far as the
relationship to God was concerned - between the child of free persons and the
child of slaves. The only distinction he did make was between a child of pagan
parents and a child with one or both parents Christian, which is examined in
chapter m.4 below.
The only other area where Roman law might be relevant to this chapter
of the thesis is Tertullian's contention that omnis anima eo usque in Adam
2
censetur, donee in Christo recenseatur. Strangely enough, not one single writer
on de anima chapter 40, not even Waszink, in all their comments on the
relationship of human nature with Adam, has remarked that censari and
recenseri are words from Roman legal usage. Since however, censari describes
the relationship in which men stand with Adam, being "registered" in him, and
not the relationship directly with God (with which this study is concerned),
comment will be postponed until chapter IX.9, when the word recenseri will be
considered along with a number of other words from Roman law which describe
the effect of baptism on the relationship of man to God.
To sum up, then, the main area where Roman law seems to be relevant
to this (first) chapter of the thesis, a child had to be conceived in lawful
wedlock,had to reach the sixth month of pregnancy, and then had to go on to be
born alive, before Roman law would accept that it had been a legal persona






was not recognised as such; only when it was actually born, could its legal life
be dated back to the earliest period of its physical existence. This contrasts
sharply with Tertullian's attitude to embryonic life, as will be brought out in the
conclusion which follows.
1.10 CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER ONE
55
The first aim of this chapter was to discover as fully as possible how
Tertullian understood and expressed the initial relationship of a human being to
God. The second aim was to identify any words or ideas which either expressed
Tertullian's view of that relationship in terms of Roman law or which seemed to
contrast with the legal position.
On the first point, Tertullian has left considerable data, express or
implied. For him,a new and unique person came into existence at every
conception, and it was not (as taught by Roman law) dependent on live birth for
its status. The new person was composed of body and soul, without any other
constituent part. Neither body nor soul had had any previous or separate
relationship with God, although the soul had been handed down, from generation
to generation, from the breath of God in the first man. Souls were not addicted
to metempsychosis, as the Pythagoreans held, but each individual was a new
product, proceeding equally with the body from its parent(s), neither created
later nor inserted into the body at birth. God's creation "de nihilo" had finished
on the sixth day but since Adam's soul was the result of the divine afflatus, every
subsequent soul had within it the power of reproducing itself in further individual
souls. This gave rise to Tertullian's distinctive teaching known as traducianism,
which had fundamental implications for his understanding of the relationship of
the embryo to God. It was not born a tabula rasa, which the experience of life
alone would influence; into every newly-conceived soul were infused the spiritual
qualities of the parent, not only the universal sinfulness of all the children of
Adam but also a remnant of the goodness of the divine image. These two
influences would manifest themselves as the child came to understanding and
Tertullian was careful not to over-emphasise the effects of traducianism,
because he was equally concerned to show that every one was personally
responsible for his won sin. For him, traducianism both established the
universality of sin, and also !
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preserved the freedom of the will; these points will be taken up in chapter six.
The act of conception was supervised by God, through angelic oversight,
which brought together the two seeds containing body and soul. From that
moment, nothing of substance required to be added to the embryo - already homo
est et qui est futurus. Tertullian would have approved of what Barth wrote:
Das ungeborene Kind ist namlich vom ersten Stadium an ein Kind, ein noch
keimender, noch unselbstandig lebender Mensch, aber ein Mensch, kein
Etwas, nicht nur ein Teil des Mutterleibes. 1
As the embryo developed through birth, childhood and adolescence, it would, by
natural growth, and without the addition of any new element, be able to enter
into a conscious relationship with God. However, even while the embryo was
microscopic and totallijunaware of God, He was concerned and He was involved.
Even the body, the lower component of man in the eyes of Tertullian's pagan
contemporaries, was a divine work of art. As for the soul, it was descended from
the very breath of God, so that the human embryo was not merely formed by an
intelligent Creator, as other things were, but it was animated from the very
substance of God, and was related to Him "ex spiritu Dei", "ex substantia eius",
"ex Dei flatus".
Accordingly, for Tertullian, the status of the embryo as a human being
was not dependent on its survival to live birth. If it was born before the 182nd
day, or if it was still-born, its soul went to Hades to await the resurrection, in its
own right; in due course a resurrection body would be provided by God and the
2
embryonic man was already entered in the book of life. Furthermore,
Tertullian made no distinction - as far as the relationship to God was concerned -
between a child conceived in lawful wedlock and a child conceived from unlawful
Karl Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, Band HI - Die Lehre von der
Schopfung, (Zurich: A.G. Zollikon, 1951) Teil 4, para 55, p 474.
2
an 37.2.11-12 - examined in chapter II.4.
intercourse. He made no distinction between the embryo in a free person and
the embryo in a slave. There is not a great deal of Roman law relevant to this
chapter, but where it is, Tertullian actually opposed the civil law of his day. He
drew substantially from the Scriptures, and borrowed much common ground from
philosophers, but it is difficult to see one single instance, in the events of
conception, where the relationship of man to God could be said to be expressed
in terms of Roman law.
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CHAPTER TWO - THE RELATIONSHIP OF GROWING EMBRYOS TO GOD
II. 1. INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER TWO
As body and soul began to grow, God continued to relate Himself to the
embryonic man and to control the pregnancy. In section two of this chapter,
certain passages are examined which imply the uninterrupted development of the
embryo. Then, in section three, Tertullian's teaching on abortion is examined, to
see whether it supports the inference of a settled relationship with God
throughout the pregnancy.
In view of Tertullian's traducianism, and in view of his teaching about
the nature of the soul, it may seem strange even to ask whether the relationship
of fetal life to God could differ at different stages of pregnancy. However, one
particular passage in Tertullian's works, and certain scholarly comments on it by
Dolger, require the question to be raised, and this is done in section four. In
particular, it is necessary to ask whether Tertullian drew a distinction between
the formed state and the unformed state of the embryo. In section five, the
Roman law for this area is set out and then in section six, certain conclusions are
drawn.
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H.2 GOD SUPERVISED THE GROWTH OF THE EMBRYO FROM
CONCEPTION TO BIRTH
Tertullian made several references to the physical development of the
embryo, from the moment of its conception to the time of live birth; in two of
these he expressly stated the involvement and responsibility of God. One of
these passages has been considered already;^ the other is particularly in point
for this section, because God is portrayed in it as protecting the embryo, while
the mother was doing her best to destroy it! Scit Deus quot jam infantes et
perfici et perduci ad partum integros duxerit, debellatos aliquamdiu a
2
matribus . Roman superstition entrusted to a pleiades of divinities to protect
every stage of a (wanted) child's conception and growth:
diuidentes omnem statum hominis singulis, potestatibus ab ipso guidem uteri
conceptu, ut sit deus Conseuius quidam, qui con ( ) nibis concubitalibus
praesit, et Fluuionia, quae infantem in utero nutriat; hinc Vitumnus et
Sentinus, per quem uiuiscat in fans et sentiat primum; dehinc Diespiter qui
puerum perducat ai partum. 3
4Tertullian saw this as yet another area" were pagans had chanced upon the
truth and then perverted it - the supervision of growth belonged to the Creator
God, who delegated it only to His angels and to no other. The whole process of
preparing, assembling and shaping the embryo in the womb of the mother was
therefore a task carried out under the supervision of God. In the de carne
Christi, and again adversus Marcionem, Tertullian went into considerable detail
to show that the inconvenience, even the sordidness, of conception, pregnancy
and childbearing were sacred things, which Christ Himself did not despise when
Omnem autem hominis in utero serendi struendi fingendi paraturam
aliqua utique potestas diuinae uoluntatis ministra modulatur, quamcumque illam






He expressed himself most strongly on the plagarism of divine truth by
pagans, who then corrupted it, in respect of certain philosophical ideas which
resembled the teaching of the Old Testament - examined in chapter VI.6 below.
taking human form for man's redemption. In similar vein, he tried to make
Marcion look ridiculous - reductio ad absurdam being one of his favourite
weapons:
Age iam, perora, in ilia sanctissima et reuerenda opera naturae, inuehere in
totum quod es; carnis atque animae originem destrue; cloacam uoca
uterum, tanti animalis, id est hominis, producendi officinam;2
3
That the relationship to God of the anima infans - whatever that
relationship might be - was a settled and uninterrupted relationship, is implied by
Tertullian's various metaphors for the growth of the soul. In de anima 37, he
used the metaphor (examined in chapter 1.5 above) of a nugget of gold or silver
which, when beaten by goldsmith, became larger, although nothing was added to
its substance; its lustre was enhanced, and the only new thing about it was its
shape; in the same way, he said, the growth of the soul brought out its latent
potentialities but did not affect its substance. While Tertullian's argument in de
anima 37 was specifically directed to the growth of the soul after birth, the
metaphor seems equally applicable to the development of the soul between
conception and birth. Tertullian's object was to refute any suggestion that the
growth of the soul could in any way be regarded as am argument for its mortality
and so it followed that any alteration in its basic relationship to its Creator was
ruled out. Furthermore the metaphors of seed sown, and twigs planted out to
grow, noted in chapter 1.4 above, all imply that God's concern for and
involvement with the embryo was uninterrupted right through the pregnancy.
This can be taken a stage further by looking at some of the texts relative to
Tertullian's teaching on abortion, which are therefore examined next.
*






H.3 THE IMPLICATIONS OF ABORTION
Since induced abortion was both common and widely accepted in Roman
society, and had been for generations before Tertullian was born,^ and since he
himself deplored it, it is not surprising that he both mentioned and condemned
the practice on several occasions:
Nobis uero homicidio semel interdicto etiam conceptum utero, dum adhuc
sanguis in hominem delibatur, dissoluere non licet. Homicidii festinatio est
prohibere nasci, nec refert, natam quis eripiat animam an nascentem
disturbet.Z
Parum humanum sanguinem lambitis, quoniam futurum sanguinem elicitis?
Parum infante uescimini, quia infantem totum praecocum perhauritis?3
quae etiam a gentilium plerisque uitantur, quae legibus coguntur, quae
parricidiis expugnantur, 4
and especially for the Christian
Quid ergo facies, si nolens uxorem de tua conscientia impleueris? dissoluas
medicaminibus conceptum? Puto nobis magis non licere nascentem necare
quam et natum.5
In only one case did Tertullian excuse the killing of an infant in the
womb. It was a sad exception, about which he wrote with considerable obstetric
detail. He was dealing with the dilemma then facing a doctor, (now minimised
Footnote (J) from previous page:
2
By entering into an infant body, the soul had itself become infans:
"Omnes enim ab infantia imbuuntur, qua infans reuertatur" - an 31.2.8-9. The
argument was carried here, as elsewhere, by reference to the entrance of a soul
into a new-born child, not into an embryo at conception - cf the references to
intellect and mind in an 19. This was, however, to meet the needs of the
moment and was not a positive assertion that the soul was implanted at birth, as
opposed to conception - which Tertullian taught so positively when it was the
issue before him.
^
The references for these statements are listed in the section on Roman










by the Caesarean section) who had to choose between the life of the mother or
the life of the child. If the mother's life was endangered by the birth,
embryotomy was the only alternative to her death by surgery (to save the child)
or her death (and possibly also the child's death) by process of nature. Against
that background, Tertullian wrote:
Atquin et in ipso adhuc utero in fans trucidatur necessaria crudelitate, cum
in exitu obliquatus denegat partum, matricida, ni moriturus. 1
Tertullian's justification of embryotomy started from the supposition that it was
already impossible (without surgery fatal to the mother) to save the life of the
child - that was the only case where he permitted abortion even to be
considered. The child was lying across the exit of the womb; it would be
murdering the mother if the child was not dismembered; it was better, then, to
kill the child at once, in utero, to save it the suffering which would follow in the
struggle for the mother's life.
A very different interpretation was placed on this passage by Noonan:
Although therapeutic and social reasons for abortion were known from the
best of doctors and philosophers (of paganism), these reasons were never
mentioned (by the early Christians) as justification.2
When faced by a reviewer with the above passage from Tertullian, Noonan wrote:
I don't believe the passage from Tertullian is meant to incorporate a direct
moral judgement as he is focusing on another issue, but I think his whole
tone is terribly critical and not approving of craniotomy, which he thinks the
doctors believe is necessary but which, he, in passing, condemns. 3




John T. Noonan, "Abortion and The Catholic Church: A Summary
History", Natural Law Forum 12 (1967) p 97. Noonan published substantially the
same article in the Dublin Review 241 (1967/8), under the title "The Catholic
Church and Abortion", where the quotation appears at p 312.
3
A letter of 6th May, 1968 from Noonan to Cyril C. Means, quoted by
the latter at page 22 of "A Historian's View", in Robert E. Hall, Editor, Abortion
in a Changing World (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970) vol
I.
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not expressing moral judgement on the necessity of embryotomy. The only
similar interpretation of Tertullian's view is found in Jacobus Pamelius, where
Pamelius rejected the apparent meaning of Tertullian's words, because (it seems)
they were counter to the moral theology current in Pamelius' time.^
The immediate concern of this thesis, however, is with the reason why
Tertullian was opposed to abortion - either totally as Noonan thought, or, as
seems more likely, in every case except medical embryotomy. Tertullian gave
his reason in one simple phrase in the apologeticum - a phrase already noticed in
chapter 1.5 - komo est et qui est futurus . Having rejected the heathen
2
accusation that Christians killed children during their secret rites,
Tertullian counter-attacked with the words already quoted at the beginning of
this section:
Nobis uero homicidio semel interdicto etiam conceptum utero, dum adhuc
sanguis in hominem delibatur, dissoluere non licet. Homicidii festinatio est
prohibere nasci, nec refert, natam quis eripiat animam an nascentem
disturbet. Homo est et qui est futurus; etiam fructus omnis iam in semine
est .3
Tertullian therefore consciously enlarged the meaning of the secular words for
4
murder, to include the destruction of the embryo in the womb. He did so
because the embryo was already homo, already under the care and the control of
God - in other words, already in some relationship with God.
^
Adnotationes in Librum Tertulliani de Anima, No. 331 in Q.S.F.
Tertullian Carthaginiensis Presbyteri Opera, (1584) torn. Ill, p 626.
^
The secrecy surrounding the Eucharist, to which only the initiated were
admitted, aroused suspicion, and evil stories circulated as to what took place.
Eating the flesh of Christ and drinking His Blood, which the Christians said they
met to do, lent itself to malignant misinterpretation, and they were accused of




Examined in section II.5 below.
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H.4 WHETHER THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EMBRYO TO GOD ALTERED
DURING PREGNANCY
Because Tertullian was traducianist, and in view of what has been noted
already about the growth of the soul, it may seem unnecessary even to ask
whether the relationship of the embryo to God could materially alter during the
ten months^ of pregnancy. However, the phrase non caro habitus ante
formam, non pecus dictus post figuram3 and one of Tertullian's references to
abortion (immediately below) require the question to be asked.
ex eo igitur fetus in utero homo, a quo forma completa est. Nam et Mosei
lex tunc aborsus reum talionibus iudicat, cum iam hominis est causa, cum
iam illi vitae et mortis status deputatur, cum et fato iam inscribitur, etsi
adhuc in matre uiuendo cum matre plurimum communicat sortem.3
It is difficult to reconcile those words - fetus in utero homo a quo forma
completa est - with Tertullian's clearly expressed view in the apologeticum that
dum adhuc sanguis in hominem delibatur, dissoluere non licet . . . Homo est et
4
qui est futurus; etiam fructus omnis iam in semine est . Indeed, Waszink
regarded the two texts as "incompatible" and as yet another example of
Tertullian dealing with the needs of the moment without reference (in this case
5
without appreciation) of what he had written elsewhere. Dolger, who wrote a
series of articles on the subject in 1934,3 believed that Tertullian had
Tertullian regarded birth at the beginning of the tenth month as not
only the norm but as symbolic: an 37.4.17-21.
2
IV Marc 21.11.2-3. Tertullian was taunting Marcion that his
(Marcion's) Christ was unnatural - Non uulva, licet uirginis tarnen feminae,
coagulatus, et si non ex semine, tamen lege substantiae corporalis ex sanguine et





apol 9.8.32-33 and 35-36.
3
Waszink, op. cit|l25-6.
Franz Joseph Dolger. The series is collected under the title "Das
Lebensrecht des ungeborenen Kindes und die Fruchtabtreibung in der Bewertung
der heidnischen und christlichen Antike", in part 4 of Antike und Christentum
(Minister; Aschendorff, 1934), pp 1-61.
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deliberately followed Aristotle, and ancient physiology generally, when he wrote
de anima chapter 37, and that he had consciously distinguished between a formed
and unformed fetus:
Aber Tertullian sagt eben nicht, dass der unausgebildete mit der Seele
verbundene menschliche Embryo von Anfang an schon Mensch sei. Mensch
wird der Embryo erst mit der Entwicklung zur menschenahnlichen Gestalt.
Von diesem Zeitpunkt ab, also von dem vierzigsten Tag nach der Empfangnis
an hatte danach die Zerstorung des Embryo nach Tertullian als Menshenmord
erscheinen mussen.l
Two factors must be taken into account, in assessing Tertullian's
understanding of forma completa:
(a) that he lived in a society which accepted stages of development in
fetal life - in particular, degrees of aliveness as the embryo passed through its
various stages, and
(b) that he probably read Exodus chapter 21 (to which he refers) in the
2
Septuagint translation of the Old Testament and not in the Hebrew original.
That is important, because the Hellenistic Jewish translators of the Septuagint in
Alexandria had introduced a distinction, not found in the Massoretic text,
between an unformed and a formed foetus in the womb.





That Tertullian did not read Hebrew is implied in Prax 5.1.5-6 and is
generally agreed by commentators on Tertullian - e.g. d'Ales, op. cit. p 231;
Barnes, op. cit. "Tertullian" p 92; Pierre Monceaux, Histoire Litteraire de
l'Afrique Chretienne.I: Tertullien et les origines, (Pairs: Ernest Leroux, 1901) p
188; T.P. O'Malley, Tertullian and the Bible: Language - Imagery - Exegesis,
(Nijmegen: Dekker & Von de Vegt, 1967) p 134. In any event, he appears to have
accepted the Septuagint as 'scriptura'^giving the translation the authority of the
original text, -"tenedum quod Graeca scriptura signauit" (IT Marc. 9.1.25) See
J.E.L. van der Geest, Le Christ et l'Ancien Testament chez Tertullien,
(Nijmegen: Dekker & Von de Vegt, 1972) p 12-13.
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(a) Contemporary physiology
From the writings of Galen,^ it is apparent that contemporary
physiology not only accepted different stages in embryonic life, but linked these
stages with development from plant life through animal life to human life. The
2
distinction can be traced back to Aristotle, who had taught that the embryo
was first animated by a vegetative soul, then, when the embryo was sufficiently
organised to receive it, by an animal (sensitive) soul, these states being common
to man and to the lower animals. In the case of man, and man alone, the animal
soul was succeeded by a rational (human) soul.
3
Although Tertullian declared his own interest in medical science, it
is unthinkable that he had the soul (as opposed to the body) in mind when he
wrote fetus in utero homo a quo forma completa est. The texts quoted above at
Chapter 1.3 established beyond any doubt that immediate hominisation, not just
immediate animation, was fundamental to Tertullian's anthropology. However,
there is room for enquiry into the development of that other component part of
man, the body,of which Dolger wrote:
Erst in einer spateren Stufe der Embryoentwicklung mit der klar in die
Erschienung tretenden menshlichen Gestalt des Embryo sei dieser nicht nur
als animal (jojoi/ ) 'Lebewesen', sondern als Mensch (homo) zu betrachten.
Als Zeitpunkt, der hier nicht ausdriicklich gennant wird, gilt in der antiken
Physiologie allgemein der vierzigste Tag nach der Empfangnis.4
For Galen, see p 17 above, footnote 2.
2
op cit., Book 2, chapter 3.
Tertullian's words: Sed et medicinam inspexi - an 2.6.53-54 -
presumably mean, in context, that he read Soranus' TTgpi H1 u.Xl S ^or t^e
purpose of composing his treatise de anima. Pierre de Labriolle (a Latin
philologist) contributed with some diffidence a paper to Archives Generales de
Medecine.,83 (1906), on "La Physiologie dans l'Oeuvre de Tertullien", columns
1317-1328, which, no doubt because of its intended readership, is more about
Tertullian than about physiology.
^
o£. cit., p 36.
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Although much ridiculed by modern writers,^ Aristotle's theory that
the human soul was infused forty days after conception in the case of the male,
2
and eighty days in the case of the female, is not so absurd as it appears. He
based the distinction on the observable progress of the body. To the naked eye,
an embryo, in its early stages, looks no more like man than does a sea anemone.
As the embryo develops to the point where it is observable, it does indeed look
like any animal embryo. After about forty days, the phallic tubercule makes a
male embryo look distinctively human, but the external genitalia of the female
are not discernible to the naked eye until about the eightieth day. If, then,
Dolger is right, that Tertullian was following contemporary medical physiology
when he wrote de anima 37.2, it will be necessary to consider the relationship of
the £iiov to the homo, and of both to God, as the pregnancy passed the six-week
period - and to consider whether this involved a change in the relationship of the
embryo to God. Before that question can be answered, it is necessary to
consider the other background factor - the Biblical text which Tertullian had in
mind when he wrote ex eo igitur fetus in utero homo, a quo forma completa est.
3
Nam et Mosei lex tunc aborsus reum talionibus iudicat...
(b) Exodus 21:22-23
The context of Tertullian's reference to the only abortion text in the Old
Testament is of great importance for its correct understanding. In de anima
chapter 37, Tertullian was seeking to establish God's involvement with embryonic
man, and God's control over the embryo, from the very moment of conception.
Having stated the fact, he illustrated it by reference to Exodus 21:22-23. It
For example, Norman St. John-Stevas 'Abortion and the Law', Dublin
Review, 241 (1967-8) p 294 and R.F.R. Gardner, Abortion - the personal
dilemma ^(Exeter: Paternoter Press, 1972) p 98.
2




seems likely that Tertullian intended the passage to support, rather than to
contradict, his teaching that homo est et qui est futurus was present in the
embryo from the moment of conception. Taken in that sense, the Old
Testament passage suited his purpose admirably. The Mosaic law had provided
that if, in a fight between two men, a pregnant woman was injured and an
abortion followed, the death of the foetus (at whatever stage of development)
was to be dealt with by a standard monetary penalty, provided the mother was
unharmed. There was a different (standard) penalty if the mother herself died.
There was no reason for the He__brew text to distinguish stages in the
development of the unborn child because in Jewish law the foetus was not
regarded as a human being at any stage until the infant had drawn its first
breath.^
However, as mentioned above, the Septuagint translators introduced a
distinction, not found in the Massoretic text, between am unformed foetus in the
womb and a formed foetus. They deemed it murder, no less, even accidentally to
abort a 'formed' foetus:
If...her child comes forth while it is not yet formed ( £$£t Kovic-ftgvoy)
then the penalty shall be a money payment...; but if it was formed
(0^£.tKovi.<7)*ivov), then you shall give a life for a life. 2
So there was a capital penalty for the abortion itself, after a certain stage of
development had been reached, even if the woman was unharmed.
Dolger, (who dealt with Tertullian's use of the scriptural passage only
after he had already expressed a clear view on Tertullian's position by reference
to the medical background) understood Tertullian to mean that forma completa
was a distinctive stage, post-dating the creation of the foetus at conception.
V. Aptowitzer, "Observations on the Criminal Law of the Jews" (part 5,





However, four reasons, based on the text of Tertullian itself, are here advanced
to suggest that Tertullian intended to say, and did say, the very opposite. The
four reasons are:
First, the interpretation which Dolger took out of the passage requires
the reader to make more of tunc and cum than Latin usage would seem to
warrant.^ He made the passage say that Moses punished abortion in kind "at
that stage when it was a matter of a homo" - rather than a mere foetus prior to
forma completa. That is by no means the only reading of the passage. Cum iam
hominis est causa could equally well mean "since it was already a matter of a
2
homo" and indeed the passage has been rendered by Quain as "the embryo was
rudimentary "man", exposed to the chances of life and death". "Rudimentary
man" is perhaps too bold a translation but it does make the point that forma
completa, in the quotation from Exodus, does not necessarily post-date the
creation of the foetus.
The second problem, for the interpretation proposed by Dolger, is
Tertullian's statement that the embryo in matre vivendo was fato iam
3
inscribitur. If Tertullian assumed a development in the faculties of the soul,
Because of the importance of this passage, I discussed it at some
length, in September 1975, with Professor Jan Waszink, of Amsterdam (author of
the monograph 'De Anima'). He was emphatic that 'tunc' did not imply emphasis
or contrast, but was used to balance 'cum'. Further, in his view, 'ex eo' was
temporal, not causal, and 'igitur' had no more significance than, 'Now the rtext
point in the argument is ....'.
2
Edwin A. Quain, "On the Soul", in Tertullian, Apologetical
Works and Minucius Felix Octavius, (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1950).
3
an 37.2.11-12. "The interpretation of fato is not quite certain; the
most probable translation seems to be: "when it is already recorded in the book
of fate". By this liber fati we may understand the 'book of the living' frequently
mentioned in Judaic literature and in the N.T .... It should, however, not be
forgotten that in this book not all men are registered, but only the faithful (from
Tertullian's works cf. cor. 13,9: illius (sc. Christi) es, conscriptus in libris vitae;
ad ux 1,4; scorp. 12 = 173,19); hence it might be better to call to mind the
pagan conception of the book of A.ikq or the Fata (cf. Ruhl, De mort. iudicio,
101/5), a Christian version of which is found in spect 27. ... Finally, it is not
altogether out of the question (cf.39.2: Fata Scribunda) that the sense is: "when
(continued overleaf)
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as did his medical contemporaries, it is strange that he did not say when the
embryo was to be entered into the book of fate. The absence of such a reference
points to a parallel, not a distinction, between the phrases




The third difficulty, if Dolger is correct, is Tertullian's designation,
3
elsewhere, of all abortion as murder. Tetullian was not always consistent, as
noted above; nevertheless if he had intended, even in the passing, to make a
distinction between the early and the later stages of fetal life, he would surely
not have been so definite;in repulsing the criticism of the heathen, that abortion
was murder - they could have retorted that he too permitted abortion, at earlier
stages. The inference must be that he did not - because he regarded the embryo
as sacred at every stage of development.
Fourth, mention can be made here of an aspect which will be explored in
more detail in Chapter IV.3 - Tertullian's insistence that the soul took the lead,
at all stages of life, and that the body followed. That principle would be
breached if the physical development of the body could materially have
influenced the relationship of the whole to God - in other words the body would
then be giving the lead to the soul.
Footnote (3) continued from previous page:
it is already recorded by the fatum." Waszink, o£. cit. p 427. The meaning of
"Fata Scribunda", referred to at the end of that quotation from Waszink's work,
is taken up in chapter HI.2 below, where it is clear that, at least in the pagan
understanding, the name was recorded only after birth. Tertullian, in the






The texts were quoted in the previous section, 13.3, and the meaning of
the various words for murder in Roman law will be examined in the next
section, II.5.
The distinction which Dolger postulated between afuov and a homo was
accepted by Waszink, although for a very different reason - Waszink believed
that it was the text of Exodus which influenced Tertullian and he (Waszink) made
no reference to contemporary physiology."'' With the greatest respect to
Waszink's erudition, it seems that he too is introducing a distinction which
Tertullian did not intend to make, and that he too has overlooked the very
positive support which the quotation gave to Tertullian's basic argument. The
context is certainly more consistent with Tertullian's previously expressed view -
continuity of development - rather with the distinction which Dolger postulated
and which Waszink accepted. Waszink's point is that the Septuagint overtones of
Exodus 21 caused Tertullian to distinguish a £u)ov from a homo; but Exodus
21:22-23, unless one reads these Septuagint overtones into it, supports what
Tertullian had just said - there were sanctions for abortion right from the
moment of conception. If the Septuagint distinction is made to govern the text,
it contradicts all that Tertullian had taught elsewhere. It seems much more
likely that Tertullian quoted from Exodus in order to support his basic case, not
contradict it!
If Tertullian did mean what Dolger and Waszink attribute to him, it is an
another example of Tertullian dealing with the immediate problem, without
regard for the wider context. Nowhere else in his writings - especially in
chapters 25 and 27 of de anima - did he suggest that the embryo was an animated
being but not a human being. However, Tertullian may have given his own
answer to the question which has occupied this section. Shortly after he used the
phrase homo a quo forma completa est, and as soon as he began to discuss the
close relationship between body and soul after birth, he himself used these
words:
Waszink, op. cit., p 425.
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Societatem carnis atque animae iamdudum commendauimus a congregatione
seminum ipsorum usque ad figmenti perfectionem; 1
While figmenti perfectio, like Tertullian's use of Exodus 21 is enigmatic, because
it could refer back to a^ quo forma completa est - in which case Waszink's
interpretation of the earlier passage is supported, because Tertullian would then
be emphasising the close relationship of body and soul from conception until the
embryo beca^fvp homo - in context it seems more likely that figmenti perfectio
means birth, because the sentence is the link or transition from a discourse on
pregnancy (all ten months of it) to the growth of the soul, with the body, after
birth. There is certainly no indication in the passage that when Tertullian wrote
Dicam aliquid et de temporibus animae nascentis, ut ordinem decurram, 2 he







n.5 ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
Roman law had no concern with the embryo as such, as was noted in
Chaper 1.9 - partus nondum editus homo non recte fuisse dicitur.^ Induced
2
abortion was common and the only intervention of Roman law was if the life of
2
the adult recipient of abortifacients was endangered or if the rights of the
4
expectant father were violated. It is true that Augustus had introduced
5 ,
legislation on the subject of abortion, but that was not for any concern /
Papinian, cited in the Digest, 35.2.9.1. Ulpian taught much the same -
partus enim antequam edatur, mulieris portio est vel viscerum. -Digest 25.4.1.1;
the uniorn child was not yet in rebus humanis - Digest 37.9.7 and 28.6.10.1.
2
Classical Roman writers who refer to the frequency of abortion include
Seneca, Ad Helviam matrem consolatione 16; Juvenal, Satura 2.29-33; 3.366-
368; 6.592-597; Ovid, Amorum 1.2.13; 2.13.1 and 2; 2.14.7,37,40, and 43;
Plautus, Truculentus 1.2.99; Tacitus, Annalas 14.63 and Historiae 5.5; Suetonius,




Abortion by a married woman entitled her husband to divorce her, but
only because of the breach of her duty to bear him children, not because of any
concern for the unborn child. Furthermore, when the Emperors Septimus
Severus and Antonius Caracalla decreed temporary exile for any woman wno
procured abortion, it was to mark disapproval that any woman should be able to
deprive her husband of children with impunity - Digest 47.11.4.
5 i
The Lex Julia de mar__itandis or dinjbus (A.D.4) and its amending Act
the Lex Julia et Papia Poppaea (A.D.9) were not, as is sometimes stated, the
first Roman legislation on the subject of abortion but they were the only
legislation in force in Tertullian's day. He referred to it as three occasions - I
ux 5.2.10, ex 12.5.31-32 and mon 16.4.22-24. To encourage childbearing,
Augustus decreed under the earlier of the two Lex Julia that any man who
remained unmarried between the ages of twenty and sixty, and any woman who
continued unmarried until fifty, were not entitled to take under a will, whether
as a legatee or as heir, of a person to whom they were not related within the
sixth degree, unless they married within a certain time after becoming aware of
their rights. Furthermore, the Lex Papia Poppaea imposed a similar disability
on childless married couples, in that a married man over twenty five or a
married woman over twenty could inherit only one-half of what was bequeathed
to them by a person outside the sixth degree of relationship, if they had no
legitimate children living at the time when the right accrued to them under the
testament. A man was exempted from the operation of the Lex Papia Poppaea
if he had one li_ving legitimate child; a free-born woman was exempted if she
had three, and a freed woman if she had four lawful children. Finally, also
under the Lex Papia Poppaea, a husband and wife whose marriage was childless
(continued on next page)
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about the embryo as such - it was an attempt to halt the decline in the birth rate
of the governing classes, who practised abortion extensively to avoid labour
pains and to preserve feminine beauty, to say nothing of concealing the
consequences of adultery.^ When, therefore, Tertullian designated the
destruction of the embryo in the womb as 'murder' he was very far from using
existing Roman law to express the relationship of embryonic life to God - he was
consciously enlarging the meaning of the legal words for murder, to include what
he considered to be morally wrong. Beck has surely missed the point in stating
that Tertullian :
offenbar an Tendenzen des zeilgenossischen romischen Strafrechts an, das
einerseits die von der Ehefrau ohne Einwilligung des Mannes vorgenommene
Abtreibung unter dem Gesichtspunkt der enttauschten spes parentis,
andererseits gewisse von Dritten vorgenonmmene Abtreibungshandlung in
Anlehnung an die lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis bestrafte. 2
That was not the reason at all - Tertullian believed that the embryo in the womb
was already 'man', and from that he built his doctrine, (in contrast with the
Roman concept of the law)( that the killing of the embryo was to be regarded as
murder.
The three words which he used were parricidium, latrocinium and a new
Footnote (5) continued from previous page:
could only take under each other's wills one-tenth of what was bequeathed to
them. Tertullian naturally did not approve - he pointed out (n-on 16.4.22-24) the
difficulty which this legislation imposed on Christians who wished to practice the
celibacy which (in that work) he so much extolled. However, the point for this
study is that, at its best, Roman legislation merely encouraged the birth of
children and there was no legislation of any sort in force to discourage or forbid
abortion per se. In fact, little benefit resulted from these laws, which operated
very unequally and sometimes oppressively, and they were frequently defeated
by the emperors themselves, who used to give the jus trium liberorum to persons
who had no children, and even to some who were not married.
*
Sciunt etiam obstetrices, quot adulteri conceptus trudicentur -pud
5.11.45-46.
Alexander Beck, Romisches Recht bei Tertullian und Cyprian, (Halle:
Max Niemeyer, 1930) p 121.
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word which he himself introduced, infanticidium.'*' The latter had no
significance in Roman law, and is not examined here. Parricidium was, in Roman
law, any 'unnatural' murder, especially the killing of a close relation, such as a
parent or brother, and particularly unpleasant penalties were imposed for it. It
did not, however, apply in Roman law to the destruction by a parent of a foetus
or new born infant.^ Tertullian, nevertheless, regarding all life as inviolate,
used the word "parricidium" for not only the murder of a grown near-relative
(which Roman law condemned) but also for the interruption of the life-giving
process, (with which Roman law had no concern, except to increase the
population, as mentioned above). Tertullian used parricidium (or it cognates
C 3
parricidio and parriqdalis) nine times in all, and the other references give all
the more point to his use of parricidium in the first letter ad uxorem, for those
who practiced abortion - parricidiis expugnantur. For expugnantur, Kellner
suggested expunguntur, which if correct, graphically pictures abortion procured
by the popular method of aeneum spiculum.
Latrocinium, the other legal word used by Tertullian for the destruction
of foetal life, was derived from X<lTpiS , a 'hired servant' or a 'mercenary
soldier'. In addition to its specific meaning of 'robbery', it came to mean villainy
or criminality, often with the implication of secrecy. The word was used by
Tertullian in de anima 25.5.49, where he described in detail the instruments used
Tertullian was the first writer to use the words infanticidium (used six
times) and infanticida (twice)
2
See W.W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to
Justinian, (2nd ed.; Cambridge: University Press, 1932) p 103, and Theodore
Mommsen, Romisfties Strafrecht, (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1889) p 613. It
was not until A.D. 318, under Constantine, that Roman law made infanticide the
crime of parricidium - Codex Theodosianus 9.17.1. The meaning of the word
parricidium in Roman Law is discussed by H.F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction
to the Study of Roman Law^(2nd ed.; Cambridge: University Press, 1954) p 328.
3
apol 9.4.15; apol 9.6.24; apol 35.11.51; It nat 7.7.28; II nat 12.13.20;
It nat 14.9.5; pud. 14.27.118; scorp 7.2.3; I ux 5.2.10-11.
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in the destruction of the child in its mother's womb, which he called caecum
latrocinium.
On four of the other five occasions, when Tertullian used the word,^ it
bore its ordinary meaning of robbery or banditry, except on one occasion, when it
referred directly to the murder of an adult. The use of such a word for abortion,
taken with Tertullian's other uses of the same word, gives point (as with
parricidium) to the strength of his feelings about the status he gave to the
embryo before God, even if it did not come to live birth. Roman law had no such
concern with the embryo; it had no legal existence and no rights while in the
mother's womb. When it was actually born, its legal life was dated back to the
earliest period of its physical existence, but its capacity for rights originated
only with birth. Until then, an unborn child was considered as no more than a
2 3
part of its mother, mulieris portio, and not as a homo.
*






n.6 CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER TWO
While it would be unfair to press the text of Tertullian too closely for a
definite answer on the relationship of the developing embryo to God, certain
fundamental principles emerge:
(1) The formation of the embryo in the womb was watched over by a
power subservient to God's will and the embryo developed, under the supervision
of God, from the moment of conception to the moment of birth. Where
Tertullian's pagan contemporaries assumed the existence of a special goddess,
Alemona, whose function was to nourish the embryo, and of two other goddesses,
Nona and Decima, to watch over "the critical months", Tertullian insisted that
Christians knew of no supervision other than the angels of God and they were
actively involved on His behalf:-
Omnem autem hominis in utero serendi struendi fingendi paraturam aliqua
utique potestas diuinae uoluntatis ministra modulatur, quamcumque illam
rationem agitare sortita. Haec aestimando etiam superstitio Romana deam
finxit Alemonam alendi in utero fetus et Nonam et Decimam a
sollicitioribus mensibus. 1
(2) Although Tertullian distinguished stages of development - serendi,
struendi, fingendi are mentioned in the passage just quoted and there are other
references - there is no evidence that he distinguised stages in the relationship
of the embryo to God. On the contrary, Tertullian's traducianism and his
implacable opposition to delayed hominisation made him insist that all the
potential of the soul was present in the foetus from the moment of
conception; it was the soul which governed the basic relationship of the embryo
to God, not the physical development of the embryonic body.
Foetus perfectus may not have been present until the later stages of




that. The controlling principle was foetus animatus = foetus humanus, or, as
Tertullian preferred to call it, homo totus. Si fingit deus in utero, et afflat ex
primordii forma: et finxit deus hominem et flauit in eum flatum uitae. Nec
nosset autum hominem deus in utero nisi totum.^ It would have defeated the
argument of de anima 26.5 if homo totus had not applied throughout the
pregnancy. Obviously, homo totus was not the same as foetus perfectus, and
Tertullian said as much in the words which followed. Having emphasised that
God could enter into relationship with embryonic life simply because homo totus
was already present, he went on, in answer to his own question as to how this
could be, to explain that the formation and perfection of the embryo were still
2
to come - body and soul were simul ambas et concipi et confici, perfici.
(3) In his metaphors of growth, examined in Chapter I, Tertullian made
no mention of any further intervention by God, altering God's relationship to the
growing seed, until He brought the seed to fruition.
(4) Tertullian's condemnation of induced abortion followed from his
belief that the embryo was already a person in the sight of God and should be
allowed to live. If the embryo came to full term, and was born alive, a new set
of circumstances would govern its relationship to God - examined in Chapter III
below. In the meantime, what 'now is' had yet to 'come into being', but
paradoxically Tertullian could say that it 'already was'. There is no indication
that at any time 'dum sanguis delibatur' the embryo could be treated as less than
homo. It would come to full term in due course, but the important point was not
to deny it a relationship to God from the beginning, because homo est et qui est
futurus was already in the womb. It was in consequence of the divine presence





point, after conception, where the relationship could be said materially to alter.
(5) Tertullian's writings do not record what pastoral comfort, if any, was
given by him, or by the Church at Carthage, to mothers of miscarried or stillborn
infants. However, if they had asked him about the fate of their children, their
hope of resurrection, their place (if any) in eternal life, it seems likely (for the
"to te
reasons/examined in chapter IV.5) that Tertullian would have assured them the
embryo was not under the judgment of God, Wi that it was assured of an
eternally good destiny, even if it had not come to full term and live birth. It was
iam fato inscribatur.
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CHAPTER THREE - THE RELATIONSHIP OF INFANTS TO GOD
m.l INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER THREE
Tertullian believed that in addition to the inheritance by every child of
the sinful nature of Adam by traducianism (examined in Chapter 1.7), every child,
or at least every pagan child, was subject to satanic attack at birth. In
consequence, the endowments which the soul had received from nature were
further corrupted and obscured. The significance of this, for the relationship of
the infant to God, is examined in the second section of this chapter;the
accountability of the infant to God for its corrupted nature is examined in
Chapter IV. 5.
Tertullian's references to infant mortality are noted in section three. He
had more than ample opportunity to comment on any difference in the
relationship of infants to God, different that is from the relationship of
embryos on the one hand or of children on the other, because at least 25% of the
children born at Carthage in Tertullian's day died in infancy and a further 25%
did not reach puberty. Infants of Christian parentage had certain advantages
over pagan infants, not necessarily physical but in their relationship to God;
these are examined in section four;they were not exposed to the superstitious
practices which surrounded pagan birth, (which practically invited the devil to
enter the new-born soul), and from their early years they were made aware of
their parents' faith. ^ How their relationship to God differed from infants born
into pagan homes, and the implication of every soul being immunda until
baptism, is also examined in section four.
Section five takes up the important question of the extent to which
baptism in infancy could affect the relationship of the child to God. While
Tertullian strongly urged the postponement of baptism until later life, for the
reasons examined in that section, his high view of the significance of baptism
must mean that original sin was washed away, even in the case of an infant. In
section six, several words from Roman Law are found to be relevant to this
chapter, and then conclusions are drawn in section seven on the relationship of
infants to God.
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m.2 THE DEVIL'S ATTACK ON INFANT SOULS
The devil cast an envious eye on every newly-born soul, and the
superstitious practices which surrounded a pagan birth - Tertullian mentioned the
ribbons taken from idols, the prayers to Lucina and Diana, the table set for Juno,
the Fata Scribunda, the lock of hair dedicated to sin, and the assigning of a
2
genius - practically invited the devil to enter the infant soul at birth.
Cui enim hominum non adhaerebit spiritus nequam ab ipsa etiam ianua
natiuitatis animas aucupabundus, uel qua inuitatus tota ilia puerperii
superstitione? 3
In consequence, all the natural faculties of the soul, were (according to
4
Tertullian) further obscured and corrupted by the devil:
Quae omnia natiuitus animae conlata idem, qui in primordio inuidit, nunc
quoque obumbrat atque deprauat, quominus aut ultro prospiciantur aut qua
oportet administrentur. 5
There does not appear to be any significance for this study in Tertullian's
crediting the soul with these endowments at 'birth'. Apart from his clear
teaching that the soul was present from the initial conception, there is no
suggestion anywhere in his works that a new development took place in either
The word "devil" is here used to designate not only satan as an
individual (princeps huius mali generis - apol 22.2.7) but also to designate (as
Tertullian himself did) the sum total of all lesser demons and fallen angels. No
attempt is made in this section to distinguish demons from fallen angels,
although some commentators have suggested that Tertullian believed the demons
inhabited the earth whereas the devil's angels stayed in the air -the relevant
passage is apol 22.6.25-8.39. The devil's angels were the fallen angels who,
according to Genesis 6.1, fell in love with mortal women and from that union
were born the demons. The whole matter is discussed and summed up by Jan H.







Tertullian used the same verbs "obumbrat" and "deprauat" to describe




soul or body, at the moment of birth, which altered the relationship to God,
except that the devil stepped in further to corrupt the infant soul. Because of
that, Tertullian could say nulla ferme nativitas munda est, utique ethnicorum.^
That this impurity was additional to the vitium originis which already
marred the infant soul was emphasised by Tertullian and was important to him.
He made a clear distinction between original sin and this new source of sin
caused by the invasion of an evil spirit; he discussed the former at length in de
anima chapter 40 and 41 and distinguished it from the latter, which he had just
discussed in chapter 39.
Malum igitur animae, praeter quod ex obuentu spiritus nequam superstruitur,
ex originis uitio antecedit, naturale quodammondo. 2
In other words, the invasion by the devil, at the moment of birth, produced in the
soul an additional kind of evil, different from the vitium originis of the soul and
with its own consequences' for the child. The evil which resulted from original
sin was a second nature to the soul - (it too was attributed by Tertullian to the
3
'author of all corruption' ) - and it lived in every soul until baptism washed it
away. Tertullian did not, however, think of original sin as an evil spirit actually
4
dwelling in man; it was only at birth, when the devil stepped in to be ready to
influence the child to commit actual and specific evil deeds as the child grew








The de anima 39.4 passage does not describe 'Satan dwelling in
unbaptised children' as Schwane thought it did; Joseph Schwane,
(Dogmengeschiate der vornicanischen Zeit, (2nd ed.; Freiburg (Schweiz):
Theologische Bibliothek, 1892) I, 342.) Dolger corrected him, pointing out that
the devil was not indwelling, but was only now endeavouring to catch the infant
souls. (Franz Joseph Dolger, Der Exorzismus im altchristlichen Taufritual,
Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, Band HI, Heft 1/2 (Paderborn:
1909) p 342).
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This satanic attack on the soul at birth seems to have had little, if any,
immediate significance for Tertullian, respecting the relationship of infant life
to God. Having devoted de anima chapter 39 to the 'invasion' of the soul at
every pagan birth, he declared, at the opening of the following chapter, that
every soul was considered to be born in Adam until it had been re-born in Christ,
and every soul was immunda until it had been thus regenerated; in other words,
the relationship to God of the infant soul depended on its inherited
characteristics, not on the satanic invasion at birth. Although the sinfulness
caused by evil spirits led Tertullian to declare (as mentioned already) that nulla
ferme natiuitas munda est, utique ethnicorum,* it was in fact already
immunda, by virtue of original sin. The words at the end of chapter 39 aire
closely linked in Tertullian's thought to the words at the beginning of Chapter 40,
as is evident from his discussion on purification from sin through baptism - but
the status of the soul before God, at least as Tertullian expressed it here, was
determined by the transmission of its original nature, not by the impurity caused
by the devil, about which he had been speaking. The emphasis may not have been
without its own signiqifance to him, because he was concerned to show Christian
parents, who had shunned the pagan customs which attracted the evil spirits,
that even for them every soul was immunda until baptism; this he could do only
by tracing the immunda back to original sin, and not just to the devil's attack on
pagan souls at birth.
Tertullian's list of the actual ceremonies at and following birth in a
pagan household is not (with one exception) explored here, because it does not
assist in understanding the infant's relationship to God. Brief mention should,
however, be made of the second last ceremony on the list, namely that after a





advocantur; this merits attention, because Tertullian had already stated that
the embryo was fata iam inscribitur and the significance of the 'Fates' should be
established.
Tertullian's reference to invoking the Fata Scribunda a week after
childbirth is the only mention of the 'Writing Fates' in all extant Latin literature,
secular or religious. Weisweiler took the view that Tertullian was referring
simply to the "fate" of the newly-born child and that capital letters were
3
inappropriate for the words in the text. However, as Breemer and Waszink
remarked, "the circumstance that these Fata form part of an enumeration of
female divinities connected in some way with human birth, and, moreover, the
verfa advocantur, make it perfectly certain, that they too were regarded by
4
Tertullian as divine beings." In fact, Tertullian referred to some kind of
petition on the eighth day after birth to these "Writing Goddesses of Fate"
(taking "Scribunda" as meaning "scribentia"). Since it was on the eightlday (the
"dies lustricus") that Roman children received their praenomen, it seems a
reasonable inference that the Fata Scribunda were not invoked until the ultimus
5
dies (i.e. the dies lustricus ) because children lacked something at birth which
they had to have before the Fata Scribunda could be addressed - viz. a
praenomen. This is not entirely conjecture, because the Romans regarded the
giving of the praenomen as entitling the child to an independent existence. The






J. Weisweiler, "Zur Erklarung der Arvalacten," Neue Jahrbucher fur
Philologie und Paedogogik, 139 (1889), 39.
4
S. Breemer and J.H. Waszink, "Fata Scribunda," Mnemosyne, 3rd series,
13 (1947), 254.
5
Breemer and Waszink demonstrate their equivalence at op. cit., p 258-
259.
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usually falls off about the seventh day; after that, the child could be regarded as
no longer forming a part of the mother, but as possessing an independent
existence, which justified its receiving a name of its own and therefore a fate of
its own. At that ceremony, the Fata Scribunda were called on -to "take notes",
just like a scriba or a notarius. Since Tertullian regarded all the gods of Roman
superstition as manifestations of the devil's deception, here was yet another
invitation by the pagans to the devil to take up his residence in the life of the
newly-born child.
The attacks of the devil assumed even greater significance for Tertullian
as life went on - diabolo tamen captante naturam, quam et ipse jam infecit
delicti semine inlato^ - but this will be examined in chapter IV.2. In the
meantime, the relative importance of the two Satanic influences on infant life,
that is original sin and the invasion of the soul by the devil at birth, can be
examined by reference to those who died under the disability the first before






Infant mortality, even among the free Roman population in the healthier
parts of Africa, was as high as 200 to 250 per 1000 live births; * in the
pestilential city of Carthage and with infant mortality among the slave
population added, the percentage must have been horrifyingly worse. Tertullian's
writings record nothing about individual children who died in infancy, but he used
the concept of infant mortality on one occasion to illustrate his teaching on the
abode of the soul between death and resurrection - ecce obiit uerbi gratia infans
sub uberum fontibus.^ The soul of such an infant, although already possessing all
its faculties, would not (Tertullian insisted) develop any further - in particular it
would not develop any further relationship with God. He had to insist on that to
avoid the absurdity, at the resurrection, of joining a soul with eighty years of
experience to the body of an infant which had died at one month. Since the soul
was going to enter the very same body as it had left at death - and Tertullian
meant that, quite literally: corpora eadem recepturas in resurrectione animas in
3
quibus discesserunt - the soul must remain at the same age, and have the same
experience, as the body from which it had temporarily departed.
His only other direct reference to the relationship of infant life to God
came later in the same chapter, where he wrote about the presence, in the
4
"good" part of Hades, of animas immaturas . . . puras et innocuas. It is
^These statistics were excerpted from an article by A.R. Burn, "Hie
Breve Vivitur: A Study in the Expectation of Life in the Roman Empire", Past
and Present, (November 1953), 14.
2
am 56.5.33. A brief outline of Tertullian's understanding of life after
death is set out in chapter VI.4 below.
3
am 56.5.38-39. When this view was questioned, he stated "habes
scriptum: Et mandabo piscibus maris et eructuabunt ossa, quae sunt comesta, et
faciam conpaginem ad conpaginem et os ad os" - res 32.1.2-4.
4
an 56.8.64-65. The background to this passage was set out briefly at
chapter 1.8 above.
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significant for this study that de anima chapter 56, which was not really
concerned with infants, contains the only two references in all of Tertullian's
works to the fate of the infant soul. With the incidence of infant mortality by
natural causes, by calamity and by infanticide,^ the relationship of infants to
God must have been widely discussed - whether they should have been baptised,
where their souls had gone, and similar questions. Yet it was only in de anima
56, which was written to deal with misunderstandings about the interim fate of
the adult soul, that Tertullian even mentioned the relationship to God of a child
which had died in infancy.
Although an argument from silence is normally precarious, it seems
justified here. The relationship of infants to God cannot have been of any real
significance for Tertullian, and this will become even more evident when the
question of infant baptism is considered in section m.5 below. It does however
seem reasonable, even at this stage, to infer that Tertullian made no comment,
despite the many opportunities for doing so, because he had nothing distinctive
to say about the relationship of infants to God - nothing, that is, which he had not
already said about the relationship of fetal life to God (examined in Chapter II)
or the relationship of older children to God (to be examined in Chapter IV).
Infanticide was still practiced at Carthage, Tertullian claimed, by
exposure, drowning and other unpleasant methods - I nat. 15.3.21-4.28.
Tertullian there commented on the absence of any effective laws against
infanticide, and his reference to Roman Law is examined in Section m^below.
He referred to infanticide also in the parallel passage of apol 9.3.8-11 and 7.28-
31.
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m.4 WHETHER CHRISTIAN PARENTAGE AFFECTED THE RELATIONSHIP
Tertullian went straight from his general statement - Adeo nulla ferme
natiuitas munda est, utique ethnicorum ^ - to contrast birth of pagan parentage
with birth where one or other or both of the parents were Christians:
Hinc enim et apostolus ex sanctifi^cato alterutro sexu sanctos procreari
ait, tam ex seminis praerogatiua quam ex institutionis disciplina.
Ceterum, inquit, immundi nascerentur, quasi designatos tam en
sanctitatis ac per hoc etiam salutis intellegi uolens fidelium filios, ut
huius spei pignore matrimoniis, quae retinenda censuerat,
patrocinaretur. Alioquin meminerat dominicae definitionis: nisi quis
nascetur ex aqua et spiritu, non inibit in regnum dei, id est, non erit
sanctus. 2
Then, as if he felt that even in that he might have conceded too much, he went
on with the all-embracing statement that
omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donee in Christo recenseatur,
tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur. 3
From that passage, two complementary principles seem to emerge -
(a) there were two definite advantages of being born with Christian
parentage - whether only one or both were Christian. First, because of
Christian origin (seminis praerogatiua) such children were not to be
considered altogether impure, because they were destined to be pure
(designati sanctitatis); second, such children would, as they grew older,
receive Christian instruction (ex institutionis disciplina) and so because of
the sanctifying influence of Christian parentage in the home, they would
4
learn naturally to grow into the way of sanctification.




an 40.1.1-3, examined at 1.7 and m.2 above and mentioned at
1.8 above.
4
Tertullian placed considerable importance on this. When he laid down
the rule in d£ idolatria that Christians should not in any circumstances be
teachers, he did not forbid them to be pupils. Apart from the obvious reasons
for that - dum docet, commendat, dum tradit, affirmat, dum commemorat,
testimonium dicit (idol 10.5.20-22) - Tertullian appears to have assumed sufficiently sound
Christian instruction in the home to safeguard the pupil from the dangers of pagan
schooling.
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(b) on the other hand, all children, Christian parentage or not, were impure
(immunda) until they had been baptised.
What these principles meant, in practical terms, for the relationship of infant
life to God, is less easy to determine. If infants were not exposed to the
superstitious practices which surrounded and followed pagan birth, the devil did
not receive the open invitation to enter and so to obscure the infant soul. While
pagans were invoking Farinus and Locutius to preside over the infant's speech,
and Cunina to protect the child's slumber, and while Potina and Edula were being
invited to supervise the child's eating and drinking, Statina to teach it to stand,
and Adeona and Abeona to lead its footsteps to and fro,^ the child in a Christian
home was being taught Christian character, Christian language, and Christian
practices, it would therefore be more natural for the infant, as it grew into
childhood, to adopt a similar character, similar language and eventually to
accept Christian practices. But such infants were still immunda in the sight of
God, and, as examined in section m.2, this, rather than the activity of the devil,
went to the root of their standing before God. What then was the difference, in
their relationship to God, of children of Christian parentage?
Paul's aim in I Corinthians 7.14 (the passage quoted by Tertullian) was to
encourage the Christian partner in a mixed marriage to remain in family with
the other, partly for the spiritual good of the children of the marriage and partly
because Paul wished marriage itself to endure. By saying what he did about
sanctification, Paul did not intend, protested Tertullian, in any way to undermine
the need for baptism for forgiveness of sin and Tertullian wished that Paul
might have said so a little more clearly! Then on the other occasion when he
took up Paul's use of the Corinthian passage, Tertullian was again defending Paul




Christians to marry pagans.^ What Paul intended to say, argued Tertullian, was
that one spouse, converted to Christianity from paganism, should not desert the
other. By remaining in family, sanctificatur enim infidelis uir a fideli uxore et
infideli uxor a fideli marito; ceterum immundi essent filii uestri? 2
Patently and unarguably, Tertullian did not mean that the marriage
relationship of a pagan to a Christian could make the former into a Christian -
yet, he said, the pagan sanctificatur. It seems a reasonable inference that when,
in the passage in de anima, Tertullian said children were sanctos . . ex
sanctificato alteruto sexu - privileged on account of their origin and their
Christian instruction - the word was used in the same sense. In other words,
without that privilege, children born of Christian parents or mixed marriages
would be on a level with pagans. They were not - they were destined to be
saved, but (like the spouse of a Christian) they would attain this salvation only by
their own baptism in due course.
What then, was the relationship to God of an infant of a Christian
parent? On the one hand, there was a statable difference from an infant born
into a pagan home; on the authority of 1 Corinthians 7:14, Tertullian argued that
such children were not altogether impure - they were destined for salvation. On
the other hand, Tertullian was as much concerned to stress their need of
baptism, in due course, as he was to define the nature of their privilege from
Christian parentage. He expressly distinguished this inherited sanctification
from that which would be accomplished at a later period through baptism,
namely regeneration. In chapters 39 and 40 of de anima, he affirmed the
'Adamic', unclean, sinful condition of every soul that was not 'enrolled in Christ'.
He left his readers in no doubt that all mankind had inherited sin, or at least a
Hanc monitionem fors de fidelibus infidelibus iunctis simpliciter




sinful nature; he was at pains to stress that Christian parentage did not remove
that disability. The privileges attaching to Christian parentage were put firmly
back into the context of Tertullian's underlying and fundamental proposition:
Ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donee in Christo
recenseatur, tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur, peccatrix autem ,
quia immunda, recipiens ignominiam et carnis ex societate. 1
The evil which afflicted the soul (malum animae) was no mere superstructure due
to the invasion of the evil spirit in pagan children only, but was there by fault of
origin (ex originis witio antecedit). The basic corruption of every nature was
indeed a second nature, and nothing except baptism would tear away the curtain
of primal corruption. What then would be the relationship of the child to God if
the parents presented the child for baptism in its infancy? That important




m.5 WHETHER BAPTISM IN INFANCY AFFECTED THE RELATIONSHIP
A comparatively recent (and much-acclaimed) survey of the literature
dealing with the fate of unbaptised infants assumed that Tertullian believed
those who died unbaptised, even in infancy, could not be saved. ^ The author
cites no evidence for this assumption, and indeed none exists, yet another recent
article attributed to Tertullian anachronistically a place in limbo for such
children. ^
Although Tertullian's writings contain the first explicit reference to
infant baptism in the Fathers^ there are persistent suggestions in scholarly works
that in advising against the baptism of infants, Tertullian was expressing a
3
personal or minority view. While this study is primarily concerned with the
views of Tertullian, and not with the views of commentators of him, it must be
Peter Gumpel, "Unbaptised Infants: May they be saved?", The Downside
Review, (Autumn 1954), 342-458 (the entire volume), supplemented by
'Unbaptised Infants - A Further Report', ibid, (Autumn 1955), 317-346.
(Cyril J. Means, op. cit., p 20.
3
"It is plain that Tertullian is uging his own private scruples against what
was then a prevalent practice, and that this ch. cannot be quoted as early
testimony against the use." Lupton, op. cit., pp 49-50.
"He could hardly have taken this attitude (apparently in opposition to what was
already common enough church practice) unless he had held lightly to the
doctrine of original sin." Ernest Evans, Tertullian's Homily on Baptism, (London:
S.P.C.K., 1964) p 101.
"In his objection to the baptism of infants Tertillian is evidently protesting
against a custom which (with or without apostolic authority) was already taken
for granted", ibid.,p 104.
'The only opponent of infant baptism among the Fathers is the eccentric and
schismatic Tertullian of North Africa'. Henry Hart Milman, The history of
Christianity from the birth of Christ to the abolition of paganism in the Roman
empire, (Revised edition; London: J. Murray,
1867) I, 261.
"It is well worth noting that Tertullian is the first opponent of Infant Baptism on
record, and that he opposed it simply from the standpoint of his theory of
Baptismal regeneration. But "his protest", as Dr. Schaff says "fell without an
echo." We hear no more of opposition to infant Baptism until the Anabaptists
arose in the sixteenth century." D. Douglas Bannerman, Difficulties about
Baptism, (prepared at the request of The Publications Committee of the General
Assembly of The Free Church of Scotland) (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant,
Anderson & Ferrier, 1898) p 82.
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said that even he could hardly have advocated a delay in baptism in the terms
which he did, not only for infants and children, (paruuli) but also for bachelors
and (presumably young) widows, if infant baptism had been regarded by the rest
of the Church as an apostolic institution. As it was, Tertullian not only
encouraged the practice of deferring baptism until the candidate could
appreciate the significance of what he was doing, but he encouraged deferment
until the candidate had sown his wild oats and had settled down to a Christian
life-style. This followed logically from Tertullian's teaching that for post-
baptismal sin there might be no remission, and, if there was, it was at the
expense of long and humiliating public paenitentia.
After arguing that the baptisms of the Ethiopian eunuch and Paul ought
not to be taken as precedents for hasty baptism, Tertullian went on to say:
itague pro cuiusque personae condicione ac dispositione, etiam aetate
cunctatio baptismi utilior est, praecipue tamen circa paruulos. Quid
enim necesse, si non tarn necesse est, sponsores etiam periculo ingeri qui
et ipsi per mortalitatem destituere promissiones suas possunt et prouentu
malae indolis falli? Ait guidem dominus: Nolite illos prohibere ad me
uenire. Veniant ergo dum adolescunt dum discunt, dum quo ueniant
docentur; fiant Christiani cum Christum nosse potuerint! Quid festinat
innocens aetas ad remissionem peccatorum? Cautius agetur in
saecularibus, ut cui substantia terrena non creditur diuina credatur?
Norint petere salutem ut petentibus dedisse uidearis! 1
This advice on the deferment of baptism caused concern to certain adolescent
catechumens, who feared they might be martyred, unbaptised. They no doubt
recollected that Perpetua and her companions were still unbaptised catechumens
at the moment of their arrest; they knew Tertullian's 'standing rule'; Cum uero
praescribitur nemini sine baptismo competere salutem ex ilia maxim e
2
pronuntiatione domini qui ait: Nisi natus ex aqua quis erit non habebit uitam .






Tertullian gave to those who might die a martyr's death before baptism. * Yet
there is no record in any of Tertullian's works of corresponding concern for
youngsters who might die from natural causes or who were weakly, or who were
exposed to danger. If, during their childhood or adolescence, they had stood in
danger of the judg3nent of God, if indeed they were to be damned by reason of
original sin, would Tertullian have discouraged their baptism in infancy? Was it
not, as Refoule commented on Tertullian's treatise on baptism, that "meme dans




Reference to the influence of the devil in infant life prompts the
question of whether Tertullian's teaching on baptism differed between the
children of those who were themselves coming to faith for the first time - a
whole family, for example, of first generation converts - and children born into
an existing Christian home. Jeremias believed that Tertullian's advice to
postpone the baptism of children "referred to the children of pagan parents and
4
to them alone"; although it is a point much emphasised in modern debate,
Tertullian drew no such distinction. In addition to the text quoted at the
beginning of this section, there is the passage de anima chapters 39-40 (examined
in the last section), where Tertullian followed Paul in stating that the children of




Evans (op. cit., p 102) quotes Fr Refoule in these words and adds his own
approval. I cannot find the quotation in Refoule's Traite du Bapteme and Evans
does not indicate the source of the quotation.
3
As seen in the previous section, the foothold gained by the devil in infant
life was greater for children of pagan parents because of the superstitious
practices which surrounded pagan childbirth.
4
Joachim Jeremias, Die Kindertaufe in den ersten vier Jahrhunderten,
(Gottingen: 1958) - English translation by David Cairns, Infant Baptism in the
First Four Centuries, (London: S.C.M. Press, 1964) p 86.
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might have been expected to encourage Christian parents to have their children
baptised; instead of that, Tertullian emphasised to them the malum, animae of
all, whatever their parentage. This evil could be removed only by baptism, and
that once only - hence Tertullian's advice (to Christian parents) that deferment
of baptism was both proper and profitable.
That does not, of course, answer the question of whether baptism in
infancy would, if administered, have altered the relationship of the infant to
God. As Jeremias put it, he did not challenge "the legitimacy, but only the
expediency, of their baptism."^ It was one of Tertullian's basic beliefs that
nothing except baptism (or martyrdom) could take away the corruption of
original sin: Ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donee in Christo
2
recenseatur, tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur. On the other hand, it was
another of Tertullian's beliefs (and an equally basic one) that baptism without
faith was of no avail for the remission of sin:
Lauacrum illud obsignatio est fidei, quae fides a paenitentiae fide
incipitur et commendatur. Non ideo abluimur ut delinguere desinamus
sed quia desiimus, quoniam iam corde loti sumus. 3
Anima enim non lauatione, sed responsione sancitur. 4
The relationship between faith and baptism is explored in chapter VHI.6, but for
the present it may be said that when two principles conflict, the higher principle
must prevail. In view of that, there can be no doubt that, if the point had been
put to Tertullian, he would have agreed that the baptism, even of an infant,








washed away its sin. He would no doubt have counselled the parents or 'sponsors'*
to postpone the baptism, because of his concern that it should not be entered
into until the candidate had matured and settled down. Furthermore, Tertullian
was concerned about (what he regarded as) the dangerous and growing laxity of
church discipline, and he was in favour of more rigorous discipline even before he
became a Montanist. Baptism was the gateway to the church and was the
obvious place for strictness to be inculcated; to bring children to baptism at an
age when they could not be established in the Christian life-style would tend to
undermine the discipline for which he was so much concerned.
On the other hand, when all that has been said, 'Quid festinat innocens
aetas ad remissionem peccatorum?' must mean that an infant, thus baptised, had
a new and different relationship with God - it had the forgiveness of original sin.
The sponsors of the child then became responsible for guiding the child until it
was able itself to live a life free from the sins which could undo the efficacy of
baptism. There could be no second (water) baptism, and Tertullian's concern,
which he expressed here as an argument against infant baptism, was that the
sponsors might be prevented from fulfilling, either by their own death or by the
untoward conduct of the child, the obligation which an early baptism had placed
on them and on the child. The use of festinare seem to indicate that that some
people hurried their children to baptism without stopping to consider the
significance of baptism and the responsibilities it placed on those who brought
them forward. Tertullian gave no indication at all whether infants or children
who were (contrary to his advice) baptised at a young age - for evidently the
children in question were not necessarily 'infants' - received water-baptism only
or whether they were completely initiated, like adult candidates, at the same
time.
Tertullian said nothing about the exact duties which devolved on the
sponsor, nor did he indicate who normally acted in that capacity. He did,
however, state that sponsorship carried with it both responsiblity and a
continuous interest in the infant for whom the answers had been made - bapt
18.4.25-27.
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m.6 ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
When Tertullian contrasted pagan parentage with Christian parentage,
saying that the children of the latter (including children of a mixed marriage
where one was a Christian) were (sanctos) ex seminis praerogativa . . designatos
tamen sanctitatis . . . huius spei pignore, whereas the children of the former
were by the idolatry surrounding childbirth geminina sua daemoniorum candidata
profitentur, he used severed words taken from Roman law - praerogativa,
designatos, pignore and canditata. However, looking at the context, it seems
clear that Tertullian simply used words which he found useful to set down
concepts already in his mind - or in the mind of the apostle Paul; there is no
indication that the ideas behind these words from Roman law shaped his
thinking, on any aspect of the relationship of the infant to God. When he
indignantly repudiated the charge made by the heathen against the Christians,
that they practiced infanticide, he lamented the ineffectiveness of Roman law to
deal with what he, as a Christian, believed to be God's will for infant life:
infantes editos enecantes legibus quidem prohibemini, sed nullae magis
leges tarn impune, tam secure sub omnium conscientia unius aeditui
tabellis eluduntur .... Atquin hoc asperius, quod frigore et fame aut
bestiis, si exponitis aut longiore in aquis morte, si mergitis. 1
2
Mommsen identified this as a reference to a law of the pre-repub&can days,
which punished the abandonment of children, but this law had fallen into
desuetude by Tertullian's day. Obviously he wished that it had not - and that the
law would support his condemnation of infanticide.
While that passsage from ad nationes illustrates how little Tertullian had
in common with current legal thinking, relative to the importance of infant life,
another passage, from the apologeticum, highlights even more the gap between
1
I nat 15.3.22-25 and 4.26-28.
2 .
op. cit., p 619.
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Roman law and Tertullian's position as a Christian. He accused the pagans of not
only sacrificing children to Saturn, down to fairly recent times, but that parents
had sacrificed their own children: quos quidem ipsi parentes sui offerebant, et
libentes respondebant et infantibus blandiebantur, ne lacrimantes immolarentur.
Et tamen multum homicidio parricidium differt!^ The last sentence repudiates,
with that irony of which Tertullian was such a master, the pretended
"justification by ownership". For Tertullian, parenthood gave no right to dispose
of infant life - it was already sacred to God and in a relationship to Him. The
depth and the passion of the irony are underlined a little later on - Sed quoniam
de infanticidio nihil interest, sacro an arbitrio patretur, licet de parricidio
2
intersit, conuertar ad populum.
The position of the paterfamilias who had the right of life or death over
his offspring, will be taken up in detail in chapter VII. 5, where the question is
explored as to how far Tertullian saw the relationship of man to God in terms of
the filius/paterfamilias relationship. For this present section, it is sufficient to
note that if a child was born alive but weakly, or with any abnormality, Roman
law and society took it for granted that the parents could destroy or abandon the
3
child at birth.
For the other two main areas which have been covered in this chapter,
namely the invasion of the infant soul by the devil and the extent to which the
relationship of the infant to God depended on parentage and baptism, Roman law
seems to point to the very opposite of what Tertullian taught. At the moment of
birth, and by the mere fact of birth, the legitimate child on took on the legal






Seneca, de Ira 1.15 and Ad Helviam 16.1 Suetonius, Gaius Caligula 5.30,
in De Vita Caesarum.
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law regulated the capacity and responsibility of the child on a graduated scale
according to age. First of all, the law recognised the age of infancy, the limit of
which was defined by the inability to speak. During this, approximately the
child's first two years, the child was infans, qui fari non potest, and because of
this, the infant had no legal capacity of any description. The infant then moved
into a second period, childhood, from the time when the faculty of speech
accrued and this lasted up to the age of puberty. Still there was no persona,
necessary for the accomplishment of the acts of civil law, but, with the
assistance of a tutor, the child over two years old could act, because the
authority of his tutor completed his persona. The law presumed that if the
infant could utter the necessary words, the tutor could be his auctor and between
them they could carry out the acts required by civil law; indeed an impubes who
had completed his seventh year was capable of juristic acts if they were to his
own advantage.* Then, thirdly, came puberty, the exact date of which was in
theory indefinite as regards the individual (because it depended on the physical
fact, the generating faculty) but by Tertullian's time some jurists, from
motives of decency,had fixed the date for females at the precise age of twelve
2
years, and for males at fourteen years. Children were called impubes before
this period, and pubes as soon as they had reached it. Fourthly, came majority -
fixed at the age of twenty-five years, when full moral development was assumed,
and full maturity of judgment. A man could no longer be protected against the
consequences of his own acts by the intervention of the praetor, at least under
ordinary circumstances. Finally came old age (senectus), for which Roman law
fixed no precise term, but which, as fax as regards exemption from public duties,
began at the age of seventy.
Institutes 1.21. pr.
2
The jurists are named, and the matter discussed further, at the end of
chapter IV.6 below.
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Tertullian made no reference at all to these convenient distinctions of
age and responsibility, in connection with the relationship of the individual to
God. When he dealt with puberty, he expressly repudiated the influence of
Roman law, as will be examined in chapter IV.5 below. As for the rest, he used
the "ages" of man only to illustrate the revelation of God to successive
generations, from the creation of the world until the coming of the Paraclete,
and not for the growth of the individual in his relationship to God. Against
Marcion (who claimed to find differences between the old law and the new),
against the Jews (who would not recognise God's revelation in Christ) and against
Catholics (who would not accept his understanding of the discipline of the
Paraclete), Tertulian used a variety of metaphors to show the progressive
revelation of God, appropriate to every successive period from the beginning of
the world until his own time. His metaphors of vegetable growth are not
relevant to this present section, but in de virginibus velandis Tertullian set out
the analogy of biological growth to demonstrate that 'righteousness' was both
progressive and at the same time continuous.^ Four stages could be
distinguished:
The original state (rudimenta) = Man's natural fear of God
Children (infantia) = The Mosaic Law and the Prophets
Youth and manhood (iuventus) = The Gospel preached by Christ
Mature age (maturitas) = The Paraclete
Sic et iustitia (nam idem Deus iustitiae et creaturae) primo fuit in
rudimentis, natura Deum metuens; dehinc per legem et prophetas promouit in
infantiam, dehinc per euangelium efferbuit in iuuentutem, nunc per Paracletum
componitur in maturitatem - virg. 1.7.46-50.
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Labriolle detected something of a "point de vue legaliste" here, and wrote:
La revelation divine lui apparait done sous les especes d'une legislation qui
se modifie, se corrige, et surtout se resserre progressivement. II n'est pas
plus etonne d'en constater revolution qu'il ne s'offesne des promulgations de
lois nouvelles ou des abrogations de lois anciennes dans les Codes humains. 1
Be that as it may, Tertullian did not use the categories of human bijlogical
development, important as they were in Roman Law, to suggest any distinction
in man's relationship with God (except at puberty, where he denied any influence
on him by Roman Law).
Pierre de Labriolle, "Tertullien Jurisconsulte", Nouvelle Revue Historique
de Droit Francais et Etranger, 30 (1906), 15.
i
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m.7 CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER THREE
On the basis of Tertullian's contention that it would be absurd for an
eighty year old soul to return to an infant body, mentioned in section III.3, it may
be concluded that the soul, by joining with the body, had itself become infans,
and indeed Tertullian said as much elsewhere. ^ Whatever knowledge the bodily
senses may have had of God, whatever the relationship of the body to God, that
determined, for the time being, the relationship of the soul to God. Yet,
alongside the illustration about the absurdity of a mature intelligent soul in the
body of an infant, must be set the passages where Tertullian specifically refuted
Aristotle's view that infants had no capacity to think. The soul of the child was
born with not only sense but with intellect, created by God and for God, and
equipped, not with a ready-made understanding of God, but with the ability,
through the evidence which would later be presented to it, of coming to an
understanding and knowledge of God. The relationship of the infant soul to God
was therefore the relationship of the infant body to God - on God's part, care,
concern, and supervision; on the part of the infant, ignorance of God's existence.
In other words, the love of God and the care of God was manifest to the infant,
but the infant had as yet no appreciation of it.
The infant, newly arrived in the world, might be possessed of two
separate kinds of evil - certainly of one. Children born to Christian parents, (or
even children of a mixed marriage where only one parent was a Christian but the
home observed Christian practices, not heathen), were spared the immediate
invasion of satanic influence, and so were in a slightly different position than
children in a pagan home. Tertullian did not, however, make much of that,
because they too were immunda, by virtue of original sin. The almost total
an 31.2.8-9 - Omnes enim ab infantia imbuuntur, qua infans reuertatur.
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silence, throughout Tertullian's works, on the relationship of infants to God leads
to the reasonable inference that he had nothing distinctive to say on the topic.
In addition to the argument from silence, there are four positive factors which
seem to confirm that the relationship of infants to God was a quietly developing
relationship, and not one with distinctive features of its own.
(a) The fact that soul and body grew together, obviously not yet at the
stage of a conscious relationship with God, but with no new factor to be added to
them before they developed and matured to the point where a conscious
relationship was possible - examined in chapter 1.6 above.
(b) The presence of the departed infant (soul) in the 'good' part of
Hades, without definition of the years of innocence - animas immaturas ... et
pro condicione aetatis puras et innocuas, ^ examined in chapter 1.8 above.
(c) The advice to defer baptism, not just beyond infancy and childhood,
but until years of discretion - examined in section IH.5 above.
(d) The invasion of the soul by sinful desires at the age of fourteen,
without further classification or distinction below that age - to be examined in
chapter IV.5 below.
As for Roman Law, it is difficult to see any instance in this chapter
where Tertullian could be said to have expressed the relationship of infants to




CHAPTER FOUR - THE RELATIONSHIP OF CHILDREN TO GOD
IV. 1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER FOUR
Satan's attack on the individual human soul, which had begun, for the
pagan at any rate, at the moment of birth, continued and intensified as the child
grew older. Tertullian gave less emphasis to the spiritual battle in heavenly
places than he did to the practical outworking of that battle in the lives of
individuals. This topic obviously goes beyond childhood and into manhood (which
is studied later in the thesis) but the opportunity is taken, in section two of this
chapter, to look at all the texts relevant to the devil's bid to win the lives of
men, up to their baptism (where this study stops).
One of the fundamental tenets of Tertullian's anthropology was that the
soul gave the lead to the body, in all the important decisions of life. Although
this too is obviously of greater significance for the period after children had
come to adolescence and manhood, the whole topic is taken together at this
point in the thesis, and section three deals with the texts showing the initiative
taken by the soul. Section four takes up the topic - also relevant throughout the
thesis - of whether Tertullian made any significant distinction between male and
female in their relationship with God. Section five reverts to the specific
subject-matter of this chapter, the relationship of children to God, and examines
Tertullian's assertion that children were innocent of the knowledge of good and
evil until the age of fourteen. That leads naturally to an examination of the
Roman law for this area - which Tertullian expressly contrasted with his own
teaching. Conclusions are then draw in section seven.
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IV.2 THE DEVIL'S BID FOR THE SOUL
Satan's attack on the individual soul, which commenced with the pagan
birth-ceremonies, ^ continued and intensified as the child grew older. Although
it is no part of this study to investigate the relationship between the growing
child and the devil, ^ except insofar as it illustrates the relationship of the child
to God, it should be noted that Tertullian saw the whole of the Roman
educational system, based as it was on the customs of the pagan world,
undermining the 'good' which God had implanted in the soul. The pagan gods
3 4
were demons - Hinc prima diabolo fides aedificatur ab initiis eruditionis .
Tertullian believed (although he had to be careful not to give amy encouragement
5
to gnostic dualism ) that the devil was in direct rivalry with God for the souls of
men - one of his most frequent description of satan was aemulus dei.
super haec, si et aliquae praesunt potestates. Enimuero praesunt, secundum
nos guidem deus dominus et diabolus aemulus, 6
Examined at chapter IH.2 above. Apart from specific attacks, then and
later, Tertullian was not unmindful that Satan had already corrupted every new¬
born child through original sin, but that was not enough for satan - diabolo tamen
captante naturam, quam et ipse iam infecit delicti semine inlato - V Marc
17.10.21-22.
2
Tertullian, like many other ancient Christian writers, described man as
the praeda (booty) or the captive slave of satan, from which captivity he could
be freed only by the sacrament of baptism - e.g. Liberantur de saeculo nationes,
per aquam scilicet et diabolum dominatorem pristinum in aqua obpressum
derelinquunt - bapt 9.1.7-8; cf. Jean Rivere, "Tertullien et les droits du demon}1
Recherches de Science Religieuse, 6 (1926), 199-216.
3




A point emphasised by Christian Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der
Versohnung, (Tubingen: 1883) p 52.
em 20.4.32-5.34. Aemulus, as noun, abjective or in verbal from (e.g.
varie diabolus aemulatus est veritatem) *appears 94 times in Tertullian's works.
The devil was God's only aemulus. Alterius enim esse non possunt, si dei non
sunt, quia aemuli sint necesse est, quae dei non sunt, alius autem praeter
diabolum et angelos eius aemulus dei non est - I cult 8.3.11-14.
* i.i z
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aere isto potitus, sicut dicere eum propheta refert: ponam in nubibus
thronum meum: ero similis altissimo. Hie erit diabolus, quem et alibi, si
tamen ita et apostolum legi uolunt, deum aeui huius agnoscemus. 1
Although the 'powers' were in 'heavenly places', Tertullian saw the real battle¬
ground in the minds of men - quaedam ratio aemulae operationis insequitur, hoc
primum agens, ut homines nolint scire pro certo, quod se nescire pro certo
sciunt. Ideo et credunt de nobis quae non probantur. 2 The antithesis apparently
<X
intended, in that rather confused sentence, is that qujeda>m ratio aemulae
operationis (i.e. satan and his rebel angels) would try to prevent men (who knew
themselves to be ignorant about Christianity) from enlightening their minds by
acquiring any knowledge about it: ille scilicet spiritus daemonicae et angelicae
paraturae, qui noster ob diuortium aemulus et ob Dei gratiam inuidus de
3
mentibus uestris adversus nos proeliatur occulta inspiratione modulatis.
From the very beginning, the devil had tried to destroy mankind, individually,
and once he had gained a foothold in the mind of man, the whole of life was at
risk:
Operatio eorum est hominis euersio; sic malitia spiritalis a primordio
auspicata est in hominis exitium. Itague corporibus guidem et ualetudines
infligunt et aliquos casus acerbos, animae vero repentinos et extraordinarios
per uim excessus. Suppetit illis ad utramque substantiam hominis adeundam
mira subtilitas et tenuitas sua. Multum spiritalibus uiribus licet. 4
While much of Tertullian's teaching about the wiles of the devil lies
outside the scope of this study - relating as it does to his desperate attempts to
5










e.g. paen 7.7.23-9.34; Dux 4.1.1-4; ex 2.7.42,43; an 47.2.13-16; some
reference to this will be made when the final preparations for baptism are
examined in chapter VOL5. It is no part of this study to consider Tertullian's
teaching that presecution was willed by God and permitted by God, the devil
being only the instrument of persecution not its author - fug 2.1.1-12 and 2.2.18-
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about the strategy of the devil on impressionable minds. Tertullian may not have
been writing with children in mind, but since this section covers satanic
influence for the whole area of the thesis, and since Tertullian's references to
the tactics and tricks of the devil are relevant for all ages of man, two points
can conveniently be made at this stage.
First, the devil's campaign for the influence and capture of the mind
included the use of dream-oracles, which pretended to offer cures, warnings and
prophecies to the unwary:
dum per ea quae iuuant ab inquisitione uerae diuinitatis abducunt ex
insinsuatione falsae? Et utique non clausa uis est nec sacrariorum
circumscribitur terminis; uaga et peruolatica et interim libera est. Quo
nemo dubitauerit domus quoque daemoniis patere nec tan turn in adytis, sed
in cubiculis homines imaginibus circumueniri. 1
si multa miracula circulatoriis praestigiis ludunt, si et somnia immittunt
habentes semel inuitatorum angelorum et daemonum adsistentem sibi
potestatem. 2
Second, the devil offered a parody and counterfeit of the true relationship
between man and God, making it all the more difficult for the impressionable to
distinguish between truth and error. He (the devil) twisted the true
interpretation of scripture and mimicked the way of salvation:
.A diabola scilicet, cuius sunt partes interuertendi ueritatem qui ipsas quoque
res sacramentorum diuinorum idolorum mysteriis aemulatur. Tingit et ipse
quosdam utique credentes et fideles suos; expositionem delictorum de
lauacro repromittit; et, si adhuc memini Mithrae, signat illic in frontibus
milites suos. 3
Hie quoque studium diaboli recognoscimus res dei aemulantis cum et ipse
baptismum in suis exercet. Quid simile? immundus emundat, perditor
liberat, damnatus absoluit! Suam uidelicet operam destruet diluens, delicta
quae inspirat ipse! 4
an 46.12.80-86. The classification of dreams which followed this, and
the influence of good dreams, is taken up in chapter V.7 below.
2
apol 23.1.3-5.




As d'Ales summed it up:
Tentateur, pere des heresies, il exerce sous mille formes diverses sa nefaste
influence. Prince de l'air, il regne sur ceux que l'incredulite lui asservit.
Dieu de ce monde, il a rempli le siecle du mensonge de sa propre divinite.
Doues d'un certain empire sur la nature materielle, les demons en usent pour
gater les moissons, jeter dans l'air le germe de maladies contagieuses,
engendrer des songes trompeurs. Parfois ils s'introduisent dans les corps et
en disposent a leur gre. Nuire aux hommes est le but de toutes leurs
impostures, de ces prodiges par lesquels ils accreditent de faux dieux.
Toutes les formes de divination leur sont bonnes: evocations de morts,
sacrifices d'enfants, prestiges, chevres parlantes, tables parlantes, etc. -
Artifice d'autant plus per fide qu'il emprunte le masque de la religion. II njj
a pour ainsi dire pas un trait du christianisme que ces esprits menteurs
n'aient tente de s'approprier. L'anthropomorphisme pa'i'en est une caricature
anticipee de l'lncarnation. Les oracles et la magie sont une contrefacon de
la prophetie et du miracle. L'enseignement des philisophes a denature^ bien
des dogmes: ils ont pris a l'Ecriture le jugement, l'enfer de feu
(Pyriphlegethon), le paradis (Champs-Elysees). Et comme on rit de ces
fables, le ridicule rejaillit sur la verite. Les cdremonies pa'i'ennes copient les
sacrements divins: le diable a, dans le culte de Mithra, son bapteme, avec
promesse de remission des pechds; il a son signe, dont Mithra margue au
front ses adeptes. 1
In consequence of this, the natural man, growing up in a world of idolatry
and unaware that he was being 'manipulated' by the devil, was drawn steadily
away from a right relationship with God.
Nemo negat, quia nemo ignorat, quod ultro natura suggerit, Deum esse
uniuersitatis conditorem eamque uniuersitatem tam bonam quam homini
mancipatam. Sed quia non penitus Deum norunt nisi naturali jure, non etiam
familiari, de longinquo, non de proximo, neccesse est ignorent, qualiter
administrari iubeat quae instituit, simul quae ui sit aemula ex aduerso
adulterandis usibus diuinae conditionis quia neque uoluntatem neque
aduersarium noueris eius quem minus noueris 2
Tertullian never minimised or attempted to discredit the current and popular
Christian belief that the devil actively opposed the search of the natural man for
God. He was the first Latin writer to use the description "interpolator" for
3
satan, whose 'acting power' was all too evident in the world around. While
therefore the passages just quoted were not written with children in mind,
^




Jacques Fontaine, "Sur un titre de Satan chez Tertullien: Diabolus
Interpolator", Studi di onore di Alberto Pincherle, 38 (1967), 198-199.
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Tertullian would no doubt have applied them to the earliest years of life, if he
had been asked, because he complained bitterly of how easily people fell into the
snares which the devil set, and how the devil drew them away from
contemplation of the true God.
Cur non agnoscamus uersutias satanae, qui quod ore nostro perficere non
potest, id agit, ut suorum ore perficiat per aures inferens nobis
idololatriam? 1
Et quae illis accuratior pascua est, nisi ut hominem a recogitatu uerae
diuinitatis auertant praestigiis falsae diuinationis? Quas et ipsas quomodo
operentur expediam. 2
The detailed explanation offered by Tertullian is outside the scope of this
section, but, to borrow the phraseology of de spectaculis, every man had been
ensnared by the devil, turned away from his correct relationship to God, and only
by coming to know the Lord could he combat the wiles of the devil in the
struggle for the soul.
Nos igitur, qui Domino cognito etiam aemulum eius inspeximus, qui
institutore comperto et interpolatorem una deprehendimus, nec mirari neque
dubitare oportet: cum ipsum hominem, opus et imaginem dei, totius
universitatis possessorem, ilia uis interpolators et aemulatoris angeli ab
initio de integritate deiecerit, uniuersam substatiam eius pariter cum ipso
integritati institutam pariter cum ipso in peruersitatem demutauit aduersus
institutorem. 3
In that connection, brief mention can be made of Tertullian's argument
in the apologeticum that the presence of Christians provided some protection for
the non-Christian: Quis autem uos ab illis occultis et usquequaque uastantibus
mentes et ualetudines uestras hostibus raperet, a daemoniorum incursibus dico,
4
quae de uobis sine praemio, sine mercede depellimus? That was, of course,










well and truly ensnared by the devil, and nothing but conversion to the Christian
faith would restore him to a proper and right relationship with God. The
emphasis placed by Tertullian on the struggle for the soul (as opposed to the
body) was not accidental - it was from the soul that he believed the initiative
would come, for good or for evil. That important point, namely that the soul was
the decision-making partner in man, is therefore examined next.
Ill
IV. 3 THE SOUL TOOK THE LEAD
A dominant theme in Tertullian's writings is that whenever a moral
decision had to be taken, the lead came from the soul - at least until baptism,
when the Spirit was wedded to the soul * and He then gave the lead.
la chair n'est qu'une servante, ou plutot un instrument. Chair coupable, sans
doute; mais dont la faute se borne a executer des ordres: si parfois
l'fecriture s'en prend a la chair, ce n'est que pour atteindre plus gravement,
dans un subalterne, l'ame qui a commande. Le desorare, ou la contre-nature,
d'origine diabolique, se transmet d'ame en ame, comme un chancre
hereditaire: le traducianisme de Tertullian se prete parfaitement a cette
conception. La nature primitive et divine demeure, jusqu'au bapteme,
obscurcie et voilee; au jour du bapteme, le voile tombe; en ces noces
mystiques avec l'Esprit-Saint, Tame revoit la lumiere de sa celeste origine;
la chair elle-meme passe, comme un esclave dotal, au service du meme
Esprit-Saint. Noces bienheureuses, si l'ame esT fidele! 2
The point is fundamental to understanding the relationship of the child (and
indeed of the man) to God. The body could be guilty before God only if it was
led into sin by the soul. While the soul could perform "actions" by itself,
(because Scripture taught that sins committed in thought were equivalent to evil
3
deeds, ) the converse was not true and Tertullian nowhere held the body
responsible to God for deeds of its own.
4
Quid nunc, si et in carnalibus prior est quae concipit, quae disponit, quae
mandat, quae impellit? Et si quando inuita, prior tamen tractat quod per
corpus actura est; nunquam denique conscientia posterior erit facto. 5
Excipitur etiam a spiritu sancto, sicut in pristina natiuitate a spiritu
profano. Sequitur animam nubentem spiritui caro, ut do tale mancipium, et jam
non animae famula, sed spiritus - an 41.4.23-26. To follow through the
relationship of body, soul and Holy Spirit, which applied only after conversion, is
outside the scope of this study.
^
d'Ales, op. cit. p 2^6.
3
Tertullian said that specifically in an 40.4.21-23; an 58.6.34-36 and paen
3.13.50-52; elsewhere, he made a number of references to sins of thought, which
he did not (in those places) regard as equivalent of 'actions' and punishable as
such, but which were nevertheless sins even although not translated into deeds -
e.g. paen 3.9.33-37; 3.12.45-48; 3.15.57-16.61.
4
"in carnabilus", as Waszink pointed out (op. cit.,p 591) is a short way of




Sed delicta sicut in carne non conparent - quia nemo super cutem portat
maculas idolatriae aut stupri aut fraudis ita et eiusraodi in spiritu sordent
qui est auctor delicti: spiritus enim dominatur, caro famulatur. Tamen
utrumque inter se communicant reatum, spiritus ob imperium, caro ob
ministerium. 1
The close union of body and soul, and their relationship to each other, was set
2
out in some detail above and will not be duplicated here, except to stress that
the closing point in that last quotation was very important for Tertullian.
The flesh was not just an instrument, exempt from any praise or blame, even if it
was the soul which had commanded and the flesh had only followed. Tertullian
recognised, as he wrote de resurrectione carnis, that his opponents could well
have fastened onto his stress on the initiative of the soul, agreed with it, and
then claimed that the flesh was only a tool, not a free agent, and so not
3
answerable to God. Accordingly, Tertullian set out a lengthy argument, which
occupies all of chapters 15 to 17 of de resurrectione carnis, to show the joint
responsibility of soul and the body for good acts or bad, without, however,
conceding that the body was the initiator of moral action.
If (as will be examined in Section IV.5 below) the soul was counted
innocent by God until the age of fourteen, then it would seem to follow logically
(although Tertullian has left no explicit statement one way or the other) that the
flesh could not, and would not, be judged by God for the consequences of original
sin. Sin (said Tertullian) did not attach itself to the flesh, which was only the




Chapter I, sections 5 and 6.
3
The details of the argument are not important to this study - only its
theme. The three points which Tertullian made were: (a) that if the flesh was
entirely innocent, then God would be obliged in all circumstances to save it; (b)
that, in any event, in the normal run of human affairs, it was not true that
instruments were exempt from approval or disapproval; and (c) that the flesh
was not an instrument or tool acquired by the soul from without, but since the
moment of conception the two had been intimately entwined together and
neither without the other deserved the name 'man' - indeed, on the narrative of
creation, the flesh had the prior right to the name.
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chapter 40. If the flesh was not in itself sinful (section 2 of that chapter, quoted
below *); then Scriptural sanctions on the flesh for certain (named) evil deeds
were in reality a condemnation of the soul (section 3, quoted below ~). The
merit of any good deeds was not attributed in the first instance to the body, so
neither, in the first instance, was the consequence of evil deeds (section 4, not
quoted). Censure of the flesh served only to point more clearly to the charge
against the chief offender, the soul. As Tertullian put it, in concluding chapter
40 of de anima, the soul guaranteed the ignominy of sin for the flesh as well as
for itself.
Accordingly, as the child began to grow, and to think for itself, and to
exhibit the consequences of fallen nature, the body was not (on the above
hypothesis) under the judgement of God, because it was only the instrument of
the soul. The soul had inherited the corruption and the soul had the seeds of evil
in it; it was here, then, that the devil launched his attack. Another phrase which
Tertullian used, to express the same thought in a different context, was auriga
3
corporis, spiritus animalis - a common enough metaphor, which had probably
4
originated with the Pythagoreans and come down through Plato. The
responsibility in Roman law of 'servants' for the misdeeds of their 'masters' is
taken up in section IV.6 below.
^
Nam etsi caro peccatrix, secundum quam incedere prohibemur, cuius
opera damnantur concupiscentis aduersus spiritum, ob quam carnales notantur,
non tarnen suo nomine caro infamis. Neque enim de proprio sapit quid aut sentit
ad suadendam uel imperandam peccatelam. Quidni? quae ministerium est, et
ministerium non quale seruus uel minor amicus, animalia nomina, sed quale calix
uel quid aliud eiusmodi corpus, non anima. Nam et calix ministerium sitientis
est; nisi tamen qui sitit calicem sibi accommodarit, nihil calix ministrabit - an
4072.4-137
2
Adeo nulla proprietas hominis in choico, nec ita caro homo tarnquam alia
uis animae et alia persona, sed res est alterius plane substantiae et alterius
condicionis, adaicta tamen animae ut suppellex, ut instrumentum in officia uitae.
Caro igitur increpatur in scripturis, quia nihil anima sine carne in operatione
libidinis gulae uinulentiae saeuitiae idoloatriae ceterisque carnalibus non sensibus,






IV.4 NO SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN BOYS AND GIRLS
Tertullian was not unaware that growing boys and growing girls required
to be treated in some respects in different ways - pueris praetexta concedi et
puellis stola, natiuitatis insignia nec potestatis, generis, non honor^ ordinis, non
superstitionis; ^ - but nowhere did he hint that there was any significant
distinction in their relationship to God. However, in view of the comments of so
eminent a scholar as Monceaux:
Tertullien est le premier des grands Chretiens misogynes. Avant les
theologiens du Moyen-Age, il considere la femme comme le principal
obstacle du salut. II lui refuse tout role actif dans l'Eglise, et pretend 1'-
enfermer au logis. II la rappelle durement a la modestie, au sentiment de sa
faiblesse et de son eternelle misere, qui la rend a jamais responsable du
malheur de l'humanite; 2
and in view of the conclusion of a recent study that "Tertullian is no ordinary
3 4
misogynist", it is necessary to examine carefully just what Tertullian did say
about feminae. ^
The locus classicus of Tertullian's alleged misog|iy is the opening paragraph




Paul Monceaux, o£. cit. p 387. The closing words are based on I cult
1.1.11-12 - ignominiam dico primi delicti et inuidiam perditionis humai|e.
3
George Tavard, Woman in Christian Tradition, (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1973) p 59. Such comments ignore other passages where
Tertullian displays a remarkable sympathy and tenderness for woman.
4
His extant words addressed specifically to women are four - cult, mon,
ux and virg. Whether Liber ad amicum philosophum de molestiis nuptiarum (or
de angustiis nuptiarum) was an actual book now lost, or whether Jerome was
referring (Epistulum ad Eustochium de Custodia Virginitatis 22.22 and Adversus
Jovinianum 1.13) to passages in other and extant works of Tertullian is not of
direct relevance to this section. There is a very full note on it and an
attempted reconstruction,^ Barnes, "Tertullian", pp 250-253.
5
Tertullian considered this the most appropriate general word to use -
Naturale uocabulum est femima. Naturalis uocabuli generale mulier. Generalis
etiam speciale uirgo uel nupta uel uidua uel quot etiam aetatis nomina accedunt -
virg 4.4.38-41.
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et Euam te esse nescis? Viuit sententia dei super sexum istum in hoc
saeculo: uiuat et reatus necesse est. Tu es diaboli ianua, tu es arboris illius
resignatrix, tu es diuinae legis prima desertrix; tu es quae euro suasisti,
quern diabolus aggredi non ualuit; tu imaginem dei, hominem Adam, facile
elisisti; propter tuum meritum, id est mortem, etiam filius dei mori
habuit: 1
From that passage and in particular from the phrase "tu es diaboli ianua", it has
2
been claimed that Tertullian saw women - at any rate Christian women - in a
different relationship with God than men, and that he believed their natural
status to be inferior to men: "Elle ne peut esperer son pardon et son salut, qu'a
la condition de renoncer aux graces de son sexe. Et l'homme, s'il veut plaire a
^ 3
Dieu, doit autant que possible se separer de la femme" It is of course true that
Tertullian objected to women officiating at Church functions such as teaching
or baptising, and that he opposed their ordination to any Church office such as
A
the priesthood, which he believed to belong exclusively to men. However, these
passages relate to the status of women in the Church, after their conversion.
When it is suggested that this affected a woman's relationship to God, at all
stages and in all aspects of life, the passage from de cultu feminarum must be




For example by Nancy van Vuuren, The Subversion of Women as
practiced by Churches, Witch-hunters, and Other Sexists, (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1973) p 29 and Rosemary Ruether, "Misogynism and Virginal
Feminism in the Fathers of the Church", in Rosemary Ruether, editor, Religion
and Sexism: Images of Woman in the Jewish and Christian Tradition, (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1974) p 157.
3
Monceaux, o£. cit.,p 388.
4
Non permittitur mulieri in ecclesia loqui, sed nec docere, nec tinguere,
nec offerre, nec ullius uirilis muLieris, nedum sacerdotalis officii sortem sibi
uindicare...mulier permittitur. - virg 9.1.4-6. Quam enim fidei proximum
uidetur ut is docendi et tinquendi daret feminae potestatem qui nec dicere
guidem constanter mulieri permisit? Taceant, inquit, et domi uiros suos
consultant! bapt 17.4.28-32. He brought it as a reproach against women
belonging to heretical sects that they even ventured to baptise: Ipsae mulieres
haereticae, quam procaces! quae audeant docere contendere, exorcismos agere,
curationes repromittere, fortasse an et tingere - praes 41.5.13-15. Tertullian
rejected the suggestion made in the Acts of Paul and Thecla that Paul allowed
Thecla to baptise - bapt 17.5.24-25.
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Tertullian was about to draw a startling picture of the luxury, the display
and the extravagance of Carthaginian society - a picture which made his editor
Rhenanus apologise for Tertullian's language by explaining "Sexus mulierum in
luxum valde propensus est, et natura philocosmos". Be that as it may, certain of
the churchwomen of Carthage, ignoring the good example of their husbands and
brothers, who dressed soberly and without display, were vying with the heathen
in ostentation and amusement. While the prosperity of the times and the peace
of the Church may have contributed to this result, it must have been very painful
to a moral teacher like Tertullian to see his choicest arguments rebutted by the
wives of his colleagues in the Church. Tertullian's object, therefore, in de cultu
feminarum, was to persuade these Christian women to dress more modestly. The
passage in question comes in the exordium of the book, which was, as Sider
pointed out in another context, an attempt to set the audience in a receptive
mood by an immediate appeal to considerations of an ethical and emotional
character.^ In order to capture his audience and to establish the salvific
importance of his subject, Tertullian found it convenient to refer them back to
Eve.
Her complicity in the fall is then utilized to produce upon his listeners the
desired effect, which he provokes by means of a pointed and highly
rhetorical ad feminam argument. While details of his invective cannot be
attributed entirely to rhetorical invention, one must always keep in mind
that in Tertullian a given problem, such as the fall, may be adapted freely to
the requirements both of subject and of audience. 2
Later in the article from which that quotation is taken, the author (Church)
maintained that Tertullian, as a traducianist, could not seriously have intended
to trace the sinfulness of mankind back to Eve, as opposed to Adam, because his
anthropology depended on totum genus de suo semine infectum suae etiam
*
Robert Dick Sider, Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian, (Oxford:
University Press, 1971) p 21.
2 ...
F. Forrester Church, "Sex and Salvation in Tertullian", Harvard
Theological Review, 68 (1975), 86.
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damnationis traducem fecit. ^ Church pointed out, in support of his argument,
that the "gateway" passage is the only place in all Tertullian where the exclusive
2
culpability of Eve is spelled out; in this he is supported by Turcan, who noted
3
that in every other instance, "C'est toujours Adam qui est sur la sellette".
It does seem that Tertullian's exhortation to dress in the garb of penit&nce
ex quo deum uiuum cognouisset et de sua, id est de feminae condicione
4
didicisset , was in support of a specific argument, and was not intended to place
all females - certainly not those below the age of puberty - in a relationship with
God different in principle from that of males. Jesus Christ had given his life
equally for men and for women - Qui tamen et uiri caput est et feminae facies,
5
ut uir ecclesiae, Christus Iesus, quale, oro te, sertum pro utroque sexu subiit?
The distinction of sex would not affect their status in eternity, because, shortly
following on the "gateway" passage, Tertullian wrote Nam et uobis eadem tunc
substantia angelica repromissa; idem sexus qui et uir is eandem iudicandi dignati—
onem pollicetur Presumably Tertullian did not intend that to mean that in
heaven women would become men, any more than that in the spiritual realm both
would become angels: it means that in the spiritual realm, Tertullian was less
concerned to differentiate men from women, than he was to differentiate men





Church, op. cit.,p 86.
3
Marie Turcan, Tertullien: La toilette des femmes (De cultu feminarum),








The distinction between the Eastern and Western worlds, in the place
assigned to women, was pronounced, and in this respect Carthage was wholly
Western. The prominent part taken by women in social life at Carthage may
have led Tertullian into some of the statements which commentators have found
paradoxical - for example Theodor Brandt, in his book Tertullians Ethik:
Schon hier sind zwei Gedanken w irksam, die nicht ohne Spannung sich
gegenuberstehen : Schuld and Schwache auf der einen Seite, Schopfun^ and
gleiches Sittengesetz auf der andern. 1
and Siutcldi* >
Hinsichtlich der Stellung der Frau in der Gemeinde nimmt Tertullian eine
Stellung ein, die wiederum von zwei Faktoren bestimmt ist: Einerseits
anerkennt er die Frau als gleichwertige Glaubensschwester, andrerseits
scheint ihm das weibliche Geschlecht besonders schuldbeladen, da alle
Frauen an der Ursunde ihrer Stammutter Eva teilhaben. 2
However, if one is not misled by taking the passage from de cultu feminarum out
of its context, it seems clear that Tertullian saw women as possessing, no less
than men, a nature created in the image of God and answerable to the same
moral law of God. This invested them with a dignity and with rights which cut
across the subordinate status and capacity of women in the ancient world as a
whole, particularly the East but to a lesser extent in the West also. How far
Tertullian's teaching on the religious capacity of women differs from their legal
capacity will be examined in section IV. 6.
^
Theodor Brandt, Tertullian's Ethik,(Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1929)
^
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IV. 5 CHILDREN COUNTED INNOCENT UNTIL PUBERTY AT 14
Whenever Adam and Eve were able to discriminate between good and evil,
they became aware also of certain physical impulses which made them desire to
cover their bodies.^ Tertullian turned the equation round, and taught that when
every individual boy or girl reached that same stage of physical development
(puberty of the body) he or she underwent a corresponding puberty of the soul
and could discriminate between good and evil. In consequence, every individual
adolescent left the paradise of innocence in which he or she had lived as a child
and individual souls were invaded by sinful desires, desires which had not come
from nature. 3 These new desires made the individual accountable in the sight of
God.
nunc societatem pubertatem quoque animalem cum carnali dicimus
conuenire pariterque et illam suggestu sensuum et istam processu
membrorum exsurgere a quarto decimo fere anno ... Si enim Adam et Eua
ex agnitione boni et mali pudenda tegere senserunt, ex quo id ipsum
sentimus agnitionem boni et mali profitemur. 3
Tertullian was at pains to stress, in introducing the simultaneous puberty of
body and soul, that it did not conflict with his earlier teaching.
omnia naturalia animae ipsi substantiae inesse pertinentia ad sensum et
intellectum ex ingenito animae censu, sed paulatim per aetatis spatia
procedere et uarie per accidentia euadere pro artibus, pro institutis, pro
locis, pro dominatricibus potestatibus, quod tamen faciat ad carnis
animaeque propositam nunc societatem, pubertatem quoque animalem cum
carnali dici mus ...3».
In addition to the passage from de anima, to be quoted in part below,
Tertullian made the same point in pal 3.4.34-40; mon 17.5.24-28; virg 11.2.9-13;
and orat 22.8.60 (quoted later in this section). He regarded the fig leaves of
Adam and Eve as symbols of a depraved life, (where Irenaeus had regarded them
as signs of penitence, adu. haer. 3.23.5.) The matter was discussed at length by
Hugo Koch, Tertullianisches IV.8: "Die Feigenblatter der Sfammeltern bei Irenaus
und bei Tertullian und die Nachwirkung ihrer Erklarungen", Theologische Studien
und Kritiken, 104 (1932), 39-50.
2
Tertullian appears to have defined this first outworking of the vitium
originis in terms which nowadays would be called 'lust'.
3




Despite Tertullian's own caution in the matter, Waszink took the view that
Tertullian, far from being consistent with his own earlier teaching, had here
changed his argument to suit the needs of the moment. He pointed out that
Tertullian, having in de anima 19 established that the soul had its full
compliment of faculties, both sensation and intelligence, from the moment of
conception, here turned round and argued the very opposite:
"We must also discuss a view upheld by some people, viz. that neither the
intellectus nor the mind are inherent in the soul from the moment of birth,
and so must have been introduced into it afterwards (de anima. 19.1)....Holy
Scripture, too, furnishes an argument: for the children killed at Bethlehem
and those who ran to meet Jesus must certainly have possessed sensus and
intellectus (section 9)"
The view combatted here by Tertullian can be no other than that of the
Stoics, who did not credit man with all faculties at the moment of birth.
...In 38, I Tertullian quietly adopts the contrary view held by Stoics and
Asclepiades ...who declared that man is not in possession of the sapientia
before the age of fourteen (cf. especially the words: quicLAsclepiades inde
sapientiam supputat). Moreover, the adaptation of the material is in perfect
accordance with Tertullian's usual method: 1
With the greatest of respect to Waszink, Tertullian is disagreeing with
Asclepiades, not agreeing with him! Tertullian chose the age of fourteen
because of the development of the senses and of the bodily organs, not (he
expressly said) because Asclepiades inde sapientiam suppatat. It was Waszink
2
who introduced sapientia to the soul at the age of fourteen, not Tertullian.
Tertullian here repeated the earlier teaching that sensus and intellectus were
present from the beginning and there is not inconsistency, far less "a contrary
*
Waszink, "De Anima", pp24? -U<?.
2
Waszink's other criticism of this passage is even more difficult to
understand -in his preface to de anima 31 he wrote:- "his own statements are
highly inconsistent, as they are always modified by the context in which they
occur; in 38.1/2 he mentions a 'puberty of the soul', whereas in 56.5 he says:
aetatem...non potest (sc. anima) capere sine corpore, quia per corpora operantur
aetates)." Waszink, "De Anima", p 378. With great respect to Waszink, the two
statements seem entirely compatible - the point of the passage in chapter 56 was
that unless there was a body to age along with the soul, the soul could not grow
older - and in chapter 38 he spoke about both body and soul coming together to
the age of puberty.
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view", in asserting that although the soul had been born complete, furnished with
all its powers, and that the growth of the soul did not affect its substance, there
came a point in time when the knowledge of good and evil, coming through the
development of the senses, led the adolescent into thoughts by which de paradiso
integritatis educit. *
That Tertullian believed in principle in accountability, dependent on age,
it illustrated by one of his replies to Marcion, who had claimed:
ecce Christus diligit paruulos, tales docens esse debere qui semper roaiores
uelint esse, creator autem ursos pueris inmisit, ulciscens Heliseum
propheten conuicia ab eis passum. 2
Tertullian's reply to Marcion was that he had drawn a
Satis impudens antithesis, cum tarn diuersa committit, paruulos et pueros,
innocentem adhuc aetatem et iudicii iam capacem, quae conuiciari poterat,
ne dicam blasphemare. 3
God (the true God) had here demonstrated that He was just, because such gross
disrespect to old age was blameworthy; the same God had also demonstrated His
kindness to the paruulos by protecting the Egyptian midwives who were
responsible for their safe arrival, when they were threatened by Pharaoh's
4
edict - in the one case they were morally blameworthy and deserved
punishment, in the other case they were morally innocent and deserved
protection.
Whether or not the children who mocked the prophet Elisha had attained the
age of fourteen is not stated, but elsewhere (apart from de anima) Tertullian






IV Marc 23.5.22-25 - Tertullian made passing reference to the incident
also in II Marc 14.4.2-4 - Impendit et ipsum populum, sed ingratum. Inmisit et





only in the ordinary affairs of the world, but in the sight of God:
Excusetur nunc aetas, quae sexum suum ignorat (simplicitatis priuilegium
teneat; nam et Eua et Adam, ubi eis contigit sapere, texerunt statim quod
agnouerant), certe in quibus iam pueritia mutauit, sicut naturae, ita et
disciplinae debet aetas esse munifica. Nam et membris et officiis mulieribus
resignantur. 1
Iam et uox obsolefacta est, et membra completa sunt, et pudor ubique
uestitur, et menses tributa dependunt, ac tu mulierem negas quam muliebria
pati dicis? 2
Tempus etiam ethnici obseruant, ut ex lege naturae iura sua aetatibus
reddant. Nam feminas guidem a duodecim annis, masculum uero a duobus
amplius ad negotia mittunt, pubertatem in annis, non sponsalibus aut nuptiis
decernentes. 3
If it is accepted, then, on these texts, that Tertullian counted the (soul of the)
child innocent until the age of fourteen, and since it was established clearly in
section IV. 3 above that the soul took the lead, and that the body could not in
itself initiate a sinful action, this section can be concluded with a further brief
reference to the standing of the "flesh" before God.
When, in de resurrectione carnis chapter 18, Tertullian examined Romans 8:
8-13, he commented that while the apostle regularly condemned the works of the
flesh, he always showed by the context that it was not the flesh itself which was
being condemned, but the deeds of the flesh - discas opera carnis damnari, non
4
ipsam . If sin did dwell in the flesh, it was because it was already dwelling in
the soul; Tertullian had continually to be alert for dualistic heresies, which
taught the soul was tainted merely by contact with the body. This was not so, he
argued; the soul acquired actual sin only at a certain point in its progress through
life - at the fourteenth year. If until then the soul was counted innocent before










The innocence of children before God, up to the age of fourteen, does not
depend only on the texts quoted in this section. In chapter HI.3 reference was
made to the presence of animae immaturae in the 'good' part of Hades; with
them (whatever age that covered) Tertullian included animas ... innuptas et pro
condicione aetatis puras et innocuas . * The souls of those who by their age
were necessarily pure and innocent were apparently in such a relationship to God
in life that, on premature death, they (even unbaptised) were worthy of a resting
place in the region of Hades reserved for those in a right relationship to God.
The next point which Tertullian made was also explored in section Hr.3
above - that when a person died, the soul, although already possessing all its
faculties, did not develop any further - in particular, it did not develop any
further relationship with God. Tertullian mentioned, in that context, puer
inuestis, in addition to infans sub uberum fontibus, and then went on to the next
2
category, uesticeps, all of whom would not grow older without a body. One
final relevant point, in considering the relationship to God of children under
fourteen, is Tertullian's advice (considered in chapter m.5) to defer baptism, not
just until puberty but until the candidate had settled down. In view, however, of
the importance and significance of baptism it must be said that the innocence of
children under the age of fourteen was not 'absolute'. They were, until baptised,
subject to the presence of original sin, but nevertheless, Tertullian could speak
of their childhood as a time of 'innocence'.
It is both significant and consistent with his general attitude toward sin
that he regarded children, who had not the understanding to obey or to disobey






flesh and therefore not in the soul before the age of puberty. The essence of sin
was disobedience to the divine law, and eternal death was not the natural fruit of
corruption but the penalty for guilt. Because of this personal notion of sin,
Tertullian could consistently uphold both his doctrine of original sin, by virtue of
traducianism, and at the same time say children under fourteen were not under
condemnation and not punishable for inherited guilt. Unless and until they could
be held responsbile for any actual sins they might commit, they were 'innocent'
in the moral sense and inpcent in the sight of God.
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IV. 6 ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
Three sections of this chapter require further examination in the light of
Roman Law. First, when Tertullian was dealing with the respective
responsibilities of the soul and the body (section three), he twice referred to the
degree of blame which attached to accomplices and to servants and to
instruments, in the commission of crime. To take the latter anology first,
Tertullian compared the body to a cup, used by a poisoner to administer the fatal
dose; the human body was, in one sense at least, like a calix in respect of the
initiative taken by the soul. It was a useful point to make in the context of
resurrection; if in law an instrument was regarded as innocent, then it deserved
to be saved:
Venenum dare scelus est, calix tamen, in quo datur, reus non est. Ita et
corpus carnalium operum uas est, anima est autem, quae in illo uenenum
alicuius mali facti temperat. Quale est autem ut, si anima, auctrix operum
carnis, merebitur dei regnum per expiationem eorum, quae in corpore
admisit, corpus, ministrum solummodo, in damnatione permaneat? Venefico
absoluto calix erit puniendus? 1
uasculum uero ipsum non esse sententiae obnoxium, quia nec calicem
damnari, si quis eum ueneno temperarit, nec gladium ad bestias pronuntiari,
si quis eo latrocinium fuerit operatus. 2
Since, however, that analogy could be deliberately misunderstood by his
opponents and used against him, Tertullian safeguarded his position by
contrasting the Roman legal position with what he really wanted to say - the
body, although in some respects like a calix and so deserving of resurrection if
the (more guilty) soul was to be resurrected, did share some degree of guilt or
innocence. It was not really like an instrument, certainly not like an instrument
detached in some way from the person acting; it was an integral part of the
moral being. In other words, Tertullian took the vasculum/calix argument, which






field of common sense and experience.
Nostris quoque sordibus nubilum uel non pro animo temperatum elidere
solemus, quo magis puero irascamur .... At enim et calix bene sibi conscius
et de diligentia ministri commendatus de coronis quoque potatoris sui
inornabitur aut aspergine florum honorabitur. 1
In the same passage he showed how men gave an honourable place in the home to
a sword which had brought them battle honours, but Gladium uero latrociniis
ebrium quis non a domo tota, nedum a cubiculo, nedum a capitis sui officio
relegabit, praesumens scilicet nihil aliud se quam inuidiam animarum
2
somniaturum urgentium et inquietantium sanguinis sui concubinum? In answer
to the (hypothetical) opponent who then asked Estne ergo et in uascula et in
instrumenta sententiam figere, ut dominorum et auctorum meritis et ipsa
3
communicent?, Tertullian deliberately ignored the implications of Roman Law,
which knew nothing about deodand, and maintained that the body was not really
an instrument; in other words, Roman law was useful, but only up to a point.
Tertullian's use of Roman Law here, to illustrate the relationship between
body and soul, is a good example of his opportunism in argument. When he
wanted to emphasise the importance of the body, as in de resurrectione carnis
chapters 16 and 17, he used the analogies of servant and accomplice to serve
that end. He showed, in chapter 16, how the flesh was like a servant, capable of
legal responsibility for a deed imposed by its master; the two were accomplices
and so jointly responsible for their deeds. In chapter 17 he set out the legal
relationship between the intention and the act, demonstrating the responsibility
of the flesh for carrying out what the soul had planned. When, however, he
wanted to minimise (not maximise) the responsibility of the body, he employed
res 16.6.24-26 and 8.30-32. The striking expression bene sibi conscius
for a cup that had never been used for the mixing of poison was remarked on by







the same analogies entirely the other way:
Sed et si carni delicta reputantur, praecedit animae reatus et culpae
principatus animae potius adscribendus, cui caro ministri nomine occurrit.
Carens denique anima caro hactenus peccat) 1
and even more so in de anima chapter 40:
non tarnen suo nomine caro infamis. Neque enim de proprio sapit quid aut
sentit suadendam uel imperandam peccatelam. Quidni? quae ministerium
est, et ministerium non quale seruus uel minor amicus, animalia nomina sed
quale calix uel quid aliud eiusmodi corpus non anima. Nam et calix
minsterium sitientis est; nisi tamen qui sitit calicem sibi accomodarit, nihil
calix ministrabit. 2
However much Tertullian may seem to deny in one place the validity of the very
analogy which he himself had used in another, it seems clear that here he drew
on his knowledge of Roman law to illustrate his theology. What makes the
anologies even more significant is that they appear to be Tertullian's own; in
Waszink's detailed commentary on de anima, chapter 40 is one of the few places
where Waszink can find no other source for Tertullian's argument.
The second main area, where Roman Law is relevant to this chapter, is for
section four, which looked at the respective positions of men and women in their
standing before God. Roman law severely restricted the capacity of women, on
3
account of their sex and its presumed weakness of disposition. To take but
three examples, Roman law forbad women to fill any publica munera or to act as
4
magistrate, judge, advocate, or procurator; women could not in general act as
tutors to pupil children who were sui juris and they were not permitted to be
5








Digest 59.17.2.pr; Code 2.13.4; 2.13.18; Paul, Sent. 1.2.1.
^
By the senatus consultus VellAianum, A.D. 46.
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well after Tertullian's death), women could not lawfully adopt, because they
could not possess patria potestas. Even when the right to adopt was eventually
conceded to women - ex indulgentia principis as a solace for the loss of their own
children - the right was qualified and never carried with it the acquisition of
potestas.* As was elegantly and concisely expressed by Ulpian, "Mulier autem
2
familiae suae et caput et finis est" - the beginning and the end of her family.
For the sake of brevity in this present study, it can be stated shortly that
Tertullian does not appear to have used any term of Roman Law to distinguish
the relationship to God of boys and girls, or of men and women. On the contrary,
he encouraged women to make their own decision about the state of life which
they should embrace. Under Roman law, women were first under the potestas of
their fathers and then under the potestas of their husbands; nevertheless,
Tertullian urged women with unsympathetic husbands to make their own decision
to follow the Christian way of life and to hold to it, regardless of opposition
from the unbelieving spouse.
The third area of Roman Law touched on by this chapter was in section five,
in connection with the age of responsibility. Tertullian fixed this at puberty,
which he said occured at about the age of fourteen, non quia Asclepiades inde
sapientiam supputat, nec quia iura ciuilia adhinc agendis rebus attemperant, sed
3
quoniam et haec a primordio ratio est. He expressly stated that he had not
followed the Roman Civil Law, but that he took his doctrine from the situation
described in Genesis. When sin entered the lives of Adam and Eve, they felt it
necessary to take certain protective action. Tertullian therefore concluded that
^






when similar feelings came to children, it was for a similar- reason, namely an
infusion of sinful thoughts.
The Civil Law to which he referred, and which he rejected as the reason for
fixing on the age of fourteen, was still a matter of debate in Tertullian's day.
Later, puberty was fixed at fourteen for males and twelve for females, but in the
time of Gaius it was still disputed whether, for males, it should be determined by
age or by actual physical development^. The Proculeians held that a particular
age should be fixed for puberty in all cases, while the Sabinians thought that the
status of puberty should depend on each case on the physical development of the
individual; Javolenus required both! ^ But although Tertullian rejected the Civil
Law as the reason for fixing responsibility at the age of fourteen, he picked up
one word from it, very relevant to this chapter. Children below fourteen were
excused from responsibility, he said, by reason of privilegium. Privilegium, in
Roman jurisprudence, was a private law, applying only to a few named
individuals or to a specific group or class. Tertullian insisted that Eve and
Adam, covering themselves on the loss of their innocency, were a precedent for
his ruling that when innocency passes away at puberty, so did its privilegium - its
private exemption (innocence) from the general law, which was the guilt






IV. 7. CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER FOUR
If Tertullian had felt it necessary to draw any specific distinction between
the relationship to God of infants, children and adolescents) particularly the
eternal destiny of those who died during childhood, he did not lack the
opportunity to do so. One in four of those who survived the perils of infancy
would never reach the age of puberty, ^ and in some families, the percentage
was worse. An epitaph has been discovered for a Christian lady (as her name
shows) who was buried at Giufi before the year A.D. 227, and the inscription
runs:




MATER PIA GENVIT FILI
OS. m. ET FILIAS. n VIXIT
ANNIS. XXX. P. VICTOR!
NA. VIXIT. ANNIS. VH. P.
SVNNIVS. VIXIT. ANNIS
m. P. MARCVS VIXIT
ANNIS. n. P. MARCEL
L V S VIXIT. ANNV. I. P. FO
RTVNATA. VIXIT. ANNIS
xm. m. vm. P marcel
LVS CONIVGI DIGNAE
SED ET FILIS FILIABUS
QVE NOSTRIS ME VI
VO MEMORIAM FECI ,
OMNIBVS ESSE PERENNEM.
"Pescennia God's will - honestae memoriae femina - a lady of honourable
memory -well born - duly wedded - a chaste wife - an affectionate mother -
bore three sons and two daughters and died aged 30: her children were
Pescennia Victorina who lived seven years: Pescennius Sunnius lived three
years: P. Marcus two: P. Marcellus one: P. Fortunata 13 years and eight
months: I, Pescennius Marcellus who survive them, have erected this
tombstone to be an everlasting memorial for all to see, to my dearest wife
and our sons and daughters"
The juvenile mortality figure of 25% is my calculation from information
contained in ^Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, vol. VH[, Supplement m, 12590 -
13229 and Supplement IV 24629 - 25004. This records data taken from 745
tombstones of the Domus Caesaris (slaves and freedmen of the imperial civil
service) at Carthage in the first and second centuries.
Corpus Inscriptorum Latinarum vol VHI. 870. vr
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In such a situation, where the death of children was a common event, the
absence of more comment by Tertullian on any particular relationship of infants
and children to God, does seem to justify the conclusion that he had little
distinctive to say in that area.
According^' to the conclusions which were reached in the last chapter
(dealing with the relationship of infants to God,) namely:-
(a) that the relationship of body and soul to God was a quietly developing
relationship, closely linked at all times;
(b) that the soul was affected by a vitium originis and, in addition, was
assailed from birth by the devil;
(c) that in the 'good' part of Hades, there were 'those who by their age were
necessarily pure and innocent'; and
(d) that healthy children and adolescents should defer their baptism;
the following further conclusions cam now be added, to complete Part One of this
study.
(e) Satan's attack on the soul continued, and developed into a struggle for
the mastery of the individual human life - the struggle being centred on the
soul of the individual: section two.
(f) The struggle was concentrated on the soul, because the soul took the
initiative in all matters of human conduct: section three.
(g) While Tertullian held strong views on the respective positions of men and
women in the Church, he drew no distinction between their relationship to
God at the childhood and adolescent stages of life: section four.
(h) Until the age of puberty, children enjoyed privilegium - exemption from
the normal consequences of sin in human nature and the constant attacks of
the devil. It was only at puberty that each successive child left a paradise
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of innocence, for a new world of sinful desires, which had not sprung from
nature. Until then Tertullian acknowledged a category of 'innocence', those
who, although unbaptised and carrying the taint of Fall, were not under the
condemnation of God: section five.
(i) Roman law has, apart from the word privilegium, only one contribution
to Tertullian's expression of the relationship of the child to God at this
stage. The lead taken by the soul, over the body, was expressed to some
extent in terms of the master/servant and accomplice analogies of Roman
Civil Law: section six.
For those children who survived to adult life, an entirely new relationship
with God awaited - in a world where He gave evidence about Himself and for
which He called all men and women to account. The second part of the thesis
therefore takes up the relationship to God of unregenerate adult life and the
third part will take up the relationship of those who responded to the initiative
of God and who came in adult life into membership of the Church.
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PART TWO
THE RELATIONSHIP OF UNREGENERATE ADULTS TO GOD
CHAPTER FIVE: THE NATURAL MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
V.l. INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER FIVE
Whatever religious beliefs the unregenerate may have held, they were
estranged from God by their rejection (even in ignorance) of the vicarious
sacrifice of Christ on their behalf. Tertullian's description of those outside the
Christian faith - he employed at least twenty-six nouns and adjectives - is
examined in section two of this chapter, with particular reference to the
relationship to God implied in the twenty-six words he used. Nevertheless, God
Himself had at all times taken the initiative toward establishing a right
relationship with mankind, and had made Himself the 'tutor' of all. To the
generality of mankind, He spoke through the soul but He also gave men the
ability to see Himself in nature. These two stand next to each other as mutually
supportive pieces of evidence; the external evidence (of works) was stressed in
the treatises against Marcion and the internal evidence (of the soul) was
emphasised in the apologetic works addressed to the heathen. This initiative on
the part of God toward man, especially Tertullian's expressions of the love of
God to man, is set out in section three.
Because God revealed Himself to all, in such a way that man could not only
find Him but find Him with adequate assurance, it was one of Tertullian's
strongest convictions that all men had, or should have, some knowledge of God.
He was careful not to distinguish, as the Gnostics did, between the spiritual man,
who could apprehend God, and the natural man, who could not. The texts which
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deal with this are noted in section four; it is reserved until the next chapter to
consider how far the failure to recognise God was culpable and when man was
accountable to God.
Sections five to nine set out the five main ways in which Tertullian expected
an outsider to begin to enter into a relationship with God. For the majority of
mankind, it ought to be through the testimony of their own souls (section five) but
this should be supplemented, perhaps even initiated, by the observation of the
created world as the handiwork of God (section six). Those who had heard God
speak in a dream or in a vision (section seven), those who had come into contact
with Christians (section eight) and those who had access to the Scriptures
(section nine), had additional ways of knowing God. Finally, the relevant areas
of Roman law are set out in section ten and conclusions are drawn in section
eleven.
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V.2 TERTULLIAN'S DESCRIPTION OF NON-CHRISTIANS
All thirty-one of Tertullian's extant treatises make some reference to the
heathen. ^ The word which he used most frequently was nationes, and in this he
2
was unique - the Thesaurus linguae latinae demonstrates that every other Latin
patristic writer preferred gens to natio. It is appropriate, therefore, that
3
Tertullian's treatise to the heathen at large should be entitled ad nationes and
that it should be almost the only surviving apology so addressed.
Although natio appears 218 times in his works (of which 188 refer to the
heathen, three in the singular and the remainder in the plural) natio accounts for
less than 40% of Tertullian's references to those outside the Christian faith. Of
the other words, many (like natio itself) are not inherently descriptive of the
relationship of man to God and so are not the direct concern of this study - for
example, barbarus, communis, saeculis and saecularis all appear, at some point in
his works, in the sense of "heathen" although Tertullian did not normally employ
these words to contrast pagans with Christians. Other words, which are
descriptive of the relationship between man and God, as Tertullian saw it - for
example caecus, infidelis and profanus - are examined below.
In the chart which follows, there are no references to the heathen
against some of Tertullian's works because in those works he did not use the
particular four words analysed in the chart; he did, however, use other words for
the heathen in those works.
^
vol VI.2 (Lipsiae, 1934) cols. 1862-1865.
3
The title is missing from the beginning of the only extant manuscript,
Agobardinus, but it is found in the explicit of Books 1 and 2, in the incipit of
Book 2, and in the index of the manuscript. The title ad nationes has been
generally accepted since the editio princeps of Gothofredus "Q.S.F1. Tertulliani
ad nationes libri II", Geneva, 1625. The fact that Jerome wrote about
Tertullian: "Apologeticus eius et contra gentes libri," (Epist. 70.5), is not generally
held to contradict the view that Tertullian himself preferred ad nationes.
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Tertullian's four most common words for the heathen were ethnicus, gens,
gentilis, and natio; the chart on the following page sets out the frequency and
the location of these four words in his works, divided into five categories^ viz.:-
(a) heathen as opposed to Christian, ("X" in the chart)
(b) heathen in relation to God, ("G" in the chart),
(c) heathen in contrast with the Jew, ("J" in the chart),
(d) heathen in general terms, (i.e. not specifically contrasted with Christians or
with God or with Jews, ("N" in the chart), and
2
(e) the word used in senses other than heathen ("O" in the chart) .
There are of course some uses which refuse to conform to such a neat
and artificial classification.
2
For example, gens appears 162 times, but of these only 60 (i.e. as little
as 37%) refer to the heathen - the remainder are references to "tribes", "races",
"peoples", and "nations" without religious connotation. Tertullian's lack of
enthusiasm for gens as a word for the heathen is evident from the fact it does
not appear at all, in that sense, in over two-thirds of his works.
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1 3 1 5 1
24 23 87 54 188 30
CODE TO CHART
X = in contrast to Christians
G = in relation to God
J = in contrast with the Jews
N = in general terms
T = total of all usages where the meaning 'heathen' was intended
O = total of all usages where some meaning other than 'heathen'
was intended
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Whether these four words were intended to convey different shades of meaning
or whether Tertullian used them simply interchangeably is outside the scope of
this study but it is apparent from the chart that natio was Tertullian's
commonest word when he described the relationship of non-believers to God. He
did, however, employ both ethnicus and gens fifteen times each (against twenty-
three uses of natio); it was only gentilis which he did not employ at all in that
context.
Of greater significance for this study is the considerable variety of other
words and phrases which, although they occur less frequently, describe different
aspects of the relationship of the heathen to God. The list is not exhaustive, but









bapt 1.1.1; paen 1.1.3
I cult 1.3.31; 1 cult 2.1.1
an 51.7.42; apol 1.2. 12; apol 16.4.19;
II cult 11.2.13; ex 13.1.4; paen 1.3.10;
pud 11.7.30; II ux 2.9.61; II ux 3.1.8;
II ux 3.2.13
V Marc 17.9.12; V Marc 17.10.15
an 16.7.42; an 21.4.27
apol 48.15.96-97
apol 1.4.25; apol 1.6.33-35; paen 1.3.9
res 37.9.40
H cult 4.2.13/15; IV Marc 29.9. 11/21/22;
pud 15.5.19; pud 15.6.24; n ux 2.1.7/8/10/11:
H ux 2.2. 12/13/18/19/20; H ux 2.3.24;
II ux 2.7.52; II ux 3.3.20
This was the subject of a paper given by me at the Ninth International
Conference on Patristic Studies, held at Oxford from 3rd to 8th September 1979







(m) in umbra mortis
(n) nocentes
(o) non integre ad deum
(p) paganus1
(q) peccator
J_L UA U» 1 • I
an 47.2.11; res 26.8.33
ex 3.6.36; res 26.8.31
mart 2.2.5; HI Marc 20.2.27; IV Marc 8.1.28;
pud 7.11.49
jud 6.1.12-13
apol 48.15.96; n cult 7.2.14
apol 48.13.86
I cult 2.2.16; idol 5.2.21/22; pud 9.7.26;
res 37.9.39; spec 3.5.23
(r) profanus an 47.2.10; apol 48.13.86
(s) perditus pat 7.10.38
(t) sine domin',. lumine paen 1.1.3
and of them it could be said that they
(u) deum ignorant jud 3.12.84
(w) deum nesciunt II cult 1.2.24; jud 3.12.84;
pud 9.13.58
The word which Tertullian used above all others, to describe the natural man
in his relationship to God, was 'idolater'. Satan and his demons had so
Tertullian used paganus three times, but always in the sense "civilian" as
opposed to "soldier", not "pagan" as opposed to "Christian". It is well
established that paganus did not acquire a religious meaning until the fourth or
the beginning of the fifth century, but note should be taken of Miss Mohrmann's
comment on de corona 11: apud hunc tarn miles paganus fidelis, quam paganus
est miles fidelis.
"Ce passage de Tertullien est d'autant plus important qu'il prouve que le mot
paganus a fait de bonne heure son entree dans la terminologie de la militia
Christi. Pes l£ moment qu'on designait les Chretiens comme milites Christi,
on pourrait considerer les pa'i'ens comme pagani "civils" ou comme M. Harnack
l'a formule: "Leute. die Gott bzw. Christo den Fahneneid (sacramentum) nicht
geleistet, also am Sakrament nicht Anteil haben, d. h. Zivilisten, also pagani".
Christine Mohrmann, "Etudes sur le Latin des Chretiens", (Rome: 1958) I, 28.
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successfully corrupted mankind that man's right relationship to God was, in the
natural man, supplanted by an allegiance to idols. Every non-Christian was
involved. All the events of life involved sacrifices to idols and idol-worship
(idol. 16); business contracts included an appeal to the pagan deities (idol 23);
dress and decorations were mixed up with idol-worship (idol 8); the slave was
called upon by his master to assist in the household sacrifices (idol 17); birthdays
were celebrated with pagan rites (idol 15); the common language of society,
whether in adjuration, malediction, or benediction involved an invocation of the
gods of the country (idol 20-22). Modern readers with a love of flowers, and an
appreciation of scent and bright colours, may be surprised at the vehemence with
which Tertullian denounced flowers outside doors, windows, wreaths and the like,
-ut the symbolism behind them was important to Tertullian; hese were explicit
signs of paganism, demonstrations of idolatry, with a provocative significance.
Idolatry was the one great offence of the human race because it included all
others.
Bigg remarked that "We are apt to speak of heathenism in the abstract in
antithesis to the Gospel. But the sharp antagonisms of language do not exist in
nature. There were innummerable gradations of heathenism ranging from the
lowest to all but the highest phase of the religious life"; * that may be so, but
when Tertullian spoke about heathen virtues, as he occasionally did3 it was
nearly always simply for the sake of the argument, either to parry malicious
criticism of similar features in Christian life, or to shame Christians out of their
laxity, or to be u&vYtfed in some other way? As far as the relationship of the
heathen to God was concerned, they were in darkness, ignorance, blindness,
error and the other estranged concepts listed above. Nevertheless, God loved all
of His creation, alienated though they might be, and God's love for mankind is
examined next.
Charles Bigg, The Church's Task under the Roman Empire, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1905) p 1.
Examined in chapter VI.5 below. Tertullian not only recognised but also
appreciated pagan virtue in the area of human relationships; what he
condemned was pagan virtue as a substitute for a right relationship with God.
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V.3 THE LOVE OF GOD FOR NON-BELIEVERS
Although Tertullian stressed the estrangement of the natural man from
God, he was equally at pains to emphasise the loving-kindness and mercy of God
toward all of His creation. God cared for the general well-being of mankind,
whether they responded to Him or not - imbres etiam et soles suos peraequante
deo iustis et iniustis quae etiam inreligiosis et blasphemis semel homini
addicta conditione communicat, pluens super bonos et malos et solem suum
emittens super iustos et iniustos . 2 Tertullian contrasted the confidence which
the Christian could have in God with the attitude which the non-Christian had to
adopt toward his so-called divinities - apud uos de humano arbitratu diuinitas
pensitatur. Nisi homini deus placuerit, deus non erit; homo iam deo propitius
3
esse debebit . Indeed, Christianity was the one and only religion of Tertullian's
day which welcomed the sinner, and which offered salvation to all men,
4
irrespective of birth, occupation, or race. Speaking of the flesh, but equally
applicable to the whole man, Tertullian drew from the scriptures:
etsi perditam, sed Ego, inquit, ueni, ut quod periit saluum faciam; etsi
peccatricem, sed Malo mihi inquit salutem peccatoris quam mortem; etsi
damnatam, sed Ego, inquit, percutiam et sanabo. 5
This was indeed another side of the character of God:
ex ipsius domini persona: etsi fuerint delicta uestra tamquam roseum, uelut
niuem exalbabo, etsi tamquam coccinum, uelut lanam exalbabo ... Etiam









The point is made by Karl Holl, 'Urchristentum und Religionsgeschichte', in





IV Marc 10.2.27-02 and 4-6.
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Quite apart from offering salvation from sin, Tertullian pointed out to Marcion
that God was so concerned for the material welfare of all mankind that He
extended His good gifts even to Marcionites!
sed 'unum' esse optimum deum solum, qui sic unus sit optimus, qua solus
deus. Et utique optimus qui pluit super iustos et iniustos et solem suum oriri
facit super bonos et malos, sustinens et alens et iuuans etiam Marcionitas. 1
Although written in irony, that phrase illustrates an important aspect of
Tertullian's teaching about the love of God toward non-believers. With one or
two exceptions, to be noted in Chapter VI.4 below, the judgment of God for the
rejection and rebellion of man was not executed in this life, but was reserved
until the day of judgment.
iam primum qui florem lucis huius super iustos et iniustos aequaliter spargit,
qui temporum officia elementorum seruitia totius geniturae tributa dignis
simul et indignis patitur occurrere, sustinens ingratissimas nationes ludibria
artium et opera manuum suarum adorantes, nomen familiam ipsius
persequentes, luxuria auaritia iniquitate malignitate cottidie insolescentes,
ut sua sibi patientia detrahat: plures enim dominum idcirco non credunt
quia saeculo iratum tarn diu nesciunt. 2
Tertullian had much to say about hell-fire, and he had no doubt that when the
3
time came, there would be plenty of victims , but for the present he spoke more
about the God who preferred mercy to sacrifice, who desired penance and not
the death of the sinner, and who non praecipit tanturn (paenitentia), sed etiam
hortatur (et); inuitat praemio: salute; iurans etiam, uiuo dicens cupit credi sibi.
4
O beatos nos quorum causa deus jurat . He pointed out the patience of God,
who never wearied of loving even wicked men and of doing good to them; few
places in Tertullian's works are more moving than his description in de pudicitia






He depicted the fate of pagans, philosophers, heretics, and persecutors in




to encourage the repentance of Christians who had fallen into post-baptismal sin,
its tender wording typified Tertullian's teaching on the attitude of God to all
men :
Ilium etiam mitissimum patrem non tacebo qui prodigum filium reuocat et
post inopiam paenitentem libens suscipit, inmolans uitulum praeopimum
conuiuio gaudium suum exornat: quidni? filium enim inuenerat quern
amiserat, cariorem senserat quern lucri fecerat. Quis ille nobis
intellegendus pater? Deus scilicet; tarn pater nemo, tam pius nemo. 1
It is not uncommon to find, in writings about Tertullian, the criticism that
he lacked any appreciation of the tenderness and love of God, that he regarded
God chiefly as a Judge, and that this is a serious defect in Tertullian's character:
It is noteworthy that to Tertullian the goodness and the justice of God are
the attributes of the greatest importance, and that he never attains to the
New Testament conception of the love of God. 2
Auch er betont vornehmlich die Gerichtigkeit und Giite Gottes und der Liebe
zu Gott ni<ht besser als die Apologeten. 3
Ganz in den Spuren der Stoiker wandelnd lasst der Kirchenschriftsteller





Roberts, op. cit., p 130.
3
Friedrich Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, (4th ed.;
Halle; Max Niemeyer, 1906) p 153. There is also a revised (6th) edition by K. Aland,
Tubingen: Max Neimeyer, 1959.
4
Johannes Stelzenberger, Die Beziehungen der fruhchristlichen Sittenlehre
zur Ethik der Stoa, (Munchen: M. Hueber, 1933) p 262. Although it is true that the
Stoics did not despise mercy ("dementia"), they did consider compassion
("misericordia") to be a weakness, an unhealthy state of the soul, (e.g. E. Elorduv,
Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa in Philologus; Supplementband 28 Heft 3, (Leipzig:
1936) pp 155-160 and Hans Friedrich von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta
collegit Ioannes ab Arnim, (Leipzig: Maximilianus Adler, 1924), IV, 49).
Stelzenberger seems to have misled himself regarding Tertullian's use of Stoicism
here. This may have been because he confused the Roman Presbyter Novatianus
with the schismatic Novatus of Carthage, and concluded that Tertullian was
materially influenced by "his fellow-countryman Novatianus". Contrary to what
Stelzenberger claimed, Tertullian delighted in the misericordia of God - even as a
Montanist - e.g. pud 6.4.15. See also the comments on misericordia by Petre at the
end of the sub-section immediately following.
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Their religion seems to have been concentrated on the prospect of
Judgement hereafter, and on the consequent necessity of propitiating the
wrath of God. It was a religion of fear and dread, not of love. So Tertullian
in De Cultu Feminarum, ii.2. "Timor fundamentum salutis est". 1
In order to put such comments into context - the last one, for example, does not
indicate that the words cited were written to Christians and not to non-
believers - it should be noted that Tertullian defended the love of God for non-
believers in three main areas, as follows.
(a) AGAINST MARCION
Marcion contended that the love of God and the judgment of God were
incompatible, and so he postulated two gods, of unequal rank, the one a judge,
2
stern and warlike, the other mild, placid, only kind and supremely good. To
oppose him and to show him that God's love and God's judgment each demanded
the other, Tertullian stressed the constant mercy and the constant love of the
Creator, revealed with impartiality to all mankind, at all times. That was just
what Marcion denied; according to Marcion, Christ announced the existence of a
superior god, hitherto unknown and unsuspected, who would deliver men from the
power of their creator. In refuting this heresy, Tertullian stressed first those
attributes which it was inconceivable that God should not possess, among them:
Ita et bonitas perennis et iugis exigetur in deo, quae in thesauris naturalium
proprietatum reposita .3
Sed cessauit aliquando in deo Marcionis de opere bonitas: ergo non fuit
naturalis bonitas, quae potuit aliquando cessasse, quod naturalibus non licet.
Et si non erit naturalis, iam nec aeterna credenda .4
The second book against Marcion is particularly concerned to show that the
W.H.C. Frend, The Donatist Church: a Movement of Protest in Roman North
Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) p 97.
2
Marcionem dispares deos constituere alterum iudicem, ferum, bellipotentem,






Creator, the Demiurge whom Marcion belittled, was none other them the true
God, and identical with the God of the New Testament.
Ita non in mortem institutum hominem probat qui (et) nunc cupit in uitam
restitutum, malens peccatoris paenitentiam quam mortem,. 1
Et erit haec ipsa patientia creatoris in judicium Marcionis, ilia patientia,
quae expectat paenitentiam potius peccatoris quam mortem et mauult
misericordiam quam sacrificium, 2
super bonos et malos et solem suum oriri faciente super iustos et iniustos,
quod alius deus omnino non praestat«. 3
praemisit optimi dei titulum, patientissimi scilicet super malos et
abundantissimi misericordiae et miserationis super agnoscentes et
deplangentes delicta sua. 4
In the fourth book, Tertullian accepted, for the sake of the argument, Marcion's
mutilated Bible and proceeded to refute Marcion even on the basis of that:
Euge, Marcion, satis ingeniose detraxisti illi pluuias et soles, ne creator
uideretur. Sed quis iste suauis, qui ne cognitus guidem usque adhuc?
Quomodo suauis, a quo nulla beneficia praecesserant hoc genus suauitatis,
qua soles et imbres, qui non fenerauerat non recepturus ab humano genere,
ut creator, qui pro tanta elementorum liberalitate facilius idolis quam sibi
debitum gratiae referentes homines usque adhuc sustinet, uere suauis etiam
spiri talibus commodis: 5
Many similar references could be quoted from the books adversus Marcionem,
but the point need not be laboured: whether or not men responded to Him, God
had at all times demonstrated His love for all of His creation. As Petre put it:
lorsque Tertullien veut demontrer a l'heretique Marcion I'identite du Dieu
nomine" par le Nouveau Testament pater misericordiarum avec le Dieu
misericors et miserator et misericordiae plurimus de 1'Ancient Testament,
les temoignages de misericorde qu'il cite sont tous des exemples du pardon












H. Petre, "'Misericordia', Histoire du Mot et de l'ldee du Paganisms au
Christianisme", Revue des Etudes Latines, 12 (1934), 380.
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(b) AGAINST THE CATHOLICS
When Tertullian became a Montanist, he vigorously disputed the Catholic
interpretation of the parables of mercy. The Catholics claimed that the lost
sheep portrayed a sinning Christian, who had strayed from the sheepfold of the
Church; that the lost drachma was a figure of a sinner lost in the house of God,
the Church; that the prodigal son was an example of a baptized Christian who
had abandoned God his Father, who had wandered from the Church, his home, but
who, on his repentant return, was readmitted to the Church and assisted once
more at the eucharistic banquet of the slain Christ. Tertullian the Montanist
insisted that these parables were told to show the love of God for the natural
man before he became a Christian. They showed (he claimed) the initiative
taken by God toward establishing a right relationship between the outsider and
Himself.
De pudicitia is of course a treatise in which Tertullian was at his most
severe in every other respect, and the treatise is primarily (although not
exclusively) taken up with the question of what sins could and should be forgiven
by the Church. The Catholics maintained that no sin was irremissible, and they
referred to the many texts of Scripture which spoke of God's mercy to the sinner
and which promised par-don to the penitent. * Tertullian's response - which is
here confined to his interpretation of the parables of mercy - was primarily to
deny that these parables applied to post-baptismal sin at all, and if they did, it
was only in respect of less serious sins - lapses which did not involve spiritual
death. The sheep haii strayed, but was not dead: the drachma lay hidden, but
was not compeltely lost. (He gave examples of the kind of sin which he had in
A selection from their scriptural armoury was given in pud 2; it included
Ezekiel 33.11; Matthew 9.3 and 12.7; Luke 6.36; 1 Timothy 4.10 and Romans 14.4.
The parables ofjnercy were then quoted (pud 7-10), the woman taken in adultery
and the Samaritan woman, (pud 11), the incestuous Corinthian excommunicated and
reconciled (I Corinthians 5.3 and 2 Corinthians 2.5-11 - pud 13-15), John's Epistles
(pud 19) and the promise of the Keys to Peter (pud 21).
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mind, but that is outside the scope of this study.) The straying sheep borne back
to the fold on the shoulders of the Good Shepherd, the search for the lost
drachma, the prodigal son received back with welcome and feasted fatly by the
kindest of Fathers, who is God - all these were intended (he said to portray the
attitude of God toward the outsider who would repent from the ways of sin and
come back in response to the initiative and the seeking of God.
A parabolis licebit incipias, ubi est ouis perdita a Domino requisita et
humeris eius reuecta. Procedant ipsae picturae calicum uestrorum, si uel in
illis perlucebit interpretatio pecudis illius, utrumne Christiano an ethnico
peccatori de restitutione conliniet.2...Dic mihi, nonne omne hominum genus
unus Dei grex est? Nonne uniuersarum gentium idem Deus et Dominus et
pastor est? Quis magis perit a Deo quam ethnicus, quamdiu errat? Quis
magis requiritur a Deo quam ethnicus, quando reuocatur a Christo? Denique
antecedit hie ordo in ethnicis; siquidem non aliter Christiani ex ethnicis
fiunt nisi prius perditi et a Deo requisiti et a Christo reportati. 3
Perinde drachmae parabolam, ut ex eadem materia prouocatam, aeque in
ethnicum interpretamur, etsi in domo amissam, quasi in ecclesia, etsi ad
lucernae lumen repertam, quasi ad Dei uerbum. Atquin totus his mundus una
omnium domus est, in quo magis ethnico gratia Dei inlucet, qui in tenebris
inuenitur, quam Christiano, qui iam in Dei luce est .4
Quid perit hominum, quis labat de ualetudine, nisi qui Deum nescit? Quis
saluus ac sanus, nisi qui Deum nouit? Has duas species de genere fraternas
haec quoque signabit parabola. Vide an habeat ethnicus substantiam in Deo
patre census et sapientiae et naturalis agnitionis in Deum. 5
The argument was hardly very satisfactory, in that it involved the improbable
assertion that the publicans and sinners were heathen rather than Jews, and it
ignored the Matthaean setting of the parable of the Lost Sheep, which implied the
exact reverse of what Tertullian was determined to prove. None the less, it is a




pud 7.6.22-28. "The Catholic who interprets the parable as referring to a
Christian sinner will be obliged to show that such words as 'flock,' 'shepherd,' 'lost,'
etc. can have no application to the salvation of a pagan. In the sentence which
follows Tertullian rejects this view and attempts to prove that these words and the
sequence in which they occur point much more clearly to the salvation of an infidel
than to the reclamation of a Christian". William P. le Saint, Tertullian, Treatises
on Penance : On Penance and on Purity, (Westminster (Maryland) : The Newman




pud 9.13.57-14.62, on which Saint (op. cit., p 228-229) commented: "The man
who knows God and the man who does not are 'brothers by birth' because they are
(continued overleaf)
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While this interpretation of these three parables is the opposite of the spirit
and indeed of the letter of chapter eight of Tertullian's own Catholic work de
paenitentia, where he knew of no sin excluded from the Church's pardon and
where the parables of mercy were applied to the Christian sinner 'restored' by
paenitentia secunda, the discrepancy is outside the scope of this study, except in
so far as Tertullian's changing attitude as a Montamist is noted in Excursus Four.
What is important here is that Tertullian used them, in de pudicitia at any rate,
to illustrate his belief in the mercy of God and the love of God for the outsider,
God's preference for the repentance rather than the death of the pagan. After
throwing off the 'yoke' of the Catholic exegesis^ he proceeded, in chapter ten, to
show in detail how the love of God for sinful men and women outside the




If this is an authentic work of Tertullian, it demonstrates the mercy of God
footnote 5 continued from previous page :
both members of the same human race, children of Adam, the auctor (De exhort,
cast. 2) and princeps (De an. 20.2) generis. - Tertullian's argument in this paragraph
is a kind of sorites: the prodigal son is one who is lost; but one who is lost is one
who does not know God; but one who does not know God is a pagan; therefore the
prodigal is a pagan".
^
Excusso igitur ingo in ethnicum disserendi parabolas istas et semel disperta uel
recepta necessitate non aliter interpretandi quam materia propositi est.-pud
10.1.1-3.
2
There are three issues here. Some (e.g. the editors of Corpus
Christianorum) exclude the whole book from the main body of Tertullian's works.
Others divide the book between chapters 1 to 8 (genuine) and chapters 9 to 14. Of
those who do this, some regard chapters 9 to 14 as an unpolished draft by Tertullian
himself, who used the material in the Third book Adversus Marcionem. (Barnes,
"Tertullian" p 53 and Hermann von Trankle, Q.S.F. Tertulliani Adversus Judaeos
(Wisbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964) pp xxxvi, lii.) The remainder regard chapters 9 to
14 as spurious, being mainly excerpts from HI Marc and a clumsy attempt by
someone else to complete the work. The compiler has been identified by Quispel
with the "frater" mentioned in I Marc 1.1.9, who later on apostatized; G. Quispel,
De Bronnen van Tertullianus' Adversus Marcionem, (Leiden: Burgersdijk en
Niemans, 1943) pp 61-79.
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in another area of of his thought. The treatise shows in detail how it is
impossible to exclude Gentiles from the mercy of God, because the Old
Testament constantly asserted its covenant was intended for all nations. It is
outside the scope of the thesis to pursue this third point in any detail, but one
Tertullian made a sweeping survey of the kingdoms of the earth, past and
present, and asserted the universal sway of Jesus Christ. Were the Gentiles
admissible to God's law? Were the Jewish sacrifices incumbent on the Gentiles?
Tertullian's argument was that the failure of the Jew was the opportunity of the
Gentile. The two children of Rebecca, who embody Jew and Gentile, were both
called 'nations', and although in the sequence of birth the Jew was the older
nation, the Christian (from the Gentile) also received the understanding of God
and then conquered the earlier people, who had turned away from God.'''
Tertullian used this to emphasise the mercy and compassion of God toward the
Gentile nations.
One further point should be made. God so loved the non-believer that He
had done a great deal more than evince good will toward him; He had even done
more than search for lost mankind, as set out in the parables of mercy; He had
sent His Son. The Epicurean view of the unconcerned God was particularly
distasteful to Tertullian: otiosum et inexercitum, et ut ita dixerim, neminem
2 _
rebus hum amis . The birth, life and death of Christ were not for Tertullian
primarily a revelation of God - although that thought is not absent from his
works; the Incarnation and the life and the death of Christ were the way in
which the universality of God's love was to be supremely known and understood.
Cum ad Nicodemum (Christus) dicit: Ita, inquit, dilexit Deus mundum, ut






Filium suum unicum dederit, in quem omnis qui crediderit non pereat, sed
habeat uitam sempiternam. Et rursus; Non enim misit Deus Filium suum in
mundum ut iudicet mundum, sed ut saluus sit mundus per eum; qui
crediderit in ilium, non iudicatur; qui non crediderit in ilium, jam iudicatus
est, quia non credidit in nomine unici Filii Dei. 1
and speaking again of Christ:
Dictus est guidem 'angelus magni cogitatus', id est nuntius, officii, non
naturae uocabulo. Magnum enim cogitatum patris, super hominis scilicet
restitutionem, adnuntiaturus saeculo erat. 2
credimus deum etiam in terris egisse et humani habitus humilitatem
suscepisse ex causa hum anae salutis. 3
Because God was thas disposed to mankind, Tertullian encouraged the
nationes to search for, and to make enquiry about, the Christian God. They
4
would find that He was grande quid boni - 'a great essence of goodness'. Since
God wished all men to come to salvation in Christ, He had made some knowledge











V.4 EVERY ADULT SHOULD HAVE SOME KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
It was one of Tertullian's strongest and most frequently expressed
convictions that all men could and should have some knowledge of the Christian
God. There was no particularism in his thought, which restricted the
understanding of God to any section of mankind - there was not a Christian
workman, he said, but who had found out God, and would not tell an enquirer all
he could about God - licet Plato affirmet factitatorem uniuersitatis neque
inueniri facilem et inuentum enarrari in omnes difficilem. * That was not to
say that the salvation of God was universal - far from it, but God could and
should be understood to some degree by all men, at all times.
Nos unum Deum colimus, quern omnes naturaliter nostis, ad cuius fulgura et
tonitrua contremiscitis, ad cuius beneficia gaudetis. Ceteros et ipsi putatis
deos esse, quos nos daemonas scimus. 2
In contrast to the gods of the heathen, who were known only to the particular
tribes who had invented or discovered them,
Deum ego existimo ubique no turn, ubique praesentem, ubique dominantem,
omnibus colendum, omnibus demerendum. 3
Siquidem a primordia rerum conditor harum cum ipsis pariter compertus est,
ipsis ad hoc prolatis, ut deus cognosceretur. 4
Si et apud ethnicos tale quid traditur, ubique deus potestatis suae signa
proponit, suis in solacium, extraneis in testimonium .5
apol 46.9.45-47. The Greek god was a god who by his very nature could not
make himself known to man. The Christian God is a God who can and does when
He chooses, and refrains from doing so if He chooses. There is always the danger
of representing the barrier between God and man as being something metaphysical
rather than moral, and thus of making God the Father a God who cannot reveal
Himself to man because of his metaphysical status. He may, of course, choose not
to make Himself known, or His unapproachability may arise from His holiness, but










These general statements need to be qualified by one or two explanations, to
avoid misunderstanding, as Tertullian himself appreciated. In the first place, it
was only in a very restricted and human sense that God could be 'known':
Hoc est, quod Deum aestimari facit, dum aestimari non capit; ita eum uis
magnitudinis et notum hominibus obicit et ignotum. Et haec est summa
delicti nolentium recognoscere, quem ignorare non possunt. 1
It was a clever antithesis, which implicitly separated the two extremes - the
silent God of gnosis on the one hand, His complete understandability on the other
- and at the same time brought out the paradox that "He cannot be understood
and yet will be understood". In other words, the possibility of somehow coming
to know God was underlined by the assertion that it was not possible not to know
Him. That struck a good balance; if man could have comprehended God, He
would not be God, so in that sense God had by definition to be both unknown and
unknowable; nevertheless, because of the evidence in and around man, no one
should be unaware of the nature of God:
Porro diuinitas, si ueram retractes, ea definitione est, ut ista neque
argumentationibus incertis colligatur, neque fabulis indignis contaminetur,
neque adoptionibus passiuis iudicetur; haberi enim debet, sicut est, certa,
integra communis, quia scilicet omnium .2
and
plane benedici Deum omni loco ac tempore condecet ob debitam semper
memoriam beneficiorum eius ab omni homine. 3
Since Tertullian readily accepted that God transcended human thought, he
acknowledged the anthropomorphic nature of men's conclusions regarding Him;
Marcion in particular had raised the question of how far one could transfer
'human' qualities to God. Tertullian immediately recognised that although
certain attributes seemed to be common to God and to man, the similarity was in








mildness, patience and goodness, which men could conceive as belonging to both
God and man, were to be found in perfection only in God; other 'human'
attributes, such as anger and resentment, could be ascribed to God only in a
figurative way. Tertullian appreciated the magnitude of the difference between
human qualities and divine qualities, but he did not on that account lose faith in
the ability of man to "know God".
The second qualification, on which Tertullian insisted most strongly, as set
out in Chapter VI.5 below, was that the natural man's knowledge of God, however
extensive, had to be supplemented by Christian revelation before man could
enter into a proper and saving relationship with God.
Nemo negat, quia nemo ignorat, quod ultro natura suggerit, Deum esse
uniuersitatis conditorem eamque uniuersitatem tarn bonam quam homini
mancipatam. Sed quia non penitus Deum norunt nisi naturali jure, non etiam
familiari, de longinquo, non de proximo, necesse est ignorent, qualiter
adroinistrari iubeat quae instituit .1
There were two kinds of understanding of God. Tertullian could say in one
place that every man could and should understand God, and then immediately
assert that only a Christian could understand God, indeed that conversion to the
Christian faith was the gateway to the only proper understanding of God. These
two statements were not incompatible. Tertullian's main teaching on the natural
man's knowledge of God was directed against Marcion, in particular Marcion's
assumption that the true God -the God of Jesus Christ and of the New
Testament, as opposed to the God of the Old Testament -was unknown without
the revelation of Christ. To avoid multiplying quotations, the point cam be
illustrated by a few references to chapter 9 of adversus Marcionem book one,
where Tertullian maintained that God neither could be, nor ought to be,
unknown, the former because of His greatness, the latter because of His




Christ, nor indeed with the years before Tertullian's own day, the initial proof
against Marcion, that God could not be unknown prior to the revelation of Christ,
is the same proof that He could not be unknown among the heathen of
Tertullian's day who had not heard of Christ. Tertullian went on, in the later
books againist Marcion, to say that man's knowledge of God was enlarged and
strengthened by the prophets and amplified by Christ, but in chapter 9 of book
one his argument rested on first principles:
Scio quidem, quo sensu nouum deum iactitent, agnitione utique. Sed ipsam
nouitatem cognitionis percutientem rudes animas ipsamque naturalem
nouitatis gratiositatem uolui repercutere, et hinc iam de ignoto deo
prouocare. Vtique enim quern agnitione nouum opponunt, ignotum ante
agnitionem demonstrant. Age igitur, ad lineas rursum et in gradumi
Persuade deum ignotum esse potuisse. 1
Sed breuiter proponam et plenissime exequar, praescribens deum ignorari
nec potuisse nomine magnitudinis nec debuisse nomine benignitatis, 2
Hinc itague constatissime dirigam deum non esse, qui sit hodie incertus, quia
retro ignotus, quando quern constat esse ex hoc ipso constet, quod numquam
fuerit ignotus, ideo nec incertus, 3
or, as he put it in the following chapter ;
numquam deus latebit, numquam deus deerit, semper intellegetur, semper
audietur, etiam uidebitur, quomodo uolet. Habet deus testimonia: totum
hoc quod sumus et in quo sumus. Sic probatur et deus et unus, dum non
ignoratur, alio adhuc probari laborante.4
In addition to these general statements Tertullian advanced two specific
propositions:-
(a) non ulla gens non Christiana
and
(b) anima naturaliter Christiana










section V.5. below, but the meaning of the former phrase is explored now. Non
ulla gens non Christiana is usually explained as a reference to the rapid
expansion of Christianity, in other words that Christians could now be found in
3
practically all known races, especially the old ones. Certainly it means that, in
"tHe
(corresponding passage in de anima, uel quia nulla iam gens dei extranea est in
4
omnem terram et m terminos orbis euangelio coruscante? but that sense just
does not fit the context of ad nationes. Tertullian was disputing the derogatory
5
description of Christians as 'tertium genus', and therefore inferior in some way.
He narrated, then refuted, the stojy told by Herodotus among others, of how
Psammeticus tried to discover which language, and therefore which people, was




E.g. the comment in the Ante-Nicene Library translation of this passage, "This
is one of the passages which incidentally show how widely spread was Christianity";
also Adolf von Harnack, Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den
ersten drei Jahrhunderten, (Leipzig, 4th edn. 1924) I, 533; Waszink, "De Anima" p
518; A. Schneider, Le premier livre Ad Nationes de Tertullien, Introduction, texte,
traduction et commentaire, (Rome: Institut Suisse de Rome, 1968) ppll6 and 194.
3
Tertullian certainly did use the argument elsewhere, in defence of the truth of
Christianity, viz. the rapid increase of Christians in all parts - e.g. "Hesterni





The origin of the phrase tertium genus and its employment by Tertullian. was
discussed by Christine Mohrmann, op. cit. vol IV, p 195 ff and by Schneider op. cit.
p 187 ff. Schneider stated that the expresion tertium genus was borrowed by the
pagans from the Christians. Miss Mohrmann was once of the same view, and
expressed it in the first volumn. (1958) of Etudes sur In Latin des Chretiens, but by
the fourth volume in 1977, "jy crois devoir changer legerement mon point du vue.
Selon Pline, on appelait les eunuques tertium genus, usage qui est egalement
atteste par Lampridius: tertium genus hominum eunuchos. Tout bien consider^, je
crois que les Chretiens^ de langue latine ont emprunte la tournure aux grecs
Chretiens, sans rapport avec l'usage latin pa'i'en. Comme on In sait, la formule
grecque se trouve deja dans un fragment de la Praedicatio Petri (II— siecle) cit6 par
Clement d'Alexandrie. Je ne considere pas comme impossible que le pa'i'ens de
l'Afrique du Nord aient, au d6but du III— siecle, emprunte la formule aux Chretiens,
comme le passage cit6 de Tertullien semble suggerer/^pp195-196.
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from all human contact, except for one dumb nurse; the first word which they
spoke was in Phrygian! However, continued Tertullian:
Sint nunc primi Phryges: non tamen tertii Christiani. Quantae enim aliae
gentium series post Phrygas? Verum recog ^itate, ne quos tertium genus
dicitis, principem locum obtineant, siquidem non ulla gens non Christiana.
Itague quaecumque gens prima, nihilominus Christiana; ridicula dementia
novissimos dicitis et tertios nominatis. 1
Tertullian's argument (that the alleged 'third race' was in fact the first, because
there was no race, however early, that was not Christian) proceeded, not on the
basis of a percentage of Christians in the races of Tertullian's day but on the
basis that from the very beginning, when races first came into being, there was
not one which was not Christian. His proof was historical rather than statistical,
2
as indeed it had to be. Christianity had only recently been preached, so it
would have been impossible for Tertullian to have suggested that a few
Christians, now, in 'every race' made Christians the 'first race' chronologically.
If, however, Tertullian meant that all men (and races) had, from the beginning,
some basic understanding of the Christian God, the phrase fits into the pattern
of Tertullian's thought. Ad nationes was more or less contemporary with the
apologeticum, and so with the phrase anima naturaliter Christiana (to be
examined in the next section). That which is Christian was (he claimed) already
present in the beginning, implanted by nature in every man. It was not a
question of an assessable unit, but in so far as every race of men have possessed
reason and speech and inquisitio uniuersitatis, they have enjoyed some knowledge
of the Christian God - He was 'there' in every race and so in the first race,
chronologically speaking ... siquidem non ulla gens non Christiana. Itague




Tertullian deliberately misunderstood 'third' as a term of abuse, when he said
ridicula dementia nouissimos dicitis et tertios nominatis. Schneider caught it well
when he translated "dans votre folie ridicule, vous dites qu'ils sont les derniers, et
vous le5appelez les troisiemes." (op. cit..p 79)
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What Tertullian said of individual souls in the apologeticum he was saying of
whole races, in the ad nationes passage. It was senseless, then, for Tertullian's
opponents to speak derogatorily of Christians as 'third', because every race on
earth was 'Christian' in the sense that every race had possessed from the
beginning, and had demonstrated, the basic ethical truths which Christianity now
made explicit.
Cur etenim deus, uniuersitatis conditor, mundi totius gubernator, hominis
plasmator, uniuersarum gentium sator, legem per Moysen uni populo dedisse
credatur et non omnibus gentibus attribuisse dicatur? Nisi enim omnibus
earn dedisset, nullo pacto ad earn etiam proselytos ex gentibus accessum
habere permitteret. Sed, ut congruit bonitati dei et aequitati ipsius, utpote
plasmatoris generis humani, omnibus gentibus eandem legem dedit, quam
certis statutis temporibus obseruari praecepit quando uoluit et per quos
uoluit et sicut uoluit. 1
Denique ante legem Moysei scriptam in tabulis lapideis legem fuisse
contendo non scriptam, quae naturaliter intellegebatur et a patribus
custodiebatur. Nam unde Noe iustus inuentus, so non illi naturalis legis
iustitia praecedebat? unde Abraham dei amicus deputatus, unde fides
statim, si non de aequitate et iustitia legis naturalis? 2
Nach Tertullian hat Gott an verschiedenen Zeitpunkten und Orten alien
Volkern dasselbe Gesetz gegeben (Iud 2,If.). Per Anfang dieser gottlichen
Gesetzgebung ereignete sich schon im Paradies, als Gott Adam und Eva
verbot, vom Baum des Lebens zu essen~~T2,l: vgl. Gen 2, 16f.; 3.2f.). In
diesem einen Gebot sind bereits die spateren Gesetze Moses enthalten, d.h.
das Gebot zur Gottes- und Nachstenliebe und das Verbot gegen Mord,
Diebstahl, Ehebruch, falsches Zeugnis und Habsucht; denn in ihrem Fall
haben die ersten Menschen nach Tertullian alle diese Gebote verletzt (2,
2ff,; vgl. Gen 2 u.3). Daher kann es niemanden mehr iiberraschen, wenn
Gott in spateren Zeiten diese lex generalis et primordialis entfaltet (2,6).
Es ist diese lex non scripta, quae naturaliter intellegebatur et a patribus
custodiebatur (2,7). Weder Noah noch Abraham ware gerechtfertigt ohne
die naturalis legis iustitia, und Melchisedek ware nicht ein Priester des
hochsten Gottes, wenn es night schon Leviten vor dem levitischen Gesetz
gegeben hatte (2,7; vgl. Gen 6, 9; 15, 6; 14, 18). Jede Gesetzgebung ist aber
vorlaufig und bedarf im Laufe der Zeit der Verbesserung; so auch das
mosaische Gesetz (2, 9). 3
1
jud 2.1.2-2.11. The idea that the truths now made explicit in Christianity
formed the basis of all original human religion, thus giving the believer the true
understanding of God, seems to underlie Tertullian's attempt to prove that Moses
wasprior to Homer (apol 19.4); this is contendedbyWilliam ReginaldHalliday, The Pagan
Background of Early Christianity, (Liverpool: University Press, 1925) p 248.
2
jud 2.7.43-49.
Gregory T. Armstrong, Die Genesis in der alten Kirche, (Tubingen: J.C.B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962) p 135.
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In that sense, then, every race, from the beginning of time, had some knowledge
of the Christian God and so could be called 'Christian' in the same sense that
every individual soul was naturaliter Christiana. Obviously 'Christiana' cannot
there be taken literally, any more than the phrase which follows - quaecumque
gens prima, nihilominus Christiana - can be understood in a confessional sense.
Tertullian was very explicit, when addressing the soul of man, that while Ea
expostulo, quae tecum homini infers, quae ex temetipsa aut ex quocumque
auctore tuo sentire didicisti. Non es, quod sciam, Christiana. Fieri enim, non
nasci solet Christiana. ^ Whatever it was that individual souls reflected of the
Christian God, was here extended by Tertullian from individuals to whole races.
Therefore, whatever race was counted as 'first', elements of Christianity were
present in it, so the inferior designaiton of 'third race' was meaningless.
Regrettably, Tertullian did not expand on this phrase nor comment on it.
The surprise effect of throwing it into the argument was presumably more
important to him than the introduction of the concept with a detailed
explanation, which would have made it more comprehensible. Equally
regrettably, he did not return to it anywhere else in his works. However, an
examination of the various ways in which every individual in every race could
and should acquire some knowledge of God is explored in the remainder of this
chapter. For the present, it is clear that there is no trace in Tertullian of the
n
theory developed by the Neo-Platojists and reflected in the thought of Clement,
that God is unknowable. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that God
could be known only by the exercise of human reason- human understanding was
as corrupted as the rest of human nature- but:
Conuersabatur deus humane, ut homo diuine agere doceretur. Ex aequo
agebat deus cum homine, ut homo ex aequo agere cum deo posset. Deus






The relationship between the self-revelation of God to man and the validity of
human thought about God, and the extent to which man could stretch upward
from the imperfections of the human conception of God to the perfection of His
nature, will be examined in chapter VI. 6 below. Meantime, the remainder of
this chapter will be devoted to the reasons why Tertullian believed that every
adult should have some knowledge of God. First to be examined are the
spontaneous expressions of the irrepressible, immediate, religious consciousnness
in every man - the testimony of the soul.
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V.5 THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOUL
Basic and fundamental to Tertullian's understanding of the relationship
of man to God was the testimony of the soul to the existence of God, and to
certain of his attributes. Although every unregenerate soul was to a greater or
lesser extent under the control of demoniac powers, ^ this "deposit of inborn
knowledge" asserted itself, even in pagans, by involuntary remarks such as "deus
magnus", "deus bonus", "deus mihi reddfct", "quod deus dederit", "si deus uoluerit",
"quod deo placet" "deo commendo" and "deus uidet" - not "Jupiter grant" or
2
Saturn, or Mars or Minerva. The word common to all these exclamations was
'deus', and since the so-called gods of paganism were all given individual names,
they could not really be God at all. The remarks of the heathen not only
demonstrated the existence of one true God, but Tertullian believed that he
could read into them (and that others should read out of them) the unity and
goodness of God, the existence of demons and their ruinous influence on
mankind, future survival and the reality of rewards or punishments beyond the
grave. These were truths which nature herself, pure and simple, had left in man,
3
because man was the creation of God.
From everyday talk in the market place, therefo^ all men should learn
something about their relationship with God. When men spoke of the fear of
death or of the dead as wretched or poor, they implied punishment after death;
when they prayed "Light be the turf of the tomb", they accepted continued
sensation; when they said "such a one is gone", they suggested a return. These
remarks were not to be dismissed as trivial or unimportant, because they were
Chapters IU.2 and IV.2 above.
^
Selected from test 2.1.4-5; I Marc 10.2.10-11; an 41.3.19; apol 17.5.24-27;
res 3.2.9.
3
As examined in chapter 1.7, and as mentioned in paragraph (f) of this section,
something of the divine original goodness survived in every man; it was never
eliminated, but only suppressed, or, as Tertullian put it, obscured.
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the voice of God, the welling up of a consciousness of God in the human soul.
Because of this, the primary and most essential truths of religion and morals
were, or at any rate ought to be, known to all men independently of revelation or
authority.
Tertullian expounded this theme with differing emphases in half a dozen
separate works, separate both in time and in character - the widespread, indeed
universal, testimony of the soul, in consequence of which every man should have
some knowledge of God. Every passage has its own contribution to make to an
overall understanding of his teaching, so the relevant excerpts from the six
treatises are now examined briefly in chronological order.
(a) apologeticum
Tertullian's first reference to the testimony of the soul to God included
(in the chapter before his equally famous and seemingly contradictory aphorism
fiunt, non nascuntur Christiani, ^ the much-quoted phrase anima naturaliter
Christiana:
uultis ex animae ipsius testimonio comprobemus? Quae licet carcere
corporis pressa, licet institutionibus prauis circumscripta, licet libidinibus et
concupiscentiis euigorata, licet falsis deis exancillata, cum tamen,resipiscit,
ut ex crapula, ut ex somno, ut et aliqua ualetudine, et sanitatem suam
patitur, 'Deum' nominat hoc solo nomine, quia proprio Dei ueri. 'Deus
magnus, Deus bonus', et 'quod Deus dederit' omnium vox est. Iudicem
quoque contestatur ilium, 'Deus uidet' et 'Deo commendo' et 'Deus mihi
reddet'. O testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae! 2
3
Quispel, in an article 'Anima naturaliter Christiana' traced Tertullian's phrase
apol 18.4.18. Ernst Bickel showed that the dictum anima naturaliter
Christiana does not stand in opposition to the sentence "fiunt, non nascuntur
Christiani" - in an article of that name in Pisciculi, Studien zur Religion und
Kultur des Altertums, Festschrift fiir Franz Joseph Dolger zum sechzigsten
Geburtstag, (Minister: Aschendorff, 1939) pp 54 ff. Part of his argument is
considered at the end of this section. The less successful attempt of C. Becker to




G. Quispel, "Anima naturaliter Christiana", Latomus, 10 (1951), 163-169.
Since then, considerable new light has been shed on the doctrine of the anima
(continued on next page)
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back to Minucius Felix,* and in particular to his training in rhetoric and then,
hack through Stoic influences, to Greek literature. Although the Stoic influence
on Tertullian was strong, as will be examined in section V.10 below, it should be
said at this point that (even assuming the chronological priority of Minucius)
Tertullian approached the question rather differently from Minucius Felix. For
Tertullian, the soul did not only know God, naturally, but also knew His
judgement, the existence of the devil, hell, and eternal life. All that man could
learn about God, through the testimony of the soul, was expanded by Tertullian
and treated in a separate work, de testimonio animae, written in the same year
as the apologeticum. The desirability - indeed the necessity - of reading the
phrases "anima naturaliter Christiana" and "fiunt, non nascuntur Christiani" in
the apologeticum chapter 17 and 18 along with chapters 1 and 2 of de testimonio
animae was shown by Brox in an article which he entitled "Anima naturaliter non
2
Christiana". The argument of Tertullian's second work depends on the natural
footnote 3 continued:
naturaliter Christiana by three articles by C. Tibiletti, the most comprehensive
being "Tertulliano e la dottrina dell' anima, naturaliter Christiana", Atti della
Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, 88 (1953-54), 84-116, followed by "Una presunta
dipendenza di Tertulliano da Minucio Felice", ibid. 91 (1956/1957), 60/72, and then
"Seneca e la fonte di un passo di Tertulliano", Rivista di Filolog., 35 (1957),
256/260.
*
The majority view is now in favour of Minucius' dependence on Tertullian and
not the other way round, but the point is still much debated and cannot be regarded
as settled.
^
Norbert Brox, "Anima naturaliter non Christiana", Zeitschrift fur i^atholische
Theologie, 91 (1969), 70-75. Brox criticised Carl Becker, who, in his commentary
Tertullian's Apologeticum (Werden und Leistung, Munich: Koselverlag, 1954) had
claimed to harmonise the two seemingly contradictary phrases "anima naturaliter
Christiana" and "fiunt, non nascuntur christiani" by reading both in the light of Stoic
philosophy. "Wie nach stoischer Lehre zwar die Keime zum Rechten von An fang
an im Menschen liegen, es aber von ihm selbst abhangt, ob er schliesslich den
gliickseligen Zustand des Weisen erreicht". So, said Becker, the second phrase
grew out of the first as the realisation in due course of what had been present
naturaliter from the beginning. Brox pointed out that Becker's conclusion could
not stand, because if the apologeticum passage was put alongside the treatise de
testimonio animae, it would be seen that "Dies ist aber weder die Theologie
(continued on next page)
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soul not being Christian, because it is from a non-committed witness that
Tertullian extracts the admissions to prove his case. ^ The conclusion is the same
in both works - that the fundamentals for understanding the Christian God are to
be found in the natural human soul - but it is expedient to defer comment on the
apologeticum passage and to look at it along with Tertullians's second reference
to the testimony of the soul.
(b) de testimonio animae
In the six chapters of de testimonio animae, Tertullian not only
developed the theme that the involuntary utterances of the soul were a primary
witness for the existence and attributes of God, but also that they taught life
after death, and reward and punishment in the world to come. It was important
for him, as an apologist, to be able to show not only the absurdity of heathen
polytheism, but to show that the heathen were capable of recognising the God
whom the Christians worshipped and that they were culpable if they did not. His
first task, therefore, was to find a point of contact with his audience, and he did
it by admitting frankly that the approach of his predecessors had not succeeded.
They had attempted to prove, through extracts from secular philosophers and
poets, that there were agreements between the new doctrine and the old pagan
footnote 2 continued ;
Tertullians noch seine Auffassung des Christlichen. Man muss wieder auf den
singularen Charakter des Ausrufes iiber die anima naturaliter Christiana verweisen,
dem eine ganze Anzahl anders akzentuierter Aussagen gegeniibersteht und dem der
gesamte Duktus der tertullianeischen Theologie nicht parallal lauft. Tp 72). Brox
considered the phrase anima naturaliter Christiana to be thrown in only for surprise
effect, and intended to be paradoxical - Das Wort von der anima naturaliter
Christiana ist also sowohl paradox und emphatischhyperbolisch als auch werbend und
taktisch formuliert. Es geht fur Tertullian nicht darum, die menschliche Seele als
naturaliter Christiana nachgewiesen zu haben, sondern die christliche Lehre
gengeniiber standiger Verleumdung und Verzerrung ins Abstruse geschiitzt und
abgesichert zu haben. (p 75).
^
Non es, quod sciam, Christiana. Fieri enim, non nasci solet Christiana. Tarnen
nunc a te testimoni urn flagitant Christiani, ab extranea aduersus tuos, - test
1.7.50-52. The context in which these three sentences appear is given in a fuller
quotation on page Ibelow, -fo-tivote 6).
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wisdom. Tertullian praised their efforts, and their erudition, but they had failed;
the pagans simply rejected their most admired masters in the places where they
seemed to offer support to the truth of Christianity.^ No, said Tertullian, there
was no need for such philosphical reflexion and discussion 2 - instead, he called
on the natural, untutored soul to give testimony in favour of Christianity -the
soul just as it had come from the hands of God, unsullied by cultural influences,
virgin of all human education, such a soul as one would encounter in the street
3
and in the workshop, the common soul.
Disposed to see in all culture, and science, and art, the falsification of
original truth, he preferred to appeal to the involuntary utterances of the
immediate, original, voice of God in nature. As evidence for Christian truth
against ploytheism, he appealed to the spontaneous expressions of an
irrepressible, immediate religious consciousness in common life - the
testimony of the soul, which he held to be Christian by nature - the
testimony of the simple, uncultivated, ignorant soul, previous to all
education. 4
It is important to remember, as Tertullian himself pointed out almost as
soon as he had introduced the testimony of the soul, that the anima naturalij- was
not itself in a Christian relationship to God, however valuable a witness it might
5
be to the truths of Christianity - Consiste in medio, anima:
... Imperitia tua mihi opus est, quoniam aliquantulae peritiae tuae nemo
credit. Ea expostulo quae tecum homini infers, quae ex temetipsa aut ex
quocumque auctore tuo sentire didicisti. Non es, quod sciam, Christiana.
Fieri enim, non nasci solet Christiana. Tarnen nunc a te testimonium
flagitant Christiani, ab extran£q aduersus tuos, ut uel tibi erubescant, quod








Augustus Neander, General History of the Christian Religion and Church,






Indeed the whole argumentation of de testimonio animae chapter one is based on
the idea that the soul is not Christian in itself; the value of its evidence lies in
the fact that it is heathen and so belongs to the opposite party. That is why the
phrase from the apologeticum - testimonium animaenaturaliter Christianas- must
be interpreted in light of the teaching of de testimonio animae. When inquiry is
made as to what the soul teaches, the reply will be that it teaches the existence
of the one true God and that it will deny the existence of the pagan gods; it will
teach the nature of God, that He is good and that He is sovereign and all-
powerful, that He sees all and judges all; it will teach, moreover, the existence
of demons and of satan; it will teach the resurrection and the judgQnent.
"Anima naturaliter Christiana" must therefore mean that there is, latent in the
human soul, before it has undergone any deformation through learning, a
testimony to those things that belong to the essence of the Christian faith. Let
the sincere-minded pagan offer an attentive ear to the truth which he carries
enshrined in himself!
Whether or not Tertullian was demanding too much from the evidence of
the soul - whether for example, he had confused (perhaps deliberately) witness to
mere theism with witness to the deus christianorum, - there is no doubt that he
expected the non-believer to recognise:
(i) The sinfulness of man and the judgment of God for sin - the theme of
chapter two of de testimonio animae.
De natura quoque dei quem praedicamus, nec te latet. 'Deus bonus', 'Deus
benefacit', tua uox est. Plane, adicis: 'sed homo malus' scilicet contraria
propositione oblique et figuraliter exprobrans ideo malum hominem, quia,
a deo bono abscesserit. 1
Sunt qui etsi deum non negent, dispectorem plane et arbitrum et iudicem
non putent, in quo utique nos maxime reiciunt, qui ad istam disciplinam
metu praedicati iudicii transuolamus . . . At idem alibi animam diuinam




retorquendum aduersus opinionem superiorem. Si enim anima aut diuina
aut a deo data est, sine dubio datorem suum nouit, et si nouit, utique et
timet et tantum postremo ad auctorem. An non timet quern magis
propitium uelit quam iratum? Vnde igitur naturalis timor animae in
deum, si deus non nouit irasci? 1
(ii) The existence of the devil - the theme of chapter three.
Satanam denique in omni uexatione et aspernatione et detestatione
pronuntias, quem nos dicimus malitiae angelum, totius erroris artificem,
totius saeculi interpolatorem . . . Sentis igitur perditorem tuum, et licet
soli ilium nouerint Christiani uel quaecumque apud dominum secta, et tu
tamen eum nosti, dum odisti. 2
Although the heathen might discover, in the testimony of the common soul, some
3
evidence for the existence of the devil, Tertullian recognised elsewhere that
revelation was necessary for man to appreciate the significance and the wiles of
the devil.
(iii) The immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the flesh and future
judgment - the theme of chapter four.
Tertullian believed that immortality could be discovered by the natural man
listening to the testimony of the natural soul, which pitied the dead, feared
death and often exhibited a desire for posthumous fame - all of which proved its
belief in a hereafter. Indeed, he went further and believed he could prove the
resurrection of the body by natural means:
Primo enim, cum alicuius defuncti recordaris, "misellum" uocas eum, non
utque quod de bono uitae ereptum sed ut poenae et iudicio adscriptum.
Ceterum alias "securos" uocas defunctos. Profiteris et uitae incommodum
et mortis beneficium. 4.
Quis non hodie memoriae post mortem frequentandae ita studet, ut uel
litteraturae operibus uel simplici laude morum uel ipsorum sepulcrorum
ambitione nomen suum seruet? Vnde animae hodie affectare aliquid quod
uelit post mortem et tantopere praeparare quae sit usura post obitum? Nihil
utique de posterofcuraret, si nihil de posterio sciret. Sed forsitan de sensu
post excessum tui certior sis quam de resurrectione quandoque cuius nos
praesumptores denotamur. Atquin hoc quoque ab anima praedicatur. Nam
si de aliquo iam pridem defuncto tanquam de uiuo quis requirat, prae manu
occurrit dicere: "Abiit iam et reuerti debet." 5
^
test 2.3.21-24 and 4.29-5.36.
7








That really is going beyond the evidence - to say that a man 'has gone and will
return' is not in itself to express belief in the Christian resurrection!
Reincarnaijon it might have taught, but scarcely resurrection - which was a
matter of Christian revelation, as Tertullian recognised elsewhere.
(iv)The goodness of God and the justice of God
Etiam circumuenta ab aduersario meminit sui auctoris et bonitatis et
decreti eius et exitus sui et aduersarii ipsius. Sic mirum, si a deo data
eadem canit quae deus suis dedit nosse? Sed qui eiusmodi eruptiones
animae non putauit doctrinam esse naturae et congenitae et ingenitae
conscientiae tacita commissa, 1
Deum praedicabas et non requirebas, daemonia abominabaris et ilia
adorabas, judicium dei appellabas nec esse credebas, interna supplica
praesumebas et non praecauebas, Christianum nomen sapiebas et
persequebaris. 2
In other words, every man should not only acknowledge the existence of God, but
every man had a duty to seek the meaning and significance of what his soul told
him about God. Every soul had such natural capabilities, quite apart from
supernatural revelation.
(c) de came Christi
Tertullian, who never wearied of his insistence in the universality and uniformity
of the voice of God in the human soul, returned to his theme in de carne Christi :
Sed adeo non ignorat, ut auctorem et arbitrum et statum suum norit.
Nihil adhuc de deo discens deum nominat. Nihil adhuc de iudicio eius
admittens deo commendare s£ dicit. Nihil magis audiens quam spem
nullam esse post mortem et bene et male defuncto cuique imprecatur.
Plenius haec prosquitur libellus quern scripsimus DE TESTIMONIO
ANIMAE. 3
(d) adversus Marcionem








naturaliter Christiana, to meet the particular heresy of Marcion. Some
understanding of God - including the existence of God as Creator, His goodness,
man's duty, and his immorality - could not be dated only from the days of Moses,
because the majority of people, who still did not know the name of Moses and
knew nothing about his writings, knew, or should know, about the God of Moses.
Some understanding of God was given to all men, and for this the soul was the
"prophet":
Denique maior popularitas generis humani, ne nominis guidem Moysei
compotes, nedum instrumenti, deum Moysei tamen norunt; etiam tantam
idolatria dominationem obumbrante, seorsum tamen ilium quasi proprio
nomine 'deum' perhibent et 'deum deorum' et 'si deus dederit' et 'quod deo
placet' et 'deo commendo.' Vide, an nouerint quem omnia posse
testantur. Nec hoc ullis Moysei libris debent. Ante anima quam
prophetia. Animae enim a primordio conscientia dei dos est. 1
(e) de resurrectione carnis
Tertullian's contention that the human soul never ceased to be capable of
apprehending some divine truth appeared again in his treatise on the
resurrection:
Est guidem et de communibus sensibus sapere in dei rebus, ... Quaedam
enim et naturaliter nota sunt, ut inmortalitas animae penes plures,ut
deus noster penes omnes. Vtas ergo et sententia Platonis alicuius
pronuntiantis: 'Omnis anima inmortalis'; utar et conscientia populi
contestantis deum deorum; utar et reliquis communibus sensibus, qui
deum iudicem praedicant: 'Deus uidet' et 'Deo commendo'. 2
The use which Tertullian made of pagan philosphers, and his general
condemnation of their teaching on religious matters, will be examined in chapter
VI.6 below. Meantime it can be noted that Tertullian was not attempting, in the
passage just quoted, to base his argument on the views of Plato or the views of
the natural man, but was simply saying that this was the kind of support he was




res 3.1.1-2 and 1.4-2.9.
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(f) de anima
In his very detailed treatise de anima, Tertullian returned to the theme of why
the darkness of paganism could not hide completely the understanding of the true
God. In consequence of the semen boni, of which no soul was entirely bereft,^ Sic
et diuinitas animae in praesagia erumpit ex bono priore et conscientia dei in
testimonium prodit: 'deus bonus' et 'deus uidet' et 'deo commendo'. 2.
It was a fair point for Tertullian to make against the heathen, but it must be
taken in the context of his overall thought. If the understanding of God, of
which Tertullian had been speaking, was really inborn, then so must be the
understanding of the resurrection, the immortality of the soul and the
3
characteristics of God to which Tertullian also referred. Elsewhere, however,
he emphatically rejected the Platonic doctrine of inborn ideas, preferring the
Aristotlean and Stoic notion that the soul acquired understanding through the
senses. As will be examined in the next section, the external world had a great
deal to teach to the soul through the observation of the senses, but this present
section is concerned with the evidence of the natural, inner power of the soul.
The point Tertullian was surely trying to make, about the testimony of the soul,
was the need for man to take at face value its spontaneous utterances, that is
what came from its innermost being; he could call on the evidence of the healthy
and natural mind of man, because it gave the same testimony everywhere and
therefore it was true. Beyond that his argument should not be pushed.




e.g. an 18 and 24.
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CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS SECTION
The natural man used, and heard others use, a variety of expressions which gave
spontaneous evidence of the existence and attributes of the one true God. Every
man therefore had, or should have, some understanding of Him. God had created
man in such a way that he could possess and enjoy a relationship with God. In his
original condition, knowledge of God had been clear and unclouded, but through
sin that knowledge had been obscured. In the untutored soul, however, it had not
been obliterated, and phrases which sprang involuntarily to the lips of men were
testimonies to God which even sin could not eradicate. Futscher seems rather to
have missed the point of this, when he wrote:
Auch so, sagt T., bezeugt sie Dasein des einen wahren Gottes. Dazu
braucht es kein fertiges, aktuelles angeborenes Wissen, sondern es
handelt sich vielmehr um die Fahigkeit und Naturanlage der Seele,
vermoge deren die im Hinblick auf das objektive Zeugnis fur das Dasein
Gottes in und um uns anwillkiirlich, mit einer gewissen
Naturnotwendigkeit zur Anerkennung Gottes kommt, ohne sich das in
wissenschaftlicher Reflexion zu klarem Bewvasstsein zu bringen. Das ist
der Standpunkt, den T. sowohl in der Polemik gegen die Heiden als
insbesondere gegen Marcion einmnant, wo die Erkenntnis Gottes aus dem
Zeugnis seiner Werke so stark im Vordergrund steht 1.
The testimony of the soul was innate, according to Tertullian, not acquired by
observation impressed on the tabula rasa of the soul as life went one. That was
true of the evidence from the world outside, which was acquired and not innate,
but that was a separate (although related) source for the knowledge of God,
which is examined next.
Lorenz Futscher, "Die naturliche Gotteserkenntnis bei Tertullian",
Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie, 51 (1927), 238.
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V.6 THE TESTIMONY OF NATURE
The second main evidence, brought forward by Tertullian ^ for the
natural man's knowledge of God, was the evidence of nature. The God of
creation had been known to man since the beginning of the world and had taken
care to convey, through the works of His creation, a universal and certain
understanding of His existence. Tertullian believed this both complemented the
testimony of the soul, and also gave independent evidence for the existence of
the one true God. The two evidences were closely related, because God was the
creator of both the soul and of the external world; both aspects of His creation
bore testimony to God.
Die geistige Natur der Seele hat er nach seinem Ebenbild geschaffen mit der
Bestimmung zur Erkenntnis Gottes und sie deshalb auch mit den
entsprechenden Fahigkeiten ausgestattet, um leicht und spontan zur
Erkenntnis ihres Urhebers zu gelangen. Die aussere Natur hat er geschaffen
mit der Bestimmung, den Menschen zur Erkenntnis Gottes zu fuhren. So hat
sich Gott in der Natur und Anlage unserer Seele und der Welt ein Zeugnis
geschaffen, das jeden Menschen zu seinem Urheber emporweist. 2
Tertullian developed the argument from nature in three distinct,
although related, directions. First, against Marcion, it was necessary to
establish that God could be understood by His works in nature, and Tertullian
attacked the Marcionite god, because he had produced nothing to make his
existence known to man.
Primo enim quaeritur, an sit, et ita, qualis sit. Alterum de operibus,
alterum de beneficiis dinoscetur. Ceterum non quia liberasse dicitur
hominem, ... quam debuisse condidisse, uti cognosceretur et operibus, quia
sit fuisset, cognosci debuisset, et utique a primordio rerum, - deum enim non
decuisset latuisse. 3
If this new god of Marcion's really existed, then he would have made himself
known through works - but he had not done so, he had not produced even one
Tertullian did not originate the concept; it is frequently found in the
works of Christian apologists before him.
2
Fiitscher, op. cit., p 240.
3
I Marc 17.1.7-2.9 and 3.15-18.
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vegetable of his own - therefore he was no god.
Welches sind nun die Kriterien, die das Dasein des Schopfergottes mit
Sicherheit verbiirgen? Es ist die Tatsache, dass er niemals unbekannt war,
weil er sich eine Welt geschaffen hat, die sein Dasein unzweifelhaft kundtut.
Fehlen also fur den neuen Gott M.s diese Kriterien, so bleibt seine Existenz
in Frage gestellt und ist er nur als eine Erfindung M.s zu werten. 1
The true God would first reveal Himself through nature, Tertullian argued,
otherwise God would be unknowable, except through the scriptures, and
Tertullian held that to be an untenable position.
Furthermore, Marcion claimed that his god was a good god. What and
where were the evidences of his goodness? The evidences of goodness in a god,
said Tertullian, were to be looked for by inspecting his handiwork:
Ijitur oportebit ineuntes examinationem in deum notum, si quaeritur in qua
conditione sit notus, ab operibus eius incipere, quae priora sunt homine, ut
statim cum ipso comperta bonitas eius. 2
By observing the works which were prior to the existence of man, it would be
possible to find a starting-point from which to examine the world-order, which
had been complicated by the arrival of man. This starting-point was the obvious
goodness of the natural creation. Marcion's contempt for the lower order of
creation was answered by Tertuilian with a whole series of admiring examples -
the humblest flower, the tiniest shell on the sea shore, the feather from the wing
of the smallest bird, all these pointed to a good Creator:
Vnus, opinor, de sepibus flosculus, non dico de gratis, una cuiuslibet maris
conchula, non dico de rubro, una tetraonis pinnula, taceo de pauo, sordidum
artificem pronuntiabit tibi creatorem? ... imitare, si potes, apis aedificia,
formicae stabula, aranei retia, bombycis stamina, ... Postremo te tibi
circumfer, intus ac foris considera hominem : placebit tibi uel hoc opus dei
nostri. 3
While the polemic with Marcion demanded these arguments, they fit in
with the general pattern of Tertullian's thought, that something of the nature
1 «




I Marc 13.5.2-5, and 14.1.9-10 and 14.2.14-16.
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and goodness of God could and should be discovered by every man by observing
God's handiwork. This theme was continued by Tertullian in other anti-heretical
works, where he used both the macro-cosmic, the world at large, and the
microcrosmic, the detail of the human body and the animal and vegetable
creation, to establish the knowledge of God. When he had to refute the belief
that the life-breath was a separate substance from the soul, (a view based on the
assertion that certain animals did not possess respiratory organs,) Tertullian
argued:
Si uero non putas capere tam minuta corpuscula die ingenium, sic quoque
magnificentiam eius agnoscas, quod modifis animalibus sine necessariis
membris nihilominus uiuere instruxerit, saluo etiam uisu sine oculis et esu
sine denticulis et digestu sine alueis. 1
When the Marcionites tried to argue that their god had indeed created
things, but that these were invisible, and that the visible creation belonged to
the Creator as contrasted with their supposed superior god, Tertullian seized on
a phrase used by Marcion and by the Valentinians for the Creator - deus mundi.
That exactly suited his purpose, and he insisted that the only God was the One
who was known in and through His visible world, omnibus naturaliter notum de
2
testimonns operum. Nature presented examples of resurrection, examples
deliberately provided by God so that man, having seen resurrection in the act,
should the more readily believe it when told of it in words.
Totus igitur hie ordo reuolubilis re rum testatio est resurrectionis
mortuorum. Operibus earn praescripsit deus ante quam litteris, uiribus
praedicauit ante quam uocibus. Praemisit tibi naturam magistram,
summissurus et prophetiam, quo facilius credas prophetiae discipulus ante
naturae, quo statim admittas, cum audieris quod ubique iam uideris, nec
dubites deum carnis etiam resuscitatorem, quem omnium noueris
restitutorem. 3








sound very convincing to modern ears but Tertullian must have thought it had
some value as an argument, because he had already used it in the apologeticum
and would use it again against Scapula; his argument in his apologetic works is
therefore examined next.
The second main area where Tertullian developed his argument from
nature is found in the apologeticum chapters 17 to 20. Tertullian set out the
nature of the God whom the Christians worshipped, in contrast to the gods who
were the objects of pagan worship. In particular, he refuted the report, current
among the heathen, that the Christians worshipped an ass's head. The true
sources of the knowledge of God were, he said, threefold. First there was the
evidence from His works (apol. 17.4 ff); then there was the evidence from the
human soul (17.4) and finally, there was the revelation of Scripture, which came
to confirm '...plenius et impressius ...' the silent revelation of nature, and the
witness of the soul. It is the first of these which is the concern of this present
section - that all men should have some knowledge of God because of the
evidence of nature:
Vultis ex operibus ipsius tot ac talibus, quibus continemur, quibus
sustinemur, quibus oblectamur, etiam quibus exterremur? 1
It was therefore, the crowning guilt of men that they would not recognize the
One of whom they could not possibly be ignorant. This was a theme to which
Tertullian returned, years later, when he addressed Scapula:
Nos unum Deum colimus, quern omnes naturaliter nostis, ad cuius fulgura et
tonitrua contremiscitis, ad cuius beneficia gaudetis. 2
The third area in which Tertullian developed the cosmological argument
might at first seem irrelevant for this chapter, which is concerned with the






his moral works Tertullian made use of the basic fact that God was to be known
first in the evidence of nature.
Quaerens igitur die legem habes communem istam in publico mundi, in
naturalibus tabulis, ad quas et apostolus solet prouocare, ut cum in uelamine
feminae nec natura, inquit, uos docet? ut cum ad Romanos, natura facere
dicens nationes ea quae sunt legis, et legem naturalem suggerit et naturam
legalem. 1
Ipsum deum secundum naturam prius nouimus, scilicet deum appellantes
deorum et bonum praesumentes et iudicem inuocantes; 2
Nemo negat, quia nemo ignorat, quod ultro natura suggerit, Deum esse
uniuersitatis conditorem eamque uniuersitatem tarn bonam quam homini
mancipatam. Sed quia non penitus Deum norunt nisi naturali jure, non etiam
familiari, de longinquo, non de proximo, necesse est ignorent, qualiter
administra^ iubeat quae instituit. 3
The significance of that last quotation lies in its address - it was Tertullian's
reply to those who claimed that the 'shows' could not be offensive either to God
or to His worshippers, because everything used at them had been created by God
and for that reason was good. That was true,said Tertullian,and even the pagan
could appreciate that nature was the handiwork of the Creator God; however the
non-Christian had no real knowledge of God and consequently did not know that
things created must not be used for purposes forbidden by God -quando haec sit
4
tota ratio damnationis peruersa administratio conditionis a conditis. In other
words, God had indeed Himself known through the order of nature, but God had
also made Himself known by direct teaching, and this teaching would give a
fuller and truer picture of God than the appreciation of His majesty through the










This section seems to be another indication of Tertullian's debt to the
Stoics, who likewise employed a double approach to the knowledge of God, the
macrocosmic and the microcosmic. The great and orderly Kaay.of furnished some
proof for the existence of God and so did the little universe of man. Tertullian
did not doubt that man might come to a true, if inadequate, knowledge of God
through observing the order and beauty of the visible KOaj/os quite apart from the
revelation given through the prophets and through Christ, but it would remain
inadequate and other ways, in which God might speak to man, are now explored.
177
V.7. DREAMS, VISIONS AND REVELATIONS
Tertullian devoted five complete chapters of de anima to the subject of
dreams (45 - 49) and made a number of incidental references to them
elsewhere. ^ Of all that he wrote about dreams, few ideas are stranger to
modern ears than his assertion that almost all men came to a knowledge of God
through dreams.
A deo autem, pollicito scilicet et gratiam spiritus sancti in omnem carnem
et sicut prophetaturos, ita et somniaturos seruos suos et ancillas suas, ea
deputabuntur quae ipsi gratiae comparabuntur, si qua honesta sancta
prophetica reuelatoria aedificatoria uocatoria, quorum liberalitas soleat et
in profanos destillare, imbres etiam et soles suos peraequante deo iustis et
iniustis, siquidem et Nabuchodonosor diuinitus somniat et maior paene uis
hominum ex uisionibus deum discunt. Sicut ergo dignatio dei et in
ethqicos,...2
That this was a serious assertion, and not just a passing remark, is shown by his
heated (almost angry) reply to the suggestion that the Lybtan tribe of Atlantes
3
did not dream and so were ignorant of God - Quid ergo nec a deo Atlantes
somniarent, uel quia nulla iam gens dei extranea est in omnem terram et in
4
terminos orbis euangelio coruscante? and with that he closed his argument
about dreams.
Inability to dream would be a vitium animae, and Tertullian regarded the
suggestion that any soul should be incapable of dreaming as an insult to the
nature of the soul in general. As an adherent of Montanism he was of course
particularly interested in dreams, particularly as a source for the knowledge of
God.2 There was no question of man establishing a saving relationship with God
^
e.g. an 57.10.62-71; apol 23.1.3-5; and the story of Hermotimus, taken








His definition of the natural and normal dream as a combination of
sleep and ecstasy (an 45.3.12-18), ecstady being a completely new concept in the
discussion of dreams, must be explained from Tertullian's views as a Montanist.
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through dreams, although a dream might set a man on the correct course to
faith. To that end Tertullian was concerned to distinguish:
(a) dreams that conveyed message5 from God,'''
2
(b) dreams sent by the devil, even if they were true,
(c) dreams which were natural, produced by the free play of psychic energies,
3
and which carried no divine message, and
4
(d) dreams arising from a special form of ecstasy.
While God would use dreams to speak about Himself to all men, visions and
revelations during ecstagy were a different matter. They, together with
prophesies, were a means of communicating God's will only to the Christian;
there is no indicafton, in any of Tertullian's writings, that visions or revelations
were used by God to give knowledge of Himself to non-Christians.
Following on the examination in the previous section of nature as a
testimony to God, it is significant that Tertullian regarded dreams as the more
likely avenue for God to use, if He had a message for a particular individual. In
de anima chapter 44, just before coming to his main treatment of dreams,
Tertullian was combatting the popular view that the soul could leave the body
5
during sleep. He narrated the story of Hermotimus and what he had to say
about Hermotimus is as instructive for this section on dreams as anything else
which Tertullian wrote. It had been said of Hermotimus that his soul regularly
left his body during sleep, and so on one occasion his enemies burnt his body,












story, because it seemed to support his opponents' theory that the soul could
leave the body, which theory in its turn would support the pernicious doctrine of
metempsychosis.
Si enim tale quid semel accidere dicatur, ut deliquium solis aut lunae, i_ta et
animae, sane persuaderer deuinitus factum; congruere enim hominem seu
moneri seu terreri a deo, uelut fulgure rapido, momentaneae mortis ictu - si
non magis in proximo esset somnium credi, quod uigilanti potius accidere
deberet, si non somnium magis credi oporteret. 2
In other words, if this was anything else but a dream (a 'non-somnium'), it would
not have happened to Hermotimus during his sleep (uigilanti potius accidere
deberet); for Tertullian, any explanation was better than the popular belief that
the soul could leave the body before death. If it had happened once only, it
might be explained as a special warning on the part of God -and in that case it
would be reasonable to regard it as a dream, Hermotimus being asleep at the
time. The fact that it was said to have taken place regularly made the story
improbable to the point where it could safely be discounted.
Because Tertullian accepted as commonplace that God could speak to
man through dreams, he did not say a great deal about their effect on the
"tke
relationship of / natural man to God. One final point is, however, worth
mentioning. Denique et bona facta gratuita sunt in somiys et delicta secura; non
3
magis enim ob stupri uisionem damnabimur quam ob martyrii coronabimur.
There was therefore no question of man establishing a saving relationship with
God through dreams alone.
The story is found in five other places, viz. Plutarch De Genio Socratis
22 (592 C), Lucian Encomium Muscae 7, Pliny Nat, hist. 7, 174, Origen c. Cels.







V.8 OBSERVING CHRISTIANS, INCLUDING EXORCISM
There were, according to Tertullian, a number of ways in which a non-
Christian could learn about the Christian's God, simply by observing the
behaviour of Christian people. Even if the outsider had no interest in the
Christian faith, he could hardly avoid some contact with Christians and, through
that, some knowledge of what Christians believed.
Itague non sine foro, non sine macello, non sine balneis, tabernis, officinis,
stabulis, nundinis uestris, ceterisque commerciis cohabitamus hoc saeculum.
Nauigamus et nos uobiscum et uobiscum militamus et rusticamur et
mercamur. 1
In addition, Christians went quite openly to their religious ceremonies (except in
times of persecution or acute popular hostility) and observant pagans would be
familiar: with their places of worship, the days of their assembly, even details of
2
their rites. Apart, however, from the Christian's" general presence in society,
there were specific areas of life where non-believers should be challenged to
consider the claims of the Christian faith.
(a) By observing the way in which Christians faced persecution or martyrdom
The recorded history of the African Church begins with martyrdom. From a
village called Madqura, near Carthage, Namphanp, Miggin, Suname and Lucitas
3
were brought to Carthage to be executed in July A.D. 180; a few days later, on
16th July, the Proconsul Vigellius Saturninus condemned twelve more Christians
to death Scilli (location unknown) for refusal to do sacrifice to the gods -




I nat 13.1.14-15, 'quod innotuerit ad orientis partem facere nos
precationem uel die solis laetitiam curcure.'
"car nous ne pouvons nommement attribuer a cette premiere epreuve
de l'Eglise d'Afrique que l'archimartyr Namphamo et les martyrs Scillitains;"
Charles Guignebert, Tertullien: Etude sur ses sentiments a. l'egard de l'Empire et
de la Societe civile, (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1901) p 119- The other three names
Tin addition to Namphamo) were listed by Herbert B. Workman, The Martyrs of
the Early Church, (London: Charles H. Kelly, 1913) p 92. Their names, Punic
rather than Roman, indicate native Africans. ffZU-Ztz-
\ dated £Af.r u -f kfij , cv\cJ ^<5
4 > — f*6ijs gfc*?
Bray remarked nn Tertullian's surprising lack of mention of this
incident - op. cit., "Holiness", p 44. - bud. d\d r£.f«r "t» d - fcap 3. ±.11-22.,
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It was another outbreak of persecution against the Christians in A.D. 197-198
which produced Tertullian's first extant work, ad martyras, addressed to those in
prison for their faith. The edict of Septin^us Severus in A.D. 202, by which his
subjects were forbidden to embrace Christianity, brought another sharp wave of
persecution to the Christians in Africa. Among those arrested on that occasion
was the daughter of a well-to-do provincial named Vibia Perpetua, along with her
slave Felicitas and their catechist, the presbyter Saturus. Their imprisonment
and subsequent execution in the amphitheatre at Carthage in the spring of A.D.
203 left a strong impression on Tertullian, who may be the editor of Perpetua's
diary.^ Then, with the death of Severus in A.D. 211, and the accession of
Caracalla, persecution once again broke out at Carthage and Teipllian had to
write a vigorous apology, addressed to Scapula, the proconsul of Africa.
From the very beginning of his writings, Tertullian regarded the
persecution and martyrdom of Christians as an enticement to the faith - semen
2
est sanguis Christianorum! Tertullian continued:
Quis enim non contemplatione eifis concutitur ad requirendum, quid intus in
re sit? Quis non, ubi requisiuit, accedit, ubi accessit, pati exoptat, ut totam
Dei gratiam redimat, ... 3
Fearlessness before death was to Tertullian the mark of a true Christian. It has
often been suggested that Tertullian, who left no clear explanation in his works
4
of the reasons which influenced him to become a Christian, was himself drawn
The latest study on the relationship of Tertullian to the diary, which
includes a review of earlier comment, is by Rene Braun "Nouvelles Observations
Linguistiques sur le Redacteur de la 'Passio Perpetuad", Vigiliae Christianae, 33






Tertullian was nowhere autobiographical except by accident, and there
has been a great deal of speculation, from the few allusions to himself in his
writings, as to why he became a Christian. It is outside the scope of this study
ever* to list these, but most commentators include the spectacle of Christian
stedfastness in martyrdom, and some make it the determining cause:
(continued on next page)
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partly by the intrepid fortitude of such martyrs. Certainly he came to believe
that the spectacle of men and women who were prepared not only to embrace
the Christian faith against all human interest, but who were prepared to persist
in that faith until death, should lead the observers to make enquiry about the
Christians' God.
Quisque enim tantam tolerantiam spectans, ut aliquo scrupulo percussus et
inquirere accenditur, quid sit in causa, et ubi cognouerit ueritatem et ipse
statim sequitur. 1
(b) By observing their changed character
In the years of peace, when there were no martyrdoms, the witness of God
through Christians was not absent. Christians took their high principles and
standards out into the world, and could not help but attract attention because of
it - in silentio et modestia agimus, singuli forte noti magis quam omnes, nec
aliunde noscibiles quam de emendatione uitiorum pristinorum. ^ Even the pagans
footnote 4 continued ^
"the sight of men and women prepared to die rather than accept the conventional
form of loyalty to the Severan age led him to Christianity."
W.H.C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution In The Early Church, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1965) p 366.
"... as others before him, was converted to Christianity by the bearing of
Christian martyrs whom he happended to watch in the amphitheatre."
W.H.C. Frend, "Their Word to our Day - IX. Tertullian", Expository Times, 81
(1969-70), 136.
"Tertullien ne nous a pas laisse le recit de sa propre conversion au christianisme.
Mais il y a tout lieu de croire que de spectacle de la vie chretienne y contribua
plus que les livres". d'Ales, op^ cit. p 33.
Their obstinacy was his teacher. He looked for the reason, he learned the truth
and he followed it at once. Terrot Reaveley Glover, The Conflict of Religions in
the Early Roman Empire, (10th ed.; London: Methven & Co, 1923) p 320.
The two most relevant texts from Tertullian's own works are the climax of his
appeal in the apologeticum, quoted immediately above in the thesis (apol







acknowledged - and expected - a change in lifestyle when a man became a
Christian - if he no longer appeared at the 'shows', they assumed that he had
been converted to the Christian faith. *
Paradoxically, when frivolous, perserse natures were suddenly altered for
the better, the pagans' reaction was not always favourable - they realised that
God was at work and this could produce a sarcastic reaction, which Tertullian
turned to his advantage in the apologeticum:
Quid quod ita plerique clausis oculis in odium eius impingunt, ut bonum
alicui testimonium ferentes aamisceant nominis exprobrationem? 'Bonus uir
Gaius Seius, tantum quod Christianus'. Item alius: 'Ego miror Lucium
Titium, sapientem uirum, repente factum Christianum'. Nemo retractat, ne
ideo bonus Gaius et prudens Lucius, quia Christianus, aut ideo Christianus,
quia prudens et bonus. 2
Caecitate odii in suffragium impingunt enarrantes: Quae mulier, quam
lasciua, quam fastiua! Quis iuuenis, quam lusius, quam amasius! Facti sunt
Christiani'. Ita nomen emendationi imputatur. 3
However, the testimony to God's grace was there for the pagans to see, and a
very remarkable testimony it was, to the working of God among men. Tertullian
argued cogently that the observers should do more than express astonishment -
they should ponder whether this was not a compelling reason for they themselves
to make inquiry about the deus Christianorum.
When addressing Scapula, Tertullian went further than the personal
knowledge of his hearers, and appealed to the Christians' general reputation for
high standards -and to the fact that they would disown anyone who fell short of




apol 3.1.1-7, and the parallel passage in I nat 4.8.18-20, 10.22-24 and
11.26-28. Quo more etiam nobis soletis: 'bonus uir Lucius Titius, tantum quod
Christianus,' Item alius: 'Ego miror Gaium Seium, grauem uirum, factum
Christianum.'...Nemini subuenit, ne ideo bonus quis et prudens, quia Christianus,
aut ideo Christianus, quia prudens et bonus. ... Alii, quos retro ante hoc nomen





bad Christian no more condemned true disciples of Christ, than a passing could
obscured a summer sky;^ let Scapula make enquiry from his own officials, and he
would find how great an impact the Christian God had made in the lives of His
followers:
Praeter haec depositum non abnegamus, matrimonium nullius adulteramus,
pupillos pietractamus, indigentibus refrigeramus, nulli malum pro malo
reddimus. Viderint, qui sectam mentiuntur, quos et ipsi recusamus. 2
(c) By observing Christian home-life
In addition to his wider argrument that the observation of Christian behaviour
should give the pagan some idea about the Christian God, Tertullian mentioned
several times that the meaning and significance of a Christian's relationship to
God should be particularly apparent in the conduct of Christians in their own
homes. He drew attention to the absurd paradox of a father disinheriting his son
because he had become a Christian and so more dutiful, and of a master
banishing a slave on his becoming a Christian and so more trustworthy; the
bearing and conduct of Christians in these situations was a testimony to God.
Pater filium, de quo queri desierat, exheredauit; dominus seruum, quern
praeterea necessarium senserat, in ergastulum dedit: simul quis intellexerit
Christianum, mauult nocentem. 3
and, in the parallel passage in the apologeticum:
filium jam subiectum pater retro patiens abdicauit, seruum iam fidelem
dominus olim mitis ab oculis reljgauit: ut quisque hoc nomine emendatur,
offendit. Tanti non est bonum quanti odium Christianorum! 4
Tertullian made particular reference to the difference which conversion
to Christianity brought to the marriage relationship, again with some quite
illogical consequences:








vjorem jam pudicam maritus iam non zelotypus eiecit, 1
Scio maritum unum atque alium, anxium retro de uxoris suae moribus, qui ne
mures guidem in cubiculum inrepentes sine gemitu suspicionis sustinebat,
comperta causa nouae sedulitatis et inusitatae captiuitatis omnem uxori
patientiam obtulisse, negasse zelotypum, maluisse lupae quam Christianae
maritum; ipsi suam licuit in persuersum demutare naturam, mulieri non
permisit in melius reformari. 2
and he mentioned the specific case of Claudius Lucius Herminianus, governor of
Cappadocia, who persecuted the Christians through rage at his wife's
3
conversion.
Tertullian made several references to the custom, common in the
African Church in the third centry, of the communicant, after receiving the
sacrament during the service, carrying the bread home wrapped in a napkin and
taking a small portion at the beginning of every meal. A non-believing husband
4
would quite naturally ask "quid secreto ante omnem cibum gustes?" When
writing ad uxorem, Tertullian used this as an argument against marriage with
heathens, but if such did take place, this and other Christian practices were
compelling evidence, in the home, for the heathen spouse to consider the claims
of the Christian faith.
Nam et ad aliquam uirtutem caelestem documentis dignationis alicuius
uocatus ille de gentibus terrori est gentili, quo minus sibi obstrepat, minus
instet, minus speculetur. Sensit magnalia, uidit experimenta, scit meliorem
factum; sic et ipse dei candidatus est timore. Ita facilius huiusmodi
lucrifiunt, in quos dei gratia consuetudinem fecit. 5
(d) By observing exorcism
Another factor which Tertullian believed should influence pagans to an












made no less than ten references to public exorcism * and spoke of it, not as a
rare phenomenon to be ascertained with difficulty from the evidence of others,
but as a common event, to which he could appeal confidently for evidence in
2
favour of the Christian faith. He went so far as to offer a divine test:
Edatur hie aliqui ibidem sub tribunali uestro, quern daemone agi constet:
iussus a quolibet Christiano loqui spiritus ille tam se daemonem confitebitur,
quod in uero est, quam alibi deum, quod in falso est. 3
Alternatively, let the pagans select someone who was supposed to be god-
possessed, who was under the influence of sacrificial smoke from the alter, and
if when challenged by a Christian these persons did not confess themselves to be
4
demons, then let the Christian pay for his temerity with his life.
Tertullian did not just ask his pagan adversaries to believe that the
Christians had gifts of exorcism - that was evident; what he did demand was
their conversion to the Christian faith, when such compelling evidence of the
gift could be produced - Quid isto opere manifestius? Quid hac probatione
5
fidelius? Indeed Tertullian seems to have expected rather more tangible results
from exorcism than he did from the general influence of Christian character in
the pagan world - he claimed that Haec denique testimonia deorum uestrorum
Christianos facere consuerunt.^
apol 23.4.22-6.33; apol 23.15.77-16.84; apol 27.6.24-26; apol 32.3.14-
16; apol 37.9.41-44; apol 46.5.24-26; idol 11.7.24-25; cor 3.11.17-19; Scap




apol 23.4.22-25. The Fathers frequently assert that nothing more is
needed to expel demons from persons, places, or things than to call on the name
r-eee-lte--simple prayers or verses from the Scriptures, or to make the Sign of the
Cripss: J. Forget, Article 'Exorcisme,' in Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique,
(Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1923) vol 5.2, columns 1762-80, and (for Tertullian







V.9 READING OR HEARING SCRIPTURE
To the testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae and the testimonium
naturae, Tertullian believed that God had added another witness - instrumentum
litteraturae. His argument was directed specifically toward the books of the Old
Testament but elsewhere he gave equal status to those of the New. ^ From the
2
beginning of time, God had spoken through holy men, filled with the Spirit ,
whose words had been recorded and preserved in order that God might be known.
What the prophets had been to former generations, the Scriptures were to the
present generation:^
quo plenius et impressius tarn ipsum quam dispositiones eius et uoluntates
adiremus, adiecit instrumentum litteraturae, si qui uelit de Deo inquirere, et
inquisito inuenire, et inuento credere, et credito deseruire. 4
The prophets had proclaimed, and their writings bore witness to, the existence of
the one true God, who had framed all things, who had made man and who would
one day raise man from the dead for eternal judgement. Tertullian insisted that
the inspired writings of the Old Testament were not hidden or secret books -
anyone could consult them if he wished, and Tertullian encouraged enquiries to
do so; God in His goodness had even arranged for the books to be translated into
5
Greek, so that the Greek-speaking world might benefit by their light.
Aux premiers siecles, l'idee que la traduction des Septante etait d'inspiration
divine, etait courante. Irenee, par exemple, en parle abondamment (adv.
Haer. m, 21, Z). La Septante, en effet, etait un cas particulierement
remarquable; elle rendait intelligible a d'autres les saintes Ecritures des
J. '' m y\
il admet les Evangiles et les Epitres des apotres sur le
pdid d'une egalite absolue avec la Loi et les Prophetes. Enumerant, dans le
traite de Prescription, les sources de la foi pour 1'egHse romaine, il s'exprime










Juifs. Pendant longtemps elle fut, dans le monde de l'Antiquite, la seule
traduction vraiment accessible, entre autres aux Chretiens. Les Pere? de
l'Sglise grecs voyaient en elle l'oeuvre de la providence divine qui, de cette
facon, prepara le mondepla venue du Christ. Que les auteurs des ecrits neo-
-testamentaires se servissent d'elle pour leurs citations, ajoutait
^videmment a son autorite. 1
2
If one did not have access to the originals in the Serapeum at Alexandria, or
even to a copy of the Septuagint, no matter, because a passer-by could hear the
Scriptures recited in the open air, on one of the Fast Days when the African
Jews left their synagogues and conducted their worship in public - per omne litus
3
quocumque in aperto aliquando iam precem ad caelum mittunt. An enquirer
could also go into any synagogue, where the Jews publicly read these books every
Sabbath:
Iudaei palam lectitant. Vectigalis libertas; uulgo aditur sabbatis omnibus.
Qui audierit, inueniet Deum; qui etiam studuerit intellegere, cogetur et
credere. 4
It was no part of Tertullian's argument to mention, in an apologetic
treatise, that if an enquirer had gone into a synogogue and asked further about
the Christian God, he would not be likely to be re-directed to a Christian
congregation - there was a keen rivalry, sometimes even mutual hatred, between
5
the two monotheistic groups in Tertullian's day, and the Jews, more than
Geest, op. cit., p 13.
2
hodie apud Serapeum Ptolemaei bibliothecae (in Graecum t lum) cum
ipsis Hebraicis exhibentur - apol 18.8.38-39.
3
jej 16.6.5-6. In I nat 13.4.23-24, Tertullian referred to the 'orationes




Jewish-Christian relations in Tertullian's Carthage have received
considerable attention recently - six relevant articles are quoted at the end of
this footnote. It has long been recognised that Jews were present in large
numbers throughout North Africa, and especially in Carthage, at the end of the
second century, see, for example Pierre Monceaux, op. cit. "Histoire" pp 9, 294;
and idem, "Les colonies juives dans l'Afrique romaine", Revue d'etudes Juives.
44 (1902), 1. Though at first they seem to have lived on good terms with the
Christian community - this is implied in their use of common cemeteries - by
Tertullian's time they had shown themselves in Carthage as elsewhere its most
bitter opponents. Tertullian's ad nationes and apologeticum both contain
(continued on next page)
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anyone else, stood to lose by the spread of Christianity. However, even if the
enquirer simply heard the Scriptures, he would learn about God; Tertullian
believed that a conversation with the Jews about the Scriptures of the Old
Testament might have been what • led to Zacchaeus' conversion - Enimuero
Zaccheus, etsi allophylus, fortasse tamen aliqua notitia scripturarum ex
commercio Iudaico adflatus. Certainly, in defending the Christian faith to
pagans, Tertullian told them not to take just his word for it, but to consult the
Holy Books:
Qui ergo putaueris nihil nos de salute Caesarum curare, inspice Dei uoces,
litteras nostras, quas neque ipsi supprimimus et plerique casus ad extrarips
transferunt. Scitote ex illi, ... 2
and not just for the Christian attitude to the State - Tertullian referred the
pagans to Scripture, both to verify what he had said to them and to demonstrate
that the Christian faith was no less credible than the fables of
anthropomorphism.
footnote 5 continued:
an angry description of Jewish tactics against the Christians, and the reason for
their hostility. The Jewish community is charged with being the seminarium of
every calumny against the Christians - I nat 14.2.4. Some, e.g. T.D. Barnes, op.
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anti-Christian polemic, and that synagogae Iudaeorum, fontes persecutionum
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"Israel, the Christian Church and the Roman Empire from the Time of Septimps
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Century North Africa', Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. 21 (1970), 92-6.
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IV Marc 37.1.22-24, on which Evans commented: "Luke 19: 1-10 does
not say that Zacchaeus was a foreigner, unless that is implied by his being a
chief tax-collector." Ernest Evans, Tertullian Adversus Marcionem, (Oxford:




Tertullian advanced two arguments why the pagan enquirer should take
seriously the testimony of Scripture to God. The first was based on its antiquity.
Tertullian exploited the current notion that there was nothing so old as the
truth^ and that the antiquity of a doctrine was a guarantee of its authenticity.
Moses, he said, dated far earlier than the earliest history of the Greeks and
Romans, and the other sacred writers were little less remote. The work of God,
announced in the Old Testament, was now brought to fruition in the New and the
double collection of Jewish Scriptures and Christian Scriptures., was the
revelation of God to any man who would read them or listen to them.
Having shown that great antiquity made for great authority, Tertullian
2
turned to his second argument, namely the fulfilment of prophecy:
Multis adhuc de uetustate modis consisterem diuinarum litterarum, si non
maior auctoritas illis ad fidem de ueritatis suae uiribus, quam de aetatis
annalibus suppetisset. Quid enim potentius patrocinabitur testimonio earum,
nisi dispunctio cotidiana saeculi totius, cum dispositiones regnorum, cum
casus urbium, cum exitus gentium, cum status temporum ita omnibus
respondent, quemadmodum ante milia annorum praenuntiabantur. 3
Tertullian laid considerable emphasis on the fulfilment of the Old Testament
prophecy in the public events of his own time, claiming that the Scriptures were
the one satisfactory key for understanding the course of contemporary history.
Their accuracy attested their source in the God who controlled and governed the
world, the God who had revealed Himself of old.
Primam igitur instrumentis istis auctoritatem summa antiquitas
uindicat. Apud uos quoque religionis est instar, fidem de tempore adserere - apol
19.1.1-3.
2
Tertullian did not restrict the function of the prophets to foretelling
future events, as is seen from the previous part of the paragraph, apol 18.2.4-8.
3
apol 19.7.32-39 from Codex Fuldensis. The text of the Codex
Fuldensis is so different at this point from other texts that it is printed
separately in the edition from which quotations throughout this thqis are taken
(CCL). It may have been a first draft, but, in spite of much research, there is no
unanimity of opinion as to whether the Codex Fuldensis should be attributed to
Tertullian or to an earlier apologist whom both he and Minucius Felix used.
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It may be that some pagans were won over by such evidences of the
fulfilment of scriptural prophecy, or by the rewards and punishments announced
in Scripture, but, generally, Tertullian did not seem to expect a great deal from
the reading of Scripture by non-Christians. He appears to have said that, in his
experience, one had first to be a Christian before one would benefit from reading
or hearing the Scriptures - Panto abest, ut nostris litteris annuant homines, ad
quas nemo uenit nisi iam Christianus. * - but it is unclear whether Tertullian
meant the Bible itself when he wrote that. He may have meant the works of
1
Christian apologists - Harnack thought that he referred to the Bible but
3
O'Malley thought that he did not. Holl thought that it was just another example
4
of Tertullian's scepticism, and Mohrmann saw it as a reference to the
incomprehension with which Christian texts were greeted, owing to their
specialised vocabulary, the distance between Christian Latin and ordinary Latin
being already so great that the spread of Christian works among the pagans was
5
thereby inhibited. Whichever of these interpretations of that particular passage
is correct, Tertullian did argue in the apologeticum that the reading and hearing
of Scripture was one of the ways in which he expected the natural man to have
some knowledge about, and some understanding of, the Christian God.
test 1.4.30-31.
^
Adolf Harnack, "Tertullians Bibliothek christ licher Schriften",
Sitzungsberichte der koniglichen - preussischen Akademie des Wissenschaften zu




"Tertullian als Schriftsteller, in Karl Holl, op. cit. m, 4.
^
Christine Mohrmann, "Le latin commun et le latin des Chretiens",
Vigiliae Christianae, 1 (1947), 1-12.
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V.10 ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
Tertullian appears to have drawn on Roman law on three occasions, when
expressing God's initiative toward man and the natural man's knowledge of God.
The plainest reference came when he was endeavouring to show Marcion how
God intended man to possess goodness; goodness had on the one hand to be the
gift of God to man, but on the other hand it could not be merely conferred on
man from without - it had to be man's very own. The Roman law of
conveyancing afforded Tertullian with an example which was more or less (quasi)
in point.
Vt ergo bonum iam suum haberet homo, emancipatum sibi a deo, et fieret
proprietas iam boni in homine et quodammodo natura, de institutione
adscripta est illi quasi libripens emancipati a deo boni libertas et potestas
arbitrii, quae efficeret bonum ut proprium iam sponte praestari ab homine, 1
The making of a gift under Roman law, and in particular the function of
the libripens, appears to have been in Tertullian's mind. Property was gifted
from one person to another by the formality of mancipatio, which was a
fictitious sale in the presence of five witnesses, all Roman citizens and all over
the age of puberty. The libripens held a pair of scales, in which a token price
was weighed. (In the sale of goods, which also took place by mancipatio, the
actual price was weighed out and had to be handed over before the purchaser
became the legal owner of the goods.) In the case of mam and his goodness, said
Tertullian, the donor was God and the libripens was man's power of free choice.
God conveyed goodness to mankind after the manner of a legal gift, and by
virtue of mancipatio; man became the possessor in his own right (emancipatum
sibi) of the goodness which had its origin as an attribute of God, and goodness
was thus man's proprietas et quodammodo natura. There is nothing here of the
threat of judgement and similar legal language, which is so often said to




to choose his own destiny will be taken up in chapter VI.2, under the section on
free-will, but in this present section the example of the libripens is clearly
expressive of the good-will of God toward mankind.
The natural man's status in the sight of God, expressed in terms of
delictum, will be examined in chapter VI.8, but this is an appropriate place to
examine Tertullian's use of the concept of ius naturale to express the
relationship of God to man. There is no doubt that the meaning of natura in
Tertullian is a particularly difficult problem, and one which has given rise to
many misunderstandings. * Before coming to these, however, the use of the word
by the Roman lawyers will be briefly set out.
The Romans attached various meanings to ius naturale, for example
Ulpian described it as the law which nature taught to all living creatures, men
and beasts; generally, however, ius naturale was held to be the possession of
rational beings only. Sometimes the Romans treated it as synonymous with the
2
ius gentium, and while the two came to very much the same thing in practice,
3
the ius naturale was based on an abstract philosophical conception, whereas the
ius gentium had its origin in the practical necessity of commercial transactions
between Romans and others engaged in trade. The ius gentium therefore applied
only to freemen, irrespective of nationality, but the ius naturale applied to all
mankind, and so was more comprehensive than the ius gentium.
As Gerald Bray has recently demonstrated in "The Legal Concept of
Ratio in Tertullian", Vigiliae Christianae, 31 (1977), especially at p 110.
2
Gaius, Digest 1.1.9; Institutes 1.2.1. Even in the Corpus Juris Civilis,
the distinction between ius gentium and ius naturale is not clearly drawn. One of
the few examples of a conflict between them is in the institution of slavery. The
Romans declared that slavery was contrary to natural law but they found it was
generally recognised amongst all nations and so was a valid part of the ius
gentium.
3
A comprehensive examination of the speculative ius naturale as
understood by the Romans is contained in Moritz Voigt, Die Lehre vom jus
natujale aequum et bonum, und jus gentium der Romer, (Leipzig, 1856 - 1876).
He summarised its characteristics; (1) It applied to all mankind; (2) among all
peoples; (3) in all ages; and (4) it corresponded with man's innate sense of right.
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Tertullian's frequent allusions to natural law show the influence on him
of both Roman law and Stoicism - for ius naturale was a concept derived by the
Roman jurists from the Stoic philosophy of Greece.''' The Stoic philosophers had
professed to find certain universal rules of both moral and physical application,
based on the common nature of mankind, and from the time of the classical
jurists, Roman lawyers took over the concept and (more or less) identified it with
the ius gentium of their own system. (The ius gentium was further distinguished
from the ius civile, which could apply only to those who possessed Roman
citizenship and which is of no concern for this chapter.) The ius naturale was
however, as mentioned above, of universal application to all people, because it
was based on the inherent reasonableness and sense of justice (naturalis ratio)
implanted by nature itself and common to all mankind.
It was this concept which Tertullian took up - or at least which
2 3 4
Esser, Monceaux and Lortz thought he took up - and which he demonstrated
was due to the divine element present in every man, quite apart from revelation.
Bray disagreed, because he said this interpretation ignored "the overall context
of Tertullian's Weltanschauung, which, in our opinion, radically alters the
5
superficial view of natura outlined above". It is too big an issue to debate here,
In the Digest 1.3.2., Marcian cited the theorist of the Stoics,
Chrysippus; in 1.3.6. Paul cited Theophrast, the student of Aristotle; in 5.1.76.
Alfenus referred to the philosophers; in 41.3.30., Pomponius reproduced a dogma
of the Stoics. It would be remarkable if these educated men, who brought
jurisprudence to its highest development, had not paid heed to philosophy. The
attempt to find a philosophical basis for the teachings of Roman lawyers was
first made in modern times by Goppert, Uber einheitliche, zusammengesetzte
und Gesamtsachen, 1871. Sokolowski followed him with Die Philosophie im
Privatrecht, (Halle: I (1902), II (1907) and another study is^Ludwig Schnorr von
Carolsfeld, Geschichte der juristischen Person, (Munich: 1933).
2
op. cit., pp 16-19.
3
op.cit., "Historie" pp 376-377.
4
op. cit., I, 55-58.
5
op. cit., p 110.
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and recourse will be had to a quotation which seems to sum up as well as any the
majority view of Tertullian's understanding of nature:
Well versed in the writings of Cicero and the Stoics and, (as Eusebius
records) "accurately acquainted with the Roman law," Tertullian carried
over from these pagan sources into his teaching as Christian apologist and
theologian a settled presumption that in "nature," in some sense or senses of
the term, are to be found valid norms of belief and conduct.
It designates, namely: (a) that which is known universally and without
special revelation, i.e., is attested by the sensus communis and the
consensus gentium; (b) that, therefore, which was known (and, indeed more
clearly known) in the primitive age (in primordio, a favorite expression of
Tertullian's); (c) that which is uncomplicated, easily intelligible, evident to
the untutored, more or less dimmed to the learned and sophisticated, mind.
Natura, in short, denotes the three marks, if not of truth as such, at least of
those moral and religious truths which are fundamental and essential:
universality, primevality, simplicity. The term anima, moreover, as used by
Tertullian, frequently designates a noetic organ or function; it is the faculty
through which these "natural" truths are apprehended, that which makes
man "a rational animal, in the highest degree capable of thought and
knowledge." To accept the arbitrium animae is synonymous with credere
naturae. 1
Many of Tertullian's references to nature and to natural law are outside
the scope of this chapter - for example when he told Scapula, "Tamen humani
juris et naturalis potestatis est unicuique quod putauerit colere".^ Glover listed
3
eighteen such passages, pointing out that "a Roman lawyer could hardly
speculate except in the terms of Stoicism - it was his natural and predestined
4
language". Of these eighteen passages, three are relevant to this chapter -
(a) when Marcion condemned the God who had created the world, Tertullian
referred him to "one flower of the hedge-row, ... one shell of any sea you
like ... one feather of a moor-fowl ...", to show that God was no mean
Creator; the rationality and the order of the universe were
commonplaces of Stoic teachers.
$rtW-Q ^zJJ-CK^r U -tLt V\| /-Ur^ l_eteA£, c York ;
2 _ _ Vifr) t 2°8-
Scap 2.2.4-5. 7
3
op. cit., pp 314-317.
4
ibid., p 314. Modern writings, however, have tended to minimise the
influence of Stoicism on Roman law, and it would be unwise to rely heavily
on the views of a writer of fifty years ago in a matter like this.
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(b) On the antiquity and therefore the authority of Scripture, Tertullian
argued that it was not the pen of Moses that initiated the knowledge of
the Creator ... the maior popularitas generis humani had never heard the
name of Moses, let alone his book, but they knew the God of Moses
nonetheless - the Stoics professed to live "agreeably to Nature", and it
was they who identified reason in man with the principle of order in the
world; and
(c) One of Tertullian's favourite arguments was the testimonium animae
naturaliter Christianae - and the influence of the lex naturae on
W
Tertullian's mind here is illustrated by the difficulties which/had in
trying to reconcile the giving of the Ten Commandments, which he
accepted from the Biblical narrative, with his conviction that the moral
law of nature was known by the light of nature which shined in every
man.
These three arguments rest on Tertullian's general conception of Nature as God's
self-revelation, published in the ui^verse and written on the natural tables of the
heart. God must first be known from nature and only thereafter by instruction,
from nature through His works and by instruction through the revelation He had
given in the scriptures.
The third and final area where Roman law is relevant to this chapter of
the thesis has been well expressed by Robert Dick Sider in "Ancient Rhetoric and
the Art of Tertullian",^ where he analysed Tertullian's attempt, in de testimonio
animae, to demonstrate the basic truths of Christianity from the universal assent
of the human soul:-
Tertullian develops his proof by means of an imaginative and highly
dramatic cross-examination of the soul, as though it were a witness in the
court. This gives the evidence for the Christian belief the character of
inartificial proof, and Tertullian's development of the treatise reflects
contemporary procedure in using witnesses for proof in a court case.
pp 43-44. (The work has been cited previously)
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Tertullian first undertakes the task of establishing confidence in his witness.
Thus in chapter 1, after pointing to the inadequacy of the testimony of
heathen literature and to the unacceptability of the witness of the Christian
Scriptures, Tertullian calls upon the soul as the best witness possible:
Then in several vivid sentences, he shows the dependability and authority of
the witness. First, he claims that his witness will not be false. The
trustworthiness of the witness is asserted on the basis of its origin and
pedigree ...
In the chapters that follow Tertullian produces the evidence offered by the
soul on the great questions of Christian faith: ... The scene takes on added
life in chapter 4 where the soul appears to offer contradictory evidence on
the quesiton of whether man continues to live after death ... But Tertuilian
examines the witness and shows that the soul calls the dead securi only
under pressure of circumstances. The true opinion of the soul is seen in its
calling of blessings and curses upon its friends and foes who have died. Thus
the advocate has caught the witness in a contradiction, a circumstance
which, however, the advocate turns to his own favour.
Roman lawyers were, by the time of Tertullian, * using 'paganus' as a technical
2
term for 'civilian', that is a 'non-soldier' in contrast with 'miles'. Tertullian is
the only Latin-christian author who used the word in this meaning, but since he
did not use it to describe the non-Christian in his relationship with God -
established in section V.2 - the use of the word in Roman law is not pursued here.
It is, however, appropriate to draw certain conclusions from this chapter, and
this is now done.
Digest 28.2.16 (Paulus); 11.4.4.2 (Ulpian); 19.2.50 (Modestinus).
2
Johannes Emil Kuntze, Excurse iiber romisches Recht (2nd ed.;
Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich, 1880) pp 661-665.
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V.ll CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER FIVE
There were (as set out at the end of section V.2) many gradations of
heathenism, ranging from the lowest to all but the highest in religious life, and
embracing men of every race, every degree of civilisation. For Tertullian,
however, there was such a fundamental difference between the Christian and the
pagan in his relationship to God that he tended to speak of the heathen in sharp
antithesis to the Gospel. This is reflected in the words which he used to describe
the natural man in his relationship to God, as was set out in some detail in the
early parts of this chapter; the whole Roman world, its education, its
amusements, its administrative, civil and military services, its religious
aspirations, all were dominated by idolatry and so alienated from God. Whether
the distinction was as clear-cut in practice as Tertullian would have liked is
doubtful, as expressed by Guignebert:
... nous donnent l'impression d'un desaccord sans remede entre le
christianisme et le paganisme. II nous semble qu'un fosse profond et
infranchissable a ete, du premier jour, creuse entre les deux religions. Or,
ce n'est certainement pas la la verite. IDe nombreuses passerelles
rdunissaient les deux bords de fosse' et bein des hommes, glissant le long de
ses deux pentes, se retrouvaient et se melaient au fond. 1
However confused the situation may have seemed to the observer, Tertullian was
very clear in his own mind that there were no "demi-chretiens", as Guignebert
dubbed them; the words which Tertullian used clearly described the
estrangement of the natural man from God.
Nevertheless Tertullian emphasised the good-will of God toward all of
His creation, whether they responded to Him or not. God had done more than
merely express good-will - He had sent His Son, because He wished all men to
come into a saving relationship with Himself. Few have written more feelingly
of God's love toward sinners than Tertullian, "the sinner" as he described himself.
*
C. Guignebert, "Les demi Chretiens et leur place dans l'Eglise antique",
Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, 88 (1923), 65.
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Tertullian did not doubt that in response to the initiative of God toward men
every man could and should come to some knowledge of God, however
inadequate, apart from revelation. He specified the two ways in which such
knowledge was generally available, both of which reflected the Stoic philosophy
of his day - the order and beauty of the visible introduced, supplemented
and reinforced the testimony of the soul. Tertullian insisted that the soul
testified to God in itself, because there remained in it some residue of its
original divine knowledge; in section five (conclusion) it was noted that Fiitscher
had not made allowance for that, and in consequence he wrote: "Die Seele ist
eine tabula rasa, die erst beschrieben werden muss, sie bringt keine fertigen
Erkenntnisse mit, sondern nur die Anlangen und Fahigkeiten zu denselben. Somit
ist auch die Gotteserkenntnis nicht im eigentlichen Sinne angeboren, sondern
erworben." * With due respect to Futscher, there was (Tertullian maintained)
certain evidences about God which the untutored soul would spontaneously utter,
simply because of what it was in itself; observation should strengthen that
evidence, but observation was not the source of it. Through this double
evidence, every man could understand not only that there was a Creator God but
he could understand the essentials of his relationship to Him. This explained the
universality of the consciousness of God and at the same time explained His
lasting permanence in the history of man - He was so intimately concerned with
intelligent human nature that He could not be denied. There might be
differences among peoples and nations, differences of language and of custom,
but a consciousness of God was the inalienable property of every intelligent
human being.
This summary has deliberately omitted any reference to the other sources
available to some men for a knowledge of God - dreams, the witness of
op. cit., p 238.
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Christians, the hearing or the reading of Scripture - because Tertullian's own
emphasis rested on the evidence of the soul and the evidence of nature.
Since, however, Tertullian did refer so clearly to these two natural sources
for a relationship with God, not only independently of revelation but abundantly,
it is difficult to follow the reasoning of Hauschild, who claimed that in
Tertullian's thought, revelation was essential for any understanding of God:
Gott kann aus der Welt des Gewordenen ("Natur" im gewohnlichen Sinne) nur
recht erkannt werden, wenn man weiss, wie diese Welt geworden ist (natura
Tertullian's): Das sagt uns aber die Heilige Schrift. Und die Jeele, die ihn
erkennen soil, kann in ihrer eigentlichen Beschaffenheit und besonderen
Bestimmung ("in ihrer Natur" nach dem gewohnlichen Sprachgebrauch) selbst
nur recht erkannt werden, wenn man weiss, wie sie entstanded ist (natura
Ter^ullian's): Aber auch deruber belehrt uns die Heilige"Schrift.)~T
Hauschild would thus make revelation not only the primary source of any
relationship with God, but the essential basis for any relationship at all; however,
Tertullian believed in nature as the basis for some relationship, irrespective of
whatever opinion one might hold about the creation of the soul. The separation
of nature and revelation as two different (yet related) sources for the
understanding of God is the starting-point and nervus probandi of the whole
treatise de testimonio animae: nature should not only lead all men to some
understanding of the one true God, independently of revelation, but there were,
according to Tertullian, some truths about revelation which could also be
understood through the light of normal reason - for example, the immortality of
the soul. Furthermore, Tertullian believed that some understanding of God
through nature should normally precede the understanding of God through
revelation - not (as Hauschild insisted) the other way round: Nos definimus deum
primo natura cognoscendum, dehinc doctrina recognoscendum, natura ex
operibus, doctrina ex praedicationibus. 2
G.R. Hauschild, Die rationale Psychologie und Erken^tnistheorie
Tertullians, (Leipzig: 1880) p 2. What Hauschi^Jd appears to have done, to
justify these statements, it to take certain passages out of the context of




That stricture against Marcion is a proper reminder that unless and until
the unregenerate man had either read the Scriptures for himself or had entered
into the catechumenate, where he would be taught the revealed truth of God, his
relationship with God rested on a very imperfect understanding. The next
chapter will examine the status which the unregenerate man had before God.
Meantime, this chapter cam close with the establishment of the fact, on the
available evidence, that Tertullian separated the understanding of God into a
double source - nature and revelation. On that basis God offered some
relationship with Himself to every man, through the evidence of Himself to be
found through the inner world of the soul and the outer world of nature. God
thus offered Himself \o men in such a way that every man could come with
reasonable certainly to some understanding of God. The influence of Roman law,
for this area of Tertullian's thought, appears to be minimal in detail, although
the concept of natural law underlay much of his approach to it. If a God really
existed, then He must reveal Himself to man in his inner and outer world.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE NATURAL MAN'S ACCOUNTABILITY TO GOD
VI. 1 INTRODUCTION OF CHAPTER SIX
Faced with the obvious fact that many of his contemporaries rejected
any relationship with the one true God, even when they became aware of Him
and knew something of His attributes, Tertullian made a number of comments.
First, in order to explain why this could be so, he expounded in some detail the
freedom of every man to accept or to reject a personal relationship with God.
He developed this against the Valentinian doctrine of the immutability of human
nature, and against Marcion's accusation that the Creator God was not a good
God because He had failed to prevent man from sinning. Tertullian's teaching on
free-will, in so far as relevant to the non-believer, is examined in section two of
this chapter.
Two further responses by Tertullian to the rejection of God by man and
man's scepticism that God would do anything about it, are examined in sections
three and four. In the former, the failure to recognise God is found to be
culpable, in the light of the evidence available to man; even the admitted
influence of satan on mankind did not excuse man from responding in some
measure to God. In section four, the judgment of God on sin is examined and
found to be almost always in the future - i.e. after death. Tertullian had no
problem about the prosperity of the wicked in this world, which was under the
domination of the evil one; judgClnent was, however, so certain that Tertullian
could speak as if it had already happened. Both the body and the soul would be
judged by God, the soul alone immediately after death and then body and soul
together at the resurrection. This is the only reference in the thesis to the
future state of man, as the main theme of the study follows a progression from
the unregenerate state to conversion to the faith, and there the thesis stops.
Section five makes a 'test case' of the best in paganism, to see the
standing of the natural man before God. Tertullian was far from despising what
was good in pagan life - but he stressed the inadequacy of even the best of
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paganism to have a correct relationship with God on its own account. The wise
men of paganism distorted the voice of God to man, and Socrates was a case in
point. In fact, the so-called natural (i.e. unregenerate) mam was for Terjullian the
"unnatural" man. Tertullian took the same attitude as Paul, that the world by
wisdom could not know God - human wisdom had to be swept away before the
truth of God could find a secure place in man. Even if the teaching of good
pagans was commendable, their conduct fell short of God's standards for man;
the wise men of this world misled both pagans and Christians, because they had
misled themselves.
Section six looks briefly at the debate about the relationship between
revelation and reason in the writings of Tertullian. Confining it only to the texts
relevant to the relationship of man to God, it appears that Tertullian did not
(contrary to what some have written) despise human reason, provided it built on,
and did not try to contradict, the natural revelation of God. Philosophers were
attacked for abusing their reason, not for using it - reason provided a rational
underpinning for what God expected man to believe. Human reason could,
however, never be more than a praeambulum fidei - no one could become a
Christian without accepting (after such legitimate enquiry as he wished to make)
the truth revealed by God and unattainable by human reasoning. Only by
revelation could man come to certainty and to salvation.
Tertullian wrote almost nothing about the relationship to God of those
affected by mental illness, insanity, intellectual incapacity or diminished
responsibility. Certain deductions, can, however, be made, and this is the theme
of section seven. It was a repeated emphasis of Tertullian that God searched and
examined the human heart. Mental incapacity would not, because of the nature
of the soul and the wiles of the devil, prevent a man from committing deeds
which were in themselves offensive to God, but this section explores the extent
to which God would hold a man of diminished capacity subjectively guilty for his
objectively sinful acts. The Roman law for the area of this chapter is set out in
section eight, and certain conclusions reached in section nine.
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VI.2 FREEWILL - MAN'S RIGHT TO OBEY OR TO DISOBEY GOD
Tertullian was a firm believer in the freedom of the human will, and
where others (for example Paul) had spoken of the freedom of man, he preferred
to speak of liberum arbitrium. Waszink made the surprising assertion that the
phrase liberum arbitrium was not established, as a phrase, until Augustine,'' but
2
Tertullian used it three times against Marcion; he also used a variety of similar
phrases to express the right of the natural man to obey or to disobey the voice of
God. It was in fact Tertullian who introduced this important concept into
theology and he hammered out the details in a series of disputes with heretics.





libera arbitrii potestas 5 ^
libertas arbitrii et potestas
libertas et potestas arbitrii 7
liber et suae potestatis 8
liberi et suae potestatis 9
liberi arbitrii et suae potestatis
'
Waszink, "De Anima "(p 289.
^
Cur permiserat iiberum arbitrium, si intercedit? - 33 Marc 7.3.4-5; Si
libero arbitrio hominis...-n Marc 7.5.15; id est per liberum arbitrium-II Marc
9.8.24.
^
II Marc 5.7.23; II Marc 6.4.25; 5.8; 6.17; 7.25-26; 7.27; II Marc




The addition of potestas is discussed atjpage 352 of a study by V.
Naumann entitled 'Das Problem des Bosen in Tertullians zweitem Buch gegen
Marcion", Zeitschrift fur Katholische Theologie, 58 (1934), 311-63 and 533-51.
6
H Marc 5.6.18-19; 6.3.18; II Marc 7.2.18; H Marc 8.3.18-19.
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liberum et sui arbitrii et suae potestatis
libera hominis potestas arbitrii sui 2






He controverted the Valentinians when they claimed that human nature was
immutable^* and argued that Hermogenes was wrong to say the soul came from
7 8
matter. It was however chiefly against Marcion that Tertullian contended:
Tota ergo libertas arbitrii in utramque partem concessa est illi, ut sui
dominus constanter occurreret et bono sponte seruando et malo sponte
uitando, quoniam et alias positum hominem sub iudicio dei oportebat iustum
illud efficere de arbitrii sui meritis, liberi scilicet. 9
Tertullian argued his case in four separate areas:
(a) Adam had had freedom of choice.
(b) The catechumen had freedom of choice.
(c) The Christian had freedom of choice.












Examined in paragraph (d) of this section.
7
an 11.2..10-13. Hermogenes would not accept that man, having
received the breath of God, could fall into sin, but Tertullian drew a distinction
between the spirit of God and the breath of God (spiritus and flatus). Man was
not the spirit of God, but only the breath of God, and so Tertullian found it
possible to attribute to man a separate personal existence, and a free will, able
to obey his Maker, but also capable of disobeying Him.
g
At the beginning of the third century, Marcion was dead, but his
doctrines remained a danger for the Church; there was no adversary against




The first and third are not relevant to this thesis, but are mentioned briefly here
in order to put the fourth into the context of Tertullian's thought as a whole.
The third is explored in detail in chapter VII.3 below.
(a) Adam's freedom of choice
After having, in the first book, shown the deficiencies of Marcion's god,
Tertullian devoted the second book to defending the Creator, so misunderstood
by the heretics. In particular, Marcion alleged that the Creator God was not a
good God, because He was responsible for the sin of man, having given Adam the
capacity to choose good and evil but having failed to prevent Adam from
choosing evil:
'si deus bonus et praescius futuri et auertendi mali potens, cur hominem, et
guidem imaginem et similitudinem suam, immo et substantiam suam, per
animae scilicet censum passus est labi de obsequio legis in mortem,
circumuentum a diabolo?' 1
Tertullian defended the Creator, explaining first to Marcion (chapter five of
book two) that the fall was contingent on man's attributes, for he had freedom of
choice, and not on any deficiency in God's character - neither in His goodness,
nor in His foreknowledge, nor in His power. God had made man free (liber) and
not a slave, his own master (sui arbitrii) and under his own control (suae
potestatis):
Igitur si et fuerunt in deo istae facultates, prae quibus nihil mali euenire
homini aut potuisset aut debuisset, et nihilominus euenit, uideamus et
hominis condicionem, ne per illiam potius euenerit quod per deum euenire
non potuit. Liberum et sui arbitrii et suae potestatis inuenio hominem a deo
institutum. 2
Tertullian then went on, in chapter six, to explain why this had to be so.
Freedom for man to disobey God, as much as to obey Him, was essential for a
being worthy of the image of God. Without free-will, man would not have been






Oportebat igitur imaginem et similitudinem dei liberi arbitrii et suae
potestatis institui, in qua hoc ipsum imago et similitudo dei deputaretur,
arbitrii scilicet liber ,tas et potestas. 1
Without free-will, man could not have been good; with it, he could be either good
or bad:
quia non natura in bonum dispositus est, sed institutione, secundum
institutorem bonum, scilicet bonorum conditorem. Vt ergo bonum iam suum
haberet homo, emancipatum sibi a deo, et fieret proprietas iam boni in
homine et quodammodo natura, de institutione adscripta est illi quasi
libripens emancipati a deo boni libertas et potestas arbitrii, quae efficeret
bonum ut proprium. 2
Adam had had that choice; he had succumbed to the devil because the
devil had managed to get Adam's free will on his (the devil's) side, but the
3
responsibility lay entirely on Adam's shoulders and was not attributable to God.
Tertullian went back one stage further - to anticipate the question of
why Adam chose evil and not good. He gave the same answer - freedom of
choice - in this case in the devil. The devil had been created a good angel, and
he too, the creation of the good God, sinned of his own choice, and instigated
4
man to sin. Tertullian did not face the next question - why did the devil, after
being created with the power of choosing good or evil, choose the latter.
Tertullian had gone far enough to meet the immediate challenge -the gnostic
doctrine of determination. It was enough for Tertullian to show that both the
1




ex 2.5.30-34, where the text is corrupt but the sense seems to be that
God willed Adam's obedience, whatever one says about the devil's activity and
Adam's own choice.
4
II Marc 10.3.12-5.26. Tertullian's ideas on the origin and existence of
the devil were based on an ingenious exposition of Ezekiel 38.11-16, which he
made to refer to the devil. God created an angel endowed with free will; this
angel by his own choice became evil. He had been formed for good by God,
adorned with every angelic glory and set in God's presence but of his own accord
he began to sin and became the instigator of evil and wickedness in men. As he
had misused his own free will, so he taught men to misuse theirs - apol 22.3.. 10-
13.
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devil and Adam had had free will - that relieved Tertullian of the difficulty of
attributing evil to God as Creator.
(b) The catechumen's freedom of choice
The enquirer after the Christian faith was very plainly faced with the
alternatives of entering the discipline of the catechumenate, with the promise of
forgiveness of sin at the end of it, or of facing the wrath of God which awaited
the natural man who had not repented of his sin. The choice was there - the
choice was his; since this is fully explored in chapter VII.3, no further reference
will be made to it in this section.
(c) The Christian's freedom of choice
In baptism, all past sins were washed away, but the efficacy of baptism
was retrospective only. The path to ultimate fellowship with God lay ahead; man
was free and man had to tread that path for himself; what had been gained in
baptism could be lost again. If the Christian was to avoid post-baptismal sin, he
had to exercise his free-will to do what God had commanded, and avoid what
God had prohibited:
Igitur cum utrumque ex praeceptis eius didicerimus, quid nolit et quid uelit,
iam in nobis est uoluntas et arbitrium eligendi alterum, sicut scriptum est:
'Ecce posui ante te bonum et malum: gustasti enim de agnitionis arbore.' 1
The way by which a Christian kept himself right with God was to exercise his
free-will and to choose the good, to defeat the devil by using aright that same
freedom by means of which the devil had secured his initial success with man.
2
Thus God gave man the opportunity "worthily to recover his salvation", but that
is outwith the scope of this thesis and is not explored further here.
(d) The natural man's freedom of choice
Although every soul was derived velut surcuius from Adam, and so






of every soul. Tertullian appears to have regarded the will as an independent
faculty, having complete freedom, knowing both good and evil, and able to
choose whichever it pleased:
quod deus non inter cesserit aduersus ea, quae noluit euenire, ut conseruaret
ea, quae uoluit. Si enim semel homini permiserat arbitrii libertatem et
potestatem et digne permiserat, ... 1
In opposition to the Valentinian doctrine of the immutability of human nature,
Tertullian stressed man's freedom to accept or to reject the voice of God,
however, he came to hear it. The Valentinians maintained that all men belonged
to one or other of three classes - spiritual, animal, or terrestrial; as this
distinction was fixed at birth, it was immutable; just as a thorn could not
produce figs nor a thistle grapes, so (they argued) no choicus or animalis could
produce the works of a spiritalis, or vice versa. Tertullian disagreed; of course a
corrupt tree could not bring forth good fruit, but a good tree could be grafted
into corrupt stock and bring forth good fruit. A new nature could be grafted into
the corrupt nature of man, because the power of divine grace was stronger than
nature and could subject nature to itself, if the free will of man allowed divine
2
grace to work in the human heart.
The problem of reconciling the efficacy of divine grace with the freedom
of man's will did not seriously engage Tertullian's attention, although in general
he tended to stress man's freedom rather than the efficacy of grace; he was far
3
from the idea that man could will what was good only by the grace of God. He






The de paenitentia gives the impression passim that God's grace
somehow affected the choice, although it was freely made. The recognition of
some ultimate divine initiative is strengthened by the passage in de anima
referred to in footnote 2 above, that divine grace, mightier than nature, had in
subjection to itself the free power of choice in man. The grace of God is
studied briefly in chapter X.4 below.
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acts. Man had sinned through his own free choice, (human nature having been
corrupted by the fall of Adam) and the natural man had to take steps to return to
God - he had to make his own choice - to 'opt in'. Endowed by God with elements
of religious and ethical knowledge, but above all with free will, he should hear
and obey the prompting of God, in whatever way God spoke to him. Tertullian
was not concerned with the influence of character or environment - all was free,
unconditioned choice.
"Ainsi Adam a-t-il choisi librement. Le demon lui avait presente la matiere
du peche, mais n'avait pu Ty contraindre. La tentation n'est done pas une
excuse suffisante. De toutes facons, et quelles soient les sollicitations
venues de l'exterieur, l'homme se determine par lui-meme". 1
God had however foreseen the fall of man, and had provided the way of escape;
He gave to every new life the freedom to choose salvation. How this became,
for Tertullian, man's responsibility, is examined next.
^
d'Ales, "Theologie", p 270
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VI.3 FAILURE TO RECOGNISE GOD WAS CULPABLE
Since God had given some evidence about Himself to all men,''' through
2 3
His works and through the testimony of the soul, and since every man was free
4
to respond to the voice of God to him or within him, Tertullian believed that
all men were accountable to God if they failed to respond to Him. God had set
men the practical exercise of recognising their estranged relationship from Him,
and to fail in this was culpable.
Cum autem etiam ignorantes dominum nulla exceptio tueatur a poena, quia
deum in aperto constitutum et uel ex ipsis caelestibus bonis
conprehensibilem ignorari non licet, 5
ita eum uis magnitudinis et no turn hominibus obicit et ignotum. Et haec est
summa delicti nolentium recognoscere, quern ignorar e non possunt. 6
Recognoscere deum, as opposed simply to accepting His existence, (which
Tertullian described as cognoscere deum), was within the natural capability of
every man. If only man would search for God, he would know Him, would
worship Him and would find Him a God of pity rather than a God of anger. In the
event:
Semper hum ana gens male de Deo meruit: primo guidem ut inofficiosa eius,
quern cum intellegeret ex parte, non solum non requisiuit timendum, sed et
alios sibi citius commenta quos coleret; dehinc quod non inquirendo
innocentiae magistrum et nocentiae iudicem et exactorem omnibus uitiis et
criminibus inoleuit. Ceterum si requisissit, sequebatur, ut cognosceret
requisitum et recognitum obseruaret et obseruatum propitium magis
experiretur quam iratum. 7
















the first of the two points made in the passage just quoted - the greatest
condemnation of the natural man was that he had not only neglected to respond
to the God who was seeking after him, but that he had invented other deities,
whom he worshipped instead.
Principale crimen generis humani, summus saeculi reatus, tota causa iudicii
idolotajria. Nam etsi suam speciem tenet unumquodque delictum, etsi suo
quodque nomine iudicio destinatur, in idololatriae tamen crimine
expungitur. 1
Since Tertullian had set out both the witness of the soul and the evidence
of nature as the two separate and yet related ways in which all men should come
to some knowledge of God, it is not surprising that he made use of both
arguments in order to show the culpability of man's failure to respond to God. In
his fifth book against Marcion, he showed at length why it was not unfair that
the heathen were to be judged. Even as the poeple of Israel had been given the
commandments and had failed to live up to the standards set by God in the law,
so the Gentiles had failed to recognise God in His works:
Et populus autem per disciplinae transgressionem et omne hominum genus
per naturae dissimulationem et deliquerat et rebellauerat aduersus
creatorem. 2
Mention was made in chapter V.10 of the ius naturale and how the Roman jurists
tended to identify it with ius gentium - those laws which, as Rome's dominions
spread, they found they had in common with other nations. There is, however,
nothing of this thought of natural law underlying Tertullian's condemnation of
the natural man for his failure to recognise God; instead he made use of Paul's
argument in Romans chapter 2, that both Jew and Gentile were inexcusable
before God, the latter because they had the "lex scripta in cordibus suis." God




V Marc 5.4.6-9. Similarly in IV Marc 25.10.5-7 and V Marc 5.7.11-13.
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light they had been given by God - the emphasis being on God as both giver and
as judge:
Si enim iudicabit deus occulta hominum, tam eorum qui in lege deliquerunt
quam eorum qui sine lege, - quia et hi etsi legem ignorant, at natura faciunt
quae sunt legis - utique is deus iudicabit, cuius sunt et lex et ipsa natura,
quae legis est instar ignorantibus legem. 1
Furthermore (the argument continued) there was the evidence of God's
works. If Christ had been the messenger of the new and unknown God of
Marcion, then God could not have called the heathen to account, because He
would not have had any yardstick against which they could be judged. They could
have said that since they had not heard of God, and since the deity was unknown
because he had not created anything, they could not be held accountable.
Tertullian insisted that God was recognisable in His works, and could be known
independently of revelation, so the heathen had no excuse for not responding to
Him.
Cum enim ad ultionem uenturum scribat apostolus dominum exigendam de
eis, qui deum ignorent et qui non obaudiant euangelio, quos ait poenam
luituros exitialem aeternam a facie domini et a gloria ualentiae eius,
sequitur, ut flammam ignis inducat, scilicet ueniens ad puniendum. Ita et in
hoc, nolente Marcione, crematoris dei Christus est, et in illo creatoris est
quod etiam de ignorantibus dominum ulciscitur, id est de ethnicis. Seorsum
enim posuit *** euangelio non obaudientes, siue Christfenos peccatores siue
Iudaeos. Porro de ethnicis exigere poenas, qui euangelium forte non norint,
non est dei eius, qui naturaliter sit ignotus nec usquam nisi in euangelio sit
reuelatus, non omnibus scibilis. Creatori autem etiam naturalis agnitio
debetur, ex operibus intellegendo et exinde in pleniorem notitiam
requirendo. Illius est ergo etiam ignorantes deum plectere, quern non liceat
ignorari. 2
Even the common, yet remarkable, provision of rain and fire should have been
3
enough to make the heathen admit the existence of God, because, as le Saint








he can say 'thank you' for the world. God could and would expect a response
from all men - if need be based only on the evidence of His works.
Dasr die Erkenntnis Gottes und zwar nicht nur die rein theoretische, sondern
vor allem auch die praktische Anerkennung Gottes zur Aufgabe des
Menschen gehort, erhellt auch aus der Rechenschaft, die Gott daruber
fordern wird und zwar nicht nur von den Juden und Christen, sondern auch
von den Heiden. Diese Verantwortlichkeit stiitzt sich auf die Leichtigkeit
der Gotteserkenntnis, da das Zeugnis der Innen - und Aussenwelt den
Menschen zur Anerkennung Gottes drangt. Die Verantwortlichkeit des
Menschen fur die Anerkennung Gottes hat T. wiederholt betont. Er schliesst
seine Schrift vom Zeugnis der Seele mit einem ernsten und eindringlichen
Hinweis darauf. Auch sonst halt er diesen Gedanken den Heiden vor.
Ebenso weist T. am Beginn des zweiten Buches Ad nationes, in dem er die
Torheit des heidnischen Gotzendienstes dartut, auf die Schuldbarkeit ihres
Irrtums hin.2
Tertullian was not, of course, unaware of the influence which satan
3
exerted over men, to draw them away from God, but he absolutely rejected any
theory of sin which whittled away altogether man's responsibility. God had
provided sufficient evidence, in the world around, for every man to recognise his
Creator, and Tertullian remarked on the irony of those who said they rejected
Christianity but who were prepared to accept far less credible evidence for the
supernatural if it was put forward apud aemulatorem dei - Haec guidem in
testimonium posita sunt repellentibus fidem, si minime credant rebus dei,
4
quarum adfectationibus apud aemulatorem dei credunt. There was, however, no
'opting-out'; whether they were prepared to recognise God or not, Bene quod
omnium Deus est, cuius, uelimus ac nolimus, omnes sumus. Sed apud uos quoduis
colere ius est praeter Deum uerum, quasi non hie magis omnium sit, cuius omnes
5
sumus - and He would call all to account. The question of when that accounting
took place is examined in the next section.
op. cit. p 154, quoting someone (whom he did not name) who had used
the phrase in a more general cosmological sense.
2








Before leaving this topic, two further points should be made. First, some
reference should be made to the argument about ignorance and responsibility
which underlies Tertullian's first treatise ad nationes. There he showed that the
ignorantia of pagans, with respect to Christianity, was culpable because it was
not involuntary ignorance; it was deliberate, because they had every opportunity
to learn the truth, yet they took pleasure in their ignorance and with it they fed
their hostility. Tertullian's immediate purpose was the defence of the
persecuted Christian community, and not the relationship of the pagan to God,
but his argument is significant for this section because it rests on the assumption
that ignorantia of one's opponent could be both error and sin. From the shape of
the argument, Tertullian seems to have borrowed it from Cicero's de officiis,
which set out in juridical terms the responsibility for wrongdoing by omission and
by ignorance.
Mais c'est dans le Oe officiis que l'analyse de la responsabilite est la plus
profonde et la plus precise: a cote de l'acte injuste, commis sciemment dans
le dessein de nuire, il y a l'injustice par omission, celle qui rdsulte d'une
action dommageable a autrui qu'on a laisse commettre, par mauvaise
volonte, negligence ou paresse.
On comprend sans doute mieux a la lumiere de ces textes l'importance et la
defendit-reuineit par laquelle Tertullien commence avec eclat son trait£.
Elle n'est pas un banal effet oratoire, mais constitue le fondement meme de
son argumentation. 1
The background to Cicero's thought is mentioned in the conclusion to this
chapter, i.e. in section VI.9, but the second (and final) point to be noted in this
section is the extent to which Tertullian's emphasis on responsibility was shaped
by his quarrels with the Gnostics. If, as they claimed, evil was inherent in
matter (in the case of man inherent in the flesh) sin was unavoidable in
materially-constituted beings. This doctrine; took away all responsibility from
man and particularly it removed his guilt before God; Tertullian could not
Fredouille, op. cit., p 73.
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tolerate a system in which wrong could be done and no one be brought to account
for it. His use of the word 'delictum' to describe man's accountability to God is
examined in section VI.8, but meantime it is necessary to ask when Tertullian
believed that this accounting took place; that is examined next.
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VI.4 WHEN MAN WAS ACCOUNTABLE TO GOD
When Tertullian's inquisitors looked at the world around, and saw the
obvious prosperity of the wicked, they may have said to Tertullian that events
hardly supported his theology about judgement resting on mankind for its
rejection of God. Those who neglected God seemed to be none the worse for it;
they scorned Him, but He did not intervene; on the contrary, it was the
Christians who were suffering misfortune just then, at the hands of the pagans.
Were was this God who judged sinners?
Tertullian replied:
Qui enim semel aeternum judicium destinauit post saeculi finem, non
praecipitat discretionem, quae est condicio iudicii, ante saeculi finem.
Aequalis est interim super omne hominum genus et indulgens et incessens;
communia uoluit esse et commoda profanis et incommoda suis. 1
The Matthaean parable of the good seed and the bad seed illustrates well the
2
attitude of Tertullian to evil-doers. He had no illusions that goodness would
necessarily lead to material prosperity in this world, nor that wickedness would
bring punishment to the wicked, such as was taught in Old Testament Judaism.
The attitude of the pagan to God, had (according to Tertullian) little or no
consequence for him in this life, unless he happened to be alive during the events
immediately preceding the parousia; rewards and punishments were being stored
up for a future accounting. Of that future accounting, however, Tertullian had
3
no doubt at all. "II nous decrit le jugement dernier comme s'il en arrivait".
Judgment on the unbeliever was so certain that Tertullian could speak of it as if
1
apol 41.3.10-14.
He mentioned it briefly in an 16.7.49-50 and developed it in detail in
Prax 1.6.34-7.47, not with reference to the material prosperity of the wicked but
to illustrate the priority of truth over falsehood (as he had already done in praes
chapters 29 to 31) and to explain the freedom accorded to the here_tics to
propagate their views.
3
Christine Mohrmann, "Observations sur la Langue et le Style de
Tertullien", Neovo Didaskaleion, 4 (1950-51), 44.
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it had taken place already - judicially it had, as soon as the guilt was incurred,
thought not actually - Qui negat idololatren perisse, is negabit idololatren
homicidium fecisse; ^ renuant ob malitiam praedamnatos se in eundem iudicii
2
diem cum omnibus cultoribus et operationibus suis. Tertullian could also argue,
in another context, that the incestuous man referred to by Paul in Second
Corinthians was already 'condemned' and, hence, already 'consumed', the point
being that the sinner who was pardoned in Second Corinthians "lest he be
3
consumed" could not be the man guilty of incest because that man's
condemnation was already a fact even if it had not yet happened.
Tertullian realised that he would be ridiculed by the pagan world, when
he preached future judgment as a motive for conversion - Haec et nos risimus
4
aliquando - but nevertheless he was fully persuaded that he had to make it a
major emphasis of his apologeticum:
Itaque ridemur praedicantes Deum iudicaturum. Sic enim et poetae et
philosophi tribunal apud inferos ponunt. Et gehennam si comminemur, quae
est ignis arcani subterraneas ad poenam thesaurus, proinde
decachinnamur. 5
It is outwith the scope of this thesis to look in any detail at the future judgment
of God on the natural man, because the thesis assumes (and closes with) the
natural man's progression from heathenism to the Christian faith. However, to
set this section in the overall context of Tertullian's thought, it is desirable to
mention briefly (without citations) that Tertullian believed:
(a) All souls, except those of martyrs, went on death to what Tertullian called












there immediately after death, whether their bodies were buried or not,
whether they had departed before the time set for them or not, and whether
they had suffered a violent death or not. No soul could leave the underworld
until the resurrection, either by its own will or by necromancy.
(b) There were different places and different treatments for the guilty and the
righteous apud inferos. Tertullian described the abodes in the inferi quite
systematically, distinguishing clearly between the dwellings of the saved and
of the damned; indeed, he criticised the pagans for locating virtuous men in
the same region as criminals. For the latter, the inferi were already a place
of punishment, although not the same as gehenna, the great abyss into which
sinners would be thrown after the resurrection.The part where the righteous
lived apud inferos was distinguished as 'Abraham's bosom'; paradise or
heaven was the place of blessedness into which they would enter after the
resurrection; martyrs went to an earthly paradise as soon as they died. *
(c) Judgement began for the soul immediately on death, although it must be
noted that Tertullian's view of this appears to have developed over the
years. In the apologeticum and in de testimonio animae, he stated that a
soul separated from its body could neither suffer not enjoy, but simply
waited, and its reward or its punishment was postponed until the resurrection
of the body. In de anima, however, Tertullian wrote that the soul, because
of its corporal constitution, was capable of sensation even although separated
from the flesh; Scripture, confirmed by the new prophecy, demonstrated
that the souls of the deceased had a foretaste apud inferos of the rewards
and penalties due to them at the judgment. These sensations were, however,
The different places in the intermediate state have been fully set out
by Heinz Fine, Die Terminologie der Jenseitsvorstellungen bei Tertullian, (Bonn:
Peter Hanstein, 1958). The usefulness of the book is best indicated by its sub¬
title: 'ein semasiologischer Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte des
Zwischenzustandes'. Not all eschatological ideas are considered, but the
condition of souls immediately after death and the nature of the underworld are
set out in detail.
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no more than an anticipation of the joys of heaven or the pains of hell,
according to the soul's ultimate destiny. For the Christian who had sinned
after baptism there might be some purifying process - it is outwith the
scope of this study to comment on that - but for the non-believer, there was
no possibility of a better relationship with God. For him, the intermediate
state was a foretaste of those everlasting torments which would be declared
on the day of judgment. To those who could not understand how there could
be pains for any one in the intermediate state, Tertullian explained: Cur
enim non putes animam et puniri et foueri in inferis interim sub
expectatione utriusque iudicii in quadam usurpatione et Candida eius? *
Those fouentur were those who would be acquitted in the judgment day;
those puniqtur were those who would be condemned. Tertullian anticipated
and answered the objection that the judgment day was thus forestalled, -
Quia saluum debet esse, inquis, in iudicio diuino negotium suum sine ulla
2
praelibatione sententiae ; i.e. that no reward or infliction should take place
until the flesh has been restored to share it. He explained that it would be
iniquissimum otium if the guilty were still in comfort and the innocent not
yet in comfort; if the punishment of the wicked did not begin until death, at
least it began directly after death.
(d) A first resurrection would then usher in a reign of Christ and the just on
earth, a reign which would last for a thousand years. However, not all the
just would rise at the same time; some would rise earlier, and others later,
according to their merits, to reign with Christ. After this millennial rule,
there would be a second resurrection, general and simultaneous, when the
remainder of the just and all the reprobates would be raised together, to






(e) Judgment could not be finalised until the resurrection of the body, when the
"whole man", soul and body, would stand before God. The interim judgment
of the soul was without prejudice to the full judgment of God, which would
take place then. Unlike the gnostics, who believed that man was liberated
from the body at the end of time, Tertullian was convinved that the
perfectio of man would be the resurrection of the body.
The sentence pronounced on the judgment day would be final and
irrevocable. There was no hope of deliverance beyond the grave, and none
beyond the judgment. Body and soul would not be annihilated, which would be to
consume them, not to punish them; hell was everlasting, and so was its
punishment.
iudicii est, necessario idem ipse, qui fuerat, exhibebitur, ut boni seu
contrarii meriti judicium a Deo referat. Ideoque repraesentabuntur et
corpora, quia neque pati quicquam potest anima sola sine materia stabili, id
est carne, et quod omnino de iudicio Dei pati debent animae, non sine carne
meruerunt intra quam omnia egerunt. 1
The basis of judgment would be the conduct of man and the attitude of man to
God during his days on earth. (The passages now quoted are those addressed to
the heathen, where Tertullian's object was to prove the moral necessity of
resurrection and of judgment, not to go into details which would complicate his
argument and, to the mind of an unbeliever, partly stultify it. For Christian
readers he went into much more detail.)
adfirmamus te manere post uitae dispunctionem et expectare diem iudicii
proque meritis aut cruciatui destinari aut refrigerio, utroque sempiterno; 2
ut qui prodacto aeuo isto iudicaturus sit suos cultores in uitae aeternae
retributionem, profanos in ignem aeque perpetem et iugem, suscitatis
apol 48.4.33-39. The reconciliation of the view expressed here (that
the resurrection of the body was necessary for the judgment of God to begin)
with Tertullian's teaching elsewhere that there was an interim judgment of the




omnibus ab initio defuntis et reformatis et recensitis ad utriusque meriti
dispunctionem. 1
Item judicium annuntiamus a Deo pro cuiusque meritis post interitum
destinatum; id uos Minoi et Radamantho adscribitis, iustiore omnino Aristide
recusato. Eo iudicio iniquos aeterno igni, pios et insontes amoeno in loco
dicimus perpelfuitatem transacturos; 2
Cum ergo finis et limes, medius qui interhiat, affuerit, . . . tunc restituetur
omne hominum genus ad expungendum, quod in isto aeuo boni seu mali
meruit, et exinde pendendum in immensam aeternitatis perpetuitatem. 3
4
Tertullian's keen anticipation of the Day of Judgment, and in particular the
satisfaction he expected the Christians to enjoy from their vantage point in the
new Jerusalem - kings and governors, actors, wrestlers, and charioteers, all
5
tortuously tossing in the fiery billows of hell - has been much criticised, but
that is outwith the scope of this study; the point to be established here is that






apol 48.12.76-77 and 79-82.
4
Quid admirer? Quid rideam? Vbi gaudeam. ubi exultem, spectans tot
ac tantos reges, qui in caelum recepti nuntiabantur, cum ipso love et ipsis suis
testibus in imis tenebris congemescentes? Item praesides persecutores dominici
nominis saeuioribus quam ipsi flammis saeuierunt insultantibus contra Christianis
liquescentes?- spec 30.3.8-14.
5
Particularly by Edward Gibbon who, in the most famous chapter (15)
of The History of the Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire seems deliberately
to have misunderstood Tertullian. Certainly he abridged the translation
judiciously to suit his purpose, and in one or two places he missed Tertullian's
point. A more serious criticism is that the reader of Gibbon would not
appreciate, without referring to the text of Tertullian, but when Gibbon
concluded with a flourish"... But the humanity of the reader will permit me to
draw a veil over the rest of this infernal description, which the zealous African
pursues in a long variety of affected and unfeeling witticisms.", there was in
fact little or nothing more to be quoted which would have served his purpose.
While further consideration of the point is entirely outside the scope of this
study, it would be quite wrong to deduce from that si^ngle passage, removed (as
it is by Gibbon) from its context, that Tertullian took pleasure in imagining the
sufferings of others. The influence of literary tradition, the didactic goal, the
Biblical inspiration, the principles of classic rhetoric all have to be taken into
account. (The quotation from Gibbon is from vol II of J.B. Bury's edition,
(London: Methven and Co., 1909) p 27.
223
There were, however, two exceptions to this norm. The first was drawn
from Tertullian by the exigencies of the moment. The Christians who would not
worship the gods of Rome, nor perform sacrifices for the Emperor, were blamed
when there were severe floods in Rome (or the lack of them in Egypt), for
earthquakes, for famines and for disease. Tertullian replied that the calamities
besetting the empire did not reflect any disfavour by pagan deities at the spread
of Christianity, but were more likely to be divine punishments inflicted by the
true God on the empire, which He maintained in existence despite its refusal to
recognise him - but this was a general judgement and not related to individuals.
Eundem igitur nunc quoque scire debet iratum, quern et retro semper,
priusquam Christiani nominarentur. Cuius bonis utebatur ante editis quam
sibi deos fingeret; cur non ab eo etiam mala intellegat euenire, cuius bona
esse non sensit? Illius rea est, cuius et ingrata. Et tamen, si pristinas clades
comparemus, leuiora nunc accidunt, ex quo Christianos a Deo orbis accepit.
Exinde enim et innocentia saeculi infauitates temperauit et deprecatores Dei
esse coeperunt. 1
Vos igitur importuni rebus humanis, uos pub lieorum incommodorum illices
semper, apud quos Deus spernitur, statuae adorantur! 2
The same is true of his assumption - he implied that it was a doctrine he had in
common with the Marcionites - that God could use war as a method of
chastisement. ^
The other exception to this normal rule, that the natural man would be
dealt with by God only on the day of judgment, was certain individuals who, like
Scapula, persecuted the Christian Church. Clamant ad Dominum
apol 40.12.45-13.54. In other words, if the Creator was good enough
to grant His ungrateful creation a period of time from which it might profit and
return to Him, let it take care not to interpret this as indifference on God's part
with regard to the sins of men. Present calamaties had for their aim the
warning that God's patience was nearing its end, and should recall to all that




nec fulminibus tantum aut bellis et pestibus aliisque plagis creatoris
sed et scorpiis eius obiectus - I Marc 24.7.23-25.
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inuidia animae martyrum sub altari: Quonam usque non ulcisceris, Domine,
sanguinem nostrum de incolis terrae?^ Normally it was true that ultio illorum a
2
saeculi fine dirigitur, but just occasionally divine justice did not wait. Chapter
three of the letter to Scapula gave seven practical examples of persecutors who
had already been divinely chastised, three of them confessing on their death-beds
that they had been punished for persecuting the Christian Church. Tertullian
emphasised that the Christians did not fear persecution for themselves - in
becoming Christians they were prepared to make the sacrifice of their life - but
they appealed to the self-interest of their adversaries, who would have to bear
3
the consequences of fighting against God. For example, in the procuratorship
of Hilarianus, under whom Perpetua and Felicitas suffered, the people shouted,
with reference to the fields used for Christian burial places, "Away with the
burial fields (areae)", but what happened was that their own fields (areae)
4
suffered, and they gathered in none of their crops. Tertullian declared that his
aim was not to frighten Scapula but to save him from the folly of contending
with God. If divine chastisement was frightful here and now, as the treatise ad






The fourth chapter opens with the striking warning: "Non te terremus,
qui nec timemus; sed uelim, ut omnes saluos facere possimus, monendo \\ quoted
in Greek from Acts 5: 39 - Scap 4.1.1-2. £? Gco^l^c^.
4
Scap 3.1.4-5. The burial places of Christians were special objects of
popular fury. As a secta illicita, they had no legal right to possess them, and
from their meetings at the graves they returned with invigorated energy of faith.
Thus when there was an outbreak of persecution, the cry was raised, "Away with
the areae of the Christians," meaning their places of interment. When a season
of sterility followed, Tertullian saw a fulfilment of that demand in a different
sense -their own areae had suffered and they gathered no harvest. "Areae non
sint^'^reae ipsorum non fuerunt; messes enim suas non egerunt -Scap 3.1.4-5.
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That apart, it seems from Tertullian's writings that he believed the
heathen could live their own lives, enjoying a measure of prosperity and with
freedom to behave as they liked. It was not until the day of reckoning that God
would call them to account for their lives, and for their failure to recognise Him.
Whether the heathen who passed his life according to the light of nature could
ever be saved, appears never to have occured to Tertullian, but holding the views
that he did about the necessity of baptism for salvation, it can hardly be doubted
that his reply, if asked, would have been in the negative. Their merits or
demerits in this life would affect only the degree of punishment which would be
meted out to them on the day of judgment but their merits or demerits could not
affect the place of their eternal destiny. Whether this was true of even the most
exalted and noble of the heathen is examined next.
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VI.5 THE INADEQUACY OF THE BEST IN PAGANISM
After noting the relationship to God of the persecutors of the Church
(the worst of all men, in Tertullian's eyes) it is appropriate to ask how he saw the
best and highest in pagan life, in its relationship to God. Tertullian was far from
despising what he recognised to be good in individual pagans and many examples
from literature and from history enrich his works. For example, he commented
on the wisdom of Socrates and Cato,^ the dignity of Plato, the equanimity of
2 3
Aristotle, the vigor of Zeno, and the eloquence of Demosthenes and Cicero.
He was no admirer of savages, and the worst abuse he could direct against
Marcion was to call him, Scytha tetrior, Hamaxobio instabilior, Massageta
4
inhumanior, Amazona audacior , (although in its proper place he paid tribute to
the natural ability of the unsophisticated man to find the way to God). Writing
to encourage the confessors in prison, when he might have been expected to use
the examples of Christ and the apostles, Tertullian drew on his secular learning
and appealed to the heroes and heroines of paganism - Mucius Scaevola,
Heraclitus, Peregrinus, Empedocles, Lucretia, Dido, Cleopatra, and the
indomitable African woman, the wife of Hasdrubal, who hurled herself into the
flames with her children rather than yield, as her husband had done, to the
conqueror Scipio. From such examples of pagan virtue and fortitude, Tertullian
drew his conclusion: if the false sparkles of human vanity inspired so much
5
firmness, what would not the true pearls of celestial glory arouse?
de sapientia Socratem - apol 11.15.70; omnium Socrates sapientissimus -
I nat 4.7.12; Quis ... grauior et sapientior Catone? - apol 11.16.73-74.
2
Platonis honor aut Zenonis uigor aut Aristotelis tenor - an 3.2.13-14.
3
de eloquentia Demosthenen!-apol 11.15.72-73; quis ... eloquentior
Tullio?-apoT 11.16.74-76. * "
4
I Marc 1.4.18-19.
mart 4.4.24-6.6 (the examples) and 4.9.22-24 (the application).
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These were, however, instances of purely pagan virtue and after he had
paid tribute to the scholarship of Soranus, Tertullian had to acknowledge,
perhaps a trifle wistfully in view of the use he had made of Soranus' works, *
that Soranus was not a Christian:
Ita etiam ipse Soranus plenissime super anima commentatus quattuor
uoluminibus et cum omnibus philosophorum sententiis expertus corporalem
animae substantiam uindicat, etsi illam immortalitate fraudauit. Non enim
omnium est credere quod Christianorum est. 2
Nevertheless, Tertullian was prepared to concede that pagan philosophers and
scholars sometimes found, or stumbled on, parts of Christian truth.
Plane non negabimus aliquando philosophos iuxta nostra sensisse;
testimonium est etiam ueritatis euentus ipsius. Nonnunquam et in procella
confusis uestigiis caeli et freti aliqui portus offenditur prospero errore,
nonnunquam et in tenebris aditus quidam et exitus deprehenduntur caeca
felicitate, sed et natura pleraque suggeruntur quasi de publico sensu, quo
animam deus dotare dignatus est. 3
He set out the five sources of pagan wisdom - pure chance, common sense,
4
sacred (pagan) books, apocryphal books, and the Old Testament. The first four
were human sources, and constituted no threat to Tertullian's theology. He saw
nothing wrong, if it served his purpose, in appealing to common sense to
demonstrate the truth of Christianity, and he could show without difficulty the
point at which it had to yield to Christian revelation.
Est guidem et de communibus sensibus sapere in dei rebus, sed in
testimonium ueri, non in adiutorium falsi, quod sit secundum diuinam, non
Tertullian den Soran nicht bloss gelegentlich benutzt hat, sondern
dessen Werk in seinem Aufriss zugrunde gelegt und im Sinne seiner Theologie
iiberarbeitet hat". That is the theme of Heinrich Karpp's article "Sorans vier
Biicher TTe pi H> u TCn -S und Tertullians Schrift De anima", Zeitschrift fur
die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 33 (1934), 31-47 - the quotation is from p
31. Karpp went on to show the points at which Tertullian had to differ from
Soranus because he (Tertullian) believed the soul came from the breath of God,








contra diuinam dispositionem. Quaedam enim et naturaliter nota sunt, ut
immortalitas animae penes plures, ut deus noster penes omnes. Vtar ergo et
sententia Platonis alicuius pronuntiantis: 'Omnis anima inmortalis'; 1
The apparent similarities of pagan wisdom with the revealed truth of
Scripture were more of a problem to him, as he saw that the arguments, often
misleading because removed from their context, represented a more real danger
to evangelical purity than did flagrant disagreement, immediately obvious as
such. Accordingly, Tertullian took up the idea (often used by earlier Christian
apologists) that the Greek philosophers had plagarised and then distorted the
2
prophetic writings, not having recognised their divine character.
They have perverted what they found in scripture by altering what pleased
them to suit their own designs, because being still in obscurity they lacked
the means required for proper understanding of the scriptures. Some of
them likewise have altered and corrupted the "newly given revelation" into a
philosophic system, striking off from the one way many inexplicable ways.
They have transformed the simplicity of the truth which they were too
proud to believe and what was certain they, with their fastidious
admixtures, have infected with uncertainity. Whatever in their own systems
corresponds with prophetic wisdom they either ascribe to some other source
or apply in some other sense.3
It was from the Old Testament Scriptures, which were the surest testimony to
God available to pagans of old, that the philosophers had borrowed, or rather
pilfered, various of their doctrines which seemed to coincide with Christian
truths; yet they had so twisted anything in Scripture which displeased them that
4
facta est argumentationum inundatio de stillicidio uno atque alio ueritatis. The
5
outstanding example was their teaching about the Judgment; accordingly, when
res 3.1.1-2.7; it appears from what follows that
u X ^ meant a very different thing to Plato than anima did to
Te^tullian but, in fairness to Tertullian, he was not basing any argument on Plato's
views but merely remarking that this was the kind of support he was prepared to
accept from non-Christians.
2
apol 47 (the whole chapter); II nat 2.5.12-19.
3
H.B. Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists and Greek Philosophy
exemplified by Irenaeus, Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria, (Assen: van






Tertullian described the Advent of the Lord, it is little wonder that he included
the poets and philosophers among those who would be dealt with at the Judgment
Seat of the unexpected Christ.*
Having conceded, however, that the best of human philosophy might
uncover truth, or rather certain partial truths, by accident or by the common
sense that all men had received - and possibly just because he had made such a
concession - Tertullian went on to stress the inadequacy of paganism, even the
very best of paganism, to enter into a correct relationship with God on its own
account. Generally speaking, philosophers were regarded as embodying the
highest and best of ancient life, and among them, Socrates was the wisest of
2
all. The story of his death was treasured as the holiest symbol of philosophical
independence and freedom. Here, then, was a 'test case' and Tertullian opened
de anima with a detailed comparison between the wisdom of Socrates and the
sapientia Christiana. Here was a man, the princeps philosophorum, living before
Christ and therefore ignorant of Christianity, led by his own immense knowledge,
but ignorant of the true God. While the immediate problem for Tertullian was to
3
refute Socrates' views on the immortality of the soul, his argument raised the
whole question of how fax a pagan, exemplified in the most exalted expression of
paganism, could come to an understanding of God by his own natural processes.
God has indeed spoken to every man, through nature, through the testimony of




sapientissimus Socrates secundum Pythii quoque daemonis suffragium -
an 1.5.36-37; Socratem Apa'lo sapientissimum omnium cecinit - apol 46.5.30-31;
omnium Socrates sapientissimus - I nat 4.7.12. Tertullian's references to
philosophers are scattered throughout his works, but he dealt systematically with
them in an 1-3, apol 46-50 and praes 7-9.
3
At the end of the preface to de anima, which occupies chapters 1 to 3,
Tertullian said that the reason for his polemic against philosophy was that
philosophers were the spiritual fathers of heretics.
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what was in fact a corruption and a distortion of God's message to man.
Hunc nacta philosophia ad gloriam propriae artis inflauit prae studio (non
mirum, si istud ita dixerim) eloquii quiduis struere atque destruere eruditi
magisque dicendo persuadentis quam docendo. Formas rebus imponit, eas
nunc peraequat, nunc priuat, de certis incerta praeiudicat, prouocat ad
exampla, quasi comparanda sint omnia, omnia praescribit, proprietatibus
etiam inter similia diuersis, nihil diuinae licentiae seruat, leges naturae
opiniones suas fecit; ferrem, si naturalis ipsa, ut compos naturae de
condicionis consortio probaretur. 1
This is precisely what philosophy refused to do. Philosophers, even the best of
them, thought that they could solve, by themselves and without listening for the
voice of God, problems which lay beyond the human horizon. That was the
gravamen of Tertullian's criticism of the best of paganism; it relied on human
reason and human reason alone - and in so doing it corrupted the truth which God
had set before all men. The relationship between reason and revelation will be
examined in detail in the next section, but it should be noted here that
Tertullian's attack on the misleading teaching of the philosophers was not a
condemnation of human reason as such, but a condemnation of that misuse of
reason which led to heresy.^ In other words, to follow human reason, without
regard to the voice of God, might lead man to the heights - but it would be to




By abusing the reason which God had given to them and by exalting
their own ideas above all others, philosophers obscured the way to God: siquidem
uera quaeque et consonantia prophetis aut aliunde commendant aut aliorsum
subornant cum maxima injuria ueritatis, quam efficiunt aut adiuuari falsis aut
patriocinari. Hoc itague commiserit nos et philosophos in ista praesertim
materia, quod interdum communes sententias propriis argumentationibus
uestiant, contrariis alicubi regulae nostrae - an 2.4.34-5.40. This may have
been, in part, Tertullian's reaction against the gnostics, whose claims that
knowledge took the place of faith made members of the Church like Tertullian
acutely defensive about anything to do with philosophy as a praeparatio
evangelica. If the heretics could found on philosophy, then philosophy must be
shown to consist of human speculation rather than revealed truth. Tertullian
wished to be free to use philosophy when he wanted to - as shown in the next
section - but the fact that philosophers sometimes arrived at the same truths as
had been revealed to Christians simply proved the truth of Truth - they were
equally likely to be wrong on other occasions and their teaching was no reliable
guide to Christian truth.
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Tertullian's indictment of what the ancient world regarded as wisdom
was simply a restatement of Paul's argument that the world by wisdom knew not
God. The truths of Christianity could neither be evolved from nor understood by
the processes of human reason. Their foundation was to be found deep in the
heart of every man, but on this foundation the "wisdom" of man had erected a
useless structure, which had to be swept away before the truth could be securely
laid upon the base. Then, and only then, could man begin to build. It followed
that those whom the pagan world regarded as their wisest men and their finest
men had misled themselves and others and were considerably further away from
God than the simple, the unskilled and the inexperienced who listened to the
voice of God, uncluttered by human wisdom:
Sed non earn te aduoco, quae scholis formata, bybliothecis exercitata,
academiis et porticibus Atticis pasta sapientiam ructas. Te simplicem et
rudem et impolitam et idioticam compello qualem te habent qui te solam
habent, illiam ipsam de compito, de triuio, de textrino totam. 1
That was a theme to which Tertullian returned again and again - nature agreed
with Christianity in acknowledging to God, but on no account must 'natural
reason' be equated with the alleged wisdom of the philosophers and the poets.
Unlike the Greek apologists, who were ready to find some common basis
for ethical criteria and the recognition of truth, Tertullian spent much of his
time in correcting the errors of the greatest thinkers of earlier generations.
Plato, Aristotle and others may have done their best, but they groped in the
darkness. As far as finding God was concerned, the more they relied on human
understanding, the further they wandered away from the truth.
Even if their teaching was commendable, Tertullian was ready to
criticise their conduct. As will be seen in chapter VHI.3 below, manner of life
was as important as belief in establishing a right relationship with God. However




which incurred the condemnation of Tertullian and which, in his view, estranged
them from God. Socrates was a corrupter of youth'' and allowed his wife to visit
2 3
another man; Plato was amor puerorum; Diogenes and Speusippus were
immoral, ambitious, unchas^b, untrustworthy, insincere, extravagant, traitorous;
Anaxogoras did not respect a spoken bond; Aristippus, under a mask of austerity,
4
led a life of debauchery. Chapter 46 of the apologeticum is a catalogue of the
moral lapses of one philosopher after another, demonstrating by their conduct
that philosophers were powerless to put into practice what they taught:
'doctrinae index disciplina est'. This idea is implicit in every treatise in which
Tertullian broached the problems of morality, and he constrasted the lives of
philosophers with the integrity of the common Christian, who knew little about
philosophy, but who knew the truth about God. In de spectaculis he met the
objection that there were upright and good men among the pagans,and yet they
went to the theatre; they may have aspired to the good, said Tertullian, but their
behaviour (approval of immorality and idolatry) contradicted their profession of
high ideals. In the opening paragraph of de pudicitia he compared the best of
pagan purity with true (Christian) purity:
nisi quod infelicior etiam, si stetisset ut infructuosa, quae non apud Deum
egisset. Malim nullum bonum quam uanum. Quid prodest esse, quod non
prodest? 5
While the text is difficult to follow, the meaning appears to be that even if
lego partem sententiae Atticae in Socratem: corruptor adulescentium
pronuntiatur - apol 46.10.48-50.
^
Graeci Socratis et Romani Catonis, qui uxores suas amicis
communicauerunt - apol 39.12.53-54.
3
Plato guidem non temere philosophorum animabus hoc (=
immortalitatem) praestat, sed eorum qui philosophiam scilicet exornauerint
amore puerorum. Adeo etiam inter philosophos magnum habet priuilegium






pagans practised pudicitia, it would, because non apud deum egisset, do them no
good in the sight of God, unless they recognised Him at the same time.
Having misled themselves by the false aggrandisation of their own ideas,
philosophers and the other leaders of pagan life then misled others - both the
pagans, whom they taught directly''' and erring Christians, whom they influenced
because they were the precursors of heretics^:
Si qua igitur in hunc modum de nidoribus philosophiae candidum et purum
aerem ueritatis infuscant, ea erunt Christianis enubilanda et percutientibus
argumentationes originales, id est philosophicas, et opponentibus
definitiones caelestes, id est dominicas, ut et ilia quibus ethnici a
philosophia capiuntur, destruantur, et haec quibus fideles ab haeresi
concutiuntur, retundantur. 3
If man used his natural faculties as God had intended him to do, putting aside all
'scholarly' ideas on the subject as his relationship to God, he would be rewarded
as God responded to Him. What Tertullian was determined to demonstrate was
that the highest and best of paganism, when following its own ideals and not the
ways God intended, could not bring mam into a right relationship with God. Just
what part reason could play in the natural man's true relationship to God is
examined next.
^
Chapters 1 and 2 of de anima demonstrated how the philosophers
misled the pagans.
2
Chapter 3 of de anima extended the argument of chapters 1 and 2, to
demonstrate how the philosophers, by being the precursors of the heretics, were




VI.6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REVELATION AND REASON (INSOFAR
AS IT AFFECTED THE NATURAL MAN'S RELATIONSHIP TO GOD)
Tertullian's disavowal of the best of pagan thought as a way of bringing
man to a saving relationship with God should not be misinterpreted, as some
appear to have done, as a total rejection of human reason in the natural man's
quest for God.
There is certainly no suggestion that God could be known by the exercise of
human reason. It is true that Tertullian regarded the soul as originating in
God and hence naturaliter Christiana, but any possibility of communion with
Him has been precluded by sin, which man is powerless to eradicate. 1
If that were true, Tertullian's exhortations to the heathen to search for God with
the expectation of finding Him - Qui audierit, inueniet Deum; qui etiam
studuerit intellegere, cogetur et credere 2 - would be meaningless. The point
was that what the wise men of this world taught as wisdom was more likely to
lead men away from God than to lead them to Him; worldly wisdom should
therefore be discounted in so far as it detracted from the promptings of God
through nature and the soul. If, however, a man exercised his reason in
conformity with the self-revelation of God, God might well to some extent be
"known by the exercise of human reason", and, despite man's sin, man could have
some limited measure of "communion with Him".
Most discussions about revelation and reason in the works of Tertullian
have followed one or other of the following three lines:
(a) those which attribute to Tertullian the words "credo quia absurdum
3
est", although neither Tertullian nor any other Latin Father used
1




American authors seem particularly prone to attribute these words
(erroneously) to Tertullian - the ones which I noted, in general reading, were:
Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy, (New York: MacMillan & Co.,
1901) p 225; Benjamin Apthorp Gould Fuller, A History of Philosophy, (New
(continued on next page)
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exactly that phrase.^ Such writers see Tertullian as absolutely opposed
to reason, the handmaid of philosophy, which was the mother of all
heresies.
(b) those which recognise that Tertullian did not use that particular phrase
but which nevertheless claim "credo quia absurdum est" is a fair
2
summary of his attitude, - that of irreconcilable antagonism between
footnote 3 continued:
York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938) p 336; Robert T. Anderson and Peter B. Fischer,
An Introduction to Christianity (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) p 22; Luther H.
Harshbarger and John Arthur Mourant, Judaism and Christianity, (Boston: Allyn
& Bacon, 1968) p 152; Clyde Leonard Manschreck, A History of Christianity in
the World: from persecution to 'uncertainty, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1974) p 56. It must, however be confessed that neither British nor
Continental scholars are blameless in the matter - e.g. "He (Tertullian) wishes to
assert an absolute and radical discontinuity between Christianity and philosophy
... his ultimate Christian confession is the grinding paradox 'I believe it because
it is absurd"', Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical
Tradition, (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1966) p 1-2, and Richard Henry Popkin, The
History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, (Assen: Van Gorcum & Co.,
1960) p 93.
^
Just who did originate the phrase I cannot trace, although at one stage
I made a fairly thorough search; it does not appear to come into the works of
any Latin Father. Certainly as far as Tertullian himself is concerned, all the
extant manuscripts of earn 5.4 agree on credibile est, quia ineptum est, with a
few adding prorsus before credible. Prorsus does not appear in the best
manuscripts but in any event it would not affect the argument in any significant
manner. Prorsus simply means "straight-forwardly" or "immediately" and with it
the sentence would translate, 'It is (straight-forwardly) credible because it is
unfitting or improper.' The full context of the quotation is "Crucifixus est dei
filius; non pudet, quia pudendum est. Et mortuus est dei filius; credible est,
quia ineptum est. Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est, quia impossible" - earn
5.4.26=29^
^
Although Tertullian did not literally say "credo, quia absurdum est", he
did (as quoted in full in the previous footnote) say "credible est, quia ineptum
est", and "certum est, quia impossible". This has led a number of scholars to
regard the misquoted phrase as still an apt summary of Tertullian's views - e.g.
"Das ihm nachgesagte 'credo, quid absurdum' ist zwar apokryh; aber Tertullian
hat ahnlich sich ausgesprochen: Crucifixus ..." (then follows the text of earn 5);
Loofs, op. cit., p 118; "Ce n'est pas litt&ralement le Credo quia absurdum, mais
e'en est l'equivalent", G. Bardy, article 'Tertullien' already cited; "Het 'credo
quia absurdum' moge dan legendair zijn, het geeft den inhou d van het
bovenstaande (credible est, quia ineptum est) goed weer", G.J. de Vries, Bijdrage
tot de psychologie van Tertullianus, (Utrecht: Kemink en zoon, 1929) p 50.
Harry Austryn Wolfson and others, without putting it in words which can
be quoted succinctly, said much the same - Wolfson, in The Philosophy of the
Church Fathers, (3rd ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), I;
(continued on next page)
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natural reason and/or philosophy on the one hand, arid the revealed
Christian faith on the other, ^ and
(c) those which maintain it is unfair to Tertullian to take such ideas out of
their context and to use them as a total condemnation of reason in the
investigation of religious truth; among such writers there have been
some very able attempts to demonstrate that Tertullian held reason and
2
revelation in a legitimate balance.
The literature on the subject is extensive and has recently been surveyed in
3 . .
depth by Fredouille. One of the most important points to note for this thesis is
that the argument of credible est, quia ineptum est, and similar ideas expressed
4
in other passages of Tertullian, were all addressed to heretics, not to pagan
footnote 2 continued:
102-106, and Etienne Henry Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages
(London: Schribner's 1950; first (American) edition, 1938) p 5-10, repeated in his
later work History of Christian Philosphy in The Middle Ages, (New York:
Random House, 1955) p 45. Quasten implied the same (op. cit II, 320) as did
John Alexander Hutchison, Paths of Faith, (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill,
1975) p 439 and Ralph M. Mclnery, A History of Western Philosophy, (Notre
Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1970) p 5.
*
The book most widely quoted in support of Tertullian's supposed
"rigorism" with respect to secular culture is Charles Norris Cochrane,
Christianity and Classical Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968; first
edition, 1940), especially chapter six. An even more rigorist view was expressed
by Andre Labhardt, "Tertullien et la philosophie ou la recherche d'une position
pure", Museum Helveticum, 7 (1950), 159-180, especially at p 176.
2
"He tends to be credited with the assertion "Credo quia absurdum",
which he never used. And the passage is frequently invoked to prove his
irrationality, or that he viewed religion as the realm of subjective and
unreasoning emotion. If that was his true attitude, why did he ever descend to
apparently rational argument?": Barnes "Tertullian", p 223. Tertullian is also
defended against his critics by Robert H. Ayres, "Tertullian's 'Paradox' and
'Contempt for Reason' Reconsidered", Expository Times, 87 (1976), 308-311,
Justo L. Gonzalez, "Athens and Jerusalem Revisited: Re^ason and Authority in
Tertullian", Church History 43 (1974), 17-25 and F. Refoule, "Tertullien et la
philosophie", Revue des Sciences Religieuses 30 (1956), 42-45.
3
op. Clt., pp 337.
4
To heretics who denied to baptism by water the ability to wash away
sins, Tertullian pointed out that simplicity was the true indication of divine
works and asked them to believe the more as they understood the less; and to
Marcion, who found the humiliations of Christ offensive, Tertullian showed how
divine folly triumphed over human wisdom.
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seekers, and were not intended to prove the truth of Christianity to genuine
enquirers. The heretics accepted the divinity of Christ, but distorted divine
revelation by their peculiar whims of human reason. Tertullian's tone was
altogether different when he was debating with pagans, and so this thesis must
(not least for reasons of space) be confined strictly to the relationship between
revelation and reason insofar as it bears on the relationship of man to God, and
only up to the point in man's experience where he made his commitment to
the Christian faith. That was, for Tertullian, an important turning point in the
legitimate use of human reason in its relationship with divine revelation, the
significance of which has not always been appreciated by those who have written
in general terms about Tertullian's attitude to reason. He himself emphasised
the point in his extended discussion (de praescriptione haereticorum chapters
eight to ten) of Jesus' words "seek, and you shall find".^ That did not (he said)
warrant a search at random or an everlasting search, but it did permit a
meaningful and free enquiry until such time as the Christian truth had been
found. The non-believer should not, however, conduct his search among the
heretics, as they themselves did not know the truth. Furthermore (chapter 12),
once the Christian truth had been found, there was a very different basis for any
further seeking, which could not then proceed on the broad basis of 'seek and you
shall find' but which had to be strictly confined within the Rule of Faith. Even
then, although Tertullian did not encourage such discussion, he did not condemn
it:
Ceterum manente forma eius in suo ordine quantumlibet quaeras et tractes
et omnem libidinem curiositatis effundas, si quid tibi uidetur uel
ambiguitate pendere uel obscuritate obumbrari:. . .Nouissime ignorare
melius est ne quod non debeas noris quia quod debeas nosti. 2
Numerous attempts were made in the second century to interpret this
verse (Mt. 6:7; Lk.11.9). The gnostics claimed that the one who must seek was
the ordinary believer, who would find when he had gnosis. Tertullian claimed
that the words were adressed to the Jews or to the pagans, but not to Christians,
who had 'found' and who had then simply to keep fast what they had come to
believe.
2
praes 14.1.1-4 and 2.6-7.
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Clearly, Tertullian was not speaking in that passage to the heretics, to whose
erroneous ideas the treatise was chiefly devoted, but to faithful members of the
Church. Even for them, Tertullian did not condemn all speculation, although he
remained suspicious about the value for Christians of speculative research; for
them it was better simply to hold fast to the regula fidei.
This thesis proceeds on the basis that, for the area covered by this
section at any rate, only the third category (above) does justice to Tertullian's
thought. He himself had carefully examined the claims of Christianity before
committing himself to it and he did not demand less of others. He repeatedly
referred to the rational character of the faith which he had adopted, and
maintained that for God to have expected faith from rational man, without
giving man the rational underpinning of that faith, would (this particularly
against Marcion) have been an insult to man's intelligence. He therefore
encouraged search and investigation into the credibility of the Christian faith for
those who were still outside it, differentiating (as mentioned above) such enquiry
from idle speculation after the acceptance of faith, which merely put revealed
truth into doubt again. The former had faith as its goal, the latter disbelief.
Cum enim quaerunt adhuc, nondum tenent; cum autem nondum tenent,
nondum crediderunt; cum autem nondum crediderunt non sunt christiani . . .
Antequam defendant, negant quod eredun t confitentur se nondum credidisse
dum quaerunt. 1
(A) THE MUTUAL SUPPORT
The mutual support of reason and revelation was worked out in de testimonio
animae and adversus Marcionem, in both of which Tertullian argued that
revelation was not the starting point for an understanding of God. Reason was a
valid praeambulum fidei, and the Christian should make use of those things which
were 'self evident' to human common sense in order to assist the non-Christian to
come to faith. To that end, Tertullian frequently quoted Greek philosophers -
*
praes 14.10.26-19 and 30-32.
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knowing them better than did many of the Greek Fathers - not only to refute
heresy (which was his first aim) but to demonstrate to learned pagans, with the
assistance of their own literature, the truth of Christianity. For example, he
used the beliefs of Zeno to explain the Christian view that the Logos was the
Creator of the universe; he made use of Cleajthes to show that the Spirit was the
Creator of the worlds;^ Christian belief in demons and in angels could be
bolstered by reference to similar beliefs in Socrates and Plato.2 Norris has
3
shown, in a careful study, the extent to which Tertullian used contemporary
thought, particularly Middle Platonist philosphy, to explain the Christian faith;
Fredouille has to a large extent resolved the apparent dilemma between
Tertullian's learning and intellect on the one hand and his condemnation of the
misuse of reason on the other. Human reason, properly applied, had a very real
place to play in bringing a non-Christian to a true understanding of the Christian
faith. There were, for example, beliefs in the popular mind which were far less
credible than the Christian faith and Tertullian tried to demonstrate to the
outsider that his (Tertullian's) belief in apparently incredible things was both
reasonable and rational.
To this end,Tertullian drew analogies between the natural and the
supernatural, claiming that they mutually illustrated and confirmed each other.
The doctrine of the resurrection of man, for example, was a particular
stumbling-block to the heathen, so Tertullian pointed out the analogies of
resurrection which were to be found in nature - everywhere new life sprang from






Richard A. Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology: A Study
in Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen. (London: Adam & Charles
Black,1966) p 99-1267
240
out to faith" so that the "pupils of nature" could believe more easily what had
been revealed to them;''' divine education guided them in such a way that they
2
had a preparatory school for the great in the little. In the quest for faith,
human reason should therefore be an ally, not an enemy, and Tertullian believed
in making as much use as possible of reason to direct the outsider to the
acceptance of the Christian faith. In short, unspoiled human reason provided an
important, legitimate and valuable approach to the faith, and by it the Christian
should be able to show the pagan that faith did not contradict reason. At the
same time, Tertullian recognised there were limits to rational argument, and
these are examined next.
(B) THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REASON AND REVELATION
The differences between revelation and reason were worked out by Tertullian in
de anima and in de praescriptione haereticorum, where he showed that while
human reason might be a useful praeambulum fidei, revelation was essential
before man could enter into a correct relationship with God. While Tertullian's
contemporary, Clement of Alexandria, teaching in a Hellenistic-Jewish
background, saw Greek philosophy as a school-master to bring the Greek mind to
3
Christ, in the same way as the law should have brought the Hebrews,
Tertullian had little time for the evangelistic value of religion as taught by
pagan philosophers and poets. Thales, the founder of physics, had, in spite of
more and more time for reflection, never known anything certain to reply to
Praemisit tibi naturam magistram, summissurus et prophetiam, quo




Clement, teaching in a Hellenistic-Jewish background, saw philosophy
as a school master to bring the Greek mind to Christ, in the same way as the law
should have brought the Hebrews (Stromateis 1.28). Philosophy was one of the
gifts of God to man, at a particular stage in his development, and one of the
achievements of the divine Logos was to assist man towards a relationship with
God. Tertullian saw things very differently - philosophy as such had nothing to
do with bringing a man into a correct relationship to God.
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Crqsus who searched for the deity. Plato asserted that it would not be easy to
find the overseer of the world, and if one did find him, it would be difficult to
make it known to all. On the other hand, every Christian worker had already
found God.^ The essence of Christianity lay in an historic revelation, embodied
now in the Rule of Faith, which had to be accepted by faith and not constructed
or even proved by human reason.
Since this section is concerned only with the relationship between
revelation and reason in the search of the non-believer for God, it is not
appropriate to comment in any detail on the many texts where Tertullian dealt
with the dangerous consequences, both for the faithful and for heretics, of purely
2
human speculation. For example, the famous passage in de carne Christi 5.4.
from which the myth of the credo quia absurdum has arisen, is part of an
argument against Marcionites and other heretics, not against outsiders or
3
catechumens, and the distinction is an important one, as was set out earlier in
^
apol 46.9.43-47 and II nat 2.4.8-11.
2
Three possible attitudes seem to dominate the extensive literature
about the interpretation of de carne Christi 5.4. One is to explain it as a
rhetorical overstatement, and therefore not to be taken too seriously - "This is
one of the most defiant paradoxes in Tertullian, one of the quick, telling
sentences in which he does not hesitate to wreck the sense of words in order to
make his point. He deliberately exaggerates, in order to call attention to the
truth he has to convey". (James Moffatt, "Aristotle and Tertullian", Journal of
Theological Studies, 22 (1916), 170. A second attitude is to look in detail into
the context, tracing it back to Paul s words in I Corinthians 1: 23-24 about Christ
crucified, foolishness to the gentiles but to the believer the power and wisdom of
God, and to see the phrase simply as an extension of Pauline thought. Gonzalez
(op. cit.) wrote: "If one is to claim that the common interpretation of Tertullian
typified by the 'credo, quia absurdum' is incorrect, this must be done, not by
simply asserting that he never did say such a thing - as a matterpf fact, he
practically did - but by showing, to begin with, that this text, placed in its proper
context and correctly understood, intends to convey neither a sweeping
condemnation of reason, nor a general praise of absurdity," (p 19) and Gonzalez
proceeded to do just that in a most stimulating article. The third attitude is to
take the aphorism at face value and to see in it evidence that Tertullian was
biased against philosophy and reason. "Paradoxe choquant pour 1'BspP 'jit qui
raisonne, mais que le contexte interdit absolument d'attenuer."
(Labhardt, op. cit p 177).
3
In chapters 4 and 5 of de carne Christi, Tertullian set out to prove to
Marcion and certain other heretics that the incarnation of Christ was neither
(continued on next page)
242
this section. Likewise, in the context of de praescriptione haereticorum,
Tertullian obviously expected the answer 'nothing' to his rhetorical question
about the relationship between Athens and Jerusalem,^ but he himself drew
substantial benefit, if not from Athens, at least from Ephesus, because he
borrowed extensively from Soranus of Ephesus in composing his own work de
2
anima. Furthermore, Tertullian cannot have been unaware that when Paul was
preaching on Mars Hill in Athens, he took a verse from the Stoic poet Aratus as a
text from which to proclaim the fatherhood of God. This Stoic doctrine (like
many others to which Paul referred in his writings) was treated by Paul as
embodying an elementary truth, and as a starting-point for fuller knowledge.
Tertullian adopted precisely the same approach himself, and made a very similar
use of Stoic thought when, in de testimonio animae, he demonstrated how the
soul of mam could witness to the Christian truth.
The importance of Stoic influence on Tertullian at this point was
developed in detail by Lortz, in a chapter which began as follows:
Pass die aus dem Kosmos gewonnene GottQserkenntnis eine unvollkommene
sei, dass dagegen die wtinschenswerte Vollkommenheit erst durch direkten
Verkehr mit Gott erreicht werden konne, ist eine in der Stoa seit
Poseidonius weit verbreitete Erkenntnis. Eine ahnliche Steigerung erfahrt
die natiirliche Gotteserkenntnis des Christen durch die direckten und aus-
-driicklichen MitCteilungen, die Gott den Menschen in der Offenbarung
gegeben hat. T. hat es unmissverstandlich und mit allem Nachdruck
ausgesprochen, dass ihm die Offeabarung unendlich hoher stehe als die rein
naturliche Erkenntnis, die Gottes Wesen immer nur undeutlich, wie aus der
Feme erkennt ... 3.
If, then, Tertullian believed in the mutual support of revelation and
footnote 3 continued:
unbefitting nor undignified. His argument, while indirectly dealing with
revelation and reason, does not bear on the use of reason for the non-Christian -
he was arguing with heretics who should have accepted certain doctrines as
matter of revelation, not looked for reasons for theCm. The position of





As set out on p 227 above, footnote 1.
3
Lortz; op. cit., I, 248.
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reason and yet at the same time was aware of their differences, how did he
relate them to each other in the quest of the natural man for God?
(C) THE BALANCE FOUND IN THE REGULA FIDEl
Attention has often been drawn to the apparent inconsistency between
Tertullian's denunciation of the reasoning of the philosophers, and his own
frequent use of human reason and philosophical ideas, when it suited his
purpose.* Any apparent inconsistencies between Tertullian's disapproval of
philosophy and his own use of it are reconciled by reference to the principle that
he himself laid down - idque dumtaxat quod salua regula fidei potest in
2
quaestionem deutnire . It was permissible for Christians to claim the support of
popular reason and popular ideas so long as these were in accordance with the
Rule of Faith and not in opposition to it. Any contrary ideas, however
3
widespread or plausible, had to be rejected. The enquirer after Christianity
would find that Rule of Faith did contain certain articles which could not be
known or established by natural reason; indeed from the human point of view,
4
they might seem absurd - Stulta mundi elegit deus, ut confundat sapientia.
Such beliefs had, however, to be accepted by faith, before a man could become a
Christian, no matter how irrational they might seem to be.
But Tertullian blamed the philosophers for abusing their intelligence,
not for using it. He himself used philosophical weapons against the philosophers
-e.g. Ayers, op. cit. p 309, "A reading of the Tertullian corpus will demonstrate
that his treatises are full of such philosophical, linguistic and logical arguments",
and on the whole matter see Evans, "Resurrection", p xix, Sider, op. cit. and
another work of Ernest Evans, not previously cited, Tertullian's Treatise on the




Communes enim sensus simplicitas ipsa commendat
et compassio sententiarum et familiaritas opinionum, eoque fideliores
existimantur, quia nuda et aperta et omnibus nota definiunt; ratio autem, diuina




The true source of all knowledge was the Scriptures; the proximate
source was the Rule of Faith, which embodied the authentic teaching of the
Scriptures in a form guaranteed both by its historical origins and by the common
assent of the churches through the world. The relationship between the Rule of
Faith and the Scriptures was not expressly worked out by Tertullian or indeed by
anyone of his time;* for all practical purposes, the Rule of Faith provided both
the framework and the limit for human speculation and reason. Within it there
was a place for human reason, drawing conclusions from and expanding on the
revealed truth; beyond it no one might go.
Sed omnis inaequalitas sententiae humanae usque ad dei terminos. In nostras
iam lineas gradum colligam, ut quod philosophis medicisque respondi,
Christiano probem. De tuo, frater, fundamento fidem aedifica 2
Ceterum manente forma eius in suo ordine quantumlibet quaeras et tractes
et omnem libidinem curiositatis effundas, si quid tibi uidetur uel
ambiguitate pendere uel obscuritate obumbarari: 3
infinitas enim quaestiones apostolus prohibet. Porro non amplius inueniri
licet quam quod a deo discitur; quod autem a deo discitur, totum est. 4
si quid de anima examinandum est, ad dei regulas diriget, certa nullum alium
potiorem animae demonstratorem quam auctorem. A deo discat quod a deo
habeat, aut nec ab alio, si nec a deo. Quis enim reuelabit quod deus texit?
Vnde sciscitandum est? Vnde et ignorare tutissimum est. Praestat per
deum nescire, quia non reuelauerit, quam per hominem scire, quia ipse
praesumpserit. 5.
Heinrich Karpp set out the relationship as he understood it in
Tertullian in the lengthy and useful section "Die Bedeutung der Glaubensregel fur
die Schriftauslegung" of his book "Schrift und Geist bei Tertullian", (Gutersloh:










(D) CONCLUSIONS FOR THIS SECTION
The relationship between revelation and human reason^ in Tertullian's
thought has been much discussed and some very strange conclusions have been
reached. McGiffert, for example, believed that Tertullian opposed revelation
and reason in order to make faith meritorious simply because it was un¬
reasonable,^ Neve, working along the same line, thought that faith would
3
become stronger if it was forced to accept the rationally unbelievable, and
Phillips; "On Rereading Tertullian", wrote, "What is faith but the accepting of
teachings that seem incredible? The harder they aire to believe the more merit
4
in your faith."
Whether or not these statements are justified for the relationship
between revealed truth and human reason in so far as it affected the Christian
believer and the heretic is outside the scope of this enquiry. It does, however,
seem clear that Tertullian's apologetic literature was, with rare exceptions,
addressed to the intellect of the reader. Tertullian was not calling the non-
5
Christian to a sacrificium intellectus, but only to an appropriate limitation of
This section has been (perhaps artificially) restricted to the
relationship between revelation and the use of the human mind. Clearly the
innate testimony of the soul and the impact of nature were important elements
in man's relationship with God, but to avoid repetition, they are not covered
again here. Tertullian's arguments for a knowledge of God and certain of his
attributes based on the evident of the soul and from nature, were examined in
detail in chapter V, sections five and six respectively.
2
"The more unreasonable it appears to us, so Tertullian sems to think
the greater the merit of our faith", McGiffert, op. cit.,p 16.
3
"Faith is consent in a state of absolute obedience. The more
unreasonable the articles of faith are, the more opportunity there is for faith to
develop its strength", J.L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought, (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg, 1946) p 43.
4
George Phillips, "On Rereading Tertullian", Congregational Quarterly,
28 (1950), 237.
The phrase of the Zurich psychologist C.G. Jung, Types Psychologiques,
(Geneva: 1958) pp 16-17.
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the intellectual hubris of man, according to whatever God Himself was saying,
whether through the specific teaching of the Christian faith or (for those not in
contact with Christians or without access to the Scriptures) through nature or
through man's own soul. What the enquirer had to realise was that even if he
followed the Scriptures where they led, he would have to be aided by divine
grace, and would have to be led beyond human understanding, before ever he
could come into a saving relationship with God. Analogies from nature, however,
made it possible for man to enjoy a deeper understanding of the Faith and a
deeper insight into God's plan of salvation. Christianity embraced a range of
truth which surpassed man's natural ability to understand it, but it did not
contradict it; it was precisely in this "something other" that the work of
salvation consisted.
The inability of the natural man to comprehend divine truth was no
reason for discouraging some rational investigation into the faith before the
enquirer was called upon to accept it, so long as the enquiry was conducted
within the terms of the Rule of Faith. Reason and revelation should therefore
not be made to stand in opposition to each other, but be put in a working
relationship to each other. The revelation of God, brought by Jesus Christ,
transmitted through the apostles and the churches and embodied in the Rule of
Faith, was a perfect revelation; the rational faculty in man was implanted by
God, who was Himself rational. Stemming as they both did from the one divine
source, they should stand in harmonious relationship to each other. If one takes
certain passages out of Tertullian's writings, and especially if one takes them out
of context and with no respect for their individuality, it could be concluded that
Tertullian despised philosophy and banished reason completely for Christian
truth - but that would be a most erroneous conclusion. Tertullian had a real
sense of the supra-rational, yet not irrational, nature of revelaiton. Reason
could support but could not judge faith; the only real criterion of truth was the
revelation of God.
What, then, was the position of the man who lacked normal intelligence
or understanding? That is examined next.
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VI.7 INTELLECTUAL INCAPACITY
Although Tertullian has left no specific teaching about the relationship
to God of those affected by mental illness, (either full insanity or diminished
responsibility^) certain deductions can be drawn from what he wrote about the
2
relationship of man to God in dreams and in ecstasy (amentiae instar ), and what
he wrote about the relationship of animus to anima. Before these are examined,
note should be taken of the fundamental and oft-repeated contention of
Tertullian, that God looked not only at man's outward actions but also at his
heart, and judged accordingly. Because of the nature of the soul, and the wiles
of the devil, every man would in some way fall short of the standards of God,
sciens volens or otherwise; nevertheless, it was the perogative of God to search
the heart of man and to see whether or not an objectively sinful act had
stemmed from a subjectively sinful motive. (In the same way, it was the
prerogative of God to give man no credit for an objectively good act which was
3
done for a wrong motive. )
The main areas, apart from those taken up in this section, where
Tertullian dealt with insanity, are: (a) where he defended the reliability of the
senses againt various philosophers, whose arguments that illusions demonstrated
the unreliability of sense-perception, endangered Tertullian's teaching on the
unity of the soul. Under reference to Orestes, the classic example of madness,
Tertullian showed that illusions were the result of insanity of mind or mental
illness, not the unreliability of the senses - Qui insaniunt, alios in aliis uident, ut
Orestes matrem in sorore et Aiax Vlixen in armento, ut Athamas et Agaue in filiis
bestias. Oculi^b hoc mendacium exprobrabis, an furiis? - an 17.9.55-57; (b)
where he attributed it to the influence of demons on the priests of Apollo who
used to drink the water from Colophon before prophesying - aut lymphaticos
efficit Colophonis scaturigo daemonica - an 50.3.15-16.
2
an 45.3.13. Tertullian stated in an 45:5.25 that ecstasis was not real
insanity, but only an image of it - a withdrawing of sense-perceptcgn, not a
shattering of the mind - because he was talking in that chapter about dreams and
complete amentia would have annihilated the recollection of dreams. Elsewhere,
where the context did not prevent it, Tertullian called ecstasy simply amentia,
an 21.2.11 and V Marc 8.12.22, in ecstasi, id est in amentia.
3




Homo in faciem, Deus in praecordia contemplatur. Et ideo cognoscit
Dominus qui sunt eius, 1
Si et adicit: scit autem deus corda uestra, illius dei uim commemorabat, qui
lucernam se pronuntiarat scrutantem renes et corda. 2
Deus autem non uocis, sed cordis auditor est, sicut conspector. 3
Neque enim, si mediocritas humana facti solummodo iudicat quia uoluntatis
latebris par non est, idcirco etiam crimina eius etiam sub deo neglegamus.
Deus in omnia sufficit; nihil a conspectu eius remotum unde omnino
delinquitur. 4
Si enim scrutatorem et dispectorem cordis deum legimus, si etiam prophetes
eius occulta cordis traducendo probabtur, si deus ipse recogitatus cordis in
populo praeuenit: quid cogitatis in cordibus uestris nequam? si et Dauid:
cor roundum conde in me deus, et Paulus corde ait credi in iustitiam, et
Iohannes corde ait suo unumquemque reprehendi, si postremo qui uiderit
feminam ad concupiscendum, iam adulterauit in corde, 5
Sed nec omnia opera optima cum carnis ministerio anima partitur; nam et
solos cogitatus et nudas uoluntates censura diuina persequitur. Qui uiderit
ad concupiscendum, iam adulterauit in corde. 6
These last two quotations link Tertullian's general teaching of God as the
searcher of hearts with Tertullian's specific and frequent reference to Matthew
5.28 in order to demonstrate that a lustful look was not only seen by God but was
7
regarded by Him as the equivalent of the act of adultery.
From Tertullian's teaching about the relationship of man to God in
dreams, certain parallels can be drawn to give an answer to the question of the














an 15.4.28-30 (just quoted) ; an 40.4.21-23; an 58.6.35-36; II cult
2.4.25-26; ex 9.12.11-13; idol 2.2.25-3.30; paer\3.13.50-53; pud 6.6.26; res
15.4.12-16.
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Denique et bona facta gratuita sunt in somnis et delicta secura; non magis
enim ob stupri uisionem damnabimur quam ob martyrii coronabimur. 1
That in itself does not prove that a man, whose mental faculties were impaired,
2
did not sin, because in the apologeticum Tertullian asserted there were four
ways in which sin could be committed - by evil thoughts, by desires, by words and
by deeds. If, by virtue of mental incapacity (and on the analogy of dreams) a
man was not held responsible for his thoughts and his desires, any more than a
man was held responsible by God for his dreams, he could still sin in word and in
deed. Since, however, God looked on the heart, it may well be that, if Tertullian
had been asked about the responsibility to God of those who, by virtue of
intellectual incapacity, were permanently unaccountable as masters of
themselves, he would have replied that God did not hold them accountable for
their actions, any more than He held them accountable for their thoughts and
desires. Certainly, Tertullian did draw a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary sins, and from that it seems a reasonable inference that he believed
the absence of subjective guilt could excuse a man from the consequences of an
objectively sinful act.
As examined in chapter IV and in particular in section five of it,
Tertullian recognised a state of innocence of soul even although the soul was
affected by original sin and the body had begun to commit objectively sinful
deeds. What then was the relationship between am impaired mind and its soul,
and where did the ultimate responsibility lie for man's relationship with God? In
de anima chapters 12 and 13 and again in chapter 18, Tertullian argued that the
mind (animus or mens) was a power proper to the soul, through which it acted




apol 36.4.15-16. Male uelle, male facere, male dicere, male cogitare.
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non aliud quid intellegimus quam suggestum animae ingenitum et insitum et
natiuitus proprium, quo agit, quo sapit, 1
Videmus autem nihil istorum animam experiri, ut non et animo deputetur,
quia per ilium et cum illo transigatur. 2
In other words, the mind was the faculty by which sense-data was fed into the
soul and through which the soul acted but ultimately the soul, not the mind, was
the part of man responsible to God. The mind was never an independent
substance - as was examined in chapter 1.6 - but only a function of the soul, as
Tertullian demonstrated in de anima chapter 13, first from everyday speech,
then from philosophical and medical works, and finally from Holy Scripture.
Close though the relationship might be, it was ultimately the soul which was
answerable to God, not the mind:
Habes animae principalitatem, habes in ilia et substantiae unionem, cuius
intellegas instrumentum esse animum, non patrocinium. 3
That being so, the sanity or insanity of the mind was only one, but not
necessarily the determinative factor, in the relationship of the soul to God. It
was certainly an important factor as Tertullian expressly recognised:
Nam et cum dementit homo, anima dementit non peregrinante, sed
conpatiente tunc animo - ceterum animae principaliter casus est. 4
If Tertullian recognised other conditions where a man could be without control
over himself - such as ecstasy and dreams - and if in these situations a man was
not to be praised or blamed for his thoughts and (in dreams) his supposed deeds,
it would seem to follow that God would not hold a man responsible for his
thoughts or his deeds while committed during periods of insanity or intellectual
incapacity. The man would presumably be judged by God on the same basis as
5







an 18.9.T6-78. The use of ceterum at the beginning of the closing
phrase is presumably to contrast it with the preceding words compatiente ..
animo: i.e. " ... the mind suffering with the soul, but (though the mind also




VI.8 ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
Four of the sections of this chapter have included phrases or concepts
familiar to Roman law, and these must now be examined. In section two, it was
established that Tertullian was a firm believer in the freedom of the human will.
The underlying ethos of Roman law was the belief that men were under
obligation to obey the law and that, if they failed to do so, they deserved
punishment. Subject to that, they were free to choose whether they would obey
or not. That is precisely the attitude of Tertullian toward the relationship of the
natural man to God. To a variety of prima facie legal terms, he gave a religious
or moral meaning; every man was, in the sight of God, liber, a free man, not a
slave with a determined destiny; every adult was sui arbitrii, his own master, not
a minor under tutelage: every man was suae potestatis, under his own control,
not like a wife in manu et potestate uiri. On the other hand, the free-will of
which he spoke was, as Tertullian himself set out, a common philosophic
conception, no doubt underlying the Roman law but certainly much wider than
Roman jurisprudence; secundum communem autem opinionem prouidentia et
fatum et necessitas et for tuna et arbitrii libertas. Nam haec et philosophi
distinguunt, et nos secundum fidem disserenda suo iam uouimus titulo. ^ Indeed,
2
while arbitrium was a word of Roman law, it is its wider sense of 'power' or
3
'authority' that reflects in Tertullian's expression liberum arbitrium.
Reference was made, in the corresponding section of the last chapter, to
the use which Tertullian made of court procedure to authenticate the testimony




A judgment in equity concerning not the fact of obligation but the
amount: "judicium est pecuniae certae, arbitrium incertae", Cicero, Pro Rose.
Com. 4.10.
3
e.g. "rei Romanae arbitrium"; Tacitus, Annales VI.51.
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Tertullian's defence of the Creator against the charge of responsibility for man's
sin:
His reply is an adept treatment of the familar rhetorical themes of motive,
responsibility, and rewards and punishments. He will not allow the
responsibility to be shifted from man to God, since man was able to act as a
free agent. Against the charge that God is guilty of a criminal act both in
creating man free and then failing to prevent man's crime, he employs the
topic of motive (causa, 6.1). God acted then for a worthy end - man's own
interest. It was in man's own interest to be created with liberty of will
because only thus could he merit the reward of good, or, if necessary, of evil
(6.7). Significantly, we find in these chapters the appropriate language of
the courts. For example, in 6-8 man, or rather man's will, is called the
'defendant' in the case: Denique et bonitas dei a primordio operum perspecta
persuadebit nihil a deo mali evenire potuisse, et libertas hominis recognitata
se potius ream ostendet eius, quod ipsa commisit; and again in 7.4, Ipse
Tman) legi reus fuisset ...Aut legislator ipse fraudem legi suae faceret, non
sinendo praescriptum eius impleri. 1
Section three showed the extent to which the natural mam was
accountable to God, and at first sight there might appear to be legal imagery in
2
the juxtaposition, in the apologeticum of the trial before the magistrate and the
trial apud Deum iudicem:
"quas demerendo sibi disciplinas determinauerit, quae ignoratis et desertis
et obseruatis his praemia (Deus) destinarit: ut qui prodacto aeuo isto
iudicaturus sit suos cultores in uitae aeternae restitutionem, profanos in
ignem aeque perpetem et iugem, suscitatis omnibus ab initio defunctis et
reformatis et recensis ad utriusque meriti dispunctionem." 3
Closer investigation, however, will show that Tertullian was contrasting, not
comparing, the Roman law with the position of the natural man before God. The
trial of the unbeliever before God would proceed on a very different basis from
the trial of the Christian before the magistrate. At last, merita would be
relevant to the judgment, and no longer (as in the case of Christians on trial for
their faith) would Veritas and innocentia be condemned. Tertullian served notice
to the heathen that in that other judicium, in which the pagans would be on trial,
3
Sider, op. cit.;p 81-82.
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the criterea of human judgment would be reversed - cum damnamur a uobis, a
Deo absoluimur - and with that he closed his apologeticum.
Of greater significance for this study is Tertullian's regular use of
delictum for 'sin', as opposed to the more common word 'peccatum', and his
creation of a new word, delinquentia, for 'sinfulness'. The Thesaurus Linguae
Latinae ascribed this latter word to the Itala, (Romans 6.1-2)but that can hardly
be right, because apart from Tertullian, the Thesaurus cited the word only in
Faustinus and Maximus Taurus. ^ If the word had been in the Itala, it would
surely have survived, either in the Vulgate or in one of the writers who preferred
the Ital^ a to the Vulgate. However that may be, Tertullian preferred delictum to
peccatum and delinquere to peccare, not only in discussions of his own phrasing
but also in citing scriptural quotations; one counts, in all of his works, 89
occurrences of delinquere and 250 of delictum, against 17 of peccare and 35 of
peccatum. It seems to be commonly assumed that Tertullian preferred delictum
because it was a word of Roman law which expressed an offence against a
person, not against a law, and that Tertullian found it useful (in contrast to the
more general peccatum) to express sin as a breach of personal relationship with
God. Thus:
the term seems to be used in its legal sense, with a general application to all
cases where a defendant asks pardon of the plaintiff or seeks the indulgence
of the court. In the succeeding sentences its sense is restricted to offences
against God, and it means 'sin', as commonly in ecclesiastical writers. A
tort, delictum, is a wrong done not to the state or to society, but to a
person: which makes it an appropriate word for offences against God, who
is personal in himself and condescends to enter into personal relations with
men. 2
With respect to Evans, it may be questioned whether Roman law is necessarily
the influence on Tertullian here. In the Vetus Latina, delictum is Paul's regular
^
vol. V (1910) column 458.
2
Ernest Evans, Tertullian's Tract on The Prayer, (London: S.P.C.K.,
1953) p 50.
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word for 'sin', and its use there is practically limited to Paul
alone. Might not Tertullian have been attracted to Paul's expression of the
relationship of the sinner, as guilty before God, ana so have used Paul's word for
sin? Certainly when Tertullian was dealing with the letter to the Romans, he
constantly used delinquentia, although on occasion he changed to peccatum.
Once more, it is probably not possible to be certain whether Tertullian expressed
the relationship of man to God in terms of Roman law or in terms of some other
influence, but at least the question-mark is there and makes one hesitate to be
dogmatic about Tertullian's thought. It may be of relevance to the conclusions
of this chapter to note that both delictum and peccatum (which appear to be
interchangeable in Tertullian) have the implication of culpa, as delictum did in
1
pagan usage.
Finally, in respect of the third section, note should be taken of
Tertullian's statement that man had no excuse before God - no exceptio: Cum
autum etiam ignorantes dominum nulla exceptio tueatur a poena, quia deum in
aperto constitutum et uel ex ipsis caelestibus bonis conprehensibilem ignorari
2
non licet. Exceptio, in legal terminology, was a plea by the defence, alleging a
3
circumstance which barred a claim without denying its prima facie validity.
Man had no such defence before God.
Regarding section four, and when man was accountable to God, there is
one significant sentence in the adversus Marcionem: Venio nunc ad ordinarias







Buckland, op. cit., p 653 ff, Stirpman, op. cit., p 17-20.
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beati mendici. 1 Tertullian seems to imply, by his reference to the edictum of
Christ, that the principle on which mankind would be judged by God at the day of
judgment (the beatitudes and woes of the Gospel) would be applied in the manner
of the perpetual edict of the praetor. Certainly Tertullian was of the view that
no wrong should go unpunished, and while Roman law had no concern with
punishment which was wholly future, Tertullian demonstrated that the whole
human race lay under the condemnation of God for its guilt, and the way of
salvation was conceived largely as escape from the punishment due to sin.
The seventh section of the chapter dealt with intellectual impairment, a
subject treated extensively in Roman law because diminished responsibility was
(then as now) one of the facts of life, and legal systems have to provide for it.
Physical defects also could give rise to legal incapacity (for instance, the deaf
(surdi), the mute (muti), or deaf and dumb (surdi et muti), but Tertullian made no
reference to such affecting the relationship of man to God and they are not
covered in this chapter except in so far as deafness might affect the capacity to
understand.
A person's responsibility for legal acts might be limited or qualified,
either wholly or partially, by the mental condition of the individual. This might
be due to tenderness of age and consequent inexperience (which was covered in
chapter 3H.6 above) or to actual mental unsoundness, which was the subject of
section seven of this chapter. Roman law seems to have made distinctions,
though not very clearly marked, between the dangerous (furiosi), who had lost all
intellectual faculties; the demented (mente capti), in whom certain faculties
were wanting; imbeciles (dementes) and the prodigal (prodigi). The legal
incapacity of the insane was absolute. Such persons were regarded as having no
will of their own and were incapable of incurring any obligations involving
consent; they entirely lacked understanding (intellectus) and judgment (judicium),
1
IV Marc 14. 1.1-3.
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and so were not accountable for their actions. A person suffering from insanity
might have periods of clear and normal mental conditions, known in modern
phraseology as "lucid intervals" and Roman Law recognised that valid legal acts
might be performed and obligations be incurred and consent be given during such
periods. No doubt Tertullian would have applied just such criteria to the
capacity of the intellectually impaired to have a relationship with God, but since
he did not refer to the matter at all, it is scarcely appropriate to pursue the
point any further here.
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VI.9 CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER SIX
The theme of this chapter has been the accountability of the natural man
to God. He was accountable because he was free to enter into a correct
relationship with God (and to receive the benefits of that) or to reject God's
initiative toward all men (and to take the consequences). Against Marcion's
criticism of the Creator and against gnostic determinism, Tertullian stressed
man's freedom from both external coercion and inner compulsion. He had,
however, to be careful not to imply that some men rejected God just because
they were free to do so, as if there was some necessary connection between
human freedom and evil. God had (as Tertullian put it to Marcion) left "elbow-
room for battle", so that man could knock his enemy (the devil) to the ground and
thus furnish proof that the guilt was his and not God's. Tertullian's point, as
established in the second section of the chapter, was that any man who rejected
God did so in exercise of the free choice given as a right by God to all mortal
beings.
That very freedom, or rather the misuse of it, made man accountable to
God; section three set out the grounds on which man was culpable if he neglected
to respond to the voice of God in his own soul or to the evidence of God in the
works of nature. Although satan had corrupted the divine nature in man, (so that
it had become in effect an altera natura ^) God still gave adequate data to every
mam to enable him to acknowledge God. Tertullian's second reason, then, for the
accountability of the natural man to God, was that "they would not acknowledge
what they could not deny". The condemnation and culpability of paganism was
not unjust because sufficient consciousness of God had been made available to
every man; the knowledge of God did not depend on human teaching or
an 16.7.41-50; this interpretation of the passage is confirmed by
Waszink, 'De Anima', p 230. So also omnia a diabolo esse mutata - cor 6.3.21.
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philosophical theories, nor was it based on tradition or custom; nature was the
tutor of all. From creation without and the soul within, God proclaimed Himself
to every man, and so the accountability of the natural man to God was
unequivocally set out by Tertullian in his apologetic works.
Reference was also made in section three to Tertullian's use of Cicero's
juridical argument, namely that ignorance was no excuse. The history of this
idea is outside the scope of this study '''but Cicero's 'Partitiones' and 'Topica'
touched on the culpability at law of voluntary and involuntary ignorance
(chapters 42-43 and 62-64 respectively) and then the theme was developed in
detail in "De Officiis" chapter one. Tertullian's argument about the
accountability of the natural man before God likewise rested on the assumption
2
that ignorance was culpable, and Fredouille has suggested that the format, if
not the idea, came to Tertullian from his reading of Cicero's works. "Dans la
premiere, (i.e. I nat) Tertullien montre pourquoi et comment les paiens
s'obstinent dans leur ignorance: aussi se place-t-il a un point de vue juridicque,
3
puis logique and philosophique". The link here with Roman law is, however,
rather remote and is not pursued, but clearly Tertullian regarded error and sin as
linked and ignorance could not serve the heathen as an excuse and release them
from their responsibility to respond to God.
Although God could and would call every man to account, this accounting
was not normally begun until after death, when interim rewards or punishments
Fredouille demonstrated the extent to which Socrates, Plato and
Aristotle had taught that man was responsible for not keeping himself informed:






were given to the soul; the final accounting was not until the
resurrection of the body, as was set out in section four. Following that, sections
five and six tried to assess the extent to which Tertullian differentiated between
the heathen as a class and as individuals, in their relationship to God. While he
recognised some good in pagan life, there is no indication that he believed even
the best of paganism could ever bring a man into a saving relationship with God.
The worst of paganism certainly incurred his specific condemnation, whether it
was seen in the perversion of man's sense of deity expressed in the worship of
idols or the perversion of natural reason to which philosophers were prone.
Tertullian distinguished the legitimate use of natural reason by the heathen, in
their search for God, from the self-aggrandisement of the wise men of this
world, which led them away from God.
If, then, every soul was under obligation to collate the evidence which
God provided for it, as it advanced in observation and understanding, and could
come to the realisation that it had a Creator to whom it must answer, what was
the position of those who lacked normal intelligence and understanding?
Tertullian did not say, but there are indications that he would have said, if asked,
that God would treat those with impaired mental faculties as He would treat
children, who had inherited the vitium originis of all mankind, who might have
performed deeds which were objectively sinful, but who nevertheless could be
regarded as innocent of evil in their hearts. It was the relationship of the soul to
God which would at all times dominate the accountability of man to God, and
while ignorance was no excuse, inability to form a reasoned judgment might well
be.
In that respect, Tertullian's outlook was at one with Roman law, although
there is no indication that his view of diminished responsibility( i.e. his assumed
view of it) was derived from Roman law. In all the other areas covered by this
chapter, the extent to which Tertullian used the medium of Roman law, to
express the accountability of man to God, is perhaps more apparent than real.
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The criteria for judgment before God were expressly contrasted with the
criteria by which the Roman Magistrates acquitted or condemned on religious
issues. Free-will, while an underlying motif of Roman law, was a concept from
fields much wider than jurisprudence. Delictum, which expressed personal
responsibility, may well have owed more in Tertullian to the Pauline epistles
than to Roman law. On the other hand, there has been more judicial language in
this chapter than in any of the previous five; exceptio and edictum^/directly
borrowed from the language of the Courts and the defence of the Creator
against the charge of responsibility for man's sin showed a marked similarity to
Court procedure.
261
CONCLUSION TO PART TWO OF THESIS
It is no part of this thesis to dispute or to denigrate what is clearly a use
by Tertullian of Roman law, but merely to put that use into the context of his
overall description of the relationship of mam to God. These fifth and sixth
chapters have, together, set out what Tertullian appears to teach on the
relationship of the natural man to God. Behind most of the points of difference
between Christianity and paganism lay the fundamental difference of their views
as to the nature of the Deity; from that stemmed their different views of the
relationship of man to the Deity. Tertullian found himself trying to express in
Latin a conception of God and of God's relationship to the world which had no
precise parallel in Greek thought and there is no doubt that he found it useful to
borrow certain words from Roman law to express that relationship - libripens and
lex naturae were noted in chapter five, delictum (perhaps), exceptio, and
edictum in chapter six; at other times he presented his argument in terms of
Court procedure, as noted in both chapters.
Although these words provided useful illustrations for his teaching - he
said as much about libripens - it is also evident that he used these legal words
(with technical meanings) in less than technical senses, and knew that they would
be so understood by his readers. The extent to which he was dependent on
Roman law to express the relationship seems then to be very limited, and Roman
law can hardly be said to have "shaped his thinking". To use legal metaphors,
knowing that they would illustrate his work and that they would be understood as
metaphors by his readers, was to follow no less an example than Paul in his
Epistles - but no one says of Paul what Gwatkin said of Tertullian - "his writings
are not only full of the maxims and technical terms of Roman law, and of
allusions to its procedure: they present every doctrine from a legal
standpoint". * It is hoped that the analysis contained in the two chapters now
Henry Melvill Gwatkin, The Knowledge of God and its Historical
Development, (2nd ed.; Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1908) IT, 163.
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concluded will demonstrate that words and thoughts from Roman law form a
fairly insignificant percentage of Tertullian's overall presentation of the
relationship of the natural man to God, and certainly not sufficient to justify
some of the more extravagant generalisations quoted in the preface to the
thesis.
It was Tertullian's sincere wish that the natural man would come from a
natural understanding of God to a correct and saving relationship with the deus
Christianorum. The remainder of this thesis will therefore set out the
relationship to God of those who, from knowing God only by natural means,
progressed to the point where they could be admitted into membership of the
Christian Church.
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PART THREE: THE RELATIONSHIP OF CATECHUMENS TO GOD
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE RELATIONSHIP AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
CATECHUMENATE
Vn.l INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER SEVEN
It was presumably by catechetical instruction that Tertullian himself
became familiar1 with the doctrines of Christianity. There is no trace in his
writings of the influence of a Christian father or mother, and according to his
own testimony, he came to the Church as an adult convert. * His writings do not
refer to his own catechumenate, although his conversion must have been:
un evenement pour les Chretiens de Carthage: c'etait la une recrue tout a
fait exceptionnelle. Comme Apulee, son illustre compatriote, il possedait
toute l'erudition de l'epoque, philosophie, droit, histoire, litterature,
sciences naturelles, medecine, meme et occultisme. De plus, pour exploiter
ce tresor de science, il avait un talent peu commun de rheteur, ... 2
These talents he immediately put at the disposal of the Church, not least for the
3
instruction of catechumens. He seems to have been free from the necessity of
He had aliquando laughed at tbCe Christian doctrines of One God, the
Creator and Preserver of the Universe, His Revelation of Himself in the
Scriptures, the Resurrection of the Dead, and future Judgment - "Haec et nos
risimus aliquando. De uestris summus: fiunt, non nascuntur Christiani." - apol
18.4.17-18; furthermore, adulteria commissise (res 59.3.13) is clearly intended to
be a reference to unregenerate days. His habits before his conversion seem to
have been neither better nor worse than those of his pagan contemporaries; for
example, he recalled how he had witnessed, and had been amused at, the
cruelties of the amphitheatre; apol 15.5.20-25; spec 19.5.20-21. While he made
only a few references to his pagan youih, and he never moralised over them, he
never forgot that he had been peccator ... omnium notarum ...nec ulli rei nisi
paenitentiae natus paen 12.^9.37-38; he could remind his readers of hoc genus
hominum quod et ipsi retro fuimus, caeci, sine domini lumine - paen 1.1.2-3.
2 -
Pierre Guilloux, "L'Evolution Religieuse de Tertullien", Revue
d'Histoire Ecclesiastique de Louvain, 19 (1923), 7.
3
bapt, cult, orat, paen and spec are generally held to be explicitly
intended for catechumens, but Rauschen, in his note to paen 1.1, claimed that
that treatise was not addressed primarily to catechumens but was intended for
all Christians. The audientes, he condended were all those of whom it was said:
seruis tuis dicere uel audire contingat. Gerhard Rauschen, Tertulliani De
Paenitentia et De Pudicitia recensio nova, (Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1915).
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working for a living, and thus able to give the best years of his life to combatting
heresy and establishing the claims of the Christian faith.
He came at just the right time for the Church. The increase in the
number of Christians in the Severan era (beginning A.D. 193) was bringing
certain problems to the Church and while Tertullian the apologist delighted to
make a strong point of this increase, to Tertullian the enthusiast and rigorist it
constituted something of a problem. Many now called themselves Christians
because of family tradition rather than personal conviction or conversion, and
Tertullian believed that catechetical instruction for them (and also for some of
the new converts) was being perfunctarily received, perhaps even inadequately
given. ^ He was concerned, because he believed it essential to lay a solid
foundation for the faith, during the catechumenate. There were grave dangers in
going forward to baptism without adequate preparation, because Christians who
sinned after baptism had, at best, only one further opportunity of paenitentia,
painful and humiliating. ^ It was no good to plead, for post-baptismal sin, that
one had been inadequately grounded at the catechumenate stage:
nullum ignorantiae praetextum patrocinatur tibi, quoad domino adgnito
praeceptisque eius admissis, denique paenitentia delictorum functus, rursus
te in delicta restituis. 3
dementia ilia Dei malentis paenitentiam peccatoris quam mortem ad
ignorantes adhuc et adhuc incredulos spectat, quorum causa liberandorum
uenerit Christus, non qui jam Deum norint et sacramentum didicerint
fidei. 4
"qui similiter credidisse contenti non exploratis rationibus traditionum
temptabilem fidem per imperitiam portant" - (bapt 1.1.4-6); "nam et multi rudes
et plerique sua fide dubii et simplices plures, quos instrui dirigi muniri oportebit"
(res 2.11.58-59; "Simplices enim quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotae, quae
maior semper credentium pars est" - Prax 3.1.1-2; "plerosque uero in uentum et
si placuerit Christianos ..." Scorp 1.5.11-12.
^
It is outside the scope of this thesis to refer to post-baptismal sin, but,
in addition to whole chapters like paen 9~12, texts like bapt 8.5.28-29 and pud






It was fundamental to Tertullian's theology of salvation that a solid basis for a
man's future relationship with God should be established during the
catechumenate. Accordingly, he set himself to bring catechumens ad
paenitentiam semel capessendam et perpetuo continendanr . ^ He emphasised
that if a catechumen had not truly dealt with all his sins before he was baptised,
he would never deal with them at all:
Quis enim seruus, posteaquam libertate mutatus est, furta sua et fugas sibi
imputat? quis miles, postquam castris suis emissus est, pro notis suis
satagit? 2
In view of this, Tertullian's involvement with catechumens and his concern for
them is readily understood; the foundations laid during their catechumenate
would probably determine their relationship to God for all eternity.
This chapter investigates the relationship of the catechumen to God at
the very beginning of the catechuminate, and does so from two points of views: -
(a) Tertullian insisted that catechumens should be seen to occupy a
distinctive place in the Church - symbolic of that relationship to God which
differed from those in full membership of the Church. First to be
investigated, then, is the distinction in the relationship to God between
catechumens and Church-members, including the distinction between
catechumens at the beginning of the catechumenate and those at later
stages of instruction. This is examined in section two of the chapter.
(b) Even the enquirer could have a relationship to God which differed in
some respects from that of the complete outsider; section three therefore
investigates the challenge put to the enquirer. If he responded to it, there
was a difference, even at the beginning of the catechumenate, in his
relationship to God.
The basic attitude, which had to be inculcated, before the catechumen
would make any progress in the faith, was to fear God and this is examined in
section four. Section five looks at the Roman law which is relevant for this area





Vn.2 RELATIONSHIPS NOT OPEN TO CATECHUMENS
Tertullian believed strongly that catechumens who, at least in the early
stages of their instruction, cum maxime incipiunt diuinis sermonibus aures
rigare quique ut catuli infantiae adhuc recentis necdum perfectis luminibus
incerta reptant should be seen to occupy a distinctive place in the Church;
this was because they had a distinctive relationship to God, cum pendente uenia
2
poena prospicitur, cum adhuc liberari non meremur, He censured the heretics
for failing to make an adequate distinction betwen those who were under
instruction and those who had completed the catechumenate: quis
4
catechumenus, quis fidelis incertum est, and Ante sunt perfecti catechumeni
4
quam edocti. In particular, the followers of Marcion and their catechumens,
5
pariter adeunt, pariter audiunt, pariter orant. Tertullian may be referring here
to three different classes of catechumens^ namely, those who were not allowed
into the gathering of Christians at all, those who were admitted as hearers only,
and those who were admitted to the prayers; if that is so, Tertullian is expressing
his disapproval of catechumens taking part in these activities 'together with' the
Christians. If, on the other hand, "adeunt" refers to the approach to the altar
itself, this would charge the heretics with allowing unbaptised persons at the
7












Whether Tertullian recognised different groups within the
catechumenate, and whether they stood in different relationships to God, is
examined in chapter VIII. 1 below.
7
Marcion opposed the separation between catechumens and the baptised
entitled to communion, and the dismissal of the former from certain prayers
(continued on next page)
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While catechumens would be given instruction about God the Father, God
the Son and God the Holy Spirit - because candidates for baptism were required
to affirm their belief in the Three Persons of the Trinity - it is outside the scope
of this thesis to explore the relationship of the catechumen to Christ and to the
Holy Spirit. As was mentioned in the preface to the thesis,the catechumen had
no significant or abiding relationship with Christ until baptism, and would not
receive the Holy Spirit, as a permanent possession, until he had completed all the
baptismal ceremonies - immersion in water, anointing with oil, and the Laying on
of the Hand - as examined in Chapter X.3. below.
It will become increasingly evident throughout this and the following
two chapters, that the position of catechumens in the Church was symbolic of a
deeper and more fundamental distinction - they stood in a distinctive
relationship to God the Father; Tertullian was careful to distinguish even those
qui cum maxime ad Deum acceditis from those qui iam accessisse uos
testificati et confessi estis. * It was only cum de illo sanctissimo lauacro noui
natalis ascenditis et primas manus apud matrem cum fratribus aperitis ... 2
that they could enjoy the full relationship to God which He intended for His
children.
On the other hand, while there were some relationships to God which
were open only to baptised Christians and not to catechumens, it must also be
footnote 7 continued:
whijrh were connected with the supper. In the orthodox Church, the eucharistic
service was in two sections, the first of which, a service of Bible-reading and
instruction, might be attended by non-Christians. Then unbaptised persons and
those under discipline were required to leave, so that the congregation, for the
Eucharist itself, was exclusively Christian. Whether or not a disciplina arcani
was the reason for excluding profane persons from the Eucharist, or whether it
was merely from reverence for the eucharistic celebration proper, is outside the
scope of this study. That debate is reviewed in detail by Dom E. Dekkers
"Tertullianus en de geschiedenis der Liturgie" (Amsterdam: de Kinkhoren, 1947)






said that they were reckoned in some ways, right from the beginning, as
belonging to the Christian community and under its care. Although still under
instruction and on the fringe of the Church, there were at least two areas where
the relationship had the potential of change. First, whenever the catechumen
associated himself with the Christian Church, he exposed himself to the danger
of martyrdom. If he was accused by the authorities and if, however
inexperienced he was in the faith, he stood firm in his profession, he would have
been counted by Tertullian among the martyrs for the faith - that most
privileged group, who stood in the highest relationship to God. His experience of
the Church on earth might scarcely have passed beyond the enquiry stage, but:
Since baptism was not conferred without serious preparation, and as a rule
only at Easter and Pentecost, it could (and apparently did) happen that in
time of persecution a catechumen was brought to death by martyrdom:
since without baptism there is no salvation the question was bound to arise
whether such persons were saved. The answer was universally given that
they were baptized in their own blood. 1
Second, if a catechumen became seriously ill - even if he was one of
2
those ut catuli infantiae adhuc recentis necdum perfectis luminibus - he would
3
be baptised, by a layman if need be in an emergency. It would already have
been made clear to him that his natural relationship to God was estrangement by
sin, and that he had to confess faith in Christ and be baptised if he was to
4
receive the forgiveness of sin. While therefore in normal cases the
catechumenate was not the time when the relationship to God was materially
Evans "Baptism'\p 94. Nevertheless, Evans (loc. cit.) believed that if
Tertullian had been pressed on the meaning of that, he would have said that
martyrdom saved in the same sense as baptism saved, i.e. not by its own merit






The relationship between paenitentia, faith and baptism is examined in
chapter VIII.6 below.
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altered, but the time when the foundation for a new relationship to God was
being laid, the very fact of entering into the catechumenate brought the enquirer
into the situation, where, if martyrdom or terminal illness intervened, he had the
opportunity of entering into a saving relationship with God.
These two apart, it is clear that, in the view of Tertullian, a saving
relationship to God was not open to the enquirer until (a) he had been instructed
in the truth revealed only to the Church (b) he had amended his life in line with
that truth, and (c) he had been baptised. The inference must be that normally
the relationship of the catechumen to God, at the commencement of his
catechumenate, differed only potentially, but not actually, from that of a pagan,
in so far as his salvation was concerned. When the relationship began to alter
depended on when, and to what extent, the catechumen was prepared to face up
to the choices presented to him, and that is examined next.
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vn.3 THE CHOICE PUT BEFORE THE ENQUIRER
Tertullian has not recorded when the name 'catechumen' was first given
to applicants for Church membership, but there must have been some
preliminary enquiry, on both sides, before any commitment was made to the
catechumenate. On the part of the Church, there was some reluctance (although
Tertullian berated the heretics for too much secrecy^) to disclose the details of
Christian truth and Christian morality until the enquirer was known to be
serious. On the part of the enquirer, there would not doubt be certain questions
he would wish to ask before committing himself to a catechumenate which would
radically alter his life and his life-style. Tertullian has not described in detail
what was put before an initial enquirer at Carthage, but the practice at Rome
2
illustrates the caution on the part of the Church and the practice at Alexandria
3
illustrates the caution on the part of the enquirer.
Tertullian himself implied that there was some preliminary discussion.
When he set out in the apologeticum chapter 8 (parallelled in the first book ad
nationes chapter 7) to dispel certain rumours spread by the heathen about
offensive rites at Christian meetings, he asked his readers to visualise an
initiation ceremony: Atquin uolentibus initiari moris est, opinor, prius patrem
4
ilium sacrorum adire, quae praeparanda sint describere . Tertullian then
1
Val 1.1.7-3.15; Val 1.3.19-04; Val 1.4.11-12. The whole chapter is a
fine example of Tertullian's withering irony. Even to a bona fide enquirer,
Tertullian pictured the hierophant replying with stern face and frowning brow,
'Tis too deep a matter'.
^
The 'Apostolic Tradition' of Hippolytus (Part n, Chap 16, Sections 1 and
2) described the practice of the Roman Church at the beginning of the third
century. The enquirer, accompanied by those who had led him to the 'true light',
had first to present himself to a priest or a deacon and request to be received
into the Christian Church. Hippolytus described how he was then submitted to a
preliminary examination, before being accepted as a catechumen.
3
Clement of Alexandria described a stage of a precatechesis, for the
benefit of Gentiles whose attention was beginning to be aroused towards
Christianity. -Paedagogus 1.6.
4
apol 8.7.24-26, paralleled at I nat 7.23.12-14.
271
satirically described the colourful (imaginary!) scene in which the 'pater' told the
candidate to bring a child, who was to be slaughtered . . . and asked his audience
whether anyone would endure either initiation into such a religion, or, indeed,
silence about the knowledge he would have gained if initiated. Within the
general argument, Tertullian implied that the serious enquirer would indeed be
given some preliminary information - Christians did not (he protested) trap the
unwary into their ranks. In another place, when extolling the disciplines of the
Church, he referred to the (lex) propria Christianorum, per quam ab ethnicis
agnoscimur et examinamur, haec accendentibus ad fidem proponenda et
ingredientibus in fidem inculcanda est, ut accendentes deliberent No doubt
some basic minimum of doctrine and precept was set before the enquirer - some
short statement of truths to be held and of sins to be put off at the very outset.
If the enquirer accepted these, he would be received into the catechumenate and
progressively introduced to the truth of Christian doctrine, as opposed to the
falsehood of paganism, the purity of Christian morals, as opposed to pagan
licentiousness and the brotherhood of Christian fellowship, as opposed to the
selfishness and cruelty of paganism.
This section of the chapter is particularly concerned to set out the
choice which was placed before the enquirer, by Tertullian, relative to his
relationship with God, when an application was received for Church membership.
As was noted in section VII. 1 above, Tertullian made himself available for the
teaching of catechumens, and Nisters has made the interesting suggestion that it
was the rejection of his (Tertullian's) views on how catechumens should be
instructed and the refusal of the Church to enforce his views which led to




Bernard Nisters, Tertullian, Seine Personlichkeit and sein Schicksal,
(Minister: Aschendorff, 1950) p 124. There is unfortunately no one sentence
which can readily be quoted in support of this - there is a long and sustained
argument to that effect.
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catechumens in de spectaculis was typical of his instruction, one can almost hear
him saying to an enquirer:
"Bonum est paenitere an non?" Qui reuoluis? deus praecepit! Atenim ille
non praecipit tantum, sed etiam hortatur (et); inuitat praemio: salute;
iurans etiam, uiuo dicens cupit credi sibi. O beatos nos quorum causa deus
furat, o miserrimos si nec iuranti domino credimus! 1
"Choice" was the key phrase. The goodness and the severity of God were not
only one of Tertullian's most cogent means of urging catechumens to adopt
Christianity, by setting before them the alternatives of everlasting bliss or
everlasting fire (the texts are examined below) but the two were constantly
emphasised by him as constituting the fundamental basis for man's understanding
of God:
Quodsi utraque pars, bonitatis atque iustitiae, dignam plenitudinem
diuinitatis efficiunt omnia potentis . . . Magis enim eos coniungunt, quos in
eis diuersitatibus ponunt, quae deo congruunt ... 2
Olim duplicem uim creatoris uindicauimus, et iudicis et boni, littera
occidentis per legem et spiritu uiuificantis per euangelium. 3
From the Scriptures, Tertullian frequently and gladly showed God's mercy to
4
penitent sinners. At the same time, he wanted the enquirer to be in no doubt as
to what Christianity would mean in practical terms - he would have to live in a
hostile society, with its idolatry and ridicule, and if he was to succeed in the
Christian life, he would have to make as clean a break as possible with the world.
5








j. Examined in chapter V.3 above.
Idolatry was so interwoven with the texture of daily life that the
Christian was necessarily debarred from many occupations; those which
Tertullian considered unsuitable for a Christian were itemised in idol, spec and
cor. Some heathen trades, such as astrology, sore ery and divination, were
obviously closed to a Christian, either to undertake or to patronise, but idolatry
(continued on next page)
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of working hours, would be well advised to keep away from the theatre, the
arena, and the circus, partly because they were immoral, but primarily because
of their connection with idolatry.
Tertullian's treatise on idolatry was the first writing in Latin patristic
literature (as fair as is known) to be entirely devoted to the daily life of
Christians and it shows that Tertullian was under no illusion that society was
going to make allowances for the Christian conscience. It was better to face the
issue now:
Plane impensius respondebo ad excusationes huiusmodi artificum, quos
numquam in domum dei admitti oportet si quis earn disciplinam norit. Iam
ilia obici solita vox, non habeo aliud quo uiuam, districtius repercuti potest:
uiuere ergo habes? quid tibi cum deo est si tuis legibus uLij ?" 1
The choice confronting the enquirer was a stark one, and Tertullian did not
shrink from it; he had very much in mind the Lord's parable of the prudent
footnote 5 continued-.
did not consist only in offering sacrifices or incense to idols. It began with the
various industries, which were connected in varying degrees of nearness or
remoteness with idolatry; for example, sculpting, painting and decorating were
legitimate enough in themselves, but a Christian craftsman must never employ
his skills to build temples, or make images or anything else explicitly for use in
the pagan cultus; a Christian business man must never sell wares, such as
incense or wine, for idolatrous purposes. The profession of the schoolmaster
involved the tacit, but incriminating, recognition of the heathen gods; business
contracts concluded with heathen religious formalities ought to be broken off; no
plea of the necessity of providing for one's children could excuse a man for
participating in any such activity. Furthermore, a Christian actor or comedian,
or a Christian trainer of gladiators, was a contradiction in terms; to those who
complained to Tertullian that they had no other way of earning their living,
Tertullian indignantly retorted that they should have thought out the
implications, before becoming Christians. From these passages it is clear that
the occupation and manner of living of the catechumen was regarded by
Tertullian as critical in determining his relationship to God, and to demonstrate
this in practical terms, the Church would not admit to baptism those who would
not give up certain occupations. Pushed to its logical conclusion (about not
doing anything which could contribute, however indirectly, to idolatry)
Tertullian's teaching would make it impossible to have any occupation at all.
Tertullian did not in fact insist on the logical end of his own argument, except
when he was mocking at the excuses put forward by some 'compromising'
Christians. He was, however, perfectly serious in asserting that in the last
resort the convert had to be prepared to suffer the loss of everything for his




builder who, before erecting a tower, sat down to count the cost. * Earlier
writers had made use of the description of 'two ways'; 3 while Tertullian did not
use that phrase, he bluntly confronted the enquirer with the choice of heaven or
hell, this world or the next, God or the devil, eternal life or eternal death.
ecce proponimus uobis disciplinae nostrae sponsionem: uitam aeternam
sectatoribus et conseruatoribus suis spondet, e contrario profanis et aemulis
supplicium aeternum aeterno igni comminatur; 3
Eo iudicio iniquos aeterno igni, pios et insontes amoeno in loco dicimus
perpetuitatem transacturos; 4
siquidem meliores fieri coguntur qui eis credunt, metu aeterni supplicii et
spe aeterni refrigerii 5
and he reminded the readers of aduersus Marcionem:
Nam et ita praemiserat: ecce posui ante uos benedictionem et
maledictionem. Quod etiam in hanc euangelii dispositionem portendebat. 6
Accordingly Tertullian promised to all who would both enter and complete the
catechumenate, that God would forgive their sins - sins of the flesh and of the
7
spirit, sins of deed and of the will. For the catechumen who proceeded to




Found in the Doctrina and in a more developed form in the Didache and
the Letter of Barnabas. A useful outline of the origin and use of the concept of
'two ways' was given by Danielou, who traced it back to the Mosaic law, through
the New Testament and down to Irenjeus - Jean Danielou, Le Catechese aux








IV Marc 15.5.17-20. There are many such texts in Tertullian setting
out a stark choice, but they are directed to Christians and it would not be
appropriate to use them to illustrate his teaching to catechumens.
7
paen 4.1.1-2.6. Although this passage refers to the efficacy of
paenitentia generally, its context (the early chapters of de paenitentia) deals
with sins committed before baptism.
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believed in the forgiveness of God for all who repented of what he called 'sins
committed in ignorance', i.e. before baptism, and he assured catechumens of
that forgiveness, in the baptism which followed true repentance.
At this point, however, the initiative passed squarely to the catechumen.
While nothing was more worthy of God than man's salvation, it went to the root
of Tertullian's theology that when man was shown his situation, he had to do
something about it. It was not that man had, within himself, the power to form,
out of his own self-sufficiency, a holy temper and disposition, merely by
exercising a choice to that end. That was the prerogative of God, given in
baptism; but the catechumen had, of his own free will, to resolve to give up his
former way of life, to undertake paenitentia prima, to receive instruction in the
faith, and, in due course, to be baptised. He was offered no spiritual resources
at this stage, no guidance from the Holy Spirit, no fellowship with Christ. The
catechist showed him God's offer of salvation; whether he undertook and
persevered in paenitentia prima was essentially the choice of the catechumen
himself. His response to the divine initiative might not be active enough to
secure the forgiveness of his sins; he had not only to commence, but to carry
through to completion, paenitentia prima. The burden lay with man to form, in
himself, the disposition which would make his baptism effective.
What would motivate men and women to break with their past, their
attachments, probably their employment, possibly their family, and to embark on
the catechumenate?
The western European thinks of God as a loving Father who sent His only
Son into the world as the Redeemer of mankind. The emphasis is on the love
and mercy of God, the liberating power of Christianity, and the example of
Christ's perfect life. But this was not the outlook of either Donatists or
Catholics in Africa. Their religion seems to have been concentrated on the
prospect of Judgment hereafter, and on the consequent necessity of
propitiating the wrath of God. It was a religion of fear and dread, not of
love. So Tertullian in De Cultu Fe minarum, ii. 2 'Timor fundamentum
salutis est.' While this attitude was common to Christians throughout the
Mediterranean area, it seems to have taken on a more pronounced form in
Africa. 1
Frend, "The Donatist Church", p 97.
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While that paragraph was written with reference to the Donatist controversy,
and the text from Tertullian was addressed to Christians and not to
catechumens, there is no doubt that Tertullian did believe the basic and the
sustaining relationship with God, which would take a man or woman through the
catechumenate and beyond, was a proper understanding of the fear of God, and
this is now examined.
Ill
VH.4 THE FEAR OF GOD TO BE INCULCATED
Tertullian took it for granted* that a reverential fear of God was an
essential part of paenitentia prima, (which, together with instruction, formed the
basis of the catechumenate.^) There is no indication in his writings that the fear
of God would by itself improve the catechumen's relationship with God, but due
reverence for God and fear of His punishments provided the necessary
motivation for the catechumen to give up sin completely, and so to qualify for
baptism, in which he would receive the forgiveness of sins. The relationship
between paenitentia prima and baptism will be examined in chapter VIII.6, but
meantime it should be noted that metus integer was so fundamental to the
relationship of man to God that, in a striking oxymoron, Tertullian described the
catechumen with metus integer as actually iam corde loti:
Non ideo abluimur ut delinquere desiimus sed quia desinamus, quoniam iam
corde loti sumus: haec enim prima audientis intinctio est. Metus integer
exinde quod dominum senserit. 3
As soon as Tertullian came to teach a catechumen about God, he would
begin by supplementing the existing (inadequate) teaching of nature about God,
by the explicit teaching of Scripture on this point:
Quern non penitus admiserant, neque nosse potuerunt neque timere nec inde
sapere, exorbitantes scilicet ab initio sapientiae, id est metu in Deum. 4
Nam et diuina alias enuntiatio Solomonis: "Initium," inquit, "sapientiae
metus in Deum." Porro timoris origo notitia est: quis enim timebit, quod
ignorat? Itague Deum timuerit, ignotio omnium, Deum omnium notitiam et
ueritatem assecutus plenam atque perfectam sapientiam optinebit. Hoc
autem philosophiae non liquido successit. 5
*
In de paenitentia alone he referred to the fear of God as the motive for
repentance and amendment of life in chapters 2,5,6,7,9,10 and 12.
2
Instruction in the faith, as part of the catechumenate, is examined in








One of Tertullian's fundamental criticism of heretics (who were the offspring of
philosophy) was:
Negant Deum timendum: itaque libera sunt illis omnia et soluta. Vbi autem
Deus non timetur nisi ubi non est? ubi Deus non est, nec ueritas ulla est; ubi
ueritas nulla est, merito et talis disciplina est. At ubi Deus, ibi metus in
Deum qui est initium sapientiae. Vbi metus in Deum, ibi grauitas honesta et
diligentia attonita et cura sollicita, et adlectio explorata et communicatio
deliberata et promotio emerita et subiectio religiosa et apparitio deuota et
processio modesta et ecclesia unita et Dei omnia. 1
Marcion had invented a god:
qui nec offenditur nec irascitur nec ulciscitur, cui nullus ignis coquitur in
gehenna, cui nullus dentium frendor horret in exterioribus tenebris: bonus
tanturn est. 2
Atque adeo prae se ferunt Marcionitae, quod deum suum omnino non
timeant. "Malus enim", inquiunt, "timebitur, bonus autem diligetur".
Stulte, quem dominum appellas negas timendum, cum hoc nomen potestatis
sit, etiam timendae? At quomodo diliges, nisi timeas non diligere? 3
Marcion deum suum timeri negat, defendens bonum non timeri, sed iudicem,
apud quem sint materiae timoris, ira saeuitia iudicia uindicta damnatio. 4
Tertullian totally rejected the concept of a god who was not to be feared, and
asked Marcion why he practiced baptism, when his god did not judge sin in any
event:
Cui enim rei baptisma quoque apud eum exigitur? Si remissio delictorum
est, quomodo uidebitur delicta dimittere qui non uidebitur retinere, quia, si
retineret, iudicaret? 5
Marcion's answer - "absit, inquis, absit" - is examined in the conclusion of this
chapter, and it was rejected by Tertullian out of hand. Tertullian was concerned
that the catechumen should not only begin his paenitentia through the fear of














dominum simul cognoueris timeas, simul inspexeris reuerearis! *
its continuation:
modum denique paenitendi temperarent quia et delinquendi tenerent,
timentes domilium scilicet. Sed ubi metus nullus, emendatio proinde nulla: 2
and its end - (otherwise there would be no successful end):
Quem censeas digniorem nisi emendatiorem? quern emendatiorem nisi
timidiorem et idcirco uera paenitentia functum? Timuit enim adhuc
delinquere, ne non mereretur accipere. At ille praesumptor cum sibi
repromitteret, securus scilicet, timere non potuit: sic nec paenitentiam
impleuit, quia instrumento paenitentiae, id est metu, caruit. 3
It was only insofar as the catechumen feared God that he would find himself
sinning less frequently and as a result would have fewer occasions to practise
paenitentia. Thus sin was held within limits by the fear of God, and there would
be a progressive improvement in the catechumen's relationship with God, leading
up to the point where he was ready to be baptised.
It is outside the scope of this study to examine why Tertullian believed
that man's fear of God did not stand in opposition to God's love for man, but of
necessity belonged to it, albeit as an accidens which followed only after the fall
4
of man. Miller examined the question in great detail, not specifically with
reference to the thought of Tertullian (although he did mention Marcion's failure
5








Roy F. Miller, The Fear of God: A Study of the Fear of God in the
Christian Religion, an unpublished Ph.D. Thesis presented to the University of




how the relationship of man to God could be both of fear and of love at one and
the same time, and how the love could alter the fear. To develop the matter here
would lead into an extended discussion of the relationship of the Christian to
God, and so this section closes by referring back to Tertullian's emphasis on the
love of God for man (examined in chapter V.2 above) and the comment that God's
love for man and man's fear of God should never be treated in isolation from the
other. The extent to which Tertullian was influenced by Roman law in coming to
these views is dealt with next.
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vn.5 ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
The emphasis of the section just concluded, namely that reverential fear was the
basis of a right relationship with God, provides the only major contact with
Roman law for this chapter, although brief mention will be made, at the end of
the section, of the pagans' accusation to Christians that 'non licet esse vos'; no
one commencing on the catechumenate could be unaware that his new religion was
diametrically opposed to the established order.
While the fear of God's punishment was repeatedly given in Scripture as
a motive for repentance and amendment of life, ^another 'model' lay near at
hand for Tertullian, namely the relationship within the family unit, one of the
fundamental institutions of Roman law and society. Roman lawyers recognised
and took pride in the fact that the relationship between the head of the Roman
family and all his descendents in the male line was unique throughout the known
world. ^ The head of the family was known as the paterfamilias, and the almost
unlimited authority which he exercised over his descendants, the filiifamiliae,
was called patria potestas. A daughter was a member of her father's family,
only so long as she was unmarried; on marriage she passed into the potestas of
her husband's paterfamilias, and her children belonged to her husband's family.
Even grown-up children stood under the 'disciplina' of the head of the family and
3
owed him obedience; Cicero praised Appius Claudius because, in spite of being
^
e.g. Psalm 2.12; Proverbs 15.27; Ecclesiastes 1.27, and 5.7 ff;
Matthew 10.28; Luke 3.3 ff; John 5.14.
^
Gaius 1.55-107, 127-136, taken up by Justinian, Institutes 1.9.2 which
(translated) states "the power which we have over our children is peculiar to the
citizens of Rome; for no other people have such power over their children as we
have." So also Ulpian 5 and 10. The Roman jurists maintained the patria
potestas with singular tenacity against the influence of other systems with which
they came in contact.
^
"Tenebat non modo auctoritatem sed etiam imperium in suos,
metuebant servi, verebantur liberi, carum omnes habebant" - ad Catalinam, 34.
Cicero added, as proof of that statement, "vigebat in ilia domo patrius mos et
disciplina".
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old and blind, he was still lord and master over four grown-up sons and five
daughters. The absoluteness of the obedience demanded by the 'domestica
disciplina' is evidenced by the acceptance of the concept of 'severitas' as part of
the 'disciplina', in the Roman understanding of home discipline. Dionysius
recorded an incident where a distinguished counsul, Spurius Cassius Viscellinus by
name, having been convicted of misconduct in office, was taken home by his
father and executed. *
Some of the features of the paterfamilias/filiifamiliae relationship are
clearly not applicable to the relationship of God to man, \ut the underlying
concept seems to provide a better 'model' for Tertullian's emphasis that
reverential fear should characterise the approach of man to God, better than is
the 'legal' or "judicial/criminal" relationship which featured so strongly in the
quotations in the preface to this thesis. It was therefore a matter of surprise to
find that only one of the many works read in the preparation of this thesis took
up the theme:
Thus when he turns to write an exposition of the Lord's Prayer, we find ...
that in the opening clause of the prayer, God, viewed on the severe model of
a Roman family father, is honoured as possessing his unique 'power' over his
domestic establishment, and that the Church is here explicitly referred to as
the 'family' 'embracing God and those who belong to him by legal right'. 3
4
Perusal of two (non-religious) studies confirmed the positive contribution which
^
n. 26; also Livy n.41.
2
For example, the absolute right to kill or expose unwanted children, to
sell free-born children as slaves, to pledge them, to withhold the consent to
marry, etc; but these powers were (in any event) severely curtailed during the
Imperial period and by the time of Tertullian were even more restricted.
(Alexander Severus limited the power of the father to simple chastisement).
These extraordinary powers must have in general been sensibly and equitably
used, or they would have been discarded much earlier.
3
Robert F. Evans, One and Holy: The Church in Latin Patristic
Thought, (London: S.P.C.K., 1972) p 9.
4
E. Burck, "Die altromische Familie," in von Helmut Berve (editor) Das
Neue Bild der Antike (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1942) II, 48 ff, and L.
Wenger "Hausgewalt und Staatsgewalt im romischen Alter turn" in Misc. F. Ehrle,
(Rome: 1924) II, 1 ff.
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further reading about patriapotestas could make to understanding Tertullian's
expression of the relationship of man to God. For example,
(a) it held the balance between pieta- s and potestas; the Lord's Prayer
was a reminder, said Tertullian, that frequentissime dominus patrem
nobis pronuntiauit deum, ... dicendo autem patrem, deum quoque
cognominamus: appellatio ista et pietatis et potestatis est. * In thus
2
applying pater to God, both here and elsewhere, Tertullian was able to
emphasise, at one and the same time, both filial confidence and
obedience - precisely the relationship of the Roman family community
with its paterfamilias.
(b) it preserved Tertullian's emphasis that God was personal - an important
emphasis against the "metaphysical infinite" or the "all-inclusive whole"
£
of rival theologies. God was indeed a ruler, majestic, sovereign, yet at
the same time a personal Being, to whom the catechum^ could be related.
The superior moral life which was taught during the catechumenate
stemmed from the Christian idea that God had to be reverentially
feared; his 'children' should follow His will out of that mixture of love
and respect which characterised the paterfamilias/ filiifamiliae
relationship of Roman law.
The fear of God, as the basis of a right relationship with God throughout
the catechumenate, was an important concept for Tertullian, but to regard the
'judgment' of God as the judicial determination of a case before a Roman judge
for sentence does not seen to fit easily into Tertullian's thought. It would be of
course be wholly inappropriate to make this suggestion about the significance of
*
orat 2.2.5-6 and 2.4.11-12.
2
Specifically in apol 34, where Tertullian's point was that pater was a
more appropriate word in the family situation than dominus, because it carried
the element of affection which dominus lacked - gratius est nomen pietatis quam
potestatis. Etiam familiae magis patres quam domini uocantur, apol 34.2.7-8.
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the paterfamilias model without recognising the use by Tertullian, particularly in
de paenitentia, of the word judex about the relationship of man to God, for
example in chapter 2: Bonum factum deum habet debitorum, sicuti et malum,
quia iudex omnis remunerator est causae. At cum judex deus x. . .
Commentators have regularly used the opening chapters of this treatise to
2
"illustrate" a judicial relationship between man and God in Tertullian's thought.
What they have not always appreciated is the structure of the treatise de
paenitentia. Chapters 1 to 4 were introductory, speaking of paenitentia as a
virtue in general terms; from chapter 7 onward, Tertullian was dealing with
post-baptismal sin. It was only chapters 5 and 6 which professed to deal with
paenitentia as an initial conversio; only chapter 6 was directed expressly to
catechumens; the word iudex does not appear once in either of these chapters.
Care must therefore be taken not to transfer to the catechumenate stage,
concepts which were used by Tertullian for the Christian.
Having said that, and iiOieed in light of that, it is here suggested that
the mixture of discipline and yet affection which marked the attitude of a
paterfamilias toward those under his jurisdiction, seems to be reflected in
Tertullian's descriptions of God, such as the following, written in fact to Marcion,
but more widely applicable:
Vsque adeo iustitia etiam plenitudo est diuinitatis ipsius, exhibens deum
perfectum, et patrem et dominum, patrem dementia dominum disiplina,
patrem potestate blanda dominum seuera, patrem diligendum pie dominum
timendum necessarie, diligendum, quia malit misericordiam quam




For example, "The influence of Tertullian's legal training upon his
theology is particularly noticeable in his treatise De Poenitentia. The nature of
the subject here dealt with is such as to illustrate admirably the legal cast of his
thought....(i.e. God is the Judge administering justicqjL.God is, however, not only
the Judge who administers the law; He is the Giver of the law. It is because He
has commanded that man must obey....The fundamental relation of man to God is
that of fear (timor). Roberts, 0£. cit., p 28-29.
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paenitentiam peccatoris quam mortem, et timendum, quia no lit peccatores
sui iam non paenitentes. Ideo lex utrumque definit; diliges deum et: timebis
deum. Aliud obsecutori proposuit, aliud exorbitatori. 1
As soon as an enquirer associated himself with the Christian Church, he
exposed himself to the accusation, hurled by the pagans at the Christians, "non
licet esse vos". Whether Tertullian's earlier apologies were written against any
specific law condemning Christianity, as many French and Belgian scholars
2
believe, or whether the persecutions were based on the common law, a
catechumen's first step toward a 'right' relationship to God put him ipso facto
into a 'wrong' relationship with Roman law. However, as noted in chapter VL8
above, Tertullian contrasted, not compared, the relationship of the Christian to
God with the relationship of the Christian to Roman law, so the point need not




The voluminous literature on this topic was well reviewed by J.W. Ph.
Borleffs in "Institutum Neronianum", Vigiliae Christianae, 6 (1952), 129-145.
Borleffs believed that there was no specific legislation - "Tertullien ne souffle
mot de la base juridique des persecutions, d'une loi sur laquelle cette
condamnation aurait ete fondee, et institutum Neronianum prend virtuellement
le sens de coutume, d'usage de condamner et de punir les Chretiens" - p 144. It
must of course be added that in A.D. 202, Severus passed a law which forbade,
under severe penalties, conversion either to Judaism or to Christianity: "Judaeos
fieri sub gravi poena vetuit. Item etiam de Christianis sanxit" - Aelii Spartiani
Severus, c.17.
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VH.6 CONCLUSION FROM CHAPTER SEVEN
It was fundamental to Tertullian's theology that a sound basis for the
faith should be laid during the catechumenate. During it, pardon was still in
prospect and the fear of God had to be inculcated as the very basis of a correct
relationship. To emphasise and illustrate the fact that catechumens were still on
the fringe of the Christian faith, Tertullian distinguished between catechumens
and full members of the Church - only after baptism and admission to the
Eucharist could they enjoy a full relationship with God.
Tertullian therefore placed a stark choice before enquirers - and insisted
that they examine the religious implications of everything they did. In detail he
may have been too scrupulous, but his challenge was sound in principle. Modern
excuses like 'art for art's sake', *business is business', 'political necessity' would
have brought the retort from Tertullian that the catechumen should consider
what God offered and what God threatened, and then make up his mind which
way he wanted to go. There was no fence on which to sit, no halfway house.
The concept that men and women had to make a choice, when they
reached the age of responsibility, was common throughout antiquity. It was
sometimes symbolised by the letter Y, the vertical spike being the road common
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to all men until they reached the age of reason and responsibility, when they had
to choose between the right or the left branches. The former appeared from the
foot to be steep and rough - the hard road of virtue - but those who climbed it
would obtain at the summit a well-deserved rest."^ The other path appeared from
the foot to be level and pleasant, but it led to an abyss, into which those who
followed it would fall. There was therefore nothing novel in Tertullian's
application to the catechumenate of a choice between short-term and long-term
gain, and certainly nothing drawn directly from Roman law. What requires
more consideration, however, is the place of reverential fear in the relationship
of the catechumen to God.
When Tertullian challenged Marcion's concept of the God of the New
Testament as only loving and with no capacity to judge (section four, above) he
anticipated and rejected the Marcionite reply to such criticism -"absit, inquis,
absit!" 2 Tertullian's own understanding of God may well be defective here, in
the emphasis he placed on the fear of punishment and the hope of reward as the
basis of the relationship; the love of God is diminished if one overemphasises His
judgment and retributive righteousness. This chapter is not concerned to strike
the correct balance between the goodness of God and the justice of God, but it is
concerned with the view, evidenced by the quotations in the preface to the
thesis, that Tertullian taught reverential fear in these circumstances because of
his own legal training. Many of these general statements are applicable only
when merit and satisfaction enter into the relationship, that is when the
forgiveness of postbaptismal sin is under discussion. However, confining the
The illustration on the previous page of this 'Y' concept was reproduced
photographically from an ancient funeral relief by August Brinkmann in "Ein
Denkmal des Neupythagoreismus", Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie, 66 (1911),
622. The photograph shows, in the bottom part of the stele, a dead man
accomplishing the labours of his career; at the top of the stone he is shown




enquiry to the relationship between the catechumen and God, and bearing in
C
mind the signif^knce in Roman life of the patriapotestas, it is here suggested
that this, rather than the judicial model, reflects Tertullian's view. Judgmental
systems operated in the home and in the family, where the Roman father had the
unquestioned right to decide how the family should be run, yet his discipline was
exercised within the context of a personal relationship with those under his
control. So, at the same time as the catechumen was being taught the fear of
God to bring him to the commencement of paenitentia, he was being taught that
there was an attainable goal, a worth-while goal, namely that God would, under
certain conditions, establish a new relationship with men. What the catechumen
had to do if he wished to move toward that relationship is considered in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT - THE RELATIONSHIP DURING THE CATECHUMENATE
Vm.l INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER EIGHT
Tertullian's chief concern for catechumens was to prepare them for the
worthy and profitable reception of the sacrament of baptism. Accordingly the
durarton of their catechumenate was variable, depending on the aptitude, the age
and the circumstances of the candidate - itague pro cuiusque personae
condicione ac dispositione, etiam aetate cunctatio baptismi utilior est .^
Most scholarly comment on that passage consists of cross references to
the practices at Rome and at Alexandria, as described by Hippolytus, Clement
and Origin. The only substantial investigation into the views of Tertullian
himself appears to be that of Dekkers, whose valuable chapter on the preparation
2
of catechumens includes the comment that:
De duur van den voorbereidingstijd voor het Doopsel was niet strikt bepaald,
maar werd aangepast aan den stand, de gesteltenissen en ook aan den
ouderdom van iederen geloofsieerling; doch de strenge moralist, die reeds
voor het Doopsel een volledige zedelijke bekering eiste en slechts met
tegenzin sprak over een vergeving van de zonden, die na het Doopsel werden
begaan, gaf onomwonden zijn voorkeur te kennen voor een langeren
voorbereidingstijd: "Pro cuiusque personae condicione ac dispositione, etiam
aetate, cunctatio baptismi utilior est" (De bapt. 18). Vooral kinderen zal




Dekkers, op. cit., pp 164-166. Since Dutch does not appear to be
widely used in patristic writings, the liberty is taken of offering a rough
translation of the passage: "The length of the preparation time for baptism was
not fixed, but it was adapted to the rank, circumstances and age of each
catechumen, but the strict moralist who alread_y demanded a full moral
conversion before baptism and who only spoke with dislike about a forgiveness of
the sins which were committed after baptism, stated frankly his preference for a
longer time of preparation: (Pro - 18). Especially children should not be
admitted too early: (Veniant - ibid). With great care he states why the
Ethiopian eunuch and St. Paul were baptised so quickly. At the other hand he
laughs at the eleusinian mysteries and their 5 year long time of preparation
which he compares with the secrecy of the Valentinians: (Diutius - 177); he also
reacts against those who postpone baptism to be able to enjoy as long as possible
a sinful life: (Omne -24); Furthermore he protests against the action of
Marcion, who (neminem -451).
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cum Christum nosse potuerint" (ibid.). Met zorg verklaart T. waarom de
ethiopische eunuch en Paulus zo spoedig gedoopt werden. Anderzijds lacht
hij toch met de eleusinische mysterien en hun vijfjarigen voorbereidingstijd,
waarmede hij de geheimdoenerij van de Valentinianen vergelijkt: "Diutius
initiant quam consignant, cum epoptas ante quinquennium instituunt" (Adv.
Val. 1_); ook reageert hij tegen hen, die het Doopsel uitstellen om zolang
mogelijk van een zondig leven te genieten: Omne praeterea cunctationis et
tergiversationis erga paenitentiam vitium praesumptio intinctionis importat.
Certi enim indubitatae veniae delictorum, medium tempus interim furantur
et commeatum sibi faciunt deliquendi quam eruditionem non delinquendi"
(De paen. 6,3); verder protesteert hij tegen de handelwijze van Marcion, die
"neminem tingit, nisi caelibem aut spadonem, morti aut repudio baptisma
servat" (Adv. Marc. IV,11).
When a candidate's preparedness %£ baptism had been established, he was
no longer catechumenus, because his instruction was complete, and he joined the
ingressuri baptismum,^ those actively preparing for baptism. (Their special
relationship to God is examined in section five of this chapter.) Until then,
2 3
candidates were variously described by Tertullian as catechumeni, audientes,
4 5
auditores or nouitioli; on one occasion Tertullian included catechumens among
the fideles^ but normally he used "fideles" only for those who had been baptised
and who were taking part in the Eucharist.
bapt 20.1.1. Later in the same chapter he addressed them as
benedicti, normally used by Tertullian without reference to catechumens, but in
this context it must mean them - benedicti quos gratia dei expectat, cum de illo
sanctissimo lauacro noui natalis a^enditis - bapt 20.5.28-29.
^
cor 2.1.3; praes 41.2.4-5; praes 41.4.12-13. The adoption by Latin -
Tertullian is the earliest example - of this Greek word was set out in detail by
Matti Antero Sainio, Semasiologische Untersuchungen Uber Die Entstehung Per
Christlichen Latinitat, (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1940).
3




paen 6.1.4. - the first reference in Christian literature to religious
recruits as 'novices', an expression which shows rather more compassion toward
them than Tertullian's critics normally allow.
^
omnes (fideles) ita obseruant a catechuemnis usque ad confessors et
martyras. - cor 2.1.2-3.
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Tertullian referred to the catechumenate as a whole as tirocinium.
Within it there may have been, at Carthage, some distinction between:-
(1) those who had just entered their period of probation,^
(2) those who had been accepted into much of the life of the Church without
any immediate intention of being baptised, (a group of which Tertullian
did not approve; while he would never hasten a catechumen to baptism
before he was ready for it, he expressed strong disapproval of
catechumens who were not steadily moving toward baptism and full
membership of the Church), and
(3) those who had sufficiently advanced in Christian knowledge and practice
to be making active preparations for baptism - the ingressuri baptismum
mentioned above.
Many attempts have been made not only to identify such groupings within the
catechumenate as described by Tertullian, but even to classify the audientes as a
3
distinct group, not members of the catechumenate at all; that is not
paen 6.14.53. The 'tirocinium' was defined by Charlton T. Lewis and
Charles Short (A Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879) as "the first
military service or first campaign of a young soldier", "young troops, raw forces,
recruits", hence, more generally, "the first beginning of anything." (abbreviated)
^
Examined in chapter VII.3 above.
^
Suicer divided the catechumens into two classes, one called
"audientes", who had only begun to hear the Word of God; the other
"competentes", who had made such advances in Christian knowledge and practice
as to be qualified to appear at the font -(Joannes Caspar Suicer, Thesaurus
Ecclesiasticus e^ patribus Graecis, ordine alphabetico exhibens quaecumque
phrases, ritus, dogmata, haereses et hujusmodi alia spectant. (3rd ed.;
Amsterdam: 1746) II, 72). Dekkers went to the other extreme -
Het feit T. enkel in het De paenitentia, dat zich waarschijnlijk tot deze
uitverkoren catechumenen richt, het woord ,,audientes" bezigt, terwijl
hij overal elders ,,catechumeni" zegt en tevens dezen laatsten term
zonder meer gebruikt als tegenhanger van ,,fidelis", maakt het
waarschijnlijk dat ,,catechumenus" de algemene naam was voor alien, die
wensten gedoopt te worden, terwijl ,,audiens" of ,,auditor" voorbehouden
was voor diegenen onder de geloofsleerlingen, die zich reeds op een
spoedig ontvangen van het Doopsel voorbereidden, de eigenlijke
,,ingressuri baptismum", (op. cit., p 168-169).
A rough translation of the quotation is: "The fact that Tertullian only in the de
(continued on next page)
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investigated here, because there seems to be no evidence in Tertullian's writings,
especially in light of the conclusions of chapter 7 above, that even if there were
different groups, they stood in any distinctive relationship to God, distinctive
that is from catechumens as a whole.
Furthermore, there is no suggestion that Tertullian's interest was
divided, as appears to have been the case with the catechists at Alexandra and
Antioch, between those who were to be initiated into the higher mysteries of the
Christian faith, and the 'ordinary' carechumens, who formed the great body of
believers. In de praescriptione haereticorum Chapter 26, Tertullian denounced
the heretics for attempting to make such distinctions; he maintained that all
who were to be admitted to baptism were entitled to the same instruction into
the mysteries of the faith. Just as he had argued that the natural knowledge of
God was available to all by the testimonium animae, so he believed that this
further step in a man's relationship with God, the introduction to the regula
fidei, was to be given equally to all genuine enquirers in so far as they were able
to receive it.
There were apparently two basic ingredients of the catechumenate -
instruction in the doctrine of the church, examined in section two of this chapter
and paenitentia prima,examined in section three.
... in fides God teaches intellectual truth - the truth of Himself and his
works - the content of that right belief which it is necessary for man to hold
in order to be saved, disciplina teaches practical truth, the things to be done
or not to be done, for performance and observation, for the good life
necessary for salvation. 1
footnote 3 continued:
paenitentia which is probably directed to the elected catechumens, uses the word
"audientes" while at other places he speaks of "catechumeni" and also uses this
last term as the counterpart of "fidelis", makes it probable that "catechumenus"
was the general name for all those who wished to be baptised, while "audiens" or
"auditor" was reserved for those among the pupils who were preparing
themselves for an early baptism, the real "ingressuri baptismum", (translation
mine). Le Saint listed the earlier literature on this debate, op. cit., p 161.
E. Langstadt, "Tertullian's Doctrine of Sin and the Power of Absolution
in de pudicitia", in Studia Patristica II (1957), 253. Although written about post-
baptismal sin, the quotation above is an apt summary of the two areas of
instruction for the catechumen.
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In opening his treatise de spectaculis, Tertullian declared that to catechumens
(qui cum maxime ad deum acceditis) as well as those who had already been
baptised (qui iam accessisse uos testificati et confessi estis) he would explain the
essence of the Christian faith (qui status fidei), the nature of truth (quae ratio
veritatis), the precepts for Christian morals (quod praescriptum disciplinae) -all
of which forbad visiting the shows. This might seem to imply three, not two,
areas for the catechumens' instruction, but a closer look^ makes it clear that
Tertullian has expressed the same idea twice in different terms, for the sake of
rhetorical effect, and that status fidei is here virtually synonymous with ratio
ver_,itatis. Unless and until the catechumen had been instructed and tested in
both of these areas, he would not make that progress in his relationship with God
which would bring him, in baptism, to the forgiveness of sins.
Tertullian's insistence that salvation could be found only in the church,
and not in heretical movements calling themselves Christian, is looked at in
section four, followed in section five by an examination of the distinctive
relationship to God during the short period of final preparation for baptism. In
light of all that has then been said, section six then seeks to set out the
relationship of paenitentia prima to baptism and of both to the work of Christ.
Finally, such Roman law as is relevant to this area is mentioned (section seven)
and conclusions are drawn in section eight.
It would, however, be inappropriate to imply that this period of initiation
consisted only of intellectual and moral training. The prepa^ion was at heart
spiritual; de oratione seems to have been written with catechumens especially in
mind and prayer was a spiritual exercise which depended for its worth on the
right mind and right intention of the suppliant. That was precisely the attitude
towards God which Tertullian tried to implant in the heart of all the
catechumens under his instruction.
Pieter Gijsbertus van der Nat, "Tertullianea 13 - the Structure of De
Spectaculis", Vigiliae Christianae, 18 (1964), 138. A similar case is found in the
opening sentence of idol: Principale crimen generis humani, summus saeculi
reatus, tota causa iudicii idololatria (idol 1.1.3-4). Here too, the first two
expressions are virtually synonymous.
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Vm.2 INSTRUCTION IN THE REGULA FIDEI
"Le candidat au christianisme doit accepter l'enseignement traditionnel,
tel qu'il lui est donne par l'Eglise et cet enseignement comporte un certain
nombre de dogmes qui s'imposent a lui sans reserve".* Whether the enquirer
came to the catechumenate with very little understanding of the Christian faith,
or whether he had some prior knowledge of it, one of the first duties of the
catechist was to ground the enquirer in certain doctrines of the faith. No
examples of actual catechetical instructions have survived from the ante-Nicene
age, but it appears that catechumens were expected to answer questions on
doctrine, over and above the actual formula put to them at baptism."* From the
opening paragraph of de spectaculis, it appears that fairly detailed instruction
was envisaged, in which the status fidei, the ratio veritatis, (together with the
praecepta disciplinae) were taught. Certainly the candidate was expected to
have some understanding of the trinitarian formula used in the baptismal
ceremony, which was fundamental for his becoming a Christian. At the same
time, the catechist would no doubt set out, at least in outline, what truths were
certain, what speculations were allowable and which heresies were to be avoided.
The main heads a£ teaching and the way in which they were put together
3 4for practical purposes, are contained in the regula fidei - (or regula veritatis ) -
*
Gustave Bardy, La Conversion au Christianisme durant les Premiers
Siecles, (Paris, Aubier, 1949) p 171.
^
Jose-Maria Restreop-Jaramillo sought to demonstrate this in
'Tertuliano y la doble formula en ei simibolo apostolico', Gregorianum 15 (1934),
3-58, especially at p 36. Whether the catechumens had to learn some formula
by heart, or whether they affirmed their belief in it by responses, there is no
indication, but no catechumen was exempted from answering detailed questions
on doctrine, in Tertullian's ideal at least. The regula fidei or something like it
must have been explained and rehearsed until the catechumen knew it
thoroughly.
Tertullian's use of the word regula was fully set out by Ellen Fles^man-
van Leer, Tradition and Scripture (Assen: van Gorcum, 1954) pp 161-170. She
demonstrated that while a single doctrine could be designated as a "regula fidei",
so that Tertullian could speak of "regulae" in the plural to designate various
(continued overleaf, together with footnote 4)
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a summary exposition of the chief headings of revealed doctrine, variable in its
precise wording^ but immutable in its dogmatic substance, quam ecclesiae ab
apostolis, apostoli a Christo, Christus a Deo teadidit.2 These were the
specifically Christian doctrines, which a catechumen had to accept, not just to
improve his intellectual understanding of the faith but in order to secure a saving
relationship with God.
Cum enim quaerunt adhuc, nondum tenent; cum autem nondum tenent,
nondum crediderunt; cum autem nondum crediderunt non sunt christiani. 3
footnote 3 and 4 continued:
doctrines of the Christian tradition, "regula" with Tertullian was mainly equated
with Christian doctrine in its totality. "So we can say that the regula is a
summary, formulated according to the need of the moment, of the entire
christian faith." (p 165). The "regula fidei" was therefore the content of the
faith or - which is the same - the whole educational content of the Holy
Scriptures which had been faithfully preserved in the apostolic communities.
The matter was also usefully discussed by Bergt Hagglund, 'Die Bedeutung der
'regula Fidei' als Grundlage theologischer Aussagen', Studia Theologica, 12 (1958)
19-29.
4
In apol 47.10.41 (only) Tertullian used that word as a synonym for
regula^fidei.
*
Tertullian's shortest summary of the Ri^e (virg 1.3.17-23) includes just
three items: belief in one God, Creator of the Universe; belief in Jesus Christ,
born of the Virgin Mary and Son of the Creator-God; and belief in the
resurrection of the flesh. These heads of belief were, however, capable of
expansion, to meet the circumstances of any particular challenge. The Rule set
out in praes. 13.1.1-5.16 is much longer and is clearly anti-Gnostic, with a strong
emphasis on the fact that the one God is Creator, and on the relity of the human
nature of Christ (against docetism). The rule was stated rather differently
again in Prax 2.1.1-16 to meet the Sabellianism of Praxeas, and Tertullian there
introduced expressions to define a doctrine of the Trinity and to specify the
nature of the incarnate Word. The order in which the dogmata are enumerated
is basically the same in all three (they are set out in parallel columns in E.
Evans, Tertullian's Treatise against Praxeas, (London: S.P.C.K., 1948 p 189-192).
It should be noted that "Es ist gar kein Widerspruch, wenn die 'regula' in einem
Falle auf ein einziges Dogma, in einem anderen Falle auf eine kurse
Zusammenfassung der ganzen christlichen Lehre oder auf den inneren Gehalt der
gottlichen Offenbarung hindeutet. Es ist der Glaube selbst (sozusagen die 'fides
quae crediture'), oder die gottliche Offenbarung als solche, die als 'regula' im
eigentlichen Sinne (nach Flesseman-van Leer 'Regula' im Unterschied zur






quibus competat fides ipsa, cuius sint scripturae, a quo et per quos et quando
et quibus sit tradita disciplina qua fiunt christiani. 1
Adeo non erit Christianus qui earn negabit, quam confitentur Christiani, et
his argument is negabit, quibus utuntur non Christiani. 2
Marcion, who at one time had repudiated the physical birthjChrist and the events
surrounding it, was, by his own action (in denying these basic Christian beliefs)
no longer a Christian - non es Christianus, non credepo quod creditum
3
Christianos facit .
The insistence of the Church, that catechumens should accept certain
basic doctrines, might be explained as an attempt to safeguard the Church
against heresy, but Tertullian went fair beyond that - his purpose was to
communicate to the catechumen the true revelation by God of Himself, so that
the catechumen could enter into a new and saving relationship with God. As
Tertullian put it in another context - Non est leuior transgressio in
4
interpretatione quam in conuersatione. Fiducia had to be preceded by at least
some grasp of fides - i.e. the regula fidei - because fiducia was the inner
conviction and godward relation only of those who had accepted the Rule of
5
Faith. Immo neque Iudaeos, conuertere neque ethnicos indueere potuissent










Fides in Tertullian appears to be the formal content of the faith, while
fiducia is the personal commitment to God - or at least so it appears from
Tertullian's discription of the content and purpose of Christian worship in apol 39
- Certe fidem Sanctis uocibus pascimus, spem erigimus, fiduciam figimus,
disciplinam praeceptorum nihilominus inculcationibus densamus: apol 39.3.11-14,




adequately taught about God, he could neither enter into nor maintain a
meaningful relationship with Him - he would face the problems of those who
credidisse contenti, non exploratis rationibus traditionum temptabilem fidem
per imperitiam portant
The task of the catechist was therefore to be satisfied that the
catechumen had, according to his intellectual capacity, accepted the meaning
and the implications of the Christian faith. Tertullian not only urged that great
care should be taken to admit no one to the ceremony of baptism who had not
2
been adequately prepared for it - he also urged that the content of what was
taught should be only the regula fidei as it had been received by the instructor on
the authority of the Church, the apostles, and of Christ, and delivered by him
with no less authority to his catechumens. The catechumen had to see that the
Rule took priority over any other ideas, however good, which he had brought with
him or which might have picked up elsewhere. Within the terms of the Rule of
Faith, he could debate and question, but only within its terms - haec regula a
Christo, ut probabitur, instituta nullas habet apud nos quaestiones nisi quas
3haereses inferunt et quae haereticos faciunt . What Tertullian wrote in other
contexts could well be applied to the catechumenate - urguemur a communione




Part of the attraction of gnosticism was that it claimed to
communicate secret knowledge to its adherents. It was the gnostics' practice
(for which they were severely criticised by Tertullian) to baptise first and to
instruct afterwards. Applicants for baptism and Church membership had to be
given a clear understanding of the God with whom they sought a relationship in
baptism. For those coming from a pagan background, the catechist had not only
to teach the convert the basic doctrines of the Christian faith, but, to avoid
synchretism, had also to persuade the catechumen to abondon and renounce the
ideas of his pagan ancestors.
3
praes 13.6.16-18. One of the characteristics of the rule of faith
emphasised by Tertullian was its "totality"; the "regula fidei" contained the




Nos definimus deum primo natura cognoscendum, dehinc doctrina
recognoscendum, ex operibus, doctrina ex praedictionibus. ^ The catechumen was
therefore first instructed, and then tested, in the basic doctrines of the Christian
Faith, until the catechist was sure that the catechumen accepted the Rule of
Faith as his belief. When a man accepted there articles he stood on Christian
ground, and the recognition of them brought him to the state of mind called
Faith. "Mais la conviction intellectuelle ne suffit pas; l'essentiel est de
provoquer a cet approfondissement de la conversion qui est la. loi meme d'une foi
2
vivante. The other aspect of the catechumenate was to learn the discipline of




Jacques Fontaine, Q. Septimi Florentis Tertulliani de Corona
(Tertullien sur la couronne), (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966) p 9.
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Vm.3 PAENITENTIA PRIMA
The duty of the catechist was not only to teach sound doctrine to the
enquirer after the Christian faith; of equal importance was his duty to teach, and
to supervise, the performance of paenitentia prima.^ Before the content of that
is examined, brief reference should he made to the word 'disciplina'. Further use
of the word will deliberately be avoided after this paragraph, for two reasons.
First, while Tertullian used it most commonly as the complement or couple of
regula fidei (which had a fixed and delimited content), in which case all the rest
of the Christian faith (moral laws, rites, disciplinary problems and doctrinal
questions which were susceptible to development under the guidance of the
Spirit) were denoted by disciplina, ^he sometimes used disciplina for the whole of
3 4
Christianity, sometimes for one particular doctrine and sometimes for the
5
practice of the faith as opposed to the doctrine of the faith. Secondly,
Tertullian used the word disciplina chiefly in reference to Christians, so while
catechumens were no doubt given some insight into the obligations which would
be incumbent on them when they joined the faithful in full membership of the
For the spelling paenitentia rather than poenitentia, see Stephan W.J.
Teeuwen "De voce paenitentia apud Tertullianum", Mnemosyne, 55 (1927), 419.
The phrase paenitentia prima does not appear in Tertullian's works, but three
times he used paenitentia secunda - paen 7.10.36; paen 7.12.46; paen 9.1.1 - so
paenitentia prima is a useful way of referring to the repentance of conversion,
before entry in the Church, the paenitentia of catechumens, where forgiveness
was freely obtained and sealed in baptismby the Church. Paenitentia secunda,
by contrast, was the penance of the sinner after conversion, within the Church,
the paenitentia of the Christian, where forgiveness was painstakingly obtained
and sometimes not recognised by the Church during the life-time of the penitent.
^
Valentin Morel, "Disciplina - le mot et l'idee representee par lui dans
les oeuvres de Tertullien", Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, 40 (1944-45), 17-24.
^
ibid, 14-16; also the same author in "Le development de la 'discipltna'







Church, it seems appropriate, for both of the reasons mentioned, to refer to the
practical instruction of catechumens only under the title paenitentia prima.
There were compelling practical reasons ^why the Church should
supervise the conduct of a catechumen and reject his application for baptism, if
he failed to pass her scrutiny, but Tertullian's requirements went far beyond any
reasonable apprehension that the Church might be discredited. He believed that
a catechumen would fail to establish a saving relationship with God if he did not
only undertake paenitentia^ but also persevere with it right up to the time of his
baptism. The task of the catechist was therefore two-fold. He had to teach the
catechumen the distinctive features of Christian paenitentia, and at the same
time he had to supervise the catechumen, as far as it was humanly possible, to
ensure that the teaching was carried out in practice.
Tertullian was concerned that Church members should not bring
discredit on the Church. He invited (and wanted to be able to invite) the critics
of Christianity to go into the prisons, and to inspect the criminal records: among
the murderers, thieves and debauchees, how many would they find who would at
the same time be noted as Christians? Not a single one. In the apologeticum
and ad Scapulam, he confidently asserted that Christians were honest citizens,
prompt tax-payers, and loyal to the Emperor. His fight to secure toleration for
the Church would be discredited if members of the Church were brought before
the courts on criminal charges, particularly if charged with crimes which
threatened the welfare of the State. He recognised that, inevitably, a few
would be received into the Church and then prove an embarrassment to her, but
it was important to him to keep these renegades to a tiny minority of members -
Maior boni portio modico malo ad testimonium sui utitur. Cum tamen aliquos de
nostris malos probatis, iam hoc ipso Christianos non probatis. Quaerite sectam
cui malitiae deputatur. Ipsi in conloquio, si quando aduersus nos, "cur ille,"
inquitis, "fraudator, si abstinentes Christiana ? cur immitis, si misericordes?" - I
nat 5.3.19-5.24.
^
No attempt is made here to translate 'paenitentia'. Some editors have
used the English words 'repentance' and 'penance' for paenitentia prima and
paenitentia secunda respectively, with a third word, 'penitence' when both
concepts seem to be intended. There is no one word which will adequately
convey all that Tertullian meant by paenitentia, and to leave it in Latin avoids
the problems which Saint ran into when he wrote, "In the translation
'repentance', 'penance', and 'penitence' will be used as seems most appropriate in
each context." (op. cit. p 135). His reviewers did not approve of his choice of
what was appropriate in each context - particularly Ernest Evans, in the Journal
of Ecclesiastical History, 11 (I960), 228-229.
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Paenitentia was a common enough concept and the word was in everyday-
use in Tertullian's time (although not found in classical Latin), so Tertullian had
first of all to teach his catechumens the difference between the Christian and
the pagan uses of the word.^ He singled out three distinctive features of
Christian paenitentia:
(a) Christian paenitentia always made men better, for Christians never
repented of good opinions, but only of bad ones; pagan paenitentia could,
ironically, make men worse instead of better - Quam autem in paenitentiae
actu inrationabiliter deuersentur, uel uno isto satis erit expedire, cum illam
etiam in bonis factis suis adhibent.^ When they were rebuffed, they
repented that they had shown loyalty, love, generosity, patience, mercy and
similar virtues; because they had been slighted, they resolved never to do
3
good again. Christian paenitentia by contrast could never grieve for a good
deed and would never repent of what was good in order to adopt what was
evil.
Ceterum ratio eius, quam cognito domino discimus, certam formam tenet,
ne bonis umquam factis cogitatisue quasi uiolenta aliqua manus jniciatur.
Deus enim reprobationem benorum ratam non habet utpote suorum.
Paenitentiam hoc genus homines quod et ipsi retro fuimus, caeci sine
domini lumine, natura tenus norunt passionem animi quandam esse quae obueniat
de offensa sententiae prioris - paen 1.1.2-5.
ignorantes quique deum quoque eius ignorent necesse est quia nullius omnino
thesaurus extraneis patet - paen 1.3.9-10.
Samuel McComb in the article 'Repentance' in Hasting's Encyclopaedia of
Religion and Ethics, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1918) vol 10, at p 734, criticised
Tertullian for introducing into theology an imperfect understanding of Christian
paenitentia, giving the above passages as Tertullian's definition of repentance.
Tertullian, however, was deliberately setting out the pagan concept of
repentance, in order to contrast it (in the following chapter) with the Christian
concept, and to reject the pagan concept as inadequate. Tertullian wanted to
make it clear that no one could understand Christian paenitentia unless he had
been taught it by a Christian.
^






Those who undertook Christian paeqtentia would sin less and less frequently,
because under Christian tuition they would acquire a right understanding of
paenitentia and would realise that it had to be restricted to things that were
sinful* - ... ita in paenitentiae quoque causa iustitiam deo praestandam esse?
2
Quod guidem ita impleri licebit, si peccatis solummodo adhibeatur.
(b) Christian paenitentia was always directed towards God.
The second distinction between pagan and Christian paenitentia was that
Christian paenitentia was directed toward God, whereas pagan paenitentia
gave no place to the offensiveness of the past action in the sight of God.
(The nearest which classical Latin had got to the concept of paenitentia was
the impersonal sense of remorse represented by phrases like poenitet me or
pudet me.) Christian paenitentia, by contrast, was performed to restore a
sinner to a right relationship with God and it was not only directed toward
God, but it was accepted by Him - Omnibus ergo delictis . . . ueniam per
3
paenitentiam spopondit .... Christian paenitentia was required only
because the relationship with God had been disrupted, and the purpose of
such paenitentia was to restore the sinner to the friendship of God and so to
effect his salvation.
(c) Christian paenitentia always had practical outworkings.
Christian paenitentia was further distinguished from pagan paenitentia in
that the latter might be nothing more than a passio animi quandam . . .
4
quae obveniat de offensa sententiae prioris. Tertullian stressed,









always involved conversio, an actio as well as a passio; it was something one
did, not simply something one felt or experienced - figere paenitentiam in
corde; paenitentiam incubare; in actu paenitentiae; per paenitentiam
delinquere, recte facere. It is true - as these expressions show - that
paenitentia could be, even for pagans, an activity and not merely a psychic
state, but for Tertullian the idea of passio animi was quite over-shadowed by
the conversio of life, which he regarded as essential if paenitentia was to
bring a sinner to a new relationship with God. ubi emendatio nulla,
paenitentia necessario uana, quia caret fructu suo suo cui earn deus serult, id
est hominis salute.^
Since both body and soul had shared the guilt of sin, each must have its
part in the paenitentia which dealt with sin.^ Accordingly, both sorrow for sin
3
and conversio to a new way of life were required. It was quite wrong, Tertullian
believed, to say that conduct did not affect one's relationship to God, so long as
one's attitude purported to be reverent. To those who argued thus, Tertullian
wrote:
Sed aiunt quidam satis dominum habere si corde et animo suscipiatur, licet
actu minus fiat; itague se saluo metu et fide peccare, hoc est salua castitate
matrimonia uiolare, salua pietate parenti uenenum temperare. Sic ergo et
ipsi salua uenia in gehennam detrudentur. 4
Since it was no more possible to sin and at the same time to improve one's




This is the theme of de paenitentia chapter 3, summed up by
Tertullian himself in these words - Hoc eo praemisimus ut non minorem alteri
quam utrique parti, si quid deliquerit, paenitentiae necessitatem intellegamus
inpendere; communis reatus amborum est, communis et iudgx, deus scilicet;
communis igitur et paenitentiae medella - paen 3.7.25-29.
3
As illustrated by the verbs which he used - amplexari (4.2), inuadere
(2.13:4.2), capessere (6.1), cogere (2.10), adsumere (6.1), adhibere (2.12),




chastity, or to poison one's parents and to keep one's filial duty, the catechist
had not only to teach the catechumen the meaning of Christian paenitentia, but
he had to persuade the catechumen:-
(a) to undertake paenitentia in such a way that it would not only pass the
external scrutiny of the Church but would pass the scrutiny of God, who
Himself would examine the paenitentia, and
(b) to cover every aspect of his life in his paenitentia, and
(c) to persevere in that paenitentia right up to the moment of baptism.
These three, fundamental to establishing a right relationship with God,
are all brought out in one passage of de paenitentia; it will shortly be quoted in
full, and then the three aspects will be examined separately. It is a passage
which reflects Tertullian's determination to dispel any notion that the mere fact
of commencing, or even of appearing to complete, paenitentia prima could in
itself improve a catechumen's standing before God. He argued that God was not
obliged to honour paenitentia as such, even if it led the Church into baptising the
candidate; God would honour only paenitentia which passed His own scrutiny. As
a merchant examined a coin, to see whether it was clipped or plated or
counterfeit, before concluding a contract of sale, so the Lord would test
paenitentia, to see whether the catechumen had genuinely turned from sin,
before granting forgiveness of sin. The passage is quoted in full as it appears in
the text of Tertullian's works, but for clarity it is (artificially) divided into three
paragraphs to denote the three points to be examined, and these are taken up in
reverse order to the text; the passage reads as follows:
dicunt quidem pristinis renuntiare et paenitentiam adsumunt, sed includere
earn neglegunt. Interpellat enim illos ad desiderandum ex pristinis aliquid
ipse finis desiderandi, uelut poma, cum iam in acorem uel amaritudinem
senescere incipiunt, ex parte aliqua tamen adhuc ipsi gratiae suae adulantur.
Omne praeterea cunctationis et tergiuersationis erga paenitentiam uituium
praesumptio intinctionis inportat. Certi enim indubitatae ueniae delictorurn
medium tempus interim furantur et commeatum sibi faciunt delinquendi
quam eruditionem non delinquendi.
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Quam porro ineptum, quam peruersum paenitentiam noil adimplere et
ueniam delictorum sustinere, hoc est pretium non exhibere et ad merqem
manum emittere! Hoc enim pretio dominus ueniam addicere instituit, nac
paenitentiae conpensatione redimendam proponit inpunitatem. Si ergo qui
uenditant prius nummum quo paciscuntur examinant ne scalptus ne uersus ne
adulter, non etiam dominum credimus paenitentiae probationem prius inire
tantam nobis mercedem, perennis scilicet uitae, concessurum? 1
(a) Paenitentia was scrutinised by God Himself
The passages in which Tertullian emphasised that God looked at the
heart as well as the deed, looked behind the outward performance to the motive,
were listed in chapter VI.7. It is a relevant emphasis for this chapter also. The
lengthy passage just quoted concluded with the picture of God scrutinising
paenitentia as a merchant scrutinised a coin offered to him in a commercial
transaction, to see whether or not it was genuine.
To a degree, the Church could supervise the paenitentia of the
catechumen, but only to a degree. She could test his knowledge and life-style as
she saw them; she could refuse baptism if his understanding of the faith or if his
manner of life was not worthy of his profession of faith; but catechists could not
see into the hearts of their catechumens.^ So Tertullian warned catechumens
that a saving relationship with God, normally to be secured by baptism at the end
of the catechumenate, might elude the catechumen if he went through the forms
of paenitentia without a corresponding change of heart. The price at which the
Lord had agreed to sell (addicere) His merchandise (wenia delictorum) was
adimpletio paenitenitae. If the price was not paid, sin would not be forgiven. It
was no good to state publicly that one had given up the specious pleasures of the
world, if inwardly one was cultivating worldly desires. External paenitentia




Furto guidem adgredi et praepositum bjius rei adseuerationibus tuis
circumduci facile est - paen 6.10.39-40.
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to the catechumen the pardon of God, because such paenitentia was without one
of its essential elements, namely a change of heart toward God.
(b) Paenitentia had to cover every area of life
The second concern, which comes out of the centre section of the
passage quoted above, was lest any catechumens should omit certain areas of life
from their paenitentia. Teeuwen has shown,'' from an examination of various
expressions in de paenitentia chapter six, that Tertullian's concern here was for
those catechumens who were unwilling to give up completely a life of sin before
they were baptized, and not (as Oehler and Thelwall had believed) those who
failed to persevere to baptism - although that also was in Tertullian's mind, as is
examined below. This is not the place to itemise all the areas of life which
Tertullian believed should be covered in the preparation for baptism, as that
would lead to a full description of the life of the Christian, which is outside the
scope of this study; briefly, however, it appears that certain catechumens
believed Tertullian's requirements to be too exacting, because they suggested :
"differamus tantisper paenitentiae ueritatem: tunc opinor emendatos
licebit, cum absoluimur."
Tertullian replied:
Nullo pacto, sed cum pendente uenia poena prospicitur, cum adhuc liberari
non meremur, ut possimus mereri, cum deus comminatur, non eum ignoscit.
Quis enim seruus, posteaquam libertate mutatus est, furta sua et fugas sibi
imputat? quis miles, postquam castris suis emissus est, pro notis suis
satagit? Peccator ante ueniam deflere se debet, quia tempus paenitentiae
idem quod periculi et timoris. 2
Tertullian was concerned that if all areas of life were not brought under control
before baptism, sin would reappear, and so he insisted on virtually the full saving
relationship between the catechumen and God being established before baptism,
*
££• £11*' P 412-444.
^
paen 6.6.26-8.34. The relationship between paenitentia prima and
baptism is examined in Section VH3.6 below.
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indeed well before baptism. It gave the catechist the opportunity of assessing
whether the catechumen was ready to be presented for baptism,^ and it gave the
catechumen the opportunity of deciding whether he was ready to accept the
implications of baptism, because any reversion to his former pattern of
behaviour, after baptism, would destroy the improved relationship with God
which paenitentia had achieved.
Hoc enim dico, paenitentiam, quae per dei gratiam ostensa et indicta nobis
in gratiam nos domino reuocat, semel cognitam atque susceptam numquam
posthac iteratione delicti resignari oportere. Iam guidem nullum ignorantiae
praetextum patrocinatur tibi, quod domino adgnito praeceptisque eius
admissis, denique paenitentia delictorum functus, rursus te in delicta
restituis. 2
Since the time of the catechumenate was the time to lay the foundation for a
life-long relationship with God, it was important to dispel any notion that certain
areas of conduct, even if they did not involve the outside world, could be omitted
from paenitentia prima and be dealt with after baptism. The only paenitentia
which would make baptism effective, was paenitentiae. Veritas, in which all sin
was completely abandoned.
(c) Paenitentia must not be relaxed
Tertullian's third concern - although obviously the three shade into each
other and cannot be treated in isolation - was lest the catechumen should relax
paenitentia as he progressed through the catechumenate, particularly in the final
stages which led up to baptism : Nemo ergo sibi aduletur quia inter auditorum
3
tirocinia deputatur, quasi eo etiamnunc sibi delinquere liceat. Perilous indeed
The catechumenate, as a period of probation to test the sincerity of
the candidate's petition and to prove his ability to lead the sinless life demanded
of a Christian, has been examined by Franz Joseph Dolger, 'Das Garantiewerk
der Bekehrung als Bedingung und Sicherung bei der Annahme zur Taufe", in
Antike und Christentum, 3 (1932) 260-77 and by Eduard Schwartz, "Busstufen und
Katechumenatsklassen", in Gesammelte Schriften, Funfter Band, Berlin: Walter






was the spiritual state of the man who had started paenitentia but who failed to
maintain it, and even those inter auditorum tirocinia could not relax. The
formidable step of commencing paenitentia prima did not bring about a saving
relationship with God; it had to be persevered in, right through to baptism. The
catechumen had the prospect of the forgiveness of sins, of a relationship with
Jesus Christ, of the gift of the Spirit and entrance to the Church, but Tertullian
gave the catechumen no assurance that his response to the divine initiative at
any interim stage of the catechumenate was sufficient to merit the forgiveness
of sins. The burden lay with the catechumen to persevere with his paenitentia
right up to the time of baptism. The promise of the forgiveness of sin in baptism
did not entitle him to relax his paenitentia prima in any way, rashly anticipating
the pardon which he hoped to receive. Forgiveness could be achieved by
baptism, but only if the candidate had already ceased to sin; he was not to be
baptised in order that he might cease to sin. Whether this activity on the part of
the catechumen was regarded by Tertullian as making satisfactio (or
compensatio) to God will be taken up at the end of section Vm.5 below, and the
relationship of paenitentia prima to baptism will be examined in the section
after that.
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Vm.4 SALVATION WAS ONLY IN THE CHURCH
Tertullian drew several conclusions from the Pauline analogy of the
union of Christ and his Church with that of Adam and Eve , the most important
being that there could be only one Church: apostolus in ecclesiam et Christum
interpretatur 'erunt duo in unum carnem' secundum spiritales nuptias ecclesiae et
Christi - unus enim Christus et una eius ecclesia - . . . De uno matrimonio
censemur utrobique, et carnaliter in Adam et spiritaliter in Christo. ^ Although
that particular text comes from his Montanist period, Tertullian at all times
claimed for the Church the exclusive right to the sacraments which led to
salvation. He interpreted Matthew 28.19 as a directive given to the Church only
and used it to exclude heretical (or any other) baptism; the Church's monopoly of
2
salvation comes out in the comparison of her to a storm-tossed ship and in the
phrase,common in the early Fathers, extra ecclesiam nulla salus. Tertullian
dealt with this subject more fully in a Greek treatise, no longer extant, but if a
heretic had received baptism in his own sect, and then applied to join the
orthodox Church, Tertullian insisted that true baptism had to be administered to
him. No other baptism was valid, and the pretended baptism of heretics, by their
own sect, was null and void.
Vnum omnino baptismum est nobis tam ex domini euangelio quam et apostoli
litteris quoniam unus deus et unum baptismum et una ecclesia in caelis. Sed
Circa haereticos sane quae custodiendum sit, dignius qui retractet. Ad.nos
enim editum est, haeretici autem nullum consortium habent nostrae
disciplinae, quos extraneos utique testatur ipsa ademptio
communicationis. 3
It stood to reason that a man who was himself outside the Church could not
convey the forgiveness of sin or the Spirit in baptism, and thus an ex-heretic or
^
ex 5.3.16-19 and 4.22-23.
2
e.g. nauis ecclesiae - pud 13.20.79 and in arcae typo - idol 24.4.6.
3
bapt 15.1.4-2.10. (Circa has a capital C because (Sed) is in brackets in
the text).
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schismatic would have to be baptised anew when he came into the Church. Since
baptism, following on profession of faith, was a critical event, in Tertullian's
judgment, in establishing a right relationship with God, the Church effectively
controlled the means of salvation. The actions of the Church, performed in
God's name, were God's actions.
As far as is known, Tertulllian never devoted the sustained and precise
attention to thought about the Church that would have issued in a treatise "de
ecclesia", but it is very evident that his conception of the Church shifted with
his progress from orthodoxy to Montanism.* This will be looked at in detail in
Excursus Four, but here it can be briefly summarised by saying that in his pre-
Montanist days, he taught that the Church was a visible, magisterial and
hierarchical organisation, founded by Christ through the Apostles. As a
Montanist, Tertullian conceived of the true Church, the Church of the Spirit, as
an amorphous group within the external Church of the bishops. However, in both
of his conceptions of the Church, Tertullian upheld the claim of all the orthodox
writers of Christian antiquity, that the Church had not only the power to control
admission to baptism but that the Church had a monopoly of admission to valid
baptism. There was no valid baptism outside the Church, and (except for
martyrdom) no salvation without baptism. So not only did the Church hold that
baptism was essential for salvation, but the Church supervised the progress of
the enquirer through the catechumenate until the Church deemed that he or she
was ready for baptism. When the Church decided that the catechumen was
adequately instructed and had shown evidence of change of life, the time had
come for the final preparations for baptism. These (and their effect on the
relationship to God) are now examined.
*
Examined in Excursus Four.
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vm.5 THE FINAL STAGES OF PREPARATION FOR BAPTISM
When the catechumen had finished his period of probation and had
satisfied the Church that he was iam corde lotus, * he could in cases of necessity
or of danger of death or in times of persecution, receive baptism without further
delay:
sufficit scilicet et in necessitatibus ut utaris sicub i aut loci aut temporis aut
personae condicio compellit: tunc enim constantia succurrentis excipitur
cum urguetur circumstantia periclitantis, quoniam reus erit perditi hominis
si supersederit praestare quod libere potuit. 2
In such a situation, even a Christian layman (but never a woman) could baptise,
but he ought not to do so except in case of urgent necessity; the necessity arose
because without baptism, either of water or of blood, there was no assurance of
salvation. Normally, the minister of baptism would be the bishop or, with his
3
permission, a presbyter or deacon, and the usual time for baptizing was at
Easter:
Diem baptismo sollemniorem pascha praestat cum et passio domini in qua
tinguimur adimpleta est. Nec incongruenter ad figuram interpretabitur quod
cum ultimum pascha dominus esset acturus missis discipulis ad
praeparandum - Conuenietis, inquit, hominem aquam baiulantem - paschae
celebrandae locum de signo aquae ostendit. 4






Dandi guidem summum habet ius summus sacerdos, si qui est, epis|3pus;
dehinc presbyteri et diaconi, non tamen sine episcopi auctoritate, propter
ecclesiae honorem quo saluo salua pax est. Alioquin etiam laicis ius est - bapt
17.1.3-2.6. Later, in ex 7, he argued that since a layman could administer
baptism in cases of emergency where no clergyman was available, and since a
priest was not allowed to contract a second marriage, being ipso facto deprived
of his priestly functions if he did, a layman also should avoid taking a second





Maundy Thursday to midday or sunset on Saturday;1 baptism at Carthage took
place on the Saturday evening. (The Roman custom, according to Hippolytus,
2
was to baptize at cockcrow on Easter day. ) Pentecost was the next most
suitable time for those who through indisposition or amy other reason could not
be baptised at Easter, but by this Tertullian did not mean only the fiftieth day
after Easter. The later custom was to baptize on the eve of the day of
Pentecost, but Tertullian regarded this whole period (spatium) of fifty days
between Easter and the day of Pentecost as suitable because it all
3commemorated the post-resurrection appearances of Christ. The practice of
restricting the normal times for baptism to Easter and to Pentecost no doubt not
only gave solemnity to the rite, but also enabled the bishop to act as the chief
minister at baptism. However, Tertullian was careful to point out that Ceterum
omnis dies domini est, omnis hora, omne tempus habile baptimo: si de
4sollemnitate interest, de gratia nihil refert.
Whenever the appointed time for baptism approached, those ingressuri
5
baptismum had to increase their personal opera paenitentiae in anticipation
that the devil, sensing that his prey would shortly escape him, would attempt a
a
last assult to hold him; so in the days leading up to baptism, the catechumen had
A
to redouble his vigilance, and to protect himself from the devil by frequent
Schiimmer, Johannes, Die Altchristliche Fastenpraxis mit besonderer




Exinde pentecoste ordijandis lauacris laetissimum spatium est quo et
domini resurrectio inter discipulos frequentata est et gratia spiritus sancti




bapt 20.1.1. At Rome they were called electi; in Africa generally
they were called competentes, but Tertullian designated them simply as
ingressuri baptismum: Christine Mohrmann, Die altchristliche Sondersprache in
den Sermones des HI. Augustin, (Nijmegen: Dekker und van de Vegt, 1932), p 90
and Dekkers, o£. cit., pp 167-69.
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prayers, fasts and vigils:
orationibus crebris, ieiuniis et geniculationibus et peruigiliis orare opertet et
cum confessione omnium retro delictorum, ut exponant etiam baptismum
Iohannis. 1
The final stages of preparation for baptism were critical for establishing a
correct relationship with God for the years that lay ahead - the devil's attempts
to undo the work of baptism would be violent and persistent; the answer provided
by God and offered by Tertullian was the solid foundation laid in the paenitentia
prima of the catechumentate. Only if he was thoroughly grounded in the faith
could he resist every weapon of temptation which the devil would use to try to
overpower and captivate once more his former slave:
si qua possit aut oculos concupiscentia carnali ferire aut animum inlecebris
saecularibus inretire aut fidem terrenae potestatis formidine euertere aut a
uia certa peruersis traditionibus detorquere. 2
This second phase of the catechumenate was probably of short duration -
perhaps it coincided with the weeks of Lent, leading up to baptism at
Eastertide - and it may have been supervised, perhaps even examined, by the
bishop himself.3 Whether these fasts, vigils and prostrations had, as their goal,
the attraction of God's mercy, i.e. whether they made any actual contribution to
the forgiveness of sins, or whether they merely provided outward evidence to the
bishop of the inward and spiritual state which was required of the catechumen
before admission to baptism, is difficult to decide on the scant evidence provided
by Tertullian. simul enim de pristinis satisfacimus conflictatione carnis et
4
spiritus, et subsecuturis temptationibus munimenta praestruimus. Saint










actual forgiveness of sin; it is a question of whether satisfacimus yet meant
more thati "express contrition"; in later years, it came to mean "satisfaction to
the Divine Justice" but this legal view of the relation of the sinner to God does
2 3
not seem to be in Tertullian's mind. Certainly Poschmann and Teeuwen
thought not - they saw these opera paenitentiae. simply as a progression in the
paenitentia which began with the turning away from sin and which would be
sealed by receiving the sacrament of baptism. This topic is, however, better
explored when the relationship between paenitentia prima, baptism and the
merits of Christ is looked at detail in the next section.
^
Saint, ££. cit., p 153.
^
Bernard Poschmann, Per Ablass im Licht der Bussgeschichte, (Bonn: P.
Hanstein, 1948) p 1 ff.
3
Teeuwen op. cit., p 415.
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vm.6 THE RELATIONSHIP OF PAENITENTIA PRIMA TO BAPTISM AND OF
BOTH TO THE MERITS OF CHRIST, IN DETERMINING THE
RELATIONSHIP OF MAN TO GOD
The whole process of conversion, including both the subjective element
of turning away from sin in personal penitence and the objective element
supplied by the external rite of baptism, is sometimes collectively described in
Tertullian's terminology as the prima plancq salutis or as paenitentia prima. This
section uses the words paenitentia prima in the more restricted sense of the
sinner's subjective reaction against his sin and guilt, a reaction which is here
described simply as paenitentia.
Tertullian believed, with great sincerity, and at one and the same time,
that
(a) paenitentia was essential for salvation
Omnibus ergo delictis seu carne seu spiritu, seu facto seu uoluntate
commissis qui poenam per judicium destinauit, idem et ueniam per
paenitentiam spopondit dteens ad populum: 'Paenitere et saluum faciam
te'. 1
(b) baptism was for essential for salvation
Cum uero praescribitur nemini sine baptismo competere salutem ex ilia
maxim e pronuntiatione domini qui ait: 'Nisi natus ex aqua quis erit non
habebit uitam'. 2
(c) faith was essential for salvation
de Deo natum omnem qui crediderit Iesum esse Christum. Propter quod et
hortatur, 'ut credamus nomini Filii eius Iesu Christi,' ut scilicet 'communio
sit nobis cum Patre et Filio eius Iesu Christo'. 3
(d) the death of Christ was essential for salvation











Clearly, therefore, any statement which purports to emphasise one aspect at the
expense of the others must be put into the context of the whole, and a complete
picture will have to set out the God-ward and the man-ward aspects of salvation,
the part played by paenitentia in relation to the part played by baptism, and so
on. Some of the most significant of Tertullian's texts are those in which he
himself expressed the way one aspect of the relationship shaded into another.
A point which is often overlooked, when the relationship of paenitentia
to baptism in Tertullian is discussed, is Tertullian's concern for the ultimate
salvation of the candidate for baptism. The stress which he placed on the
preparation necessary for the worthy reception of the sacrament may seem to
hedge it about with conditions far and above what Scripture taught. To an
extent that was true, but Tertullian was not looking to the spiritual standing of
the neophyte on the day following baptism, or even the week or the month
following baptism - he was (because of his severe view of post-baptismal sin)
looking for a life-long relationship with God, which would not be marred by a
relapse into sin. Therefore, for baptism to be effective and to remain effective
for the forgiveness of all sin, the candidate should already have formed in
himself the disposition necessary for a sin-free life. With that 'definition' of
salvation, i.e. Tertullian's long-term concern for the individual, not just the
immediate effect of baptism, the four statements made above and marked (a),
(b), (c) and (d) can now be examined in more detail.
(a) Paenitentia was essential for salvation but . . .
The emphasis of the opening chapters of the treatise de paenitentia was
naturally on the importance of the part played by paenitentia, as the text quoted
above illustrates. Nevertheless, even in the treatise de paenitentia, Tertullian
pointed out the need for baptism: Itague audientes optare intinctionem, non




emphasis was on the need for the worthy reception of baptism, after, but only
after, due paenitentia, quidquid in corde hominis ignorantia contaminasset, id
paenitentia auerrens et eradens et foras abiciens mundam pectoris domum
superuenturo spiritui sancto paret quo se ille cum caelestibus bonis libens
inferat.^ The problem of reconciling the efficacy of baptism with the efficacy
of paenitentia does not seem to have troubled Tertullian; he stated without
embarrassment that both were necessary, and he called baptism the reward of
genuine paenitentia:
Lauacrum illud obsignatio est fidei, quae fides a paenitentiae fide incipitur
et commendatur. Non ideo abluimur ut delinquere desinamus sed quia
desiimus, quoniam iam corde loti sumus: haec enim prima audientis intinctio
est. Metus integer exinde quod dominum senserit, fides sana conscientia
semel paenitentiam amplexata! 2
Because Tertullian wished to emphasise that cleansing was effected first by a
man's own personal penitence and only then by the rite of baptism, he said, in
effect, in the treatise de paenitentia at any rate, that baptism effected the
forgiveness of sins only because the disposition which was necessary for its
3
reception (metus integer) had already effected their remission - yet even when
stressing the responsibility of man to achieve a valid paenitentia Tertullian was
not unmindful that the end-product was the work of God.
Quod iterum deus tantopere conmendat, quod etiam humano more sub
deieratione testatur, summa utique grauitate et adgredi et custodire
debemus, ut in adseueratione diuinae gratiae permanentes in fructu quoque




paen 6.16.60-17.65. So also bapt 6.1.5-7 abolitione delictorum quam
fides impetrat obsignata in patre et filio et spiritu sancto. The significance of
the word 'obsignata' is examined in the next section, viz. Roman Law for this
area. The place of 'faith' in relation to paenitentia and baptism is examined in
paragraph (c) of this section.
3
There is a useful commentary on this whole complex matter by Dolger




(b) Baptism was essential for salvation, but ...
Just as there are texts which in isolation imply that paenitentia was the
key element in a saving relationship with God, so there are texts - such as the
one quoted at the opening of this section - which imply that baptism was the key
element in salvation. Again, seen in the overall context of Tertullian's teaching,
there is no incongruity and even in de baptismo itself, where obviously the stress
was on baptism,* Tertullian had to deal (in chapter 13) with certain adversaries
who denied the necessity of baptism, insisting that faith alone was sufficient to
please God. Tertullian showed how faith was a necessary disposition for baptism,
not a substitute for it. It may be significant that while there are places where
Tertullian (taken out of context) appears to state that paenitentia could be
efficacious without the actual reception of baptism, he nowhere says (unless the
text is completely isolated) that baptism could be efficacious without personal
repentance first.
This emphasis re-appeared in chapter 18 at the same treatise, where
Tertullian reminded those who were going to administer baptism of the words of
2
the Lord, Nolite dare sanctum canibus et porcis proicere margaritan uestram;"
there must be no presumptious or premature reception of the sacrament. The
burden of Tertullian's teaching, both in de baptismo and in de paenitentia, is
clear:
Neque ego renuo diuinum beneficium, id est abolitionem delictorum, inituris
aquam omnimodo saluum esse; sed ut e£ peruenire contingat elaborandum
est. 3
The immediate object of the treatise was to refute the heresy of the
Cainites, according to whom (being of gnostic tendency) matter was evil and the
baptismal water should be rejected, faith alone serving for salvation. This is






Catechumens were expected to move toward baptism, but baptism without
adequate preparation, would disappoint:
sic nec paenitentiam impleuit, quia instrumento paenitentiae, id est metu,
caruit. Praesumptio inuerecundiae portio est: inflat petitorem, despicit
datorem; itaque decipit nonnumquam. Ante enim quam debeatur repromittit,
quo semper is qui est pr aestaturus offenditur. 1
The good and practical reason for Tertullian's emphasis here was that if a sinner
had not repented of sins before he was baptised, Tertullian believed that he
would never repent of them at all; this was clear from the example of slaves and
2
soldiers, who forgot their past offenses once they had secured their freedom.
The divine pattern for conversion was therefore paenitentia (essential) sealed by
baptism (essential), and in that order; repentance prepared the way for the
forgiveness of sin in baptism "Mais peut-etre on veut faire dater sa conversion
du jour de son bapteme? Illusion: c'est avant le pardon, et sous le grondement de
la justice divine, qu'il faut pleurer ses peches. Le bapteme ne saurait suppleer a
- - , 3
ce qui manque du cote de la penitence."
There is, however, one area where Tertullian repeatedly placed the
emphasis on baptism alone, and that was for the removal of the vitium originis.
In paenitentia, the emphasis was on contrition for, and turning from, the actual
sins of life; the remedy for original sin, as well as for the effects of personal sin
committed before baptism, was immersion in the waters of baptism. Tertullian
was clear, however, that the effect of baptism was not ex opere operato; the
forgiveness of sins was granted in response to faith, and the place of that is
examined next.
(c) Faith was essential for salvation but ...
4






d'$.les, "Theologie", p 337.
4
res 48.11.51-52. No sentence in Tertullian so emphasises the
importance of the avowal of faith in the baptismal ceremony as this one.
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section VIII.2> fides, in the sense of the acceptance of the basic doctrines of the
Rule of Faith, was an essential ingredient of the catechumenate - non es
Christianus, non credendo quod creditum Christianos facit;* personal trust was
expressed by fiducia. Baptism was obsignatio fidei, a phrase which (as noted in
paragraph (a) above) related to the efficacy of paenitentia to the efficacy of
baptism. It is not easy to determine exactly how Tertullian related personal
faith to these other elements of the conversion process, but it seems to be this -
the recipient of baptism must have faith; wherever there was faith, baptism was
the divine medium through which the forgiveness of sins was communicated.
Faith was necessary to baptism, but baptism was necessary to faith. In baptism,
faith was clothed with the divine realities which were its objective counterparts.
All that need be noted here, correlating the various elements, is that Tertullian
himself expressly linked fides with both baptism and the grace of God, showing
that faith was no more than an element in the whole complex of the right
relationship with God - "Pour lui foi et bapteme s'organisent en une seule economie
de salut." ^ As Tertullian himself put it:
Proinde cum ad fidem peruenit reformata per secundam natiuitatem ex aqua
et superna uirtute, 3
and in one of his three statements of the regula fidei . . . "inde potat fidem; earn
(i.e fidem) aqua signat, . . " ^
(d) The death of Christ was essential for salvation
While Tertullian emphasised the efforts which the catechumen had to
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catechumens and from his reminders to Christians of the basis on which they had
become Christians, that he regarded the merits of Christ as the basis of the
forgiveness of sins. It was presumably not by chance that right at the beginning
of de baptismo he emphasised the way in which baptism derived its effectiveness
unristum in aqua nascimur; tne play on tne ureex. word ^nrist as baviour;
showed the baptised, the pisciculi, where they had found their salvation. When
occasion demanded, he could emphasise the incarnation of Christ, or His sinless
life in fulfilment of all the demands of the law, or His triumphant resurrection,
or His ascension, or His continuing priestly work and His second coming - but
when he wrote about the salvation of man, it was to the Cross that his emphasis
went -
Quod sciam, non sumus nostri, sed pretio empti. Et quali pretio! Sanguine
Semel Christus pro nobis obiit, semel occisus est, ne occideremur. Si uicem
repetit num et ille salutem de mea nece expectat? 3
Illius es, conscriptus in libris uitae. Illic purpurae tuae, sanguis domini, et
clauus latus in cruce ipsius; 4
Vt autem redimas hominem tu nummis, quern sanguine suo redemit Christus,
quam indignum Deo et dispositionis eius! ... Quis est nunc, qui aduersus ilium
reluctatur, immo depretiat mercedem eius tam magno comparatam,
pretiosissimo scilicet sanguine agni immaculati? ... Hunc ergo liberum pretio
aestimabis et pretio possidebis, nisi eodem, quanto, ut diximus Domino
constitit, sanguine suo scilicet? ... Sanguine empti, sanguine numerati
nullum nummum pro capite debemus, quia caput nostrum Christus est ...
Quid autem Deo debeo, sicut denarium Caesari, nisi sanguinem, quem pro











fug 12.2.11-13; fug 12.3.24-27 and 34-36; fug 12.8.88-90; fug
12.10.105-107.
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Tertullian saw the Cross "everywhere";3 the mystery of the Cross was so
astonishing, and so offensive to human reason, that God had outlined it
beforehand in many symbols, to facilitate its understanding. Tertullian saw the
Cross in the crossed hands of Joseph blessing his sons,2 in Moses praying while
Joshua fought with Amalek and in Isaac carrying the wood of sacrifice*; he saw
a
^it (in the mark which he thought was the letter 'Tau' of Ezekiel, in the inner
5framework used by image makers to strengthen their handiwork, in the human
6 7
body, in the frames of military banners, and even in the wings of birds in
g
flight. The types of Christ in the Old Testament were worked out in a way
which assigned a unique value to the Cross for the putting away of sin; for
example, Tertullian expounded the brazen serpent as a symbol of the power of
9the Lord's Cross, whereby the old serpent, the devil, was vanquished.
Tertullian was the first to record that at the conclusion of the baptismal
service, the signing or sealing with the Cross was made.^" He went further, and
referred to making the sign of the Cross throughout daily life, for example at
3
An understandable exaggeration by T.P. O'Malley, op. cit. at p 88, as
he reviewed the symbolism of the Cross in Tertullian. Every single reference by
Tertullian to the Cross has been meticulously catalogued by G.Q. Reijners in The
Terminology of the Holy Cross in early Christian literature as based upon Old















^ idol 5.3.3-4.13, also HI Marc 18.7.21-27, paralleled in Jud 10.10.81-82.
3^
HI Marc 22.7.19; praes 40.4.7; res 8.3.10; spec 24.4.14.
323
going in or coming out of the house, while dressing, while putting on shoes, while
taking a bath, before and after meals, when lighting the lamps, when going to
bed or sitting down - indeed in every ordinary action of life. ^ Sometimes his
belief in the power of the Cross stretches modern credulity - the sign of the
Cross promptly made, when one had been stung by a serpent, might avert the
2
stricken man's death.
There is more to this than merely an abundance of reminders of the
death of Christ. Tertullian himself said that he regarded the Cross at the focal
point in all the work of Christ:
3
(i) Totum Christiani nominis et pondus et fructus, mors Christi,
(ii) quia nec mors nostra dissolui posset nisi domini passione... (adding, in
this instance)... nec uita restitui sine resurrectione ipsius.4
(iii) quod figitur, in hoc enim uenerat: 5
(iv) Ad hoc enim uenerat, ut ipse a delicto purus et omnia sanctus pro
peccatoribus obiret.6
(v) ut natiuitatem nostram natiuitate sua reformqret atque ita etiam
mortem nostram morte sua dissolueret resurgendo in carne, in qua natus
est, ut £t mori posset. 7
(vi) At uero Christus mori missus nasci quoque necessario habuit, ut mori
posset. 8
*

















The emphasis has been remarked on many times by commentators:
He lays greater stress, indeed, on Christ's death them does Irenaeus,
speaking of it as the whole weight and fruit of the Christian name . . .
the supreme foundation of the gospel. Not only did Christ die for us, but
He was sent for precisely this purpose. 1
Tertullian lays greater emphasis than Irenaeus on the importance of the
death of Christ. Even if he had made no further contribution to the
development of doctrine, yet his special emphasis on the importance of
the death of Christ is remarkable as he strikes a note characteristic of
Latin theology.2
Tertullian has no definitely formulated doctrine of the death of Christ
beyond that of Irenaeus: nevertheless his peculiar insistence upon it (the
death) is noteworthy. Here, as in many other cases, he strikes a note
characteristic of Latin Theology. 3
While Tertullian had no fully thought out theory of work of Christ, it does seem
that whenever he spoke about the sufficiency of Christ - for example when he
insisted that Christ was competent to effect salvation without the assistance of
angels - his stress fell on the death of Christ:
Nullus unquam angelus ideo descendit, ut crucifigeretur, ut mortem
experiretur, ut a morte suscitaretur. Si numquam eiusmodi causa angelorum
corporandorum, habes, cur non nascendo acceperint carnem. Non uenerant
mori, ideo nec nasci. At uero Christus mori missus nasci quoque necessario
habuit, ut mori posset; 4
Many of these references have been to works not addressed to catechumens and
not necessarily relevant to their situation, but an indication that Tertullian gave
an important place to the suffering and death of Christ, as he taught
catechumens, is found in the emphasis laid on it in the regula fidei, in which the
catechumens were instructed and examined:
(i) in de wirginibus velandis, Tertullian went straight from Christ "born of
5
the Virgin Mary" to Christ "crucified under Pontius Pilate";
*
Kelly, op. cit., p 177.
2
Morgan op. cit., p 157; cf also ibid, p 114.
3




natum ex uirgine Maria, crucifixum sub Pontio Pilato - uirg 1.3.19-20.
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(ii) In the version in de praescriptione haereticorum, Tertullian laid some
stress on the life of Christ but included the crucifixion;*
(iii) When he wrote to Praxeas about the regula fidei, Tertullian did not
mention the life of Christ at all, but went from "called by the name of
Jesus Christ", to "suffered, died and buried."'*
Several times Tertullian quoted the text "one mediator between God and men" (1
Timothy 2.5), and he left his catechumens in no doubt that Christ's purpose in
assuming a human form was to save mankind, who could not be saved except in
Him.
(e) Conclusions from this section
The efficacy of the personal and subjective contribution of the
catechumen, (in paenitentia and in proceeding to baptism), and the efficacy of
the divine and objective contribution of God, (in granting faith and imparting the
merits of Christ to the sinner) are not precisely related to each other in
Tertullian. They cam however be briefly stated as follows-
(a) Repentance was in man's own power - yet repentance alone would not bring
about the forgiveness of sin; that was Tertullian's argument, both in de
baptismo 10 and in de paenitentia 2, in respect of the baptism of John:
Quodsi paenitentia humanum est, et baptismus ipsius eiusdem condicionis
fuerit necesse est: aut daret et spiritum sanctum et remissionem
peccarorum si caelestis fuisset. Sed neque peccata dimittit neque spiritum
indulget nisi solus deus. 3
4
and, in the de paenitentia passage, Tertullian distinguished Christian baptism
from the baptism of John which was exclusively a baptism of repentance,











prima was, however, as noted in section (a) above, an essential ingredient.
Tertullian gave no indication at all that the will to repent could come from God;
man had his part to play. A long catechumenate, followed by an examination as
to whether the baptismal candidate had 'fulfilled every good work' during that
period, must inevitably have led some catechumens to think that, in some
respect at least, the sacrament was a reward of virtue rather than a seal of
faith; this was, however, an unsatisfactory understanding of the forgiveness of
God, which is examined next.
(b) Forgiveness was in the power of God. The argument of Pos^mann is very
persuasive,^ that Tertullian regarded the forgiveness of sins, following
paenitentia prima and baptism, as due solely to the merits of the passion of
Christ and not by reason of personal works of penance performed by the
sinner himself. Poschmann's argument (summarised) was that in spite of the
fact that God required the catechumens to deplore their offences and to
offer to make reparation for them before He forgave them, God's
forgiveness remained wholly gratuitous. Baptism was thus to be contrasted
with paenitentia secunda, in which the sinner was obliged to perform works
2
of penance proportioned to his offence in order to make amends to God. In
the later chapters of the de paenitentia, and throughout the treatise de
pudicitia, Tertullian was concerned chiefly with the paenitentia secunda of
exomologesis, the penitence of those who had sinned after baptism. This
involved, in addition to the subjective reaction of the sinner against his
*op. cit., p 1 ff.
2
Karl Rahner, Zur Theologie der Busse bei Tertullian, in Abhandlungen
uber Theologie und Kirche - Festschrift fur Karl Adam, (Dusseldorf: Patmos-
verlag, 1952) set out in some detail the difference in efficacy, as between
paenitentia prima and paenitentia secunda, of the paenitentia of the sinner - pp
166 ff. Adhemar d'Ales set out the difference between the confession of sin
required from the sinner in like circumstances - pp 46-48. (The matter is taken
up breifly in the immediately following section of the thesis.) d'Ales De
Baptismo et Confirmatione (Paris: 1927), English translation by Joseph H.
Howard, Baptism and Confirmation London: Sands & Co., 1929)
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guilt, a number of external features such as the confession of sin before the
Church, the performance of public penitential acts under the direction of
ecclesiastical authority, some exclusion from communion with the Church,
and the forgiveness of the sinner by the bishop. None of these features were
present in paenitentia prima, because forgiveness of sin in baptism was the
gift of God and did not require to be secured by the merit of man. This
indicates that Tertullian was not unaware of the divine side of the work of
salvation, and it counterbalances the apparent over-emphasis of the virtue
of paenitentia in parts of Tertullian's works. Actual forgiveness could not
be assumed without reference to the state of mind of the candidate for
baptism, because both repentance and faith were required of him, but
forgiveness of sin depended ultimately on the gift of God through the merits
of Christ.
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VIII.7ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
Three new legal words have been introduced in this chapter, namely
compensatio (to which must be linked the concept of satisfactio, because in
Roman jurisprudence satisfactio was the removal of an obligation by
compensatio), obsignata and praescriptio. The last is examined in more detail in
Excursus One, but is mentioned briefly here because of the "standing rule" that
no one could obtain salvation without baptism.
Compensatio occurred in the passage, noted in section Vm.3, in which
Tertullian stated that God agreed to seU (addicere) His merchandise (venia
delictorum) in exchange for paenitentia. Hoc enim pretio dominus ueniam
addicere instituit, hac paenitentiae conpensatione redimendam proponit
1 2
inpunitatem. Buckland listed the meaning of compensatio in Roman Law, and
cited the literature bearing on its meaning. It is evident from these references
that Tertullian used a word which was current in Roman legal usage, and it has
3
frequently been assumed that in using such a word, Tertullian was expressing
the relationship of the catechumen to God in legal language; in Saint's words,
God would accept impletio paenitentiae "as compensatory payment, a quid pro
4
quo, in place of the punishment which the sinner has deserved." However, just
because Tertullian used a word which happened to be current in Roman Law, it
does not follow that he intended to convey a legal concept, particularly when
etymologically the word meant simply a "weighting" or a "balancing". The non¬
technical sense appears to be much more in line with Tertullian's understanding
of the relationship of the catechumen to God than a juridicial use of the word




££• cit., pp 703-707
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Compensatio in Roman law was the reciprocal extinction of debts
between two persons, each of whom was indebted to the other. Compensatio est
debiti et crediti inter se contributio.2 If the debts to be compensated were
unequal, the lesser obligation was extinguished and the greater was diminished,
but the essential factor, for compensatio to operate, was the existence of two
debts, one on each side. This appears to fit well into Tertullian's concept of
satisfactio for post-baptismal sin, to be examined below, but it is difficult to see
how it could possibly be applied to the catechumen, who was not yet in a position
to obtain 'meritum' and so to put God in his debt. Furthermore, for compensatio
to operate, the two debts had to be of the same nature - an obligation to deliver
goods could not be set off against an obligaiton to pay money. Yet again,
compensatio in its legal sense could not operate ipso jure, but only when a debtor
pleaded it in reply to a demand made by creditor for the performance of the
debtor's obligation. Tertullian's use of compensatio for catechumens - hac
paenitentiae compensatione redimendam proponit inpunitatem - just does not
seem to fit into the Roman legal concept of the word; on the other hand,the
popular and non-technical sense of compensatio, meaning an offer of impunity
"in exchange" for paenitentia without any reciprocal obligations or "set off",
seems to fit very well.
When it comes to post-baptismal sin, the legal sense of compensatio as
the reciprocal extinction of the indebtedness of two persons who were each
under obligation to the other for debts which were of the same nature, and which
were equally exigible for payment, does seem to underlie Tertullian's concept of
satisfactio. Since it is the contention of this thesis that neither compensatio nor
satisfactio in their legal senses were applied by Tertullian to the relationship of
. To-T+mtan'-S




catechumens to God, it would be irCappropriate to spend much time on these
words. A brief description of Tertullian's understanding of satisfactio and
meritum^ is however necessary, even if only to explain and to justify their
omission from the remainder of this study.
3
Many writers have implied, and Saint has said expressly, that Tertullian
used the Roman legal concept of satisfactio about catechumens as well as those
who fell into post-baptismal sin:
"Tertullian is the first Christian writer to speak of penance explicitly as
satisfying God for sin. . . It can hardly be denied that the generic notion of
satisfaction as a compensation made to God for the debt incurred by sin is a
constituent part of his penitential theology. Tertullian was aware of the
juridical meaning of the word satisfacere in cases of material indebteness. .
. . The juridical sense of the term satisfacere is easily transferred to
express the idea of satisfaction for sin... The whole penitential process
beginning with an aversion from sin and including, besides personal works of
penance, the intervention of the Church in the prima or secunda
paenitentia, is a means of paying the moral indebtedness which the sinner
has contracted by offending God... a necessary and effective means of
making amends to God by a compensatio pro debito peccati. 4
As a statement of satisfactio in relation to paenitentia secunda that seems
unobjectionable, although detailed comment on paenitentia secunda is outside
the scope of this study. However, Saint has expressly stated in that passage that
satisfactio in its juridical sense was applicable to paenitentia prima as well, and
that does not seem justified. Tertullian did use the word satisfactio in relation
The concept of satisfactio in theology as a whole has been well set out
by Pierre Galtier, De Paenitentia, (Rome: Pont. Universitatis Gregorianae, 1950)
pp 421-435. An older but still useful article on satisfactio in the patristic period
is A. Deneffe "Das Wort Satisfactio", Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie, 43
(1919), 153-178.
^
Wirth, op. cit., set out in detail how meritum was related to satisfactio
in Tertullian's thought - section IVa - and how man earned merit before God -
sections II, III and V.
3
Typical is Roberts, op. cit., p 180 ("He uses the term satisfacere, it is
true, but never in the sense of vicarious satisfaction. With him it means
invariably the amends which men make for their own sins by confession,
repentance, and good works") which does not distinguish between pre-baptismal
sin, where merit had no application in Tertullian's thought, and post-baptismal
sin, where it did.
4
op. cit., p 155, note 77.
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to catechumens, but it is the contention of this section that for them he used it
in non-juridical sense, and this is now examined.
Once a man had become a Christian - and only then - there were areas of
his life wjere he had the option of pleasing God by following the "secret" or
"higher" will of God (voluntas) or alternatively of pleasing himself by following
the "manifest" or "lower" will of God (indulgentia). The latter was good, but the
former was better. If a man opted for the better (non-obligatory) life-style, he
acquired meritum, which put God in his debt; all non-obligatory performances
could be meritorjus. Because God was then in debt to man, man deserved a
reward; but when man sinned, he put himself in debt to God and deserved
punishment. Here were the all ingredients for compensatio in its judicial sense -
one debt to be set off against the other, and, if the debts were unequal, the
lesser obligation was extinguished and the greater was diminished. In
corresponding theological terms, merit first of all cancelled out the debt which
God owed to man for his supererogatory works, and the balance was carried
forward as reward. Meritum created a Plus; satisfactio obliterated a Minus.
2 3
Schultz and Franks have demonstrated the extent to which Tertullian's system
presupposes that man can put God into His debt. If man had previously incurred
debt to God by acts of sin, his newly achieved good works or meritorious
sufferings liquidated the Minus. If he had a clean slate at the time, his new
merit stood as a Plus. If he already had a credit balance, the balance was
swelled.
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paen 5.9.34. quoted on p / below.
^
Hermann Schultz, "Der sittliche Begriff des Verdienstes und seine
Anwendung auf das Verstandniss des Werkes Christi," Theologische Studien und
Kritiken , (1894), 1-50, 245-314, 554-614; Schultz acknowledged that he had
relied heavily on help given to him by a legal colleague, Professor Merkel.
3
op. cit., p 77-81.
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The critical point for this section is that the means by which man could
acquire meritum - fasting, virginity, self-chastening, patience, almsgiving etc. -
were all areas where only paenitentia secunda applied. It is true that in the
course of paenitentia prima, certain actions were prescribed. Ingressuros
baptismum orationibus crebris, ieiuniis et geniculationibus et peruigiliis orare
oportet et cum confessione omnium retro delictorum, ut exponant etiam
baptismum Iohannis . ^ but (a) these were not required until the paenitentia was
almost complete and the catechumen was already judged worthy to be baptised,
and (b) they were the same for all. Exomologesis was different for one sinner
and another, in accordance with the gravity of the sin. Furthermore, paenitentia
prima was always assured of success, while (at least this was Tertullian's view
while he was a Montanist) paenitentia secunda was not. In short, there was no
suggestion that the works of paenitentia prima had as their goal the acquisition
of merit -they were simply the external signs of the inward and spiritual changes
in a man's life which qualified him for the worthy reception of baptism.
Therefore the legalistic concepts of compensatio and of satisfactio could have no
application for catechumens.
That is, of course, a considerable over-simplication of an exceedingly
complex subject. In Roman law, solvere and not satisfacere was the proper
technical expression for the true and exact discharge of a liability. In a less
precise sense, satisfactio could meet a legal claim in some way other them the
strict performance of it ("solvere" being the proper performance) or it could
meet the claim in another way agreeable to the creditor; there has been much
debate about the sense in which Tertullian used satisfactio for post-baptismal
sin, but that is all outside the scope of this chapter. Perhaps the clearest




catechumens, and an appropriate point at which to close this discussion, is
Tertullian's own statement that a catechumen qui per delictorum paenitentiam
instituerat domino satisfacere, diabolo per aliam paenitentiae paenitentiam
satisfaciet. ^
The second word, (strictly speaking not used by Tertullian until baptism
but introduced in section VTH.6 in dealing with the relationship of paenitentia
prima to baptism) is obsignatio. In legal Latin, obsignare meant to seal or to
2
certify. Leeming devoted two whole chapters (v and vi) of his book 'Principles
of Sacramental Theology' to discussing the place of the seal in Christian
initiation, and said that "Tertullian, thinking in legal fashion, speaks of the seal
of a contract on a document; in several passages the sealing is a ratification of
A
Baptism, or of right faith."' Tertullian's particular phrases - Lauacrum illud
obsignato est fidei"* and post fidem obsignatam0 - neatly summarise what he




eius rei condicionisque tabellas obsignaverunt (i.e. as witnesses) viri
boni complures: res in dubium venire non potest. (Cicero, Pro Quinctio 21.67)
3
Bernard Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology. (2nd ed.;
London: Longmans, I960). G.W.H. Lampe, The Seal of the Spirit (2nd ed.;
London: S.P.C.K., 1967) also devoted his fifth and sixth chapters to 'The Sealing
of the Faithful in the Early Church', dealing with Tertullian from p 157 to p 162:




o£. cit., p 165.
5
Lauacrum illud obsignatio est fidei, quae fides a paenitentiae fide
incipitur et commendatur. Non ideo abluimur ut delinquere desinamus sed quia
desiimus, quoniam iam corde loti sumus - paen 6.16.60-17.63. The only other
use of obsignatio as a noun in Tertullian's works is obsignatio baptismi - bapt
13.2.8-9. However, in verbal form it appears fourteen times.
°
Male nobis de necessitatibus humanae exhibitionis supplaudimus, si post
fidem obsignatam (i.e. after baptism) dicimus: non habeo auo uiuam. - idol
12.1.31-01.
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repentance; the difficulty is to know/what extent he took the word from Roman
law. Leeming, whose two chapters were particularly concerned with the sealing
of the candidate by the Holy Spirit, and whether the Spirit was given at baptism
or at 'confirmation' or at both, traced the imagery of the seal to brands burned
upon animals, military tattooing, signet rings, inscriptions on coins, circumcision,
the paschal lamb in Egypt and the sealing of a bag for security.^ To prolong this
chapter would not be justified, but it is clear that whether or not Tertullian took
the sealing of faith in baptism directly from Roman law, the current legal usage
does not contradict what he mean to say by obsignatio fidei.
The third legal word, (which will be examined at greater length in
Excursus one) is praescriptio, which occurred three times (together with the verb
praescribitur) in Tertullian's understanding of the importance of baptism for
salvation.
Cum uero praescribitur nemini sine baptismo competere salutem... quomodo
ex ista praescriptione apostolis salus competat... aut praeiudicatum esse de
ceterorum periculo qui careant aqua Christi ut praescriptio salua sit aut
rescindi praescriptionem si etiam et non tinctis salus statuta est. 2
Since there was no record of any of the apostles except Paul having been
baptised, and in view of Tertullian's insistence on the necessity of baptism for
salvation, some persons had quesitoned whether the apostles were saved.
Tertullian replied that whether or not the apostles had been baptised, it was
presumptuous to question their salvation, because they had been in the Lord's
company, and He remitted the sins of those who believed in Him; furthermore, if
these had not been saved, how could others-have been, whose salvarfon was
Two non-legal uses of the word by Tertullian were: deo ipsos hoc
nomine obsignat - idol 10.6.22 - the Christian schoolmaster, in calling the gods
gods, acknowledged or ratified their existence, and referring to the height of
Joseph's head-dress in Egypt: cuius suggestus modialis figura frumentationis eius
memoriam obsignat - II nat 8.16.17-18 - i.e. being shaped like a bushel-measure
it visibly recorded his management of the corn-supply. Other uses of the word




assured? Praescriptio was of course a technical term of Roman law, but here it
seems to be no more than a 'standing rule' and its legal usage does not seem to
bear directly on the relationship of the catechumen to God, so it is not examined
in any further detail here. (TKere is -Purtker com^ikt on prae/cr. w txcurs«s one.)
Beck argued at length that Tertullian, as a jurist, was the first to
designate the regula fidei by the juridic^ial terms lex fidei and
decretum/edictum dei and also the first to model it on the regula juris of the
civil law.^ Since however, some understanding of doctrine was required of all
candidates for baptism in the contemporary church, and since the essential
2
features of the regula fidei were not of Tertullian's framing, it does not seem
important for the relationship of the catechumen to God that Tertullian gave the
regula a new title or even a new form and the matter is not pursued here. For
the sake of completeness, it should also be noted that Futscher claimed:
Er verwendet die Glaubensregel genauso, wie der romische Jurist seine
regula iuris handhabt: Wie dieser aus dem geltenden Recht, nicht aus dessen
formelhafter Zusammenfassung seine Entscheidung nimmt, so Tertullian aus
dem uberlieferten christlichen Glauben und der Schrift, die beide in der
regula fidei zusammengefasst sind. 3
but, for the same reason, the matter is not taken any further here.
*
op. cit., pp 25-27 for lex fidei and pp 102-103 for decretum/edictum
dei.
2 ....
Zahn, article "Glaubensregel" in Realenzyklopadie der Pro test ant ischen
Kirche.
3
op. cit., p 40.
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Vni.8 CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER EIGHT
The first point established in this chapter was the close connection (and the
necessary connection) between the catechumen's actions, his attitudes and his
beliefs, in his relationship with God. Tertullian taught his catechumens that
paenitentia prima (in its widest sense) included the practical steps a man must
take in order to secure a right relationship with God, an attitude of mind which
would satisfy the scrutiny of God himself, and assent to certain doctrines about
God, considered in Himself.
If we would deduce ... that Tertullian makes a distinction between doctrine
and discipline (that is, between what the Christian should believe and what
he should do) and that the first is so much more important than the second
that the decision as to whether a person is heretical depends only on the
point of doctrine, we should be mistaken. For though he does indeed make a
distinction between doctrine and discipline, the two are so closely connected
that they condition each other; the lower standard of discipline among the
heretics is an indication of their doctrine, just as the stricter discipline of
the orthodox Christians testifies to their hold on the truth; and a corruption
of doctrine is followed by and attended with an unchristian discipline. 1
In this respect the Roman law of Tertullian's day provided little parallel
with the relationship of man to God. With the exception of murder and arson,
where 'motive' or 'mens rea' had to be established, early Roman law dealt with
men's actions only as they were objectively seen, not judging a man for the
attitude of mind by which he was motivated. By Tertullian's time, the animus of
the parties to a dispute, or the voluntas of a man acting contrary to the
established social order, were of some relevance to the legal position, but when
there was any doubt as to the existence of a given relationship, the jurists
decided the matter by applying legal canons to the actual facts of the case, not
by asking whether the parties had intended that particular relationship. As
2
Jolowicz has clearly brought out, one of the features which distinguished post-
classical law from the law of Tertullian's day was the introduction of a
1 p
Fles&man van-der Leer, ojj. cit., p 158.
2
op. cit., pp 532-538.
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subjective element to it. (The reasons for that are much debated but are
entirely outside the scope of this study.)
Not only would the catechumen's activities identify him, in the eyes of
the world, as an associate of the Christian Church, but his attitude to
paenitentia was to be different from the pagan understanding of it. The further
he progressed through the catechumenate, the more he ought to be unlike the
'man of the world'; by the time he was ready for baptism, he should already have
acquired that disposition and character which marked off Christians from non-
Christians. So paenitentia prima was very much the work of the catechumen.
He would be baptised because he had ceased to sin, because he was iam corde
lotus. The completeness of his forgiveness in baptism depended on the effort he
had made to cleanse himself.
What was the consequence for a man who was accepted for baptism,
believing that his attitude was correct, but whose paenitentia had not in fact
been accepted by God? It was his responsibility to come adequately prepared to
baptism, if God was to forgive his sins. Worse still, what of the man anxiously
awaiting baptism, who was beset by nagging doubts, worried whether he had
sufficiently feared God and lived a life of purity to merit God's forgiveness for
his sin? He had, according to Tertullian, not received the grace of God nor the
Holy Spirit to keep him from sinning, so it must have been a worrying time. It is
plain that the catechumen had no assurance of salvation and none of the
considerable spiritual consequents of baptism, until he had actually been
baptised. Tertullian gave no indication that a catechumen dying unbaptised,
unless martyred, was in any better relationship to God than was a pagan. (In this
he was hardly alone in the early Church, which was all but unanimous that divine
judgment would fall on the unbaptised.) One passage in de baptismo chapter 13




However, the sentence appears in context to mean that only fides integra could
be secura de salute in baptism; the question of fides without baptism did not
arise. It would be better to defer baptism until fides was integra - in other
words, only such faith was secura de salute in baptism.
The relationship between paenitentia prima, faith, baptism and the
merits of the death of Christ was fully discussed in section six, and certain
conclusions were reached at the end of that section. There is no need to repeat
them here, but it should be mentioned, as has frequently been remarked by
commentators, that there is no suggestion in Tertullian of a forensic statement
of the atonement wrought by Christ. Typical is Roberts - "He uses the term
satisfacere, it is true, but never in the sense of vicarious satisfaction. With him
it means invariably the amends which men make for their own sins by confession,
repentance, and good works." ^ (It is typical also that such statements do not
distinguish between prebaptismal sin and post-baptismal sin).
As for the influence of Roman law on Tertullian, for the period reviewed
in this chapter, it was suggested that a non-technical use of both compensatio
and praescriptio fitted into the context of Tertullian's thought better than the
strictly judicial use of these words. Whether Tertullian used obsignata in the
legal sense is difficult to decide, but his application of it to baptism was not
inconsistent with current legal usage. That appears, however, to be the extent
to which it can confidently be asserted that Tertullian drew on Roman law as
such to express the relationship of catechumens to God.
op. cit., p 180. Morgan did, to be fair, indicate in his parallel passage
that 'satisfaction' was applicable only in paenitentia secunda - "It is also true
that he is the first to use the term 'satisfaction', but nothing is said of a
satisfaction rendered by Christ to divine justice. The 'satisfaction' of which he
speaks is that which is required of the penitent Christian who would make
amends to an offended God by means of confession, repentance, and good works",
(op. cit., p 158).
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A saving relationship with God was normally to be obtained only (1) by
completed paenitentia prima, scrutinised by the Church and by God, followed
(2)l>y baptism. Only when the catechumen had emerged from the waters of
baptism could he call God "our Father". The ceremonies surrounding this second
and fundamental step, the baptismal ceremony,are therefore examined next.
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CHAPTER NINE - THE RELATIONSHIP AT BAPTISM
IX. 1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER NINE
Nowhere has Tertullian set out a comprehensive or systematic
description of the baptismal service and the ceremonies surrounding it, as they
were practised in his day, but he made frequent reference to baptism and to the
accompanying ceremonies. Not only are these reference of considerable
importance in themselves, but his treatise de baptismo is the only surviving ante-
Nicene treatise on the significance of the rite.^ Even although his references are
allusive rather than descriptive, a fairly clear outline of the ritual can be
reconstructed,^ and it falls into three main parts - the baptism itself, the rite
now called 'confirmation', and the first admission to the Eucharist. Considered
in detail, the order of the Christian initiation ceremony as practised in
Tertullian's day appears to have been:
(a) The blessing of the water
(b) The public renunciation of the devil
(c) The triple immersion, with accompanying baptismal vow
3
(d) Anointing with oil
4
(e) The signing with the Cross
The lost work of Hippolytus, reconstructed and now known as The
Apostolic Tradition, provides an approximately contemporary and detailed
account of the Church's baptismal rite and the forms which surrounded the act of
the baptismal washing.
2
In addition to the whole treatise de baptismo, there are three long
passages, viz cor 3.2.12-3.22; praes 36.5.18-19; and res. 8.3.8-12. Other
reference, all of which contribute to reconstructing the outline are - an 41.4.20-
24; I Marc 28.2.28-3.12; mart 3.1.12-13; praes 20.3.9-11; Prax 26.9.57-60; pud
9.11.47-48 and 16.70-74; pud 16.5.16-20; res 26.10.35-11.46; res 48.11.49-52;
and spec 4.1.1-3.13.
3
Examined in chapter X.2.
4
Examined in chapter X.2. The signing with the Cross is placed at this
point in this analysis of the baptismal ceremonies because of the reference to it
in res 8.3.8-11 "caro abluitur, ut anima emacuietur; caro unguitur, ut anima
consecretur; caro signatur, ut (et) anima muniatur; caro manus inpositione
adumbratur ut (et) anima spiritu inluminetur". There is no corresponding
reference to it in de baptismo.
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(f) The imposition of the hand'*'
(g) The giving of the ring^
3
(h) The receiving of the Eucharist
4
(i) A taste of milk and honey.
Whether or not the reception of the Eucharist was regarded by Tertullian
5
as part of the baptismal ceremony itself is clear that he envisaged the
catechumen normally proceeding from water baptism straight to 'confirmation'
(as later ages described it) as part of one connected rite.
The relation between Confirmation and Baptism is one of essential unity
rather than of mere liturgical associaiton. For completion in Christian
initiation a man had to be "confirmed" as well as "baptised".... When an
ancient writer spoke of "Baptism", the thought of "Confirmation" was as
much present to his mind as that of Baptism proper. It should be
remembered, indeed, that the very word confirmatio means "completion." 6
Tertullian still considers this rite (confirmation) and baptism inseparably
connected, and forming but one whole, although he distinguishes in it the
two distinct momenta, the negative and the positive, the forgiveness of sin
and purification which was effected by baptism in the name of the Father,
Son, and Holy Ghost, and the communication of the Holy Spirit following
thereupon to the individual now restored to the original state of innocence,
to which communication the imposition of hands refers. 7
Accordingly, the position of the catechumen who had been baptised but not
"confirmed" was not dealt with by Tertullian, but his feelings on that will
become clear as this chapter proceeds and a section in the following chapter is
*
Examined in chapter X.3
2
Examined in chapter X.l.
3
Examined in chapter X.6.
4
Examined in chapter X.6.
5
Also examined in chapter X.6.
^
E.C. Ratcliff, "The Relation of Confirmation to Baptism in the early
Roman and Byzantine Liturgies", Theology, 49 (1946), 290^2. So also Lupton, op.
cit., p xxii - "Baptism in the second century was a composite rite, and included
what is now called Confirmation".
7
Neander, 0£. cit., p 437.
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devoted to it. He did, however, clearly distinguish the spiritual effects of the
separate parts of the composite rite and so the consequences of the separate
parts, for the relationship to God, will be examined in this chapter up to the
baptism itself; the consequences of the further aspects, up to and including the
first admission to the Eucharist, will be examined in the final chapter.
Tertullian was the first to mention the consecration of water before
baptism. For him, this blessing of the water was the initial act of the ceremony,
but since it had in itself no effect on the relationship of the catechumen to God,
it will be dealt with later in this introductory section only and not further
referred to. This descent of the Spirit upon the waters, sanctifying them, must
be carefully distinguished from the later descent of the Spirit to the individual
candidate at the Imposition of the Hand.
After the water had been blessed, aquam adituri ibidem, sed et
aliquanto prius in ecclesia sub antistitis manu, contestamur nos renuntiare
diabolo et pompae et angelis eius. Dehinc ter mergitamur amplius aliquid
respondentes quam dominus in euangelio determinauit. ^ The significance of the
renunciation of the devil will be examined in section two, and the amplius
respondentes in section three. Then, spread over the next five sections, five
2




In de anima chapters 39 to 41, four consequences of baptism are
mentioned, and in adversus Marcionem book I, 28.2.28-3.9, four consequences are
also mentioned - not the same four.
de anima adversus Marcionem
1. deliverance from power of devil
2 remission of sins
3. regeneration regeneration
4 deliverance from death
5. illumination
6. marriage of soul to Spirit receiving the Holy Spirit.
The first of these will be dealt with in section two, and the last in chapter X.3;
numbers to to five comprise four of the 'five' referred to above. The 'fifth', for
which there are numerous references throughout Tertullian's works, is
restoration to the likeness of God, examined in section IX.8. Tertullian referred
(continued on next page)
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will be made to the union with Christ which was accomplished in baptism,
because this study is confined to the relationship of man to the First Person of
the Trinity.) The relevant aspects of Roman law will then be set out in section
eight and certain conclusions drawn in section nine.
The first part of the baptismal ceremony was to invoke by prayer the
blessing of the Spirit on the water to be used. Tertullian's teaching on that is
found in de baptismo chapters 4 and 5. Building on the previous chapter, in
which he had described how the Holy Spirit rested on the waters at the creation
of the world, Tertullian showed that the element of water was either sanctified
forever* or at least had acquired sanctifying power. It made no difference
whether the person was baptised in the sea or in a pond, in a river or in a
fountain, in a lake or in a trough, because the sanctifying power of any water
would be activated when prayer was made; the Holy Spirit would supervene from
Heaven and give to the water the power of making holy. Accordingly, Tertullian
warned against futile speculation as to whether the baptismal water was the
same as the water present in the beginning, because all water from that time
possesed sanctifying power, provided prayer was made to God. There was
therefore first a prayer, inuocato deo: superuenit enim statim spiritus de caelis




also to union with Christ in baptism - bapt 12.2.8; fug 10.2.16-18; mon 7.8.55-57;
mon 17.5.22-23 and III Marc 12.4.25-27 - but the relationship of man to Christ is
not within the scope of this study.
*
prima ilia, qui iam tunc etiam ipso habitu praenotabatur baptismi
figurandi, spiritum qui ab initio super aquas uectabatur, super aquas instinctorem
moraturum, Sanctum autem utique super sanctum ferebatur aut ab aut eo quod
super ferebatur, id quod ferebat sanctitatem mutuabatur, quoniam subiecta
quaeque materia eius quae desuper imminet qualitatem rapiat necesse est,
maxime corporalis spiritalem et penetrare et insidere facilem per substantiae
suae subtilitatem. Ita de sancto sanctificata natura aquarum et ipsa
sanctificare concepit- bapt 4.1.2-TTfi
2
bapt 4.4.23-25. The prayer was to God the Father, asking Him to send
the Spirit, not a prayer addressed to the Holy Spirit Himself.
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Tertullian referred on several occasions throughout de baptising to the
intervention of an angel, both in respect of the preparatory ceremonies and in
respect of the baptism itself. The specific role of this angel in the consecration
of the baptismal water was first hinted at toward the end of chapter 4,^ then
2
taken up as a definite theme in chapter 5 and explained in detail in chapter 6.
It is outwith the scope of this study to look in any detail at who this angel might
be;^ it is sufficient to note here that he only prepared the water, so that when
the candidate entered the water, the candidate was purified and made ready for
the later advent on the Holy Spirit. Non quod in aqua spiritum sanctum
4
consequamur, sed in aqua emendati sub angelo spiritui sancto praeparamur.
This was indicated just as clearly at the end of chapter 4 - Igitur medicatis
bapt 4.5.32-33 - igitur medicatis quodammodo aquis per angeli
interuentum.
^
Anticipating criticism that an angel should be entrusted with such a
task, Tertullian wrote in some detail about the activity of the angel at the pool
of Bethsaida, pointing to this physical healing in the waters as a figure of the
healing of the soul which was to take place in Christian water-baptism, and so
demonstrating than an angel could work on water for men's salvation. ne quis
durius credat angelum dei sanctum aquis in salutem hominis temperandis adesse,
cum angelus mali profanus commercium eiusdem elementi in perniciem hominis
frequentet. Angelum aquis interuenire si nouum uidetur, exemplum futuri
praecucurrit; piscinam Bethsaidam angelus interueniens commouebat;
obseruabant qui inualitudinem querebantur; nam si quis praeuenerat descendere
illuc queri post lauacrum desinebat. Figura ista medicinae corporalis spiritalem
medicinam praedicabat, ex forma qua semper carnalia in figuram spiritalium
antecedunt. - bapt 5.5.30-40.
3
The identity of the angel of baptism has been discussed in considerable
detail by E. Amann in 'L'ange du bapteme dans Tertullien', Revue des Sciences
Religieuses. 1 (1921), 208-221. From the Benedictine Dom Thomas Corbinier in
the 18th century until Backer in the 20th, there have not lacked those who
believe that the 'angel' was the bishop or his appointed delegate. "Nous pensons
que cet ange designe le ministre du bapteme, qui benit l'eau destinee au
sacrement, c'est-a-dire que par une invocation a Dieu ( etriKXpg-ij ) il y
fait descendre l'Esprit diyin, qui lui donnera la vertu sanctificatrice. C'est lui
encore qui accomplit la ceremonie rituelle ci prononce la formule sacramentelle.
Nous basons notre opinion sur la comparaison des texts:" (and there follows an
analysis of bapt 6 and cor 3-14.) - Backer 0£. cit., p 163-164. Amann said that
he was 'bien etonne' (p 210) by Backer's views, and proceeded to show that the




quodammodo aquis per angeli interventum et spiritus in aquis corporaliter
diluitur et caro in eisdem spiritaliter mundatur. ^
It is important to note that it was an angel, not the Holy Spirit Himself,
who sanctified the baptismal water. It emphasises Tertullian's teaching that the
blessing of the water was no more than a preparatory part of the baptismal
ceremony; it also emphasises Tertullian's teaching (to be examined in chapter X)
that even baptism did not confer the gift of the Holy Spirit - that came later
with the Imposition of the Hand.^ What was accomplished by the preparatory
ceremony of blessing the water was that the water received healing power by the
angel's intervention - in no way did Tertullian regard the washing in water as a
mere washing in water. In the same way as a miracle had taken place at the
Pool of Bethesda, when an angel prepared the water, so a miracle took place in
the baptismal water just before the baptism; the angel of God prepared the
water to cure the soul's infirmities, so that when the body was washed, there
would be a spiritual cleansing of the soul in just the same way as ordinary water




It may seem pedantic to keep stressing the point, but G.H.W. Lampe
maintained in his book "The Seal of The Spirit". (2nd ed.; London: 1967) at page
161 that "there is a real confusion in Tertullian's theology" at this point because
(he claimed) Tertullian sometimes said the Holy Spirit was given in water-
baptism, and at other times that He was given by the Imposition of the Hand.
This is, with respect to Lampe, just not so. Nowhere did Tertullian assert or
even imply that the Spirit was given at the baptism itself, yet Lampe again and
again read this idea into Tertullian's language, and then accused him of
inconsistency - e.g. at p 158 - 'He (Tertullian) can, however, also speak of the
laver of Baptism as the 'seal' which is typified by the ring given to the prodigal
son. The ring at the same time signifies the 'vestem priorem, indumentum
Spiritus Sancti' which was lost at the Fall, but has been restored to man by the
gift of the Spirit in Baptism. The clear implication of this passage is that the
seal of the Spirit is given in the 'laver', that is, water-baptism". Yet Tertullian
distinguished the symbolism of the ring from that of the robe; the former he
identified with water-baptism, the latter with the subsequent clothing with the
Holy Spirit, and other points could be made about the context of that passage. In
fairness to Tertullian, it must be said that Lampe was reading his own theology
into Tertullian's words and not out of them.
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spirit acted on the human compound, man being composed of flesh and spirit.
Accordingly, the spiritual consequences of the baptismal ceremonies began for
the candidate only when he himself became involved in the baptismal ceremony.
It appears that his first act may have been the renunciation of the devil, which is
examined now.
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IX.2 RENUNCIATION OF THE DEVIL
The formal renunciation of the devil, his works, his pomp'* and his angels,
was not part of the actual rite of baptism. It formed a separate step, and
practice appears to have varied between the renunciation taking place in the
baptismal pool itself (but before immersion) and the renunciation taking place
even before the candidate entered the water. The former was expressly stated
by Tertullian in the context that no Christian should attend pu blic amusements
because their origin, history, names, ceremonies and locations all showed them
to be a form of idolatry which every believer renounced. Cum aquam ingressi
Christianam fidem in legis suae uerba profitemur, renuntiasse nos diabolo et
2
pompae et angelis eius ore nostro contestamur.
On the other hand, when Tertullian was being more specific about the
renunciation, he wrote (in the words quoted in the preface to this chapter)
aquam adituri ibidem, sed et aliquanto prius in ecclesia sub antistitis manu,
contestamur nos renuntiare diabolo et pompae et angelis eius. Dehinc ter
mergitamur amplius aliquid respondentes quam dominus in euangelio
3
determinauit. The detail does not appear to have been important to him, but the
principle was, as will be seen later in this section. That the detail of when and
how the candidate renounced the devil had in itself little significance is evident
Pompa diaboli was a favourite expression of Tertullian's. Its meaning
has been studied by Salomon Reinach, Cultes, mythes et religions, (Paris, E.
Leroux, 1905, English translation, Cutts, Myths and Religions by Elizabeth Frost,
London: D. Nutt, 1912) I, 347-362; Hugo Rahner, 'Pompa diaboli', Zeitschrift fur
katholische Theologie, 55 (1931), 239-273; Pierre de Labriolle, 'Pompa diaboli',
Archivum latinitatis medii aevi, 2 (1926), 170-181; Waszink, 'Pompa diaboli', 13-
41 and Jean Danielou, The Origins of Latin Christianity (translated by David
Smith and John Austin Baker), (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1977) pp 412-
418. The later view is that the word 'pompa', meaning 'procession' in its
narrower sense, was used by Tertullian in the wider sense of every manifestation






from the general way in which Tertullian referred to it - Hi sunt nempe angeli,
quos indicaturi sumus, hi stmt angeli, quibus in lauacro renuntiamus ; ^ and other
passages are even more unspecific. In de spectaculis 24, where the context of
'sealing' appears to be the making of the cross on the forehead of the neophyte as
a sign of new ownership, (which, according to the de resurrectione passage^
came fairly late in the baptismal ceremony) Tertullian appears to equate the
renouncing of the devil with the sealing of the Cross.
hoc erit pompa diaboli, aduersus quam in signaculo fidei eieramus. Quod
autem eieramus, neque facto neque dicto neque uisu neque conspectu
participare debemus. Ceterum si nos eieramus et rescindimus signaculum
rescindendo testationem eius. 3
and in de paenitentia he implied that the renunciation was part of the whole
conversation process :
Ceterum non leuiter in dominum peccat qui, cum aemulo eius diabolo
paenitentia sua renuntiasset et hoc nomine ilium domino subiecisset, rursus
eundem regressu suo erigit et exultationem eius semetipsum facit, ut denuo
malus recuperata praeda sua aduersus dominum gaudeat. 4
Indeed, it may have been done twice, first during the preparation of the
catechumen, and secondly, just before the actual service nobis ... qui bis idolis
5
renuntiamus . That text led Dekkers to state:
T. kent twee afzweringen van de heidense goden:..."nobis qui bis idolis
renuntiavimus" (De spect. 13), waarvan de eerste enigen tijd vodr het
Doopsel - "ailquanto prius", (de cor.3) - werd uitgesproken, naar alle
waarschijnlijkeid op den dag, waarop de catechumenen tot "audientes"
werden aangenomen. De tweede en voornaamste "eieratio" werd
daarentegan uitgesproken, wanneer de "baptizandus" reeds in het doopwater













profiteraur, renuntiasse nos diabolo et pompae et angelis eius ore nostro
contestamur" (De spect. 4), waardoor een duidelijke antithese tussen de
"eieratio" en de onmiddellijk volgende "fidei pacto" bekomen werd. 1
The significance of the renunciation for the relationship of man to God
(as opposed to the insignificance of the detail) is evident from Tertullian's
repeated reference to the renunciation as part of the sacramentum/ He never
forgot (and tried to ensure that his readers never forgot either) the consequences
of the baptismal pledge to renounce the devil and his retinue. What had the
Christian, who had renounced the devil, his pomp and his angels, to do with the
circus or the theatre, when both places were consecrated to them? How could
the maker of idols and the temple-painter be said to have renounced the devil
and his angels, if they made their living by them? The difficulty of the
schoolmaster, and the general question of trade, were both referred back by
Tertullian to the baptismal renunciation; since he believed that the whole of
pagan life - the market, the baths, the taverns, the streets the houses - was
impregnated with satanic influence, the renunciation of satan was of critical
importance for the right relationship of the baptismal candidate to God.
Of particular interest for this study is Tertullian's statement that
although the renunciation was founded ex traditio)and not ex scriptura, it was
op. cit., p 181. A rough translation is: "Tertullian knows two
renunciations of the pagan gods. (nobis - 13) of which the first one was
pronounced sometime before baptism (aliquanto - 3) in all probability on the day
on which the catechumens were accepted as "audientes". The second and most
importcjleieratio" was pronounced when the "baptizandus" was already standing in
the baptismal water. (Cum - 4) through which there is a clear antithesis
between the "eieratio" and the immediately following "fidei pactio".
^
e.g. omnes alienae, profanae, illicitae, semel iam in sacramenti
testatione eieratae - haec enim erunt "pompae diaboli et angelorum eius" - cor
13.7.45-47. The sacramental oath in baptism was of the utmost importance to
Tertullian in the relationship of man to God, but it is not clear just how he
related it to the 'amplius aliquid respondentes quam dominus in evangelio
determinauit' - cor 3.3.16-17. The whole matter will be examined together in
the next section and at that point reference will be made to Tertullian's use of
the word sacramentum.
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nevertheless his auctoritas^ for certain standards of Christian living; the former
as <l
|word from Roman law, will be examined in section IX.9 below. The context in
which Tertullian introduced the renunciation of the devil as a Christian tradition
is well known, but it is mentioned briefly here in order to provide a foundation
for the examination, in section IX.9, of the word traditio. A Christian soldier
had recently been put to death after a trial which resulted from his refusal to
wear a crown on the occasion of a military review in honour of an imperial
anniversary. Certain Christians believed that he should have worn it, but
Tertullian sympathised wholeheartedly with the soldier. When he was challenged
to provide scriptural authority for his view, Tertullian replied that the refusal to
wear a crown, although admittedly not dealt with in Scripture, was correct
because it was a consuetudo, quae sine dubio de traditione manauit. He refused
even to enter into argument for or against the question of support or lack of
support by Scripture, because the matter was settled -
Hanc si nulla scriptura determinauit, certe consuetudo corroborauit, quae
sine dubio de traditione manauit. Quomodo enim usurpari quid potest, si
traditum prius non est? "Etiam in traditionis obtentu exigenda est", inquis
"auctoritas scripta." Ergo quaeramus an et traditio nisi scripta non debeat
recipi. Plane negabimus recipiendam, si nulla exempla praeiudicent aliarum
obseruationum, quas sine ullius scripturae instrumento solius traditionis
titulo et exinde consuetudinis patrocinio uindicamus. 2
The first of the exempla which Tertullian produced was the renunciation of the
devil at baptism; the next three are also of interest to this chapter of the thesis
"Ne quis argumentari nos putet, ad principalem auctoritatem conuertar
ipsius signaculi nostri. Cum aquam ingressi ... renuntiasse nos diabolo et
pompae et engelis eius" - spec 4.1.1-4. After this page had been typed and after
the bibliography had been prepared, a micro-film (ordered some time previously)
arrived of a Ph.D. thesis submitted by Stanley Helms Kelley to the Emory
University (U.S.A.) in 1974, entitled Auctoritas in Tertullian: The Nature and
Order of Authority in his Thought. Kelley's conclusion was that auctoritas
referred in Tertullian to an innate or ontological quality within an individual or
an institution which allowed it naturally to subordinate to itself those who lacked




(the three-fold immersion, the words of the baptismal creed and the tasting of
milk and honey) and then Tertullian went on to other practices, outwith the
scope of this study. Here were a number of traditional rites, not specifically
commanded in the Bible, but which were valid because established by custom.
One reference to the baptismal renunciation has been held over until now
because it raises the whole question of baptism as a negotium between mem and
God. It will be sufficient to quote the passage here, to complete the texts in
which Tertullian referred to the renunciation of the devil, and then to take up
the significance of it in section IX.9 below. In de anima chapter 35, Tertullian
was concluding his lengthy refutation of metempsychosis, and wished to discredit
the heretical teaching of Carpocrates. If (conce^ ding for the sake of argument
only) Carpocrates was right that the 'adversary' mentioned in Matthew 5.26 was
the devil, then Carpocrates had already renounced the devil - pactus es enim
renuntiasse ipsi et pompae et angelis eius;^ Tertullian warned against any
attempt to get back from the devil those things which had been renounced ne te
ut fraudatorem, ut pacti transgressorem iudici deo obiciat.2
The renunciation of the devil was a final and irrevocable renouncing -
renuntiasse (perfect infinitive); it was the first step in that series of ceremonies
surrounding baptism which had such a profound and fundamental effect on the
relationship of man to God. The next step was to take the baptismal vow, and






IX.3 THE BAPTISMAL VOW
Following the renunciation of the devil - Tertullian specifically stated
that it was following and apart from that - Dehinc ter mergitamur amplius
aliquid respondentes quam dominus in euangelio determinauit J Since the
catechumen had to be well grounded in the faith before he was admitted to
baptism, it does not appear to a/feet this study of his relationship to God
whether, in baptism, he made a shorter or a longer profession of his faith, or
whether he added to the divine names the mention of the Church, quae trium
2
corpus est. The extensive modern debate as to what exactly was said and by
3 4
whom, when in aqua demissus et inter pauca uerba tinctus, is therefore not
discussed here at all. What is of significance for this study is the clear
impression from Tertullian's various texts that he regarded the baptismal vow
more as a promise or as the taking of an oath than a declaration of orthodox
doctrine or a summarizing of the faith. This seems to be the aspect of the
Christian's response to God in baptism which appealed to him most, and several




The significance of these words from bapt 6.2.13-14 was discussed by
Evans, "Baptism", pp 68-69.
3
The debate is two-fold. First, many older scholars identified the rule
of faith with the baptismal creed and some still do, including Oscar Cullmann,
(Die ersten Christlichen Glaubensbekenntnisse, Zurich: Zollikon, 1943, English
translation by J.K.S. Reid, The Earliest Christian Confessions (London:
Lutterworth Press, 1949) pp 18-47; ibid, The Early Church, (translated by A.J.B.
Higgins and S. Goodman, London: S.C.M. Press, 1956) p 94, and W. Telfer, The
Forgiveness of Sins, (London: SCM Press, 1959) p 52. Most modern writers on
the subject say this identification is impossible, for example, the penetrating
study of R.P.J.M. Restreop-Jaramillo, op. cit., and J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian
Creeds (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1958) p 51-63. Second, it is debated
whether the questions and answers, and particularly the answers, followed quite
the same course as they did elsewhere, when the answer was a simple "Credo", In
view of Tertullian's expressions "in sacramenti verba (not verbis) respondere" and
"in legis verba profiteri", it seems likely that the minister recited the formula




Sacramentum is a word which Tertullian employed no less than 134 times
and in his hands it can mean at least six different things: religion generally,
divine activity, pre-figuring, mystery, sacrament, and solemn oath. It is this last
meaning that he applied to the profession of faith made at baptism. On
occasions he used it more narrowly for the renunciation of the devil - de ipso
sacramento nostro interpretaremur nobis aduersas esse fidei eiusmodi artes.
Quomodo enim renuntiauimus diabolo et angelis eius, si eos facimus? *
illicitae, semel iam in sacramenti testatione eieratae, - haec enim erunt
"pompae diaboli et angelorum eius."2
but on other occasions he applied it to the whole baptismal declaration of
allegiance and faith:
Vocati sumus ad militiam Dei uiui iam tunc, cum in sacramenti uerba
respondimus. 3
Credimusne humanum sacramentum diuino superduci licere,... Ceterum
subuertit totam substantiam sacramenti causatio eiusmodi, 4
Non conuenit sacramento diuino et humano, 5
Huic sacramento militans ab hostibus prouocor. Par sum illis, nisi illis
manus dedero. Hoc defendendo depugno in acie, uulneror, concidor, occidor.
Quis hunc militi suo exitum uoluit, nisi qui tali sacramento eum
consignauit? 6
and, even more widely to the baptismal ceremony itself:
non ullum ordinem uideo consistere, iam nec ipsum fidei eius sacramentum.
















Vna nobis et illis fides, unus Deus, idem Christus, eadem spes, eadem,
lauacri sacramenta, 1
In a slightly different sense of the word, baptism was a sacramentum - for
example:
De Sacramento aquae nostrae qua ablutis delictis pristinae caecitatis in
uitam aeternam liberamur, 2
3
Quae figura manifestior in baptismi sacramento?
Igitur omnes aquae de pristina originis praerogatiua sacramentum
sanctificationis consecuntur inuocato deo: 4
5
addita est ampliato sacramento obsignatio baptismi.
From all this, it is clear that sacramentum was for Tertullian an important word,
describing inter alia that most significant of all events in the relationship of man
to God, namely his baptism. The background of the word sacramentum and its
use in Roman law will be examined in section IX.9 below.
Meantime, it should be noted (without discussion) that when the
baptismal vow was taken, the candidates for baptism were immersed^ not only
once, but three times; during the calling of the three names of Persons of the
Trinity, the candidates were baptized to the individual Persons. Five of the













The mode of baptism is entirely outside the scope of this study.
Dekkers, op. cit., p 186-188 studied the texts and concluded that in Tertullian it
was normally by total immersion, but that in special cases per infusionem was
administered and that even partial immersion would suffice - the externals were
less important for Tertullian than the spiritual significance of baptism.
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IX.4 REMISSION OF SINS
The spiritual consequences of baptism were 'manifold and complicated'
as Evans put it.''' However, the first and most obvious, and the one most
frequently mentioned by Tertullian, was remissio delictorum. The washing in
consecrated water, following an appropriate reparation through the
catechumenate, guaranteed the forgiveness of sins. Tertullian challenged
Marcion, early in his argument, as to why he required baptism. If Marcion's
superior God did not withhold from man the spiritual benefits which the
Christian obtained through baptism, why did he practice baptism?
Cui enim rei baptisma quoque apud eum exigitur? Si remissio del t'ctorum
est, quomodo uidebitur delicta remittere qui non uidebitur retinere, quia, si
retineret, iudicaret? 2
Up until baptism, every soul was subject to original sin and was impure, certainly
by nature and, if in a position to practice sin, then also by practice. Because the
soul was subject to original sin, it was in fact sinful and this infected the body.
However, baptism took away not only the curtain of corruption caused by
3
original sin, but the sin itself. Baptism was the bath in which all the pollution
of sin was washed away - the effect was immediate -all sins committed before
4
baptism would be forgiven. Numerous references could be gathered but the
point need not be laboured.
1




The texts for this are examined in the next section.
4
For example, De sacramento aquae nostrae qua ablutis delictis
pristinae caecitatis - bapt 1.1.2-3; quoniam uice sordium delictis inquinamur ...
spiritus in aquis corporaliter diluitur et caro in eisdem spiritaliter emundatur -
bapt 4.5.26 and 33-34; baptismi carnalis actus quod in aqua mergimur spiritalis
effectus quod delictis liberamur - bapt 7.2.10-11; quid festinat innocens aetas ad
remissionem peccatorum? - bapt 18.5.31-32; sordes guidem baptismate
abluuntur, maculae uero martyrio candidantur - scorp 12.10.6-7; neque ego
renuo diainum beneficium, id est abolitionem delictorum, inituris aquam
omnimodo saluum esse, paen 6.9.35-36.
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Tertullian insisted that Christian baptism could not, in contrast to
Jewish washings, be repeated:
Semel ergo lauacrum inimus, semel delicta abluuntur quia ea iterari non
oportet. Ceterum Israel (Judaeus) cotidie lauat quia cotidie inquinatur.
Quod ne in nobis quoque factitaretur propterea de uno lauacro definitum est.
Felix aqua quae semel abluit, quae ludibrio peccatoribus non est, quae non
adsiduitate sordium infecta rursus quos diluit inquinat: 1
Accordingly, because of his severe view of post-baptismal sin Tertullian
encouraged the practice of postponing the remission of sin in baptism until the
candidate had matured to the point where he could reasonably expect to live the
2
life demanded of the Christian.
The other point to be noted in this section is the manner in which
Tertullian tied the element of the forgiveness of sin in baptism into the other
aspects of the conversion experience - he did not set one over against another.
Indeed, not only were the aspects inter-related but the washing with water,
which conveyed the forgiveness of sins was not dis ^ociated from the gift of the
Holy Spirit, so that emergenti de lauacro post uetera delicta columba sancti
3
spiritus aduolat pacem dei adferens emissa de caelis ...and Non quod in aqua
spiritum sanctum consequimur, sed in aqua emendati sub angelo spiritui sancto
praeparamur .... abolitione delictorum quam fides impetrat obsignata in patre et
4








bapt 6.1.1-2 and 5-7.
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IX.5 REGENERATION
Of the four spiritual consequences of baptism mentioned in de anima
chapters 39 to 61, the second was that the soul in Christo recenseatur, ^ that it
was reformata per secundam natiuitatem^ and that nisi quis nascetur ex aqua et
a 3 4
spiritu, non inhibit regum dei. Tertullian's other listing of the spiritual
benefits confered through bapism also mentioned new birth and a new life which
began now and which lasted into eternity; Tertullian there challenged Marcion -
Si regeneratio est hominis, quomodo regenerat qui non generauit? Iteratio enim
5
non competit ei, a quo quid nec semel factum est. The concept of regeneration
in baptism was important to Tertullian, because he saw in it a symbolic
representation of dying to rise again (although not in such a sense as to exclude a
corporal resurrection in the future):
Docet guidem apostolus Colosenibus scribens mortuos fuisse nos aliquando,
alienates et inimicos sensus donimi, cum in operibus pessimis agebamus,
dehinc consepultos Christo in baptismate et conresuscitatos in eo per fidem
efficaciae dei, qui ilium suscitauit a^ mortuis: Et uos cum mortui essetis in
delictis et praeputiatione carnis uestrae, uiuificauit cum eo, donatis uobis
omnibus delictis, et rursus: Si cum Christo mortui essetis ab elementis
mundi, quomodo quidam quasi uiuentes in mundo sententiam fertis? Sed cum
ita nos mortuos faciat spiritaliter, ut tamen et corporaliter quandoque
morituros agnoscat, utique et resuscitatos proinde spiritaliter deputans
aeque non negat etiam corporaliter resurrecturos. 6
Ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donee in Christo
recenseatur, tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur - an 40.1.1-3.
2
Proinde cum ad fidem peruenit reformata per secundam natiuitatem ex
aqua et superna uirtute, detracto corruptionis pristinae aulaeo totam lucem suam
conspicit an. 41.4.20-23. This description is paralleled by earlier discussions of
the same theme in bapt and paen.
3
A quotation from the words of Christ to correct any imbalance at the
privilege of having been born of Christian parents: Alioquin meminerat
dominicae definitionis: nisi quis nascetur ex aqua et spiritu, non inibit in regnum
dei, id est, non erit sanctus - an 39.4.25-28.
4
This was set out, with the list in de anima 39 to 41, in the introduction






In view of Tertullian's description of baptism as regeneratio, and his
designation of it as secunda natiuitas, it is a little surprising to find, in Evans'
succinct description of the baptismal ceremonies, the statement that:
"In all this there is no reference to any regeneration or new birth into
everlasting life. The orginal sacramental act is limited in its effect to the
remission of sins, and that only as preparatory to what Tertullian regards as
the more spiritually effective acts of unction (the grace of which is not
precisely defined) and benediction (which ensures the descent of the Holy
Spirit). 1
Te"jtullian did have one reservation about the concept of regeneration in baptism,
but it was not the one to which Evans referred. He opposed the teaching of a
heretic by name of Menander,3 who had promised immortality, no less, and
preservation from death, by the baptism which he administered; his disciples
would have immediate freedom from death, and need not wait for the
resurrection of the body at the last day.
sed haeretici magi Menandri Samaritani furor conspuatur dicentis mortem
ad suos non pertinere, uerum nec peruenire: in hoc scilicet se a superna et
arcana potestate legatum, ut immortales et incorruptibiles et statim
resurrectionis compotes fiant, qui baptism eius induerint. 3
Tertullian was concerned that martyrdom should not be undermined as the most
4
glorious way to God. If the baptism of Menander could give immortality, it
would make martyrdom superfluous; since martyrdom was God's highest call to
5
the Christian, Menander's baptism was plainly contrary to God's will.
*
Evans, "Incarnation", p 167.
Menander taught toward the end of the first century A.D., so when not
only his first disciples but in due course he himself came to die, the general
credibility of his teaching must have been undermined. Nevertheless, Tertullian





From an 50.4.27-30 it seems that Menander and his followers
considered martyrdom superfluous, because immortality was already secured by
Menander's baptism, so there was no advantage in baptismo sanguinis.
5
apud quod nec pro deo ipso mori lex est, an 50.4.27. Tertullian
answered by quoting Isaiah 2:2-3 - omnes iam nationes ascendant in montem
domini et in aedem dci Iacob - an 50.4.27-29. In his commetary on de anima,
(continued on next page)
359
Regeneration to newness of spiritual life was no escape from natural death,
whether by martyrdom or by normal cause.
That reservation apart, Tertullian frequently spoke of baptism as rebirth
and as the beginning of eternal life:-
a secunda natiuitate, id est a lauacro 1
De sacramento aquae nostrae qua ablutis delictis pristinae caecitatis in
uitam aeternam liberamur non erit otiosum degestum istud, 2
3
m aqua nascimur,
homo in aqua demissus et inter pauca uerba tinctus ... consecutio
aeternitatis. 4
aqua reformari, 3
ne mirum sit in baptismo si aquae animare nouerunt. 3
qui uitia corporis remediabant nunc spiritum medentur, qui temporalem
operabantur saluten nunc aeternam reformant, 7
g
cum de illo sanctissimo lauacro noui natalis ascenditis,
footnote 5 continued ;
Waszink saw this as a reference by Tertullian to Jacob's dream about the ladder
leading to heaven (Gen 28,12/5), the ladder being an exemplum of martyrdom and
those ascending it being "Christians who do not fear to die for their faith. To
them Tertullian opposes Menander, whose followers obtain immortality in an
easier way, not baptismo sanguinis (cf. 55,5) but already by their first baptism"











bapt 3.1.2-3 "Reformari literally means 'are reformed', but in much
more than manners and morals - rather by a new formation at the hands of God,
parallel to that first formation from the dust of the ground: and so, in effect,








Ita nobis magis competit etiam spiritalem defendere resurrectionem ab
ingressu fidei, qui plenitudinem eius agnoscimus in exitu saeculi. 1
There is one other phrase, which seems entirely to have escaped the attention of
commentators on regeneration in Tertullian's writings. When he was
enumerating the customs associated with baptism and authenticated ex tradition
not ex scriptura, he said, after describing the triple immersion, hide suscepti
2
lactis et mellis concordiam praequstamus. The word "suscepti" seems to be
derived from a custom along the pagan Greeks and Romans, at any rate in earlier
days, to set a new-born child on the earth, from which the father raised it up,
thus acknowledging it as his own, conferring upon it legitimate status, and
declaring his intention of rearing it and not exposing it. In connecfton with this
rite, over which a special deity, Levana, was supposed to preside, the term
tollere or suscipere liberos (filios) was used. In course of time suscipere came to
mean simply "to beget" or "to bear", without any reference to the primitive
ceremony of the "raising", which, even if it survived as late as the third century,
had probably lost its original significance. Suscepti, therefore, as Tertullian used
it here means "born (again)"; like the infant at the "raising", the newly baptised
were acknowledged as the children of God.
It has been suggested that 'suscepti' here might be a reference to the
duties of sponsors at baptism to take charge of the newly baptised, but if the
word had the background just described, it would seem more natural to refer
suscepti to the new life conferred at baptism. Since any legal significance of
suscepti had long since passed into desuetude by Tertullian's time, it would not







IX.6 DELIVERANCE FROM DEATH AND THE POWER OF THE DEVIL
The first of the spiritual consequences of baptism, mentioned by
Tertullian in de anima chapters 39 - 41, was deliverance from the power of the
devil. The second, in the corresponding list in adversus Marcionem book 1, was
deliverance from death. These two are treated together in this section - as
indeed Tertullian treated them together when he explained that Christ destroyed
the works of the devil in man, when by baptism he set man free and by the same
act he delivered man from death: In hoc enim manifestatus est filius Dei, ut
soluet opera diaboli. Nam et soluit liberans hominem per lauacrum donato ei
chirographo mortis.^
Both concepts were taken up throughout Tertullian's works - as the guilt
of sin was removed in baptism, so was the penalty of sin removed, and death was
abolished: deleta morte per ablutionem delictorum: exempto scilicet reatu
2 3
eximitur et poena. nonne mirandum est lauacro dilui mortem? The
consequence of sin was not only death, taken in the usual sense of the word, but
also the separation of man from God. Tertullian saw considerable typological
value, for understanding the significance of baptism, in the crossing by Israel of
the Red Sea; by his act of baptism, the catechumen left his tormenter, the devil,
drowned in waters, as Pharoah with his host was drowned in the Red Sea.
Liberantur de saeculo nationes, per aquam scilicet, et diabolum dominatorem
. . . 4
pnstinum m aqua obpressum derelinquunt . The passage of the Red Sea, as a
figure of the sacrament, put the emphasis on the dreadful plight in which Israel
found itself and from which it could be saved by divine intervention alone.
*








The concept of the sinner as a captive slave of satan was as familiar to
Tertullian as to other ancient Christian writers.^ The captivity which had made
mam the booty (praeda) of satan was the result of original sin, diabolo tamen
captante naturam, quam et ipse iam infecit delicti semine inlato,2 and from this
captivity he was freed by baptism, as the text from de baptismo chapter 9 just
quoted, shows. How Tertullian related the renunciation of satan at the beginning
of the baptismal ceremony (when the candidate forswore the devil and all his
3
pomps, ) to the liberation in the water baptism itself, he did not explain, but it is
clear from the following passage adversus Marcionem that Tertullian regarded
baptism as the point where the victory was appropriated to the catechumen.
Challenging Marcion on the issue of baptism, Tertullian's second point (the first
being how Marcion's God could remit sins) was to ask: Si absolutio mortis est,
quomodo absoluet a morte qui non diuinxit ad mortem? Damnasset enim, si
primordio deuinxisset.^
Physical death was universal and Tertullian (as noted in the previous
section) refuted the doctrine of Menander, who offered escape from it. Even
Enoch and Elijah, though they were translated, must yet see death, which was
only postponed for them. But on the other hand death was not really "natural"
to man. Even/the decay of old age removed men in "natural course", death was
*
cf J. Riviere, op. cit., p 199-216. The texts relating to the notion of




Examined in Section IX. above.
4
I Marc 28.2.2-4 - although it must be noted that deliverance from the
powers of death and the devil was not always mentioned in the context of
baptism. Et Dominus guidem ilium redemit ab angelis munditenentibus a
potestatibus, a spiritalibus nequitiae, a tenebris huius aeui, a iudicio aeterno, a
morte perpetua - fug 12.3.28-31; portas adamantinas mortis et aeneas seras




really a violation of nature, because man was not created to die; it was sin,
which entered the world due to man's free volition, which had brought in the
complicating circumstance of death.* The spiritual consequences of death were
annulled by baptism and man was set free for eternal life.
Since this matter is not going to yield any references to Roman law, it
need not be prolonged, but one further text should be mentioned to complete this
factual part of the study. When Tertullian was refuting the slanders which the
heathen recounted of the Christians, that in their acts of worship they killed a
child, dipped bread in the blood and then consumed the bloo«£-soaked mouthfuls,
he satirised a consecration ritual which began as described above and which
concluded with the promise of eternal life.
Veni, si quis es, demerge ferrum in infantem, uel si alterius officium est, tu
modo, specta morientem animam antequam uixit; certe excipe rudem
sanguinem, in quo panem tuum saties, uescere libenter..."Haec cum
expunxeris uiues in aeuum". 2
In the Apologeticum, Tertullian replaced the last sentence with the more choice
form of words ... excipe rudem sanguinem, eo panem tuum satia, uescere
3libenter.... Talia initiatus et consignatus uiuis in aeuum . The final words in
each case - "you will live in eternity" - emphasise the importance for both
Christian and heathen of the hope of deliverance from the consequences of





I nat 7.31.8-12 and 33.17.
2




Two of Tertullian's treatises to catechumens open with a reference to
conversion as enlightenment - the removal of blindness and the coming to light
Paenitentiam hoc genus homines quod et ipsi retro fuimus, caeci sine domini
lumine;* De sacramento aquae nostrae qua ablutis delictis pristinae caecitatis in
2
uitam aeternam liberamur. He believed that original sin had 'obscured' the
primary good nature of the soul, its tota lux; the 'curtain' of this 'obscuration'
could be torn away only by baptism, - detracto corruptionis pristinae aulaeo
3
totam lucem suam conspicit.
This was an important emphasis for Tertullian the catechist to make,
because he believed that sins committed after enlightenment and baptism would
be judged more severely by God than sins committed in blindness and ignorance;
the catechumenate was the place were one had to learn not to sin. If life before
baptism was darkness, blindness, error and ignorance (one of Tertullian's
evangelistic emphasis being that all sins of that earlier life would be forgiven in
baptism) the coming of light brought not only a new relationship with God but also
a new obligation to understand and to follow God's will. Since, however, the
4
concept of enlightenment in baptism neither originated with Tertullian nor
bears any trace of influence from Roman law, it will not be pursued here. It was
mentioned simply because it featured in de anjma chapter 41 as the fourth of
5








Their history from the New Testament to Tertullian was traced in
detail by Franz Joseph Dolger in an article, "Die Sunde in Blindheit und
Unwissenheit", in Antike und Christentum, 2 (1930) 222-229.
5
See the list set out in the introduction to this chapter at p 342,
footnote 2.
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IX. 8 RESTORATION TO THE LIKENESS OF GOD
The fourth consequence of baptism, as set out by Tertullian in his debate
with Marcion, and also in the relevant passage in de anima, was the receiving of
the Holy Spirit. That will be examined in Chapter X.3 below, but before
concluding the present chapter it is appropriate to notice one other spiritual
benefit of baptism mentioned by Tertullian. He took up the Graeco-Irenaean"
distinction^ between imago and similitudo; with the removal of sin in the
baptismal water, man, who had lost his likeness of God through sin, was restored
again to the divine similitudo, as well as having the status of the divine
3
imago, i.e. the unalienable capabilities of man, such as reason and free will:
Ita restituitur homo deo ad similitudinem eius, qui retro ad imaginem dei
fuerat - imago in effigie, similitudo in aeternitate censentur recipit enim
ilium dei spiritum quem tunc de adflatu eius acceperat sed post amiserat per
delictum. 1
Tertullian referred several times to the creation of man as both the imago et
similitudo of God^, and he exhorted Christians to display the likeness of God in
Although it is generally assumed that Tertullian was indebted to
Irenaeus for this idea, it is possible that the distinction, like many other things
which Irenaeus had written, had become the standard Christian exposition of the
text of Genesis 1.26 and that Tertullian used it simply as such.
Lupton (op. cit., pp 15-16) contended that Tertullian was in error in
attempting to distinguish between "image" and "likeness", holding that the words
were synonymous, the second being added to emphasise the first. Lupton's
contention would seem apporpriate for almost every passage in Tertullian except
the one on which he is commenting; usually Tertullian did put imago and
similitudo together as one and spoke (for example) of the "integritas, imaginis et
similitudinis" - II Marc 10.3.22 - but the de baptismo text seems clearly to
distinguish them.
3
Man as the 'image' of God was discussed by Karpp, op. cit., p 53-56 and




For example, "Quis denique dignus incolere dei opera quam ipsius
imago et similitudo? Earn quoque bonitas et quidem operantior operata est, non
imperiali uerbo, sed familiari manu, etiam uerbo blandiente praemisso: faciamus
hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram." - II Marc 4.3.6-4.10; "Quae
erunt dei, quae similia sint denario Caesaris? Imago scilicet et similitudo eius.
Hominem igitur reddi iubet creatori, in cuius imagine et similtudine et nomine et
materia expressus est" - IV Marc 38.3.22-25; "Si homo et res et opus et imago et
similitudo - et caro per terram et anima per afflatum - creatoris est" - V Marc
6.11.20-21.
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their lives,* but the passage from de baptismo, just quoted, was Tertullian's only
reference to baptism as the means of man's restoration to God's likeness.
Whether and to what extent Tertullian 'took up' the idea and to what
extent he innovated on it is outside the scope of this study. Struker maintained
that in respect of the imago Dei in man, Tertullian was dependent on Iranaeus
and added nothing to his thought;^ on the other hand, Otto argued (his precis)
that Tertullian:
1. nur zum Teil von Irenaeus abhangig tst, und
2. durch die Verwendung stoischen Gedankengutes seht wohl ein forderndes
fur die Theologiegeschichte sogar entscheidendes Moment in die Debatte
getragen hat. 3
These writers are mentioned because their argument hinges on the interpretation
of the passage from de baptismo chapter 5 just quoted; the loss of Tertullian's
earlier and more detailed treatise on the theology of baptism may account for
4
his brief reference to the imago/similitudo in his extant work. Otto's second
point, about Stoic influence on Tertullian here, is that Tertullian (apart from the
de baptismo passage) placed the emphasis on man's obligation to develop the
similitudo, by means of his liberum arbitrium where Irenaeus had emphasised the
restoration of the similitudo by the Incarnation and by the reception of baptism.^
That, however, leads into the life of the Christian after baptism and cannot be
explored here.
Also to be noted, without stopping to examine it in any detail, is the
Voluntas adei est sanctificatio nostra. Vult enim imaginem suam nos
etiam similitudinem fieri - ex 1.3.12-14.
Arnold Struker, Die Gottebenbildichkeit des Menschen in der
christlichen Literatur der ersten zwei Jahrhunderte, (Munster: 1913) p 129.
3
Stephen Otto, "Der Mensch als Bild Gottes bei Tertullian", Munchen
Theologische Zeitschrift, 1 (1959), 276.
4
As he said about heretical baptism - de isto plenius iam nobis in Graeco
digestum est, bapt 15.2.16.
5
Bray set out in detail the relationship between Tertullian's, Irenaeus' and
Paul's use of imago/similitudo at pp 67-73 of op. cit. "Holiness".
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contention of Koch^ that Adam did not possess perfection, nor the Holy Spirit
nor immortality, but only the potential of these, which potential was thwarted by
the Fall. Koch analysed all the passages where Tertullian mentioned imago and
similitudo, and claimed to find in Tertullian support for his view that the
attributes just mentioned were not possessed by any one until Christ made them
attainable to 'restored' man. Koch believed that baptism did not 'return to man a
2
lost possession' but allowed man 'to complete an interrupted development' Since
there is no legal language employed in this concept, either way, it would unduly
prolong this seciton to pursue the point; it is sufficient to note that Tertullian
did use the language of the restoration of the similitudo to express yet another
consequence of baptism for the relationship of man to God. With that, it is
appropriate to return to those areas of this chapter where Roman legal language
was employed and to investigate the significance of it.
Hugo Koch, Tertullianisches in, No. 7 - "Zur Lehre vom Urstand und
der Erlosung bei Tertullian", Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 104 (1932), 127-
159.
^
Q£. cit., p 127 (translated).
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IX.9 ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
The renunciation of satan and his retinue introduced the word traditio to
this thesis for the first time. Since a great part of the Roman law was founded
on mores maiorum - that is, customs long observed and sanctioned by the
consent of the people - and since Tertullian is the earliest extant writer to have
used the word traditio for a custom or rite existing in the church, it is important
to see what part traditio had in his mind for establishing the relationship of the
baptismal candidate to God.
The word traditio occurs thirty-two times in Tertullian's works, but two
preliminary observations will eliminate most of these uses from the subject-
matter of this section. First, as Flesseman-van Leer brought out with admirable
clarity, * Tertullian distinguished ^ between 'traditio' meaning the traditional
fides-veritas (including the disciplina) of the Church as taught in his day and (so
he presumed) as it had always been taught from the time of the apostles, and
'traditio' meaning long-continued custom or observance in the Church. This
latter, often in the plural traditiones and also referred to by Tertullian as
3
observatio or consuetudo is still too wide a concept for this section of the
study, and a second restriction must be applied. The traditio relevant to baptism
was dealt with in only one treatise - de corona. Elsewhere, Tertullian explored
at length customs such as refusing the liturgical kiss at the close of the prayer
op. cit., p 145 ff. Her conclusions were accepted and followed by R.F.
Refoule, Tertullien, Traite de la prescription contre les heretiques, (Paris: Les
Editions du Cerf, 1957) p 46; Braun, "Deus Christianorum," pp 426-427; and
Fontaine "De Corona," pp 62 ff.
2
Unfortunately J. Tixeront did not, and unjustly accused Tertullian of
inconsistent and contradictory views, because, led astray by the word, he did not
see that Tertullian was using traditio for two difference concepts. Tixeront, op.
cit., I, 343.
3
The difference of emphasis between the words was noted by F. de
Pauw 'La Justification des Traditions non Ecrites chez Tertullien",
E_.phemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 19 (1942), 8-10.
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and not receiving the Eucharist on days when one was committed to fasting - but
that all relates to life among Christians, outside the scope of this chapter. Later
on, under greater Montanist influence, Tertullian would even argue that there
were exceptions to the authority of traditio - by lapse of time or by local
considerations or by reference to the people involved; ^ that debate too is
outside the scope of this section and the only enquiry made here into traditio is
traditio as Tertulian used it when he wrote de corona; which refer to the
baptismal practice.
In chapters 3 and 4 of that work, 3 Tertullian pointed to the many
ecclesiastical practices, such as those associated with baptism and the Eucharist,
which were accepted without question although custom and custom alone
prescribed them. This was perfectly proper, he argued, because even in the law
courts of his day, custom was received instead of law, where there was no
written enactment.
Si legem nusquam reperio, sequitur, ut traditio consuetudini morem hunc
dederit... Consuetudo autem etiam in ciuilibus rebus pro lege suscipitur,
cum deficit lex, nec differt, scriptura an ratione consistat, quando et legem
ratio commendet. 3
On the face of it, it seems that Tertullian drew directly from the civil law to
establish his theological point, because there is no doubt that consuetudo was one
of the sources of the ius civile. It was considered by the Roman jurists as
expressing the tacit consent of the people, and if custom could be established, it
was as binding on the judge as any other form of law.
As a Montanist, he had to discredit his opponents regarding the veiling
of those women who had taken a private vow of perpetual virginity. In de
virginibus velandis he took an entirely different on traditio from the one adopted
in de corona.
2
The word traditio occurs four times in cor chapter 3 and six times in
cor chapter 4 - over one-half of its total usage in the sense which is common
today, namely, that which has long been current in the Church.
3
cor 4.4.20-22 and 5.27-29.
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The enquiry must, however, be carried one stage further, because
Tertullian stated, not only in the passage just quoted but throughout de corona,
that the ultimate justification on traditio was ratio. That many-faceted word
was used no less than 340 times by Tertullian, and it is quite outside the scope of
this chapter even to begin to comment on ratio, except to note Tertullian's
insistence on the need to find ratio behind any religious practice which was not
directly supported by Scripture - later he added to that the authority of the
Paraclete.
Harum et aliarum eiusmodi disciplinarum si legem expostules scripturam,
nullam leges. Traditio tibi praetendetur auctrix et consuetudo confirmatrix
et fides obseruatrix. Rationem traditioni et consuetudini et fidei
patrocinaturam aut ipse perspecies, aut ab aliquo qui perspexerit disces.
Interim non nullam esse credes cui debeatur obsequium. 1
Why then did traditio - consuetudo have the force of written law in the Church?
Because, said Tertullian, (de corona chapters 5 and 6) it was based on ratio - the
reasonable character of the observances. It was then not difficult for Tertullian
to connect general reason to divine reason, because ratio was one of the. first
attributes of God; the transition from "what was reasonable" to "what was
worthy of God" was easily made, even necessarily made, by him.
Apres avoir enonce le pr tncipe general: A defaut de loi, coutume vaut loi, il
le justifie comme suit: "Peu importe que ce soit une coutume basee sur une
autorite ecrite ou sur la raison, puisque c'est au fond la raisin qui dicte la
loi." Dans la formule consuetudo ratione consistit, qui revient jusqu'a trois
fois, ratio signifie la raison en general. Plus loin, Tetullien precise sa
pensee. Apres avoir affirm e une nouvelle fois que "tout ce qui est a base de
raison revet force de loi(' il revendique pour chaque fidele le droit de se faire
des observances de ce genre,"a condition toutefois qu'elles soient dignes de
Dieu, confomes a In discipline et profitables au salut." II n'aura echappe a
personne qu'il introduit de cette facon dans la formule ratione consistit des
elements qui a strictement parler, la depassent: en reality, il passe de la
ratio-raison en general a la ratio raison divine. Deux textes de l'Ecriture, le
premiser, invitant le fidele a juger lui-meme de ce qu'il faut faire, l'autre,
une parole assez vague de 1'apStre:"si vous ignorez quelque chose, Dieu vous
le revdlera"lui facilitent ce passage. 2
2 cor 4.1.1-7.
Pauw - op. cit., p 32-33.
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There was no similar appeal in Roman law to ratio, certainly not to divine ratio;
the very fact of the long usage was in itself the ground of law. Cicero had
defined consuetudo as:
"either a principle that is derived only in a slight degree from nature and
has been fed and strengthened by usage - religion, for example - or any of
the laws which ... we see proceed from nature but which have been
strengthened by custom, or any principle which lapse of time and public
approval have made the habit of usage of the community." 1
It appears therefore that while Tertullian used a word in current use in Roman
law, he understood it and in particular its justi ication in a way of his own.
The next word connected with Roman Law, introduced in this chapter,
was sacramentum. Tertullian applied this word in a variety of situations,
including the renunciation of the devil and the profession of faith made at
baptism, and more widely to the baptism itself. The use of sacramentum by
Tertullian has been so extensively studied, over the last ninety years, ^ that it
would be inappropriate here even to try to review its complicated history.
Etymylogically the word derived from sacrum (sacred or holy) and men turn, a
suffix indicating "the means by which" something was placed in the divine sphere
as "sacer", that is, something outwith the range of human law. From meaning
"that by which something is made holy or sacrosanct", it came in classical Latin
^
De inventione 2.51.162. So similarly in the Digest 1.3.32.
2 ✓
A. Reville, "Du sense _ du mot sacramentum dans Tertullien",
Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes, Sciences religieuses, (1889), 195-229;
B. Stakemeier, "La dottrina di Tertulliano sui sacamenti in genere", Rivista
storico-critica delle scienze teologiche, 4 (1908), 446-466; Emile de Backer,
Sacramentum. Le mot et l'idde representee par lui dans les oeuvres de
Tertullien, (Louvain, Bureau de Recueil, 1911); P. Batiffol, Compte rendu sur
"Sacramentum. Le mot et l'idee representee par lui dans les oeuvres de
Tertullien, par E. de Backer", Bulletin d'ancienne litterature et d'archeologie
chretiennes, 3 (1913), 160-177. J. de Ghellinck, J. Poukens, E. de Backer, G.
Lebacqz, Pour l'histoire du mot sacramentum, (Louvain-Paris: 1924) pp 58-152;
Adolf Kolping, Sacramentum Tertullianeum, I: Untersuchungen uber die Anfange
des christichen Gebrauchs der Vokabel Sacramentum, (Regensberg-Miinster:
1948); T. Burgos-Nadal, "Concepto de 'sacramentum' en Tertulliano",
Helmantica, 10 (1959), 227-256; Braun, "Deus Christianorum" pp 435-443;
Dimitri Michaelides, Sacamentum chez Tertullien (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes,
1970).
372
to mean the money deposited at the aerarium by the parties to a law-suit as a
guarantee of good faith, ^ or the oath of allegiance taken by a soldier on
enlistment. In either case - the deposit or the oath - what was consecrated lay
under the special protection of the gods and was regarded as inviolable, res aut
persona consecrata. The sacramentum was distinguished from the general ius
iurandum in that ifc concluded with a sacratio, or a formal consignment of the
person to the wrath of the god - usually Jupiter - in case of violation. One who
violated the sacramentum became sacer, and anyone might kill him with
impunity. The military oath appears to have been essentially a pledge of
personal allegiance to the commanding general, as an instance is recorded of
renewing the sacramentum on a change of commander/ From that military use,
it came more broadly to be used for any solemn engagement or obligation
assumed.
Tertullian clearly had the military oath in mind, when he used
sacramentum for the baptismal ceremony, as for example, Vocati sumus ad
3
militiam Dei uiui iam tunc, cum in sacramenti uerba respondimus . That he
regarded the taking of the sacramentum as fundamental, whether by a Christian
or by a pagan, is seen from the passage in de corona where he discussed whether
Gaius, Institutes 4.14. The person who, in the result, lost the case
forfeited the sacramentum, at first to the priests, later to the State; originally,
it seems, the items in dispute were actually deposited with the pontifex, so that
security for payment was then unnecessary. The amount, when a deposit
replaced the actual goods, i.e. the sacramentum, was 500 asses, unless the thing
in dispute was of less value than 1000 asses or the action was to determine
whether a man was free or a slave, in both of which cases it was 50 asses only.
It is probable that the force of the sacramentum procedure was based on the fact
that, originally it was a matter not merely of money against money, but of oath
against oath (i.e. sacramentum, in the ordinary sense of the word). The person
tendering the oath pledged, for the truth of his oath, either his own person (i.e.
he consecrated himself to the gods), or some portion of his property, which later
was fixed at the figures mentioned above.
2




a Christian could join the army and whether a soldier should on conversion leave
the army:
Tertullian distingue curieusement le cas du soldat qui est entre dans 1'armee
apres le~bapteme et celui du soldat entre pai'en dans l'armee, et qui se
convertit ensuite au christianisme; et il apparait mo ins rigoureux dans le
premier cas, peut-etre parce qu'il pense que le bapteme, ayant priorite
chronologique sur le sacramentum militaire, conserve aussi une puissance
psychologique qui le met en etat de superiorite permanente sur l'engagement
a l'empereur: "credimusne humanum sacramentum diuino superduci licere, et
in alium dominum respondere post Christum?" dit-il lui-meme avec une
certaine clart6 (XI.I; cf.XI,7). Theorkuement en effet, l'empreinte
baptismale est ineffacable, i l'inverse du "serment" prete a un homme, fut-
-ce l'empereur lui-meme. Est-ce pour cette raison que Tertullien reprdsente
la vie professionelle du baptise devenu soldat comme bourrel^e d'impressions
facheuses et de remords aigus? 1
Since, in context, the "sacramentum humanum" can only mean the
military oath of allegiance, then in the first instance the "sacramentum divinum"
must have the definite meaning of "divine oath of allegiance:" but while the
military sacramentum was regarded as a legal obligation, and its violation was
nefas (criminal wickedness), there seems to be no usage of sacramentum in
relation to baptism in Tertullian to correspond to the sense of a deposit or
security in a law-suit. In Tertullian's hands the word did indeed convey the most
profound spiritual consequences, but it is difficult to see any way in which he
applied its usage in Roman civil law to the relationship of man to God.
2
Rordorf, in suggesting three possible explanations for Tertullian's use of the
word - a copy of the military ceremony of recruitment, the mystery religions
(Mithras in particular) and the influence of the late-jewish Essenes - made no
reference to its legal significance. In other words, it appears that Tertullian
found and used 'sacramentum' as an established "terminus technicus" of
ecclesiastical language.
Jean Bayet, "En relisant le 'de corona'", Rivista di Archeologia
Christiana, 43 (1967), 27.
^
W. Rordorf, "Tertullian's Beurteilung des Soldatenstandes," Vigiliae
Christianae, 23 (1969), 133-135.
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A number of other words should be mentioned briefly, for the sake of
completeness, before the section is brought to a close with a study of baptism as
a contract. When dealing with the candidates' renunciation of the devil,
Tertullian used two further words which are found in Roman jurisprudence -
auctoritas and signaculum. Of the former, Tertullian said that lest anyone
should think that he was quibbling, when he was denouncing Christian attendance
at the shows, he would go straight to his principal authority - his auctoritas -
namely the renunciation at baptism of the devil and his pomp and his angels.
While the argument is interesting, it does not bear directly on the relationship of
the candidate to God and so is not pursued here.^ Signaculum, which Tertullian
appears to have borrowed from the mysteries, is taken up later in this section.
Another word from legal Latin used by Tertullian was repromittitur -
hominum quam simplicitas diuinorum operum quae in actu uidetur et
2
magnificentia quae in effectu repromittitur. The word was used for a present
pledge or guarantee for the future fulfilment of a promise, so the 'simplicitas
quae in actu uidetur' was an earnest of the 'magnificentia' to come; again, this
does not bear directly on the subject of this study and is not pursued.
What must, however, be taken up is the contention that Tertullian regarded baptism as
a contract between man and God, based on a legal contract.
For example:
So obvious is this idea of baptismal contract in the writings of Tertullian
that if anyone undertook to read them for himself at all widely, he would
come upon its traces in almost every work. The present writer, having
become convinced from such an investigation that this was Tertullian's
sense, was pleased to find that the same conclusion had been reached in
1930 by A. Beck in his study: Romisches Recht bei Tertullian and Cyprian.
He writes: "Gott verpflichtet sich im Akt der Entgegennahme (durch den
Bischof resp. Priester) des Taufbekenntnis, Fahnenschwurs der KreigerChristi,
freiwillig-vertraglich zur Erteilung des Seelenheils, das der Mensch mit der
Ursiinde schon verwirkt hat." 3
*




Joseph Crehan, Early Christian Baptism and the Creed, (London: Burns
Oates and Washbourne, 1948) p 97.
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C'est surtout quand on considere le bapteme comme acte public, que nous
apparait la conception que Tertullien en avait, celle d'un contrat passe entre
Dieu et l'homme ... De la l'expression de Tertullien: ablutio delictorum,
quam fides impe trat obsignata in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto. En
retour du double sacrifice que l'homme offre a Dieu, il recoit une double
remuneration: la confirmation de la foi et l'ablution des pgches. L'homme
promet a Dieu de conserver intacte la foi recue; Dieu lui promet, en retour,
la vie eternelle. Mais pour etre plus solide, le pacte conclu entre Dieu et
l'homme demande, comme les autres contrats?la presence de trois temo^ups:
ce sont les trois personnes divines ... 1
Enfin, le contrat doit etre scelle; c'est pourquoi, l'homme recoit de Dieu
l'anneau de la grace au moyen dequel il signe le pacte de la foi, en
promettant de la garder toujours intacte. Dieu s'engage, en lui conferant
cette grace, a le conduire au salut. La conception que Tertullien se fait du
bapteme est done celle d'un contrat unilateral, passd entre Dieu et
l'homme, et dont l'object est la foi. 2
Das Taufbekenntnis ist also der Fahneneid, den der Taufling Christus,
seinem neuen Herr,? zu leisten hat. Das Taufbekenntnis ist wie ein Vertrag,
den der Galubige mit Christus eingeht und der durch das Wasserbad und die
Oelsalbung "besiegelt" wird. 3
The legal language of Tertullian suggests that he considered Baptism as a
kind of contract, to which the candidate put his seal by his declaration of
faith and his promises, and God, in the person of the Church, likewise sealed
the contract by signing. 4
Pit innig verband tussen de doopakte en de doopbelofte,die tevens
geloofsbelijdenis was, verklaart den sterken nadruk, waarmede T.
meermalen het contract-karkter van het Doopsel beklemtoont: De pud 9,
16 - pactio fidei; De anima 35, 3 - "fidei conventio"; De bapt. 6 - "testatio
fidei et sponsio salutis" (vql. Ad nat. 1,7 - "disciplinae nostrae sponsio") De
cor. 13 -"sacramenti testatio". 5
pactus es: baptism is frequently represented as a negotium between God and
man e.g. bapt 8; pud 12.[6 J
^
Backer, op. cit., p 140.
2
ibid., p 142.
Rordorf, op. cit., p 132-133,
4
Leeming, o£. cit., p 197.
^
Dekkers, o£. cit., p 195. A rough English translation is "This close
connection between the act of baptism and the baptismal promise which was also
a confession of faith explains the strong emphasis with which Tertullian often
stresses the contractlike character of baptism (de pud - testatio)."
^
Waszink "De Anima";p 414.
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Two points arise on such statements. The first is the extent to which
Tertullian did regard baptism as some form of contract, and the second is the
extent to which it was Roman law which influenced him or was the medium for
his expression of the relationship. The two questions are not the same. Pliny,
for example, had used the word sacramentum to describe Christian baptism * and
Ignatius, commenting on Romans 4:3, had applied the imagery of baptism as
emancipation from slavery; did Tertullian take his concepts from current
Christian thinking or from current legal terminology or from both?








Before these are examined individually, two general points should be
made. First, among those who, as quoted above, write about Tertullian and the
'baptismal contract', some appear to have overlooked the fact that in Roman law
there was no one general theory of contract. Roman jurists spoke about a
number of legal relationships individually, which modern writers group together
as 'contracts', but a pactum, for example, to which reference will be made later,
was not a form of agreement which a Roman lawyer would have recognised as a
'contract'. The only modern study which appears to have been specifically
Ep. 10.96; taken up and expounded by A.D. Nock in the Classical
Review, ( ) 1924, pp 58-59, but unfortunately when making the note in the
Cambridge University library some years ago, I omitted to record the full title of
the article.
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devoted to this area of Roman law was by Heldrich, ^ who pointed out the extent
to which the Romans had many separate laws of contract rather than one notion
of contract in general. In Tertullian's time there were no less than ten
recognised contracts - sale, letting on hire, partnership, mandatum, etc. When
an agreement did not take the shape of any of the ten forms of contract
recognised in the civil law, it was strictly speaking, not a contract at all, but if
one party to it had executed it, the praetor would force the other party to
execute it also.
However, even if one accepts the word 'contract' in its widest sense, a
second general point arises. Any Roman legal 'contract', however informal, was
an agreement between two or more persons which the law would enforce
regarding the particular matter in which they were concerned. 2 Any 'contract'
was thus more than an 'accord of wills,' effected by an offer on the one hand, and
an acceptance of the offer on the other hand; it was the legal bond (vinculum
juris) which created the obligation and which made it a 'contract'. This
understanding of what Tertullian must have had in mind, if he had been
expressing any relationship in terms of a contract in the legal sense, is
important. It is one thing to speak of the "legal language of baptism as a
contract"; it is an altogether different matter if Tertullian took words which he
understood, and which he expected his readers to understand, in an illustrative or
general sense - i.e. a usage such as might be in the mind of a hearer or a reader
who was not himself a lawyer.
With these two general comments, a closer look can now be taken at the
various words which have been suggested as expressing baptism as 'a contract',
ja) ADOPTIO
At first sight, it might seem strange to suggest that the process of
adoption, for which the Roman law provided a set form, was a 'contract', because
Karl Heldrich, Das Verschulden beim Vertragsabschluss im klassichen




the concepts are, at least to the modern mind, inconsistent with each other. The
whole matter of Tertuilian's use of adoption, to express the relationship of man
to God, will be examined in detail in Excursus Three. > but in brief there was a legal
fiction by which the adopted son was sold three times by his father into bondage
and twice manumitted by the adopter, and then finally claimed by the one
adopting him. * This enabled Tertullian to regard the newly baptised Christian,
2
who had just emerged from the triple immersion of baptism (cf. the triple
selling and reclaiming of an adoption in Roman law) as both son of God and also
slave of God, and later he could remind his Christian readers: Tu vero nullius
3
seruus, in quantum solius Christi. and: Si ueram putes saeculi libertatem, ut
et corona earn consignes, redisti in seruitutem hominis, quam putas libertatem,
4
amisisti libertatem Christi, quam putas seritutem. The further implications
of this will be taken up in Excursus Three.
(b) OBSIGNATIO
This word was mentioned briefly in chapter VH[.7 above, where it was
noted (first) that Tertuilian's use of it for baptism as the obsignatio fidei was not
inconsistent with current legal usage, but (second) that Tertullian did not use it
exclusively for baptism, nor exclusively in the sense of a legal contract.
Illustrations of that, apart from the ones given in chapter VIII.7, are: "Alius
"Tres mancipationes et duae intercedentes manumissiones proinde fiunt
ac fieri solent, eum ita eum pater de potestate dimittit ut sui juris efficiatur.
Deinde aut patri remancipatur, et ab eo is qui adoptat vindicat apud praetorem
filium suum esse, et illo contra non vindicante, a praetore vindicanti filius
addicitur; aut non remancipatur patri, sed ab eo vindicat ia qui adoptat apud
quern in tertia mancipatione est." Gaius Institutes 1.134.
2
ter mergitamur amplius aliquid respondentes quam dominus in







scribit alius subscribit, alius obsignat", "se spadonatui obsignant', "a lauacro
carnem suam obsignant",2 "qui passknem Christi ... fuerit obsignatus"^ In short,
obsignatio as a term of Roman law does not appear to have been a decisive
influence on Tertullian's way of regarding baptism but rather (as noted for other
words) a useful illustration, in lajguage readily understood, of what he was already
trying to express.
(c) PACTUM/NEGOTIUM
If adoptio does not appear, at first sight, to provide a truly legal
foundation for the notion of baptism as a contract, then pactum provides even
less. In contrast to a contractus in the proper sense, i.e. an agreement that was
recognised and enforceable by the ius civile, all other agreements were known as
pacta. A pactum was the^fore an informal agreement that did not, from its
nature, fall within the terms of Roman law, and Tertullian seems not only to
have recognised this but to have made use of it:
Turn si in diabolum transfertur aduersarii mentio ex obseruatione comitante,
cum illo quoque moneris earn inire concordiam quae deputetur ex fidei
conuentione; pactus es enim renuntiasse ipsi et pompae et angelis eius.
Conuenit inter uos de isto. Haec erit amicitia obseruatione sponsionis, ne
quid eius postea resumas ex his quae eierasti. 5
A 'contract' between God and the one baptised could not conform to the
legal idea of contract, but it could be described as a pactum nudum -i.e. a non-
legal but morally enforceable agreement - and this is precisely how Tertullian
did describe it:












passionem et resurrectionem; at ubi fides aucta est credentibus in
natiuitatem passionem resurrectionemque eius, addita est ampliatio
Sacramento obsignatio baptismi, uestimentum quodammodo fidei quae retro
erat nuda, nec pot^t iam sine sua lege. 1
Tertullian's quasi-legal terminology here for the relationship of the
baptismal candidate to God was so far removed from the strict terms of real
Roman law that a historian of Roman law maintained it was such (Christian)
influences which gradually, between A.D. 200 and A.D. 450, undermined the legal
2
maxim "Nudum pactum obligationem non parit" to the point where post-
classical law come to accept a simple agreement without formalities alongside
legally executed contracts. The Christian's voluntary pactum fidei at baptism
was more binding on him than the most carefully executed legal document.
fcO SACRAMENTUM
This was set out fully in the earlier part of this section, with the
conclusion that of the several possible reasons why Tertullian might have chosen
this word to express the relationship of man to God in the act of baptism, Roman
law was not likely to be the dominant one.
fe) SIGNACULUM
Speaking of the prodigal, Tertullian said that the robe typified the
clothing of the Christian with the Holy Spirit, and that the ring typified 'the seal
of the laver - signaculum lauacri'. In de spectaculis he wrote about auctoritatem
convertar ipsius signaculi nostri. However, the terms 'seal' and 'sealed' were as
3
likely to have come to Tertullian from the mystery religions, or from the




M. Roberti, "L'influenza Christiana nello suolgimento storico dei patti
nudi", in Christianesimo e Diritto Romano ^Milan; 1935) pp 85-116.
3
This aspect is not explored at all here: there are very full references
to it in Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages Upon the
Christian Church, (London: Williams and Norgate, 1901), pp 294-300 for
baptism and p 295 especially for 'sealing' in Tertullian's concept of baptism.
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shown outwardly by the 'signaculum', that is by an exterior sign, such as a tattoo
on his arm. * The divine oath, said Tertullian was marked by the seal of baptism,
'signaculum fidei', i.e. baptism was a kind of exterior evidence of faith.
Tertullian's use of signaculum here was therefore just as likely to have come
from a military background as from its juridic al context, where it denoted the
seal affixed to a legal document to guarantee the authenticity and inviolable
nature of it. The difficulty of being dogmatic, and maintaining that Tertullian
was here describing baptism in terms of a legal contract, lies not only in the
different 'models' which Tertullian might have used, but also in the fact that his
2
use of signaculum throughout his works was so varied. In short, it appears to
OU
be yet another place where Tertullian illustrated his work byjf multimeaning
expression, and it is surely special pleading to single out the juridical sense of
the word in order to claim a legal significance for its use in the baptismal
context. (Tertullian's use of signaculum will be taken up again in chapter X.3 in
connection with the frontem signaculo which came later in the baptismal
ceremony.)
STIPULATIO
While stipulatio was the basic and fundamental word of Roman contract
3
law, so much so that an entire monograph has recently been devoted to the
4
study of the word, Tertullian used it only once and it requires an extraordinary
Franz Joseph Dolger, "Sacramentum militae (de praescriptione 40)" in
Ant ike und Christentum, 2 (1930) pp 268-280 and idem, "Sphragis, pp 32-37; also
Kolping, op. cit., p 86-87.
He used it fifteen times in eleven different treatises with a variety of
different meanings.
3
Buckland, op. cit., p 434-443.
4
Salvatore Riccobono, Stipulatio et Instrumentum, (English translation




ejpesis of the passage to make it apply to baptism. The word occured in de fuga,
after Tertullian had dealt with the question of actual flight during persecution,
he.
and when'turned to discuss the bribery of the persecutor as an alternative to
flight. Rejecting such payments, as being equivalent to flight, Tertullian argued
that bribery to escape persecution devalued man's redemption; with a wealth of
Scriptural illustrations, he set out the cost of man's redemption - Sol cessit diem
emptionis nostrae. Apud inferos remancipatio nostra est et stipulatio nostra in
caelis . x It is difficult to see how Crehan could conclude that this sentence from
de fuga;
concentrates in these few legal words the whole of Tertullian's obscure
theology of baptism. The darkening of the sun at the Crucifixion was a sign
that the debt we owe to Christ became due. Christ went down to Hell and
set us free, and we go down into the water as into his tomb, the three
immersions typifying the three days He spent there. In Hell Christ
emancipated us from the power of our father the devil, adopting us as
children of God, and the contract of our baptism was witnessed by the Three
Divine Persons in Heaven. 2
While much of what Crehan says is true, the word stipulatio does^seem to be used
here to express baptism as a contract; even accepting that the phrase cedere
diem (emptionis) is also a phrase from Roman law,it does not seem to relate to
baptism. Even if it did, for a legal stipulatio, the procedure was for one party
(the stipulator) to ask: "Spondesne?" and for the other (the promissor) to answer:
"Spondeo". It was essential, for stipulatio, for the promiser to answer in certain
set terms the formal question put to him by the promisee, that question
containing a statement of the subject matter of the promise. If Titius, wishing
to promise to give Maevius his slave Stichus, merely said to Maevius, 'I promise
to give you Stichus", there was no contract. For a stipulatio to be effective,
Maevius had to ask Titius, 'Spondesne mihi hominem Strichum dari?' and Titius




Crehan, op. cit., p 99.
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"promittisne? promitto"; "fidepromittisne ? fidepromitto"; "fideiubesne?
fideiubeo"; "faciesne? faciam", but no other formula would do; there is no trace
whatsoever of these words in Tertullian's baptismal terminology.
Furthermore, the essence of stipulatio was the presence of both parties
during the exchange: unless the argument is to be developed that the minister of
baptism stood in the behalf of God, the single most important feature of
stipulatio was missing if it is seen as a contractual relationship between God and
man.
SYMBOLUM
Tertullian used the word symbolum twice, ^of which one use has been
seen by d'Ales and by Carpenter as a reference to contract in the ritual of
baptism - "C'est l'idee de contrat, ou de sceau garantissant un contrat". In de
paenitentia chapter 6, Tertullian was debating under what conditions God would
cancel the covenant of death, that is sin, whether He was compelled by
necessity, or whether He demanded the repentance of ths sinner: Quodsi
3
necessitate (Deus) nobis symbolum mortis indulget, ergo inuitus facit.
Tertullian concluded that the second hypothesis alone was worthy of God, and
4
from that Carpenter made out a case for symbolum being understood as the
"act or token or pledge which seals the pact"; in other words to introduce the
language of legal contracts into the relationship of man to God in baptism. It is,
however, far from certain that Tertullian was applying the word 'symbolum' to
the baptismal ceremony and it would be hazardous to build too much on the
*
paen 6.12.47, quoted below and V Marc 1.2.6.
Z /
Adhemar d'Ales, "Tertullien, Symbolum", Recherches de Science




H.J. Carpenter, "Creeds and Baptismal Rites in the first four
centuries", Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. 44 (1943), 1-11.
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speculation that he might have had baptism in mind.
If one turns back in light of this rather more detailed examination of the
words from which baptism is alleged to be a contract, to read again the positive
assertions made on pages 374-375 above, one is left with the question of whether the
"idea of a baptismal contract in the writings of Tertullian" is quite as "obvious"
as the authors believe. The words quoted in support of these statements can
be discounted, one by one, as a foundation for such sweeping generalisations.
One final reference should be made, for the sake of completeness, to the
text: Habebimus de benedictione eosdem arbitros fidei quos et sponsores
salutis. * The confidence which the candidate for baptism could have in the
promises of God for the forgiveness of sin was increased by the fact that the
witnesses of his baptism also had a personal interest in seeing the 'pactum'
fulfilled. This does not, however, appear to be a sufficently direct reference to
baptism itself as a contra t to justify exploring the whole question of witnesses
and their functions in Roman law. That would lead into the area of the security
of the Christian in the years following baptism, in the faithful observation of the
relationship established with God by baptism, and this thesis stops at the point
where that relationship is first established. Before the final details of that
relationship are explored, certain conclusions should be drawn from this chapter,




IX.9 CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER NINE
Ten separate aspects of the ceremonies surrounding baptism were
identified, falling into three main groups - the baptism itself, the rite now called
'confirmation', and the admission to the Eucharist. Some of these had the most
profound significance for the relationship of man to God - in particular the water
baptism, and the Imposition of the Hand; others were of less significance. Taken
together, baptism and the surrounding ceremonies effected the most radical
alteration which a man would ever experience in his relationship with God, but it
is important to remember that in Tertullian's theology this was a restoration,
now an eternal restoration, to the state in which the first man was created by
God: Ita restituetur homo deo ad similitudinem eius qui retro ad imaginem dei
fuerat ; * (anima) ad fidem peruenit reformata per secuadam natiuitatem ex
aqua et superna uirtute, detracto corruptionis pristinae aulaeo totam lucem suam
conspicit .2
This chapter has concentrated on the water baptism. In consequence (in
human terms) of the oral profession of faith and the immersion in water, which
took place three times following the three declarations of faith, the candidate
was assured of the remission of all sins, regeneration, removal of the
'obscuration' of original sin, deliverance from spiritual death and from the power
of the devil, and restoration to the likeness of God.
Words and phrases from Roman law have been more in evidence in this
chapter than in any previous part of the thesis. However, once again, questions
were raised as to whether Tertullian used the words as legal words, whether he
employed them in a more popular and illustrative sense, or whether he gave them
a meaning all his own. For example, traditio was an important source of Roman






the same way, sacramentum had a recognised place in Roman law, but the word
appears to have come to Tertullian through other sources and to have been used
by him without reference to its strictly legal significance.
Finally, for this chapter, Tertullian's expression of baptism as a
'contract' was looked at in some detail. Of the seven words used by Tertullian
from which this argument has been advanced, obsignatio, sacramentum and
signaculum may well have come to Tertullian from sources other than Roman
law, pacta were not recognised as contracts in Roman law, and it is doubtful
whether stipulatio and symbolum were ever applied by Tertullian to baptism.
Furthermore, it was seen that the legal notion of contract cannot easily be
transferred to religious usage, partly because the Romans had no general "law of
contract" as such and partly because an essential ingredient of any contract in
Roman law was the enforcability of the contractus by the ius civile. The
conclusion is therefore reached that here, as elsewhere, Tertullian found it
useful to illustrate his thought by words, which happened to be words of Roman
law but which had other meanings as well, and there is little evidence that any
words or thought-patterns from Roman law were in themselves instrumental in
shpaing his thought about baptism to any material extent.
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CHAPTER TEN - THE RELATIONSHIP AT CONFIRMATION
X.l. INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER TEN
Tertullian envisaged the catechumen normally proceeding straight from
water baptism to 'confirmation1''' as part of the one rite,^ but he referred also to
two events which came between these two major items of the initiation
ceremonies. They were the anointing with oil and the signing or sealing with a
cross, both of which are discussed in section two of this chapter. The anointing
is particularly important for this study because it appears to be the ceremony
from which the candidate took the name 'Christian'. Whether the anointing
should be regarded as part of the baptismal ceremonies or as part of the
3
confirmation ritual is much debated but is of no relevance for this present
Tertullian did not himself use this word, but he made much of the
significance of the Imposition of the Hand, as will be examined in Section X.3.
The word 'confirmation' is therefore used, anachronistically, for convenient
reference to that.
^
As Gregory Dix put it in The Theology of Confirmation in Relation to
Baptism, (London: Dacre Press, 1946). "For Tertullian baptismum does not mean
only the Baptism in water, but other things as well. 'Not that in the waters we
obtain the Holy Spirit, but that cleansed in the water we are prepared for the
Spirit ... Leavi^ng the laver we are forthwith anointed in the blessed oil ... which
lent its name to the Lord. The oil flows upon our flesh, but profits our spirit ...
then a hand is laid upon us, by its blessing calling down and inviting the Holy
Ghost'. For Tertullian all this together is baptismum". (p 14)
3
Pierre Galtier considered that it belonged to baptism; "La consignation
£i Carthage et a Rome", Recherches de Science Religeuse, 2 (1911), 350-383. P.
de Puniet, who everywhere else considered the post-baptismal anointing as part
of Confirmation, made an exception for the African rite, "Onction et
Confirmatione", Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, 13 (1912), 450-466, and
Heinrich Elfers also considered the post-baptismal unction in the West to go with
baptism, Die Kirchenordnung Hippolyts von Rom, (Paderborn: 1938) pp 111 and
116 ff. On the other hand, Franz Joseph Dolger, Das Sakrament der Firmung,
(Vienna: Von Mayer & Co. 1906) p 189 and Backer, 0£. cit., p 128-130, were
inclined to put it with Confirmation and Bernard Welte, who made a special
study of the meaning in Tertullian, came to the same conclusion, Die
postbaptismale Salbung (Freiburg Im Breisgau: Herder & Co., 1959) p 49-51.
However, Welte's dogmatic conclusions have been criticised by Heinrich Elfers in
"Gehort die Salbung mit Chrisma im altesten abendlandischen Initiationsritus zur
Taufe oder zur Firmung?", Theologie und Glaube, 34 (1942), 334-341; and by L.
de Witte in Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique 35 (1939), 877, who concluded "La
(continued on next page)
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study. Equally debatable (and equally irrelevant for this study) is whether the
Imposition of the Hand was the final item in the baptismal ceremonies as such or
whether the ceremonies extended to include the first reception of the
Eucharist.^ The Imposition of the Hand,important as it was in itself, is only
indirectly relevant to this study, because the major significance of the
Imposition was the giving of the Holy Spirit and this study is confined to the
relationship of man to the First Person of the Trinity. The consequences of it
are, however, looked at briefly in section three.
Reference has been made from time to time to the grace of God, and the
various references to it axe gathered up in section four. The position of those
who had been baptised but not 'confirmed' is then set out in section
2
five. Although the exact position of the gustatio 'lactis et mellis' is
3
uncertain, Backer, with an abundance of citation to prove his point, placed it
after the reception of the Eucharist, as the very last item in the baptismal
ceremonies and his conclusion is adopted here. The taste of milk and honey is
therefore taken along with the first communion and studied in section six. That,
for Tertullian, was the high-water mark of the relationship to God, as far as
footnote 3 continued :
conclusion de cette etude est trop nette pour emporter la conviction." The
position was concisely summarised by J. Coppers: "A l'origine, les diverses
ceremonies sont etroitement juxtaposees, constituent une unite morale, et
l'onction est interpretee comme un rite intermediaire entre le bapteme et
l'imposition des mains, participant a la fois aux effets des deux sacrements.
Telle est encore la position certainement primitive representee par les ecrits de
Tertullien et de saint Cyprien: l'onction y complete les graces du bapteme,
menage la transition entre l'ablution et la confirmation, prepare au Saint-Esprit
une demeure sanctifiee, digne de sa venue." L'imposition des mains et les rites
connexes, (Wetteren: 1925) p 355.
^
res 8.3.11-12 and I Marc 14.3.22 seem to imply that Tertullian regarded
the first reception of Eucharist as part of the baptismal ceremony; praes
36.5.19-20 is ambiguous; cor 3.3.17-18 seems definitely to say thhat he regarded





op. cit., ppl28; 131 of. 172.
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earthly life was concerned;''' by that time, man had achieved the complete
forgiveness of sin; he had not yet fallen into any post-baptismal sin, and
Tertullian himself appeared to look back nostalgically to that event as the
highest and purest in his relationship with God thus far. The relevant words from
Roman law are then set out in section seven and conclusions drawn in section
eight.
In the reconstruction of the baptismal ceremony in Chapter IX. 1,
reference was made to the giving of a ring. The context is Tertullian's comment
on the parable of the prodigal son. In interpreting Luke 15.22, he remarked that
the ring which the Father bid the servant put on his son's finger was "the mark of
baptism,"^ or answered to baptism. No trace of such a custom is found
elsewhere, but whether an actual ring was given or whether that is an unjustified
inference from Tertullian's words, there is no ground for supposing that it had
amy effect on the relationship of the candidate to God, and so is not further
mentioned in this chapter.
1 Y"
Martydom was, in Tertulian's view, the most glorious way to God.
^ anulum ... signaculum lauacri; pud 9.11.48; and again Anulum quoque
accepit tunc primum, quo fidei pactionem interrogatus obsignat - pud 9.16.72-73.
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X.2 THE ANOINTING AND THE SIGNING WITH THE CROSS
The first of the several ceremonies which normally followed the
immersion in water was an anointing of the whole body'' with oil. Tertullian
2related this to the anointing of the priests of the Old Testament and to the
3
(spiritual) anointing of Jesus. Just as the Aaronic priests and the Lord Himself
had received the title of Christ because of their anointing, so by virtue of the
anointing after baptism the catechumen could now be called "Christian", i.e.
anointed:
Exinde egressi de lauacro perungimur benedicta unctione de pristina
disciplina qua ungui oleo de cornu in sacerdotium solebant ex quo Aaron a
Moyse unctus est; unde christi dicti 4 a chrismate quod est unctio 6 quae
et domino nomen adcommodauit, facta spiritalis... 5"
While there is no conclusive evidence in the works of Tertullian that the
catechumen was called "Christian" exactly at the point of anointing, his writings
indicate that it was not his practice to use the name "Christian" until after the
Tertullian did not say much about the physical act but both Lupton (op.
cit., p 20) and Dekkers (op. cit., p 197) suggest that the preposition per- in the
verb perunguimus might indicate that the oil was poured over the entire body,
(no doubt accounting for the prohibition of bathing during the days following
baptism). Lupton also discussed the composition of the unguent, (op. cit. p 20).
2
Exodus 29.7; 30.30; Leviticus 8.12.
3
In the case of the Lord, the anointing was not physically but with the
Spirit by God the Father - quia spiritu unctus est a deo patre, sicut in Actis:
Collecti sunt enim vero in ista ciuitate aduersus sanctum filium tuum quem
unxisti. - bapt 7.1.5-8.
4
There are variant readings for these two words, but since they are not
critical to this enquiry, the possibilities are not explored here. 'Christi' was
altered in T to 'Christiani' because it was not understood, and in B it was changed
into the singular for the same reason. Borleffs in the text of Corpus
Christianorum reverted to Christi dicti. As Evans commented, the sense is not
lost, whichever words are used, because the ordinary Christian is brought into
the significance of the event by sic et in nobis at the beginning of the next




The Greeks, unlike Tertullian's Latin readers, would have had no need
for such elucidation; the relationship between the word "Christ" and the
commonly used verb chrio, woulcihave been obvious to them.
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neophyte had been baptised at very least, and other passages, apart from the
one just quoted, connect the name with the anointing with oil following baptism:
Christianus uero, quantum interpretatio est, de unctione deducitur. 2
Christianum uero nomen, quantum significatio est, de unctione
interpretatur. 3
It ague Christum facis Patrem, stultissime, qui nec ipsam uim inspicias
nominis huius, si ta^ men nomen est Christus et non appellatio potius; unctus
enim significatur. 'Unctus' autem non magis nomen est quam 'uestitus'
quam 'calceatus' accidens nomini res. 4
The point may seem to be of small consequence, but it is more than mere
word-play. Just as with baptism, the physical act had spiritual significance:
Sic et in nobis carnaliter currit unctio sed spiritaliter proficit, quomodo et
ipsius baptismi carnalis actus quod in aqua mergimur, spiritalis effectus
quod delictis liberamur. 5
As Evans pointed out,^ the use of the word ipsius with baptismi in that quotation
is a reminder that while there was significance in the additional ceremonies,
Tertullian was anxious to retain the main focus on the immersion in water and its
spiritual effect, the deliverance from sin.
Next followed the signatio - the making of the sign of a cross on the
7
forehead of the candidate.
^











Evans, "Baptism", p 71.
7
This appears from praes 40, where Tertullian accused satan of
imitating the res diuinorum sacramentorum in his mysteries. "Tingit et ipse
(diabolus) quosdam utique credentes et fideles suos: expositionem delictorum de
lauacro repromittit; et, si adhuc memini Mithrae, signat illic in frontibus milites
suos." (praes 40.3.4-4.7).
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Sed et caro abluitur, ut anima emaculetur; caro unguitur, ut anima
consecratur; caro signatur, ut (et) anima (et) muniatur; caro manus
inpositone adumbratur, ut (et) anima spiritu inluminetur; caro corpore et
sanguine Christi uescitur, ut et anima de deo saginetur. 1
Caro signatur has nothing corresponding to it in the treatise de baptismo,
but it had particular relevance in de resurrectione carnis, where Tertullian was
concerned to include the body in the relationship of man to God. That passage
located the signatio very clearly between the anointing and the Imposition of the
Hand, but comparison with the Ordo baptismi of Hippolytus and also with the
writings of Cyprian, who both put the sign after the Imposition, prompted
Dekkers to ask:
Zou het dan vermetel zijn samen met Fr. J. Dolger en P. Galtier te
onderstellen dat de door T. in dezen zo rhetorischen passsus aangegeven
velgorde niet met de werkelijkheid overeenstemde en dat men in Afrika de
signatio altijd geplaatst heeft na de handoplegging als laatste rite en
voltooiing van de eigenlijke initiatie? 2
The order is not of basic importance for this study, but another of Tertullian's
references is, because it gives a clear picture of the spiritual consequences of
the signatio. Tertullian regarded this outward sign of the cross as a protection
against evil, especially against the attacks of the evil spirit. He saw in it a
fulfilment of Ezekiel's mark Thau on the foreheads of certain men of whom it
3
was said, "on whoever you shall see Thau, kill him not".
Ipsa est enim littera Graecorum Tau, nostra autem T, species crucis, quam
portendebat futuram in fontibus nostris apud ueram et catholicam
Hierusalem... Quae omnia cum in te quoque deprehendantur, et signaculum
frontium et ecclesiarum sacramenta et munditiae sacrificiorum... 4
Although Tertullian referred the fulfilment of that prophecy primarily to the
suffering involved in bearing the sign of the cross, nevertheless he regarded the
res 8.3.8-12.
op. cit., p 271. Roughly translated:
Ezekiel 9.4.
HI Marc 22.6.2-4 a<vct 7. 12-2-0-
" Would it be too daring to assume,
together with Fr. 3. Dolger and P.
Galtier, that the sequence given
by Tertullian in this rhetorical passage
did not correspond with reality and
that in Africa the signatio was always
placed after the laying on of hands
as the last rite and completion of
the initiation proper?"
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signing after baptism as a strengthening of the soul, and a permanent defence
against evil, an invocation of Christ's power to assist the baptized. Tertullian
referred to the signaculum on several other occasions, but since it was noted in
chapter IX.9 that Tertullian was as likely to have derived this word from the
mystery religions or from military usage as from Roman law, it is sufficient here
to note the fact that he used it as am important link in the baptismal ceremonies
and not to pursue the matter any further beyond that.
One further point remains to be made here. Bender was surely in error
when he wrote:
Dem Wasser entstiegen, werden die Tauflinge mit heiligem Ol
gesalbt. Wiederum verweist Tertullian auf das Vorbild im Alten
Testament: die Salbung zum Priestertum und die Salbung Aarons. Das
heilige '01 gibt dem Glaubigen den gleichen Namen wie Christus, der vom
Vater mit dem Geiste gesalbt wurde.
Sic et in nobis carnaliter currit unctio sed spiritaliter proficit, quomodo
et ipsius baptismi carnalis actus quod in aqua mergimur, spiritalis
effectus quod delictis liberamur.
Es liegt die Annahme nahe, dass Tertullian dieser Salbung eine Vermittlung
des Heiligen Geistes zuschrieb. Er spricht ja ausdrucklich einerseits von der
Salbung Christi mit dem Geist und andererseits von einer geistigen Wirkung
(spiritaliter proficit) der Salbung des Korpers, so wie das korperliche
Untertauchen in der Taufe die Reinigung des Geistes von Siinden bewirkt. 1
This is perhaps the appropriate place to mention yet again that the spirit of
God, breathed into man at creation, so that the soul of every man was afflatus
dei, was not the Spirit of God Who descended on the water at baptism and on the
individual candidate at the Imposition of the Hand. Tertullian's complaint
against Hermogenes and other heretics was that they mistranslated flatus in
Genesis 2:7 as spiritus so as to make the Holy Spirit, i.e. God himself, responsible
for Adam's sin. This was not so. Just as a jug produced by a potter is not the
potter himself, so the breath created by the spirit is not the Spirit Himself. The
Wolfgang Bender, Die Lehre iiber den heiligen Geist bei Tertullian.
(Munich: Max Hueber, 1961) p
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possession of the Holy Spirit was possible only after the soul had come to faith
and been reformed by the second birth by water and when the Spirit was invoked
on bodies cleansed and prepared for Him. This is now briefly examined.
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X. 3 THE IMPOSITION OF THE HAND
The fourth of the four spiritual consequences of baptism, set out by
Tertullian in his argument against Marcion, was that in baptism,^ the Holy Spirit
was received. It is commonly stated that this was accomplished by the
Imposition of the Hand - Tertullian normally used the singular "manus
imponitur".3 While that is more accurate than the generalisation that "the Holy
Spirit was given in baptism (sic)" it is still not exactly what Tertullian
wrote. He did not say that the Imposition of the Hand imparted the Holy Spirit
but that it invited and welcomed the Holy Spirit, as the texts quoted in this
section will show.
The Imposition of the Hand was to be performed only by the Bishop and
normally followed immediately on the water-baptism:
Dehinc manus inponitur per benedictionem aduocans et inuitans spiritum
sanctum 3 and
caro manus inpositione adumbratur ut (et) anima spiritu inluminetur. 4
"Baptism" defined in its wider sense, as set out in the introduction to
chapter IX. Tertullian regarded the water baptism and the Imposition of the
Hand as so closely connected, being two parts of the ceremonies normally
surrounding baptism, that sometimes he spoke of the two as one, where the
consequences of the two parts of the ceremony did not have to be distinguished.
When, however, the context required it, he was careful to distinguish the
forgiveness of sin (effected by baptism) from the communication of the Holy
Spirit to the individual (effected by the Imposition of the Hand). On one
occasion (the end of de baptismo chapter five) Tertullian seems to have realised
that the line of his argument might seem to infer that the candidate received the
Spirit in water-baptism, so Tertullian opened thhe next chapter by stating
explicitly that no such thing occcurred - bapt 6.1.1-2. The way in which
Tertullian emphasised the point may imply that he was correcting a popular or
erroneous belief that the Holy Spirit was in fact given in water-baptism.
2
This 'manus impositio' was not a stretching out of the hand over the
baptised person, but a laying of the hand on the head of the individual - Dolger,






The Holy Spirit had therefore a twofold role in baptism in Tertullian. First, as
mentioned in the introduction to chapter IX, prayer was made to God at the
beginning of the baptismal ceremony and in response to that prayer, God sent the
Holy Spirit (or rather, an angel on His behalf) to sanctify the baptismal
water. Tertullian was, however, careful to point out that this did not confer the
gift of the Spirit on the individual candidate - the washing away of sins in the
water was only a preparation, although a very necessary preparation, for the gift
of the Holy Spirit at the Imposition of the Hand; in aqua emundati sub angelo
spiritui sancto praeparamur The Spirit became the individual possession of
the believer only by the Imposition of the Hand. This second activity of the
Spirit in baptism was set out in detail by Tertullian in de baptismo chapter 8.
With the Imposition of the Hand per benedictionem aduocans et inuitans
spiritum sanctum, the Holy Spirit descended from the Father on bodies which had
been cleansed and blessed. Tertullian hinted at, but did not quote, the formula
which accompanied the Imposition of the Hand;^ he did, however, use a variety
of symbols to demonstrate how God used the consecrated hands of the bishop to
create in His creature, man, a new spiritual reality. He referred, for example,
to the Old Testament story of Jacob who blessed Ephraim and Manasseh, the sons
3
of Joseph, by laying upon them his crossed hands; he found further illustration
in the descent of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove at the Lord's baptism,
seeing a repetition, in every individual case, of what had taken place at the
Lord's own baptism:




There is no reason to suppose a standard formula in Tertullian's time - D.
van den Eynde, "Notes sur les rites postbaptismaux dans les Eglises d'Occident",




patre descendit superque baptismi aquas tanquam pristinam sedem
recognoscens... 1
He referred also to the dove coming out of the ark at the cessation of the waters
of the Flood, bringing peace to men:
...recognoscens conquiescit columbae figura delapsus in dominum, ut natura
spiritus sancti declararetur per animal simplicitatis et innocentiae, quod
etiam corporaliter ipso felle careat columba. 2
A further concept, apparently introduced into theology for the first time by
Tertullian in de anima, was that of marriage between the soul and the Holy
Spirit. Before the baptismal ceremony, the catechumen might have experienced
passing touches and effects of the Spirit, but the indwelling of the Spirit was
possible only after the soul had been prepared by its second birth. It was only by
baptism, man's second birth, that the 'curtain' of corruption caused by original
sin could be torn away; the soul then beheld its own light, after which the Holy
Spirit took it under its protection just as at birth it had been caught by the evil
spirit. This does not mean that the Spirit could never have been given to man
before Christ's coming, but that it was only given in an accidental manner, for
example in prophecy. Now, for every believer:
Excipitur etiam a spiritu sancto sicut in pristina natiuitate a spiritu
profano. Sequitur animam nubentem spiritui caro, ut dotale mancipium, et
jam non animae famula, sed spiritus. O beatum conubium, si non admiserit
adulterium! 3
As has been noticed through this thesis, and in particular in chapter 1.6,
Tertullian was careful to include the body in the relationship of man to
God. When this new relationship (i.e. with the Spirit) was established, not only
was the soul wedded to the Holy Spirit but the flesh followed it, as a slave
bapt 8.3.12-14. 'Tunc' at the beginning of the passage obviously refers
back to the water, omitting (in this situation) any reference to the unction which






forming part of the dowry - dotale mancipium, a legal word which is taken up in
section X.7 along with the very similar phrase which appears in de resurrectione
carnis, namely dotis nomine seguetur animam caro.3 In the de anima passage,
Tertullian's emphasis was naturally on the soul, as "the bride of the Holy Spirit"
but when in de resurrectione carnis he was more concerned with the body, he
stated the body was so closely connected with the soul that it could reasonably
be called 'the slave of the bride':
utrumque iam in semetipso foederauit, sponsam sponso et sponsum sponsae
comparauit. Nam et si animam quis contenderit sponsam, uel dotis nomine
sequetur animam caro. Non erit anima prostituta, ut nuda suscipiatur a
sponso: habet instrumenturn, habet cultum, habet mancipium suum carnem; ^
and, quoting from Ephesians, he related the gift of the Spirit to the significant
day on which the catechumen had received salvation: Et nolite contristare
3








X.4 THE GRACE OF GOD
Tertullian made a number of references to the grace of God operating in
the life of man, at different stages of life and at different levels. For example,
he stated that the grace of God operated toward the heathen, so that God,
although incomprehensibilis, etsi per gratiam repraesentetur;^ it was the grace
of God which could bring the unbelieving husband of a Christian wife to
faith. ^ Elsewhere, Tertullian stated that the capability of prophecy was given
3
per dei gratiam, but the greatest experience of the outpouring of God's grace
was at baptism and at the Imposition of the Hand which followed:
omnis hora, omne tempus, habile baptismo: si de sollemnitate interest, de
gratia nihil refert. 4
gratia dei expectat, cum de illo sanctissimo lauacro noui natalis
ascenditis. 5
This was consistent with the pattern of God's overall dealings with man^ and
Tertullian's clearest statement that God's grace accompanied the giving of the
Holy Spirit came when he was distinguishing the baptism of John from Christian
baptism. John's baptism was exclusively a baptism of penance, and gave neither
7
the forgiveness of sins nor the grace of the Spirit of God.
The relationship in the thought of Tertullian, between the grace of God
g




Ita facilius huiusmodi lucrifiunt, in quos dei gratia consuetudinem
fecit -II ux 7.2.13-14.
3






Proficiente itaque in omnibus gratia dei plus aquis et angelo accessit:
qui uitia corporis remediabant nunc spiritum medentur, qui temporalem






appears to say that God not only helped man to perform good deeds, but that
those deeds were the deeds of God Himself. On the other hand, Tertullian
emphasised equally the freedom of man; grace was stronger than nature and
enabled man to shake off the limitations of sinful nature and to exercise his
free-will in favour of good. However, the problem of reconciling the efficacy of
grace with the freedom of man's will was clearly not a problem for Tertullian,
and is not pursued here.^ Two points should, nevertheless, be noted as relevant
to this study. First, it is obvious that in Tertullian grace was opposed to nature,
but not to merit. By the grace of God, all past transgressions were cancelled in
baptism, but thereafter grace operated by potentiating the free-will of men, so
that he became able to gain merit, if he chose to do so. Furthermore, any
future transgression had to be expiated by self-inflicted punishment and
mortifications for sin or else it would be punished by God. Grace helped the
infirmity of man, but only to the extent of aiding the will; the New Testament
concept of grace as God's fatherly care, forgiving, preserving, instructing and
drawing man to Himself with everlasting love and patience seems to find no
place in Tertullian's thought - but that is to go outside the scope of this
study. What should be noted finally here is that the grace with which this
section is concerned did not come ex opere operato; it was given in response to
the faithful prayers of God's people:
cum de illo sanctissimo lauacro noui natalis ascenditis et primas manus apud
matrem cum fratribus aperitis, petite de patre, petite de domino peculia
gratiae distributiones charismatum subiacere. Petite et accipietis inquit. 2
That prayer leads on to the first admission to the Eucharist, with which this
thesis closes, but before that is examined, one category of person remains to be
mentioned - those who had been baptised but not confirmed, and they are
discussed next.
There are studies of the relationship in d'Ales"Theologie", pp 270, 286;
Karl Rahner, 'Sunde als Gnadenverlust in der fruhkirchlichen Literatur,'
Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie 60 (1936), 491-507 and Paul Galtier,




X.5 BAPTISED BUT NOT CONFIRMED
For Tertullian, baptism and confirmation were normally so linked
together that they consituted only one single (composite) ceremony. By virtue of
the fact that baptisms were normally concentrated into the period from Easter
to Pentecost, when the bishop would make himself available to complete the
initiation rites, and by virtue of the fact that there seems to have been enough
bishops in the area of Carthage to realise the Ignaticm ideal that every Christian
should have a visible Vicar of Christ within reach, ^the position of catechumens
who had been baptised but not confirmed appears to have been rare and was
mentioned only once by Tertullian. 3 However, an occasional emergency would
no doubt arise, where the attendance of the bishop could not be arranged in time;
if Tertullian was to be consistent in his view that baptism was essential for
salvation, it was to be expected that he would give some teaching about
baptising in such emergencies, and he did.
A catechumen seriously ill or otherwise expecting death ought to be
baptised at once, by a layman if no ordained priest was available - etiam laicis
ius est ... et in necessitatibus ut utaris sicubi ant aut loci temporis aut personae
3
condicio compellit. More than that, Tertullian pursued his theology of baptism
to its logical conclusion - reus erit perditi hominis si supersederit praestare quod
In Proconsular Africa, there appears to have been a great number of
sees, all with a single bishop, and every modest town seems to have expected to
have its own bishop. "Auf der Synode zu Karthago unter Agrippinus (spatestens
um 218-222) uber die Giiltigkeit der Ketzertaufe waren bereits 70 afrikanische
und numidische Bischofe zugegen ... ErwagQt man, dass erfahrungsgemass nur ein
Teil der Bischofe die Synoden besucht hat, so lassen diese Zahlen auf eine
ausserordentli^che Verbreitung der Kirche schon vor der Mitte des 3.
Jahrhundertsfcehliessen. Allerdings ist dabei nicht zu vergessen, dass die
Organisation der Kirche in Nordafrika augenscheinlich ein Bistum verlangte, wo
auch nur weinge Christen waren, also in jedem Stddtchen." Harnack, "Die
Mission", p 516.
3
bapt 4.4.21-5.27, quoted below.
3
bapt 17.2.6 and 3.15-17.
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libere potuit. * However, Tertullian warned against anyone going any further
than that and assuming the specific dictatum of the bishop, because the
Imposition of the Hand was the special privilege and duty of the bishop and his
2
alone. Morgan was surely in error in writing^'He makes no distinction between
the minister of Baptism proper and the minister who performs the duty of the
3
Imposition of Hands."
If the candidate recovered, or if the emergency passed, then the
initiation ceremony would presumably be completed later by the bishop.
Tertullian does not seem to have contemplated the situation where a bishop
might make visits through his diocese, in order to administer "confirmation" to
those who had meantime been baptised by the pastors or priests of outlying
congregations; it may have been because "Tertullian ist auch als Christ
4
Grosstadter - das Land kummert ihn nicht". However, de baptismo chapter
four seems to contain, at least in parenthesis, a reference to emergency baptism.
Perhaps because of urgency or perhaps because of lack of experience or perhaps
even by oversight, the water had not been blessed; Tertullian's words ad
simplicem actum, seem to accept that in such an emergency, water and the word
were enough for salvation.
Igitur omnes aquae de prist ina originis praerogatiua sacramentum
santificationis consecuntur inuocato deo; superuenit enim statim spiritus de
caelis et aquis superest sanctificans eas semetipso et ita sanctificatae uim
sanctificandi conbibunt. Quamquam ad simplicem actum conpetat
similitudo, ut quoniam uice sordium delictis inquinamur, aquis abluamur. 5














emergency, only if the catechumen was iam corde lotus and so (in Tertullian's
view) fit to be baptised. Conversely, it cam be presumed (because there is not
the slightest indication to the contrary in Tertullian's writings) that not even the
most sincere desire to receive baptism would confer the benefits of baptism if
the outward ceremony did not take place - Tertullian insisted that the external
rite was essential for salvation. Accordingly, the performance of the rite, even
by a layman, would suffice for the forgiveness of sin and the salvation of God. In
such a situation, the baptised person would not have received the gift of the Holy
Spirit, but such a person surely stood in a saving relationship to God. Tertullian
might well have adjusted some of his statements, if the question of the
relationship of Confirmation to Baptism had been an issue. Whether a man was a
'Christian' after baptism without confirmation, and at what moment of the
composite transaction he was regenerate, Tertullian would no doubt have
answered plainly, if asked. It was not, however, in his mind when he wrote, and
it is not fair to draw inferences from his language when he was not dealing with
that question.
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X.6 THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE EUCHARIST
From the baptismal ceremonies, the catechumen would normally go
straight on to participate for the first time in the Eucharist. That is not studied
here in itself, but the importance of the first Eucharist after Baptism for the
relationship of the believer to God was emphasised by Tertullian in three areas:
(a) there was significance in the first prayer of the newly baptised; with an
eloquence which displays more emotion than normal in Tertullian, he
commended himself to those whom he had prepared for baptism because (he
implied) they had the "ear" of God in a special way, qualifying them for
blessings which could at that time be claimed for themselves and for others,
(b) there was significance in their thanksgiving, on the analogy of sinners in Old
Testament days attending the temple to offer sacrifice when cleansing had
been received, and
(c) there was significance in the tasting of milk and honey. ^
(A) THE FIRST PRAYER AFTER BAPTISM
Tertullian urged the newly baptised to profit from the whiteness of their
souls by sending up ardent prayer to God, and he asked that in so doing, they
would remember their catechist, himself: quapistes enim et inuenistis, pulsastis
et apertum est uobis. Tantum oro ut, cum petitis, etiam Tertuliani peccatoris
memineritis. ^ At that point, having been baptised and having received the Holy
3
Spirit, having been accepted into the family of the Church, the candidates could
Placed at this closing point in the ceremonies for the reasons set out in
the introduction to this chapter, although Dekkers, op. cit., p 205, for whose
work a high regard is due, placed it as a transition between the last of the post-




Not to be overlooked, but not pursued here, is the close relationshop
which Tertullian saw between baptism and Mother Church. De baptismo, for
example, closed with a vivid picture of the newly-baptised being admitted to
liturgical worship and raising their hands in prayer for the first time at their
Mother's (home) with their brothers. Thus the newly baptised have God for
father, the Church for mother, and the other baptised for brothers.
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for the first time address God as Father; for the first time their prayers had full
weight before God. Whether or not they recited the Lord's Prayer is not the
concern of this section/but it was an occasion for great rejoicing:
Der Ausdruck "die Hande offnen" ist dabei soviel wie die "Hande
ausbreiten". Es ist fur Tertullian selbstverstandlich, dass diese
Gebetshaltung zum freudigen Lobgebet gehdrt, im Gegensatz zum
Bussgebet, bei dem mam sich auf die Erde nederkniete oder niederwarf. 2
More than that, the time immediately following baptism and in particular the
receiving of the first Eucharist was considered to be a time in which God showed
Himself to be particularly benevolent, and the newly-baptised should take full
advantage of that to pray for themselves and others.
(B) THANKSGIVING
No reference at all will be made here to the Eucharist itself, as it lies
outwith the limits set for this study, but it was the first occasion when the
candidate could respond to God in thanksgiving for the forgiveness of sin and the
other benefits conferred in the baptismal ceremonies. When debating with
Marcion, Tertullian referred to Old Testament typology in a way which implies
he may well have used it to instruct catechumens along that line, namely
typology:
quae significabant hominem quondam peccatorem uerbo mox dei
emaculatum offerre debere munus deo apud templum, orationem scilicet et
actionem gratiarum apud ecclesiam per Christum Iesum, catholicum patris
sacerdotem. 3
(C) THE TASTE OF MILK AND HONEY
The origins of the custom of giving to the newly baptised a mixture of
J.P. Bock, Die Brotbitte des Vaterunsers, (Paderborn: 1911) pp 70 ff
and 204, thought that it was; Franz Joseph Dolger, Das Erste Gebet der
Tauflinge in der Gemeinschaft der Briider, Antike und Christentum, 2 (1930) 142-
155, thought that it probably was.
3




milk and honey are obscure ''but that it was common in the Church of
Tertullian's day, is clear from his reference to it - Inde suscepti lactis et mellis
concordiam praegustamus 2 - in support of his claim that other (non-Biblical)
observations should be given authority in the Church. Tertullian mentioned the
same custom among the Marcionites:
"Sed ille (deus Marcionis) guidem usque nunc nec aquam reprobauit
creatoris, qua suos abluit, nec oleum, quo suos unquit, nec mellis et lactis
societatem, qua suos infantat, nec panem, quo ipsum corpus suum
repraesentat, etiam in sacramentis propriis egens mendicitatibus
creatoris." 3
and gave at least some indication of its significance for himself when he
allegorised the holy land, promised to the saints in the Old Testament, as being
Christ himself:
carnem potius domini interpretandam, quae exinde et in omnibus Christum
indutis sancta sit terra, uere sancta per incolatum spiritus sancti, uere lac
et mel manans per suauitatem spei ipsius, uere Iudaea per fidei
familiaritatem . 4
Milk, the food of childhood, and honey, the symbol of earthly happiness, were
entirely suited to symbolise the hopes raised by the initiation ceremonies. There
may also have been an eschatological meaning - a foretaste of heavenly joys, a
spiritual application of the promise of a land flowing with milk and honey to
which (heavenly) country, with all its blessed privileges, the newly baptised
now belonged.
Be that as it may, on the night of his baptism, a man stood in a unique
J. Schrijnen, "Melk en Honig in de oudchristelijke doopliturgie", Studia
catholica, 2 (1925),71-78,repeated in Collectanea Schrijnen, (Nijmegen: 1939) pp
296 ff; A. Wilmart, La benediction romaine du lait et du miel dans l'euchologe
Barberini, Revue Benedictine 45 (1933), p 11; Franz Joseph Dolger, "Milch und
Honig, eine Taufzeremonie im christlichen Altertum, Antike und Christentum 5









relationship to God. The slate had been wiped clean. Later as a Christian he
might gain "merit"; later he might become a martyr; in the meantime, he had
achieved a position which he might later come to envy and in which he might
never stand again. Stufler ^ made the interesting suggestion, backed up by
parallel studies in several other Church Fathers, that when Tertullian dealt with
the uniqueness of the relationship to God achieved by baptism, he wanted to
emphasise that even paenitentia secunda could never quite restore a man to that
same relationship, once it had been lost by post-baptismal sin. There was a
qualitative difference between the relationship to God at the conclusion of
paenitentia prima and the relationship at the conclusion of even the most
acceptable paenitentia secunda. It may have been the fact that in baptism all
actual sins and also the vitium originis were erased, or it may have been that
baptism was accompanied by a particular outpouring of the grace of God, but
Tertullian does seem to have regarded the Christian, at the close of the
baptismal ceremonies, as being in a unique relationship to God. After an
examination of the only terms from Roman law which are relevant to this area,
this study will be brought to a close.
^
Johan Stufler, "Die verschiedenen Wirkungen der Taufe und Busse nach
Tertullian", Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie, 31 (1907) 372-376.
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X.7 ROMAN LAW FOR THIS AREA
The phrases dotale mancipium and dotis nomine sequetur animam caro
were noted in section three, where Tertullian emphasised that when the Holy
Spirit was "married" to the soul, the body (which, in his thought, always followed
the initiative of the soul) was like a slave who formed part of a dowry. That
these were terms of Roman law is evident from Justinian's Code ''and they
provide a useful illustration of how Tertullian saw flesh as well as soul in a new
relationship to God at baptism (in its widest sense). The Holy Spirit now took
control, but it would be pressing the metaphor too hard to look there for a
reference to man as the "slave of God"; that topic will be taken up in Excursus
Two.
These appear to be the only two places where Roman law could have
been in Tertullian's mind, as he expressed the relationship of man to God in the
closing parts of the baptismal ceremonies. Once again, they seem to have
provided a useful illustration of what he wanted to say, but they can hardly be
said to have shaped his thought or substantially to have expressed the




X.8 CONCLUSIONS FROM CHAPTER TEN
This thesis has been concerned with the relationship between God and
man, as it developed through pre-natal life, infancy, adolescence, unregenerate
manhood, the catechumenate and then baptism. That the first Eucharist (following
after baptism, anointing and the Imposition of the Hand), was the "high-water
mark" of the relationship between man and God, and accordingly the appropriate
place to bring this study to a close, is seen by Tertullian's references to the first
prayer of the catechumen, after his baptism. Tertullian implied that the newly
baptised then had the "ear" of God in a unique way, which qualified him for
blessings to be claimed for himself and for others. Along with the benefits, there
went the opportunity of expression thanks to God for deliverance from sin,
another situation which could never quite be repeated because this was the only
occasion when one could receive not only the forgiveness of all actual sins but
also the washing away of the vitium originis. It was indeed a unique occasion and
a unique relationship with God.
The significance (for this study) of the anointing with oil was seen to lie
in the fact that the catechumen was called "Christian" after he had been
anointed and he was then"sealed" with the sijn of the cross on his forehead. Both
of these events emphasise the importance for Tertullian of the body in the
relationship of the whole man to God; the importance of the soul was seen in the
marriage of the soul, now cleansed of sin, to the Holy Spirit of God at the
Imposition of the Hand - a concept introduced into theology for the first time by
Tertullian. Nevertheless, if Tertullian had been asked to express a view as to
when a man came into a saving relationship with God, baptism would presumably
have been the critical and determining event - water and the word would, in an
emergency, procure salvation. However, the norm was to proceed from baptism
to the rite now called "confirmation" and from there to the Eucharist.
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The taste of milk and honey symbolised man's new relationship with God.
As a new-born child in the family of God, he received milk; for the promise of
happiness through the forgiveness of sin he received honey; he was now on his
way to a heavenly land where the spiritual equivalents of milk and honey flowed




The first aim of the thesis was to set out systematically, on a factual
basis, how Tertullian described the relationship of man to God from the time of
conception until the first admission of the neophyte to the Eucharist. Although
this does not appear to have been attempted before, at least not in one contipous
study, this part of the thesis yielded a surprisingly full picture of the relationship
of man to God for the areas under review. Every one of Tertullian's thirty-one
treatises contributed something to his understanding of the relationship of man
to God, up to the point of 'complete conversion' to the Christian faith.
From the beginning of life, which Tertullian insisted was the moment of
conception, God stood in a two-fold relationship to embryonic man. First, the
soul of the embryo was related to the flatus of God, breathed onto man at the
original creation and directly transmitted from generation to generation. Every
new soul therefore contained, from its earliest moment, something of the
original goodness with which God had created man. Every new life would
develop in its own individual way, but Tertullian taught that the human soul,
although now marred by sin, was in its essential nature the soul which had been
created by God. Maturity would come with passing of years, but no new
substance required to be added to the developing life before man was able to
enter into a conscious relationship with God.
Furthermore, God supervised the formation of the embryo. This (second)
involvement of God with embryonic man was through the mediation of an angel,
subservient to God's will, who (alone) controlled and supervised the process by
which the human embryo was implanted in the womb, developed and brought to
its final form. Accordingly, the human embryo, both by virtue of its descent
from God's original creation and by virtue of God's concern for its development,
stood in a relationship to God which was not paralled (at least not in the writings
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of Tertullian) by any other form of life on earth.
The only two 'component parts' of man were his body and his soul. As
these grew together, they were under the close and personal notice of God
throughout the pregnancy, as evidenced by Tertullian's teaching on abortion. At
this early stage, embryonic man was totally unconscious of any relationship with
God, but He was concerned with human life without distinction, from its earliest
moment. One passage in Tertullian's works may seem to imply two different
stages in the relationship of fetal life to God, but there was in fact no time when
God was not concerned with the development of embryonic human life.
This settled and uninterrupted relationship during pregnancy was not
basically altered by birth and by the coming of the child to independent life.
However, the endowments which the soul had received from God at its original
creation, and which had been transmitted (obscured but not extinguished) from
generation to generation, were further blighted by the attack which satan
launched on every child at birth, or at least on every pagan child. Nevertheless,
Tertullian explicitly described all children as 'innocent' and the implication,
nowhere contradicted in his works, is that neither the vitium originis of the soul
nor the assault of the devil from birth onward had any immediate significance
for the relationship of infant life to God.
The children of Christian parents were in a privileged position, because
they were destined to be pure and they had the benefit of Christian instruction
at home. Tertullian discouraged the baptism of infants (because sin after
baptism was difficult, perhaps impossible, of forgiveness and so baptism should
be postponed until the candidate had overcome the sinful tendencies of youth),
but it appears that the baptism of a child in infancy would have washed away its
original sin. Nevertheless, the fact that Tertullian said so little about the
relationship of children to God leads to the inference that he had nothing really
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distinctive to say about them, distinctive that is from the principles he had laid
down for all infant and juvenile life.
Certain catechumens expressed the fear they might be martyred before
they had been baptised. Tertullian allayed their concern with the assurance that
martyrdom was the equivalent of baptism, but nowhere did he voice (or deal with)
a similar concern about the status before God of unbaptised children. Some
parents apparently wished to hasten the baptism of their children, but Tertullian
counselled them to delay; the inference must be that he was not concerned about
their present standing before God, as unbaptised infants, nor was he concerned
that they might, without the opportunity of baptism, succumb to the many
diseases and perils which afflicted life in Carthage. That is not to say that he
would have discouraged the baptism of any child mortally ill; on the other hand,
he did not distinguish between baptised and unbaptised when he designated infant
life as 'innocent' before God.
By joining the body, the soul, even with all its potential, became infans,
and so the relationship of the child to God was basically the relationship of the
child's soul to God. Tertullian was not unconcerned about the body, and he
stressed its importance against heretical denigration of the flesh, but ultimately
it was the state of the soul which determined the relationship of human life to
God. In any moral decision, and in all its conduct, the body could be guilty only if
it was led into sin by the soul; the soul, on the other hand, had the ability to
perform "actions" by itself and would be judged by God for them.
At the age of fourteen, every individual child left its paradise of
innocence, and became accountable to God for the new attitudes which the
advent of puberty had brought. On a broad view of Tertullian's theology, it is
obvious that not even the innocence of children could be "absolute", because they
were subject to the presence of original sin. Nevertheless, as the first part of
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the thesis concluded, Tertullian could speak of infancy and childhood as a time of
"innocence" (that is "unaccountability") in the relationship to God. The judgment
of God on human sin was not for original sin as such, but for the disobedience to
the divine law which charactised every single human life after adolescence
brought it to the age of accountability.
Part two of the thesis therefore examined the relationship and
accountability of the natural man to God. For this, Tertullian employed a wide
variety of words, but every single one of them implied estrangement. It was,
however, an estrangement which God, out of His love for all mankind, wished to
remedy. The various means by which God sought to make Himself known to all
men need not be repeated in detail here, but God spoke so clearly to all man that
Tertullian believed He would hold every man accountable if man failed to
respond to the voice(s) of God. Tertullian repudiated the gnostic distinction
between those who had the capability of understanding God and those who, by
reason of the nature inherited at birth, could not apprehend God. Nevertheless,
for those whose mental faculties had not developed to the point where they could
respond to the initiative of God, it appears (although Tertullian did not say so)
that they would be treated in the same way as children, namely on the basis of
unaccountability and therefore innocence before God.
Although they were many grad_p.tions of heathenism, Tertullian divided
mankind sharply into those who received and those who rejected the Christ of
God. For the latter, he held out no escape from the judgment of God. For
certain enemies of the Church, he mentioned specific judgments, and although he
did not say expressly that all except the Christian would be found in hell in
eternity, his theology leads irresistibly to that conclusion. There were some
features of paganism which he could commend, but even the highest and best of pagan
virtue could never bring a man into a saving relationship with God. God's
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judgment of human sin was, however, almost invariably postponed until after
death. In this world, God would continue to show His favour to all men, whether
they responded him or not; pagans could, because of the freedom of the will.,
develop their lives in whatever way they wished. Tertullian rejected Marcion's
accusation that the Creator God was thus responsible for human sin; if a man
opted for a life of sin, that was his prerogative but it was also his responsibility.
God would judge, and although judgment was postponed until after death, it was
so certain that Tertullian could speak of it as if it had taken place already.
In the pagan religions of Tertullian's day, there was hope of the favour of
/
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the gods and fear of offending them, but no thought of man enterng into a
personal relationship with deity. Part three of the thesis therefore explored in
some detail the distinctively Christian catechumenate. Here, partly by receiving
instruction as to the nature and character of the one true God, and partly by
amending his manner of life to conform to the known Will of God, a candidate
for baptism could begin to move toward a totally new relationship with God.
During the catechumenate, this relationship was prospective rather than actual,
and Tertullian was critical of those who failed to make an adequate distinction
between catechumens and baptised Christians.
Catechumens were; however, encouraged to move steadily forward to
baptism because in it, after an appropriate period of preparation of mind, heart
and will, they would receive the complete forgiveness of all past sin. To bring
catechumens to the not inconcfiserable effort required to prepare for baptism,
Tertullian urged on them a reverential fear of God. Metus integer was the basic
and fundamental attitude of a catechumen who was going to move toward a
saving relationship with God; so important was this that Tertullian once
described the catechumen with metus integer as iam corde lotus.
When a candidate's preparedness for baptism had been established, and
after a final arid intensive spell of spiritual preparation, the candidate entered on
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the baptismal ceremonies. These were validly practiced only in the Church, as
Tertullian understood the Church, and pretended baptism outside the Church did
not restore the candidate to a proper relationship with God. Every aspect of the
ceremonies surrounding baptism had its own significance - these were explored in
detail in chapters 9 and 10 - and the candidate emerged, having renounced the
devil, having received the forgiveness of all sin, having been anointed to
spiritual priesthood, have been sealed with the Cross, and having received the
Holy Spirit; the neophyte was then admitted for the first time to the Eucharist.
That was, for Tertullian, the 'high water mark' of spiritual experience on
earth. He appears to have looked back, wistfully, to that time in his own
experience; the candidate could never recapture that moment; even if fully
forgiven for post-baptismal sin, he would never again (in this life) rise to the
same relationship with God as he could enjoy at the conclusion of the baptismal
ceremonies. It was therefore at that point that the first enquiry of the thesis
was closed. There are areas where one would have liked to question Tertullian
further - for example, the exact nature of the privilege of Christian parentage,
the implication of inclusion in the "book of fate", the position of the mentally
impaired, the status before God of those ingressuri baptismum and the position
of those who were baptised but not confirmed - but Tertullian has left sufficient
data for the modern reader to understand how he conceived most of the
relationships of man to God throughout the areas under review.
The second aim of the thesis was to set out all the areas, within the
subject matter of this study, where Roman law appeared to have been the
vehicle for Tertullian's expression of the relationship of man to God. Certain
specific words from Roman law were identified and certain forms of Roman
legal procedure appeared in Tertullian's thought. Nevertheless when set against
Tertullian's overall expression of the relationship of man to God for these areas,
the influence of Roman law turned out to be suprisingly small.
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From the time of conception to puberty, only one single word,
(privilegium), used once only by Tertullian, seems fundamental to the
relationship of the child to God. In other areas, where Roman law distinguished
very sharply between legitimacy and illegitimacy, Tertullian drew no such
distinction; where Roman law distinguished between the offspring of a free man
and a slave, Tertullian made no distinction in the relationship to God; where
Roman law insisted that a child had to come to live birth before it could be
presumed to have had any persona in the womb, Tertullian dated life, in every
instance, from the moment of conception. Because he held that view, Tertullian had
consciously to enlarge the Roman legal words for murder (which never applied to
embryonic life) to state fore. L bly that the destruction of embryonic life was an
offence in the sight of God, Who was concerned for it and Who stood in direct
relationship to it.
Tertullian flatly repudiated the right of pagans to sacrifice children,
either in religious ceremonies or simply to dispose of unwanted children. Where
they claimed that parenthood gave them the right to dispose of infant life,
Tertullian rejected their claim, stating that infant life was already sacred to
God, and in relationship to Him. Where Roman law gave the inheritance of the
father to the child, by the mere fact of the child's legitimate and live birth,
Tertullian stated that the child of a Christian parent was destined for holiness
but had to come personally to that holiness, of its own accord. No child, and
certainly not by the mere fact of birth, inherited status before God in the
manner in which a pagan child inherited civil and legal rights from its natural
father.
Furthermore, Roman law regulated the capacity and responsibility of
men, on a graduated scale according to age - infancy, childhood, puberty,
maturity and old age. Tertullian knew of only one such distinction, puberty, and
he expressly disclaimed that Roman law was the reason for his fixing on the age
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of fourteen for that. When discussing the respective responsibilities of soul and
body before God, Tertullian began to use the analogy of an instrument used in a
crime. He then appreciated that the Roman legal position was going to lead him
into a unacceptable position in respect of the body (instrument), so he rejected
the strictly legal position and argued that men did in fact (notwithstanding the
law) give honour to a sword which had brought them glory in battle and destroy
a chalice which had contained a drink not to the diner's taste. On the same
theme, Tertullian made only limited use of the master/servant relationship,
drawing on his knowledge of Roman law where it seemed appropriate.
The sharp distinction in Roman law between the rights and
responsibilities of men and women found little place in Tertullian's thought.
There were certain areas in church life where women could not officiate, but
this thesis is concerned with the relationship to God only up to the point of
commitment to the Christian faith, and within that area Tertullian seems
deliberately to have ignored the major social and legal distinctions between men
and women.
The use of Roman law for the relationship of the unregenerate adult to
God, which was the subject of the second Part of the thesis, was summed up in
the conclusion at the end of that Part, and it would be inappropriate to repeat it
here in detail. It was noted there that although Tertullian did borrow certain
words from Roman law - libripens and lex naturae were noted in chapter five,
delictum (perhaps), exceptio, and edictum in chapter six - it appears that nearly
all these words either had other and non-technical meanings, or that Tertullian
o /
used them only as illustrations and not basically to express the relationship of
msm to God. They formed, in any event, a very small percentage of Tertullian's
total vocabulary for the relationship at that stage.
The third part of the thesis, dealing with the relationship of catechumens
to God, yielded rather more material from Roman law but still very few words
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where Tertullian appears to have depended on Roman law to express the
fundamentals of the relationship of man to God. As the enquirer entered the
catechumenate, he began a relationship with God which Tertullian contrasted
with Roman justice, and although reverential fear (of God) was at the root of
that relationship, it was suggested that the domestic patriapotestas provided a
better model for Tertullian than did the Roman judicial system.
As the catechumenate advanced, the words satisfactio and compensatio
were introduced but it was seen that Tertullian did not use these in a strictly
legal sense. Obsignata may have provided a useful illustration for him for the
sealing of faith, but it was scarcely fundamental to his expression of the
relationship. Praescriptio, as applied to the unbaptised, was no more than a
'standing rule' and not a formal legal exclusion. Furthermore, although aspects
of the ceremonies rested on traditio, the basis of this concept for Church usage
was very different from a jurist's understanding of the word. Sacramentum was
a word of much wider application than the Roman legal system, and even the
commonly expressed view that Tertullian regarded baptism as a 'contract', was
found to rest on several unjustified assumptions.
While it would be entirely misleading to contend that Tertullian made no
use of Roman law, it is the contention of this thesis that he did so to a very
limited extent. The bold and dogmatic general statements, quoted in the preface
to the thesis, and ranging over the last ninety years or so, seem difficult to
justify for this area of Tertullian's thought. To bring this study to its
completion, three reasons are suggested why such statements continue to be
made.
1. Failure to restrict passages addressed to Christians to the relationship of
Christians (only) to God.
Many statements make no attempt to distinguish between the
relationship of the baptised Christian to God (where concepts like offendere,
satisfacere, and promereri may well be relevant) and the relationship to God of
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the unbeliever and the catechumen (where the concepts of satisfaction and merit
were never applied by Terturllian). For example, Nygren claimed that Tertullian
had introduced into Western thought "an outlook which unites Old Testament
nomism and Roman moralism and jurisprudence",''' and Kirk spoke of the
relationship of man to God in Tertullian's thought as that of "an arbitrary rule, set
r* • •
out by an arbitrary ruler, to be obeyed without question, comprehension or assent,
and to be crowned by the promised guerdon." ^ These statements have, with
respect, no relevance at all to the situation of the pagan or the catechumen, to
say nothing of the child or the adolescent. Tertullian was further quoted by
3
Kirk, "if we do well we merit of God, and he becomes our debtor", and the same
sentence was quoted by Nygren in the form, "By good works man can make God
4
his debtor". Statements like that really ought to make clear that Tertullian was
there dealing with the restoration of believers, who had fallen into serious post-
baptismal sin. Confusion will arise if one does not distinguish those (later) areas
of life, where there may well have been considerable influence on Tertullian's
thought and terminology from Roman law, from the relationship of man to God
from the inception of life up to conversion to the Christian faith.
2. Failure to appreciate the complexity of the influences on Tertullian.
Recent studies have brought out the extreme complexity of the
influences on Tertullian's thought - philosophy, law, history, rhetoric, language,
%
literature, the natural sciences, medicine, occultism, etc. His primary concern,
in all of his works, was to defend or to secure or to extend or to explain the
Christian point of view (or at least the point of view regarded by him as the
Christian one). He drew on all the many skills which he possessed and the many
resources open to him to make his point; it is therefore hazardous in the extreme
*
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to suggest any one synthetic, unifying view of Tertullian's thought, such as the
influence of Roman law. One is in danger of reading Tertullian superficially if
one sees his concepts as being exclusively rhetorical, or exclusively legal or
exclusively sophistic. He was, in any event, such a highly original thinker, that
even when he borrowed views or facts from others, he often adapted them to his
special purposes. Any investigation of his sources must therefore distinguish
what is his own and what has been processed by him - which leads to the third
and final point here.
3. Many 'legal' words also had other (non-legal) meanings.
This is perhaps the real thrust and burden of this thesis. The fact that
words from Roman law, legal concepts, images, expressions, individual pieces of
information and also legal procedure are to be found in many of Tertullian's
treatises, intermingled and amalgamated with many other sources, makes one
wonder to what extent they were common ideas, borrowed from vocabulary
which was current at the time in everyday speech. It is the attempt to read such
words and phrases as technical terms of Roman law in Tertullian's thought which
this thesis has questioned. Most - nearly all - of the words identified as being
words of Roman law were found to be not only legal words - their legal usage was
one of a wider range of both legal and non-legal meanings. Most of the
quotations in the preface to this thesis lose their point (quite apart from not
being applicable to certain areas of life) unless a technical legal meaning can be
established for the words on which they rely.
It is/
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It is the final contention of this thesis that much of \Mhai has been
offered over the last ninety years as Tertullian's theology of the relationship of
man to God has been based on the assumption that any word capable of being
traced to a legal background must have been used by Tertullian as a word of
Roman law. It seems equally possible that Tertullian used many of these words in
the knowledge that his readers would understand them in a wider sense and would
not necessarily assume that he was expressing the relationship of man to God in
terms of Roman law.
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EXCURSUS ONE - THE POSITION OF HERETICS
Tertullian recognised heretics as a distinctive group, neither
pagan nor Christian - ethnici et haeretici cotidie ex blasphemia eroer-
gunt - pud 13.20.80-81. Hcwever, not all of his references to here¬
tics, even in their relationship to God, are relevant to this study,
because Tertullian made a point of emphasising that, as a rule, hoc
sit negotium illis, non ethnicos ccnuertendi sed nostros euertendi -
praes 41.1.2-3; even Marcion and Valentinian in catholicae primo doc-
trinam credidisse apud ecclesiam Romanensem (praes 30.2.3-5) before
they were expelled. Heretics who had come first to the orthodox faith
and who had then lapsed into heresy are outwith the scope of this thesis,
because it stopped at the point of conversion to the true faith. Since,
however, there may have been heretics who had been attracted directly
frati paganism into a heretical sect calling itself Christian, and since
Tertullian believed that any "established" Christian who lapsed into
heresy had never really come to true faith at all (praes 3.2.2.-3.6),
the relationship requires to be set out in a little detail.
In the matter of bulk, Tertullian's fight against heretics
occupies the largest part of his extant works. Their relationship to
God can, however, be set out in cne simple but basic tenet of Tertull¬
ian's theology. If a heretic had received baptism in his awn sect and
if he then applied to join the orthodox Christian Church, Tertullian
insisted, for at least three reasons, that true baptism be adminis¬
tered to him.
The first reason w/as that Tertullian believed the caimandment to
baptise, recorded in Matthew 28.19, had been given to the Catholic
Church alone. Since heretical baptism was administered outside that
Church, it could not by definition be valid baptism - bapt 15.1.4 -
2.10. The second reason was that heretics did not (Tertullian
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claimed) have the same understanding of God as did Christians, so even
if their baptism was in the name of the Trinity, it was not Christian
baptism and was not effective for salvation - bapt 15.2.11-14 and
I Marc 14.3.19-20. The third reason was that heretics had not them¬
selves been validly baptised, so they could not baptise others - bapt
15.2.14-15 and pud 19.5.21-23. Since baptism, following profession
of faith, was in Tertullian's view the single most important event for
establishing a saving relationship with God, heretics could not be in
that relationship. References could be made to a number of other areas
of Tertullian's teaching, but the matter is not really in dispute and
the point need not be laboured. The relationship of heretics to God
was not only a distinctive one, but it was an unenviable one - Haereses
uero mortem aetemam et maioris ignis ardorem inferentes - praes 1.4.
10.11.
No reference to heretics in this thesis would be complete with¬
out sane mention of the term praescriptio. As will be seen, it does
not basically affect the relationship of the heretic to God, but it
does illustrate yet again the way in which an apparently legal word,
found in Tertullian, has been assumed to reflect (only) a legal usage
of that word.
The background can be briefly stated. Since heretics were
outside the Catholic Church, and since the Catholic Church alone had
the right to the correct interpretation of Scripture, then in Tertull¬
ian's view heretics had no right to appeal to Scripture to establish
their teaching. He therefore attempted to "rule them out of Court"
- i.e. the Court of theological argument - by invoking a praescriptio,
a preliminary argument before the main pleading. In Reman law, if this
plea was sustained, the main pleading became unnecessary; in the
theological debate, Tertullian wished to limit the dispute with the
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heretics to one single point - the legitimacy of their appeal to Scrip¬
ture. He attempted this chiefly in the treatise de praescriptione
haereticorum, but he returned to the theme on no less than six other
occasions - apol 47.10; I Marc 1.6; III Marc 1.2; V Marc 19.1;
Herm 1.1 and earn 2.3 and 5. (Tertullian did,however, recognise that
he could not rely only on this technical point and he met the argunents
of the heretics at length in his treatises adversus Marcionem, adversus
Praxean and adversus Hermogenem) .
Michaelides (op. cit) maintained the traditional viewpoint that
the word praescriptio had in Tertullian a juridical background. Not
only did he set out the traditional arguments, but pp 154 - 162 of his
monograph contain a most useful bibliography of everything worth-while
previously written on the subject. Since he wrote, Barnes too has
accepted a technical legal background to Tertullian's use of the term
praescriptio; "Tertullian has cast a whole treatise into the form of
a legal simile. To paraphrase his own words, he applies for an injunc¬
tion to restrain any heretic from trespassing upon holy Scripture, which
is the sole property of Christians." (op. cit. "Tertullian",p 64).
The argument as to whether Tertullian was referring to one single
praescriptio of Reman law or whether he was referring to praescript-
icnes in the plural was discussed by Refoule (introduction to cp. cit.
"Prescription") with a full bibliography at pp 20 - 26 of that monog-
graph.
On the other hand, Fredouille (op. cit. pp 195 - 234) argued
that the origin of Tertullian's use of praescriptio was not to be found
in legal terminology at all, but that it was a general term of argu¬
mentation. The significance of Fredouille's argument, for this
Excursus, is his convincing demonstration that the word praescriptio
had at least two possible meanings, one from Roman jurisprudence, the
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other from general (non-legal) usage - (idem., p 232). It is outside
the scope of this thesis to pursue the matter further, because it is
clear that Tertullian's use of praescriptio has no direct bearing on
the relationship of the heretic to God; Tertullian used it, in the
sense under discussion here, solely to decide who held the true faith,
i.e., through whom, when and to whom it had been committed. (His use
of praescribitur in the sense of a "standing rule", in relation to
baptism, was examined in chapter VIII.7 above, pp 334-335).
The truth of the matter, which is not without significance for
this study, is probably that praescriptio had at least two uses and
two possible meanings in Tertullian's day. The etymological meaning
of preface or information given in advance had indeed acquired a tech¬
nical value in juridical language, but it was also used (as Tertullian's
other usages demonstrate) to mean a general precept or rule. It seems
that Tertullian combined both of these meanings in his use of praes¬
criptio, making it almost a personal neologism in his fight against
the heretics. In other words, it seems to be yet another example of
his taking a word with a technical meaning and using it in a non¬
technical sense. Since, however, it did not bear on the relationship
of heretics to God, it is not appropriate to pursue the matter here.
What is of interest to this study is the extent to which commentators
en Tertullian have assumed that because praescriptio was a word of
Raman law, it follows that Tertullian not only borrowed it frcm the
language of the Courts (and frcm there alone), but that he used it in
a technical juridical sense. Such assumptions overlook the other uses
of praescriptio, collected by Fredouille from oratorical language and
indeed from conmon speech.
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EXCURSUS TWO - THE DIFFICULTY OF ASCERTAINING ROMAN LAW AS PRACTICED
AT CARTHAGE IN TERTULLIAN'S DAY.
To consider the influence of Reman law on any particular aspect
of Tertullian's thought is rendered more difficult by the fact that
almost nothing has been preserved of the general Roman law as practised
in Tertullian's day, and even less is available of the particular for¬
mat of Reman law as Tertullian would have known it at Carthage. The
difficulty is three-fold.
(A) Modern knowledge of Roman law for Tertullian's era, even
as it was taught at Rome and standardised throughout the Empire, is
almost exclusively dependent on the extant writings of one man - Gaius.
His Institutes, published in four parts in A.D. 161, are the only legal
works of the classical period of Reman law to have survived in anything
like their original form. It was not until the sixth century, that
is three hundred years after Tertullian's death, that the next collect¬
ion, of which copies have survived, was made - the Institutes, the
Digest (or Pandects), the Code and the Novels of Justinian. The
Institutes and the Digest are, however, very relevant for endeavouring
to reconstruct the law of Tertullian's period, because the former were
deliberately modelled on the Institutes of Gaius and the latter cited
the works of many of Tertullian's contemporaries, (those mentioned on
page (iii) of the preface to this thesis.) Because the Institutes of
Gaius and of Justinian can be read in parallel, assumptions can be
drawn frcm Justinian's Institutes about the earlier law in areas where
Gaius is silent.
However, neither society nor law had remained static for three
hundred years, and there had been many changes in the law since Gaius
wrote his treatise - what was obsolete had been discarded, inconsis¬
tencies had been remedied, and Justinian's Institutes were intended
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to be read as contemporary law, not as history. Accordingly, the
reconstruction of much of Roman Haw for Tertullian's day must remain
largely a matter of conjecture, even where the Institutes and Digest
appear to be reflecting a historical situation.
For the scholar of today these discrepancies -
1 antinomies' as they are called - are provocative
and alluring. They help him to see the Reman law
not as a static system, but as a dynamic force,
changing through the centuries, adapting itself
to changing social and moral ideas and a changed
environment.
R.W. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law, (4th ed. ;
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1956) p 30.
Justinian's Institutes were intended to be an elementary text
book for the use of students, an introduction to the larger system of
the Digest and the Code and to the study of Roman law generally. The
Digest (or Pandects) was a sorting out, bringing up to date and putting
into order of all the many surviving juristic works of the classical
and earlier periods. It was basically a collection of and a selection
from the writings of eminent jurists, intended to reflect the law from
Cicero's day to Ulpian - the ius vetus. Since the great bulk of the
material is from Tertullian's contemporaries, like Pacinian, Paul and
Ulpian, the giants of the "classical period" of Reman jurisprudence,
the Digest (together with the Institutes) has been of considerable
help to this thesis. The Code and the Novels have been referred to
also, frcm time to time, but it must be remembered that the Code con¬
tained only the law after Ulpian - the ius novam. The "Novels" (a
contraction for Novellae Constitutiones) were the new decrees which had
been issued between the publication of the Code and the end of Justin¬
ian's reign and so obviously are of very limited relevance to this
study.
(B) The second problem is similar to the first, and in many
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ways is even more difficult. There is only one single reference in
the entire works of Justinian to the Carthaginian situation (D.32.11.
pr) and no reference at all in Gaius. The dominions of Rome embraced
many cultures - Egyptian, Semite, Greek, Iberic and Celtic as well as
Berber and Punic - and Rcme made no attempt to impose a unified system
of law on these diverse peoples. Legal relationships inside their own
communities went on in many ways as before, at least in Tertullian's
day, and it is impossible to compare them because almost nothing is
known about most of them. (The exception is Reman Egypt, from which
has survived a mass of legal and economic papyri;.", so that it is possi¬
ble to make some reconstruction of the legal relationships of ordinary
life there. Because, however, of the diversity of Egypt's population
and the pedantry of its bureaucracy, the law of Egypt was a thing apart
and the papyri' are of no assistance in determining the law of Carthage.)
On the other hand, this thesis has been concerned only with what
can properly be described as Roman law, not with any local variations
of Reman law as practiced at Carthage. No doubt Tertullian took back
with him, from his studies in Rome (genmarum quoque nobilitatan uidirnus
Rcmae - I cult 7.2. $-although Barnes was of the view this was not inten¬
ded to be autobiographical - op. cit 'Tertullian' p 245) - the basic
rules and principles laid down by the great Reman jurists. Neverthe¬
less, it was in Carthage that Tertullian's writings had to be understood
and the local variations of the Reman law, operating in Carthage, are
just not known today.
(C) The third problem relates to the restricted areas of law
which have been preserved, even in Justinian's massive Corpus Juris
Civilis, (the collective name for the four works mentioned above.)
This, as the name implies, was concerned almost exclusively with the
civil law, and even then with only a part of it. Except for a small
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section at the end of the fourth book of the Digest, which touched on
criminal law, the works of Justinian, like the Institutes of Gaius,
dealt only with "private" law (ius privatum) , that is the law regula¬
ting the relationship of individuals among themselves. The law re¬
lating to the Constitution, government and general administration of
the Roman state, and to relations between the state and the individual,
and almost the whole of Reman criminal law, has not been preserved.
For the sake of the completeness of this Excursus, it is men¬
tioned that the principal works consulted for the thesis were: William
Warwick Buckland, A Textbook of Reman Law from Augustus to Justinian,
(already cited in Part One of thesis) , and The Main Institutions of
Roman Private Law (Cambridge: University Press, 1931); Herbert Felix
Jolcwicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Reman Law (already
cited in Part One of thesis); Fritz Schulz, Principles of Roman Law
(translation by Marguerite Wolff, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936);
and Classical Roman Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951); and John Keiran
Barry Moylan Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1962). An invaluable reference book was Molf Berger, Encyclo¬
paedic Dictionary of Reman Law (Philadelphia: 1953) .
One matter remains to be dealt with. Throughout the thesis,
there have been references to the works of Gaius and Justinian. The
citaticn of the former presents no problem, as his Institutes are uni¬
versally referred to by Book and Section; "1.162"therefore = Gaius'
Institutes, Book 1, Section 162. These Institutes (unlike those of
Justinian) are not further sub—divided into paragraphs.
The methods of citing Justinian's Institutes, Digest, Code and
Novels vary enormously. In Great Britain, the most common method of
citing the Institutes is by reference to the Book, the Title (i.e.
chapter) and the "lex (i.e. secrtion); "Institutes 2.9.6"therefore =
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Book 2, Title 9, lex 6. Same of the Titles and same of the leges have
an introductory paragraph or preface (proaemium), usually contracted to
"pr", so"lnstitutes 1.25 pr"= Preface to Title 25 of Book 1 of Justin¬
ian's Institutes.
However, in the Digest, the term "lex" is not used for the
sections; the term "fragment" is generally used in its place. Every
fragmentum is a passage from a named author of legal repute, and these
fragments (unless they are very short) are paragraphed, the first being
called principium, followed by paragraphs 1, 2 and so on. A typical
Digest reference is therefore"26.6.4.3",meaning the Digest, Book 25,
Title (i.e. chapter) 6, fragment (i.e. section) 4 and paragraph (i.e.
sub-section) 3; "43.27.1 pr"= the Digest, Book 43, Title 27, fragment
1, and the initial paragraph of the fragment.
The Code is cited in the same way as the Digest, except that
the term "constitution" is used where the Institutes use "lex" and the
Digest uses "fragment". The Novels are usually distinguished now¬
adays by their number and chapter, so that"118.1"= the Novels, 118,
Chapter 1.
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EXCURSUS THREE - SLAVERY AND ADOPTION
Tertullian did not consider it improper to possess or to employ-
slaves - serui nostri - II cult 5.4.17; seruulis nostris - pat 10.5.18;
peuro irascarnur - res 16.6.26; domesticorum curiositas - I nat 7.15.
10-11; and domestici nostri - apol 7.3.15 (although this may mean
"the heme circle" rather than "slaves"); nor did he consider manu¬
mission to be a Christian duty. This Excursus is not concerned with
Tertullian's social attitude towards slavery but only with the use
which he made of the institution of slavery, either to illustrate the
relationship of man to God or the extent (if any) to which he regarded
slaves as being in a different relationship to God from free men and
women.
According to Roman law, as practiced in Tertullian's day, slavery
might arise in one of three ways - capture in war, birth or judicial
sentence. Prisoners of war were regarded by the Romans as the absolute
property of their captors. The issue of a slave woman was born a slave
and the father's status was immaterial; the offspring of a slave woman
and a free man was born a slave, but that of a free weman and a male
slave was born free. A free Reman citizen might be condemned to sla¬
very for certain offences and such persons became slaves of punishment
(servi poenae) or ownerless slaves (servi sine demino), or slaves of the
State. A free woman who persisted in cohabiting with a male slave,
without the consent of the slave's master, was liable by law to be
reduced to slavery and to be adjudged a slave of the master. Reman
law divided free men into those who were born free and those who were
emancipated (ingenui and lfbertini) but the distinction is of no re¬
levance for this study.
The Reman law on slavery has been expounded in massive detail
by William Warwick Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery. The condition
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of the slave in private law from Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge:
University Press, (1908) and also by Reginald Haynes Barrow, Slavery
in the Roman Empire (London: Methuen & Co., 1928). Two of the points
which they made, relevant to this study are:
(1) The fundamental difference in status between a free person and
a slave.
All men were aut liberi aut servi. Servi had no caput, no
persona, no status, and no potestas. In the estimation of Reman law,
a slave was a "thing" (res), although a res mortalis. He was subject
to the same rules of ownership, possession and transfer as domestic
animals and, like them, could be owned by several people at once - that
is one could own a part of a slave. The union of slaves was not re¬
cognised by law as marriage; it was known as contubernium, mere co¬
habitation, for slaves were incapable of contracting marriage.
Although it is not directly relevant to this Excursus, it should
be mentioned that Reman law did give seme recognition to the fact that
a slave was a res mortalis. For example, the union of slaves, although
not marriage, was recognised to the extent of creating ties of blood
relationship (oognatio) between the offspring of such unions, so that
there could not be incestuous marriage if the children subsequently
became free to marry. For the same reason, a slave was capable of
increasing his master's property by losing his intellectual powers, and
Reman law recognised at least his potential personality because, if
manumitted, he became a "person" and acquired caput. Furthermore, a
slave differed frcm domestic animals and inanimate objects, in that he
was liable to punishment for crime. However, having said all that,
there was a fundamental difference in Reman law and society between
liberi and servi, a difference which was basic to the everyday routine
of life, to business, to social life and to domestic management.
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Tertullian therefore lived in a world where a free man was confronted
daily with innumerable distinctions between his position and that of a
slave, so he had ample opportunity to make comment on the position of
free men and of slaves in their relationship to God.
In the event, Tertullian made no specific reference to the re¬
lationship of slaves to God but, in another context, he made his posi¬
tion abundantly plain - non regis apud ilium (i.e. Christum) major gratia,
non barbari alicuius inferior laetitia; non dignitatum uel natalium
cuiusquam discreta merita; omnibus aequalis, cmnibus rex, omnibus judex,
omnibus dcminus et deus est - Jud. 7.9.66-70.
(2) The various methods of manumission.
Manumissio could take place in one of two ways - either the uni¬
lateral and deliberate act of the dcminus or the intervention of the
law, without the consent of the master. Only the former is relevant
to this study, and only one of the many forms of manumissio is relevant
to the works of Tertullian. It is therefore not appropriate even to
mention the nine different methods by which a slave might be freed.
If Tertullian's teaching was as permeated by Reman law as seme would
suggest, he might have made seme reference to the formal ceremony of
manumission per vindictam, by which one person styled the "asserter of
freedom" brought a fictitious legal action and claimed the slave from
his master as being a free man. It was a ceremony full of symbolism.
The adsertor libertatis touched the slave on the head with a rod
(vindicta) or wand (festuca); the master then turned the slave round
and allowed him to go, this being known as missio manu or "the sending
away by the hand"; the magistrate then declared the slave to be free.
Cne might have expected Tertullian to make use of such symbolism - for
example, to call the Cross the vindicta of liberation - but none of the
nine methods of manumission, which could so vividly have illustrated
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deliverance frcm the bondage of sin, where utilised by him in this way.
The only form of manunissio vhich is of any relevance to this
thesis is the one to which reference was made in chapter IX.9,(pp 377-
378), namely where a person to be adopted, was "sold" three times by his
father into "bandage", twice "manumitted" by the adopter, then finally
claimed by the adopter. To enable the adopter to acquire potestas over
another,it was essential that the natural father's patria potestas
should be destroyed. This was effected by mancipatio. In early Reman
law, obsolete by the time of Tertullian, a father could sell his child
into slavery. For adoption, the natural father therefore went through
a (fictitious) form of sale of his son, repeated three times in the
presence of five Reman citizens of adult age and in the presence of a
libripens. After the third sale, the natural father's power was
destroyed in accordance with the rule in the Twelve Tables. The son
was then in mancipio to the purchaser, who was usually the adopter.
The latter re-mancipated him to the natural father and then claimed
him as his son by another legal process called in jure cessio; this
consisted of a fictitious suit before a Roman Magistrate, who declared
that the child was the son of the adopting father. (Gaius, Institutes
1.134 and Justinian, Institutes, 1.12.8).
Because of the similarity of the ceremony (although then ob¬
solete) of sale into slavery and the fictitious sale incidental to
adoption, the presence of witnesses was still essential in Tertullian's
day; otherwise, in theory at least, it might be suggested after the
death of the adopting father, that the adopted son had not in fact
entered into the inheritance, but had ccme into the patria potestas as
a bondsman. The witnesses could declare, if need be, that the deceased
had adopted a son, not purchased a slave, and that the ceremony was
truly one of adoption. As was pointed out in chapter IX.9 (page 378),
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this enabled Tertullian to combine both concepts and (set out in the
texts quoted there) to regard the new Christian as both son of God and
also slave of God.
Adoption became an increasingly important aspect of Roman social
life, because of the failure of the governing classes to rear sufficient
children to maintain its numbers. There were many factors involved in
this - the desire of society women to avoid child-bearing, the inferti¬
lity of men in the governing classes, the high death rate, the desire
to hide the consequencies of adultery, and so on. If a family was in
danger of dying out, adoption provided the only solution to the problem.
(It had little to do with the welfare of the child). There were two
forms of adoption, (1) adrogatio , where a person sui juris was in¬
volved, and not only the adopted person but all his dependents were
transferred, and (2) adoption proper, where a man or wcman or child
individually left the original paterfamilias and came by himself or
herself to the potestas of another person.
With such a wealth of illustrative material available to him,
it is surprising that Tertullian's treatment of conversion to the
Christian faith made so little use of the New Testament concept of
adoption into divine sonship. His amphasis seems to have been instead
on the aspect of slavery to a new master,not on the filial relationship
to God which adoption involved.
EXCURSUS POUR - MDNTANIST INFLUENCE ON TERTULLIAN
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Throughout the thesis, the works of Tertullian have been quoted
in support of various propositions, with little reference - unless it
was particularly relevant to the text in question - as to whether he
wrote as a Catholic or as a Montanist. It is therefore necessary to
show, at this stage, that none of the areas where Tertullian's views
altered materially frcm about A.D. 207 onward affect the conclusions of
any part of this thesis. The date 207 is suggested because the first
reference to the New Prophecy appears to be in I Marc 15, which bears
to have been written in the fifteenth year of the Emperor Septimus
Severus' reign (i.e. A.D. 206/07); however, there were several editions
of Tertullian's work against Marcion, so it would be hazardous to date
the beginning of Montanist influence on that ground alone. In any event,
there was no sudden decision, cnly a growing conviction that the Holy
Spirit could not work through an organisation as lax as the Catholic
Church; there had been no open breach with the orthodox Church by
A.D. 212, in which year Tertullian pled the cause of all Christians and
spoke in their name in his letter to the Proconsul Scapula. After that
date, the alienation became mere rapid and more marked, although Tert¬
ullian wculd always have considered himself orthodox - schismatical
perhaps, but never unorthodox.
As will be seen, this subject can safely be relegated to an Ex¬
cursus, because none of the conclusions reached in the thesis are de¬
pendant on passages or themes where Montanist influence basically al¬
tered Tertullian's views. Montanism possessed certain definite and
definable differences fron orthodox Christianity but these (at least
in so far as Tertullian took them up) were in the area of Christian
discipline and conduct, not in the area of doctrine. Furthermore,
Tertullian's efforts as a Montanist were directed to raising the
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spiritual life of the Christian community, so little of his extant
work from that period is directly relevant to the outsider or to the
catechumen. As a Montanist, Tertullian propounded rules of behaviour
which differed frcm his earlier teaching,but the difference was about
the place of fasting, about the occupations which a Christian might
follow, about marriage and remarriage, about flight during persecution,
about what he considered the growing laxity of Church government, about
the efficacy of paenitentia secunda and ab -at similar matters. All
this (in Tertullian's view) affected the relationship to God of the
Christian, but not (except in so far as Tertullian taught the catechu¬
mens what lay ahead) the relationship of outsiders or of catechumens
to God.
(A) DOCTRINE
Although Tertullian claimed in de monogamia that his teaching on
the subject of marriage was regarded by the Catholics as heretical, and
claimed in de ieiunio that the same charge was laid against his teaching
about fasting, he nowhere made any corresponding complaint about attacks
en his doctrinal beliefs; it was only later writers who accused the
at
Mantanists in general, and Tertullian in particular, of doctrine error.
(There is a useful list of such writers in Kurt Aland, Bermerkungen zum
Montanismus und zur fruchchristlichen Eschatologie, in Kirchengeschicht-
liche Entwiirfe (Gutersloh: 1960) p 117.) That this is not an argument
from silence is seen by consulting the contemporary cataloguers of
heresies, who accepted Tertullian's orthodoxy of doctrine and who dis¬
tinguished Montanists from other Christians because of their belief
that the Holy Spirit had spoken through Montanus, Prise(ill)a, and
Maximilla, and because of the practical matters of Christian discipline
which followed from accepting the "New Prophecy". This interpretation
by the ancients has the support of many modern writers, whose views were
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put as succinctly by Cruttwell as by any :-
His error was of discipline, not of faith: it
estranged him, indeed, frcm the company of the
orthodox, but no Father is more free from heresy.
As a champion of Christian doctrine he stands
second to none. On all the cardinal points he
is not only at one with the Catholic view, but
his statements of it are as accurate as those
of any other Ante-Nicene writer.
Charles Thomas Cruttwell, A Literary History
of Early Christainfiy, (London: Charles Griffin
& Co., 1893), I., 554.
Although written over eighty years ago, the words quoted seem as accu¬
rate a statement of Tertullian's position of doctrine as many more re¬
cent statements, and considerably more concise! Tertullian himself
consistently refuted the suggestion that the New Prophecy introduced
novelties of doctrine and maintained that the Paraclete only confirmed
its orthodoxy. As evidence of the reasonableness of his claim, it
should be noted that all Tertullian's anti-heretical works except de
praescriptione belong to his Montanist period, and even then he never
seriously modified the teaching of that book.
In short, the Montanist Tertullian did not seek to innovate in
any matter of doctrine. His concern was to uphold the regula fidei,
which he accepted without question, defending it at all times as the
inherited depositum of doctrinal truth, not susceptible of any alter¬
ation. If he found teaching in the Phrygian prophets which he could
not accept - for example the place which they gave to wcmen in the or¬
ganisation of their Church - he did not adopt it. His contact with
Montanism simply intensified his orthodoxy of doctrine, and the Mon¬
tanist revelations, far frcm contradicting the traditional faith,
supplied (he claimed) additional offensive and defensive arpment.
(B) CHRISTIAN LIVING
Hac lege fidei manente cetera iam disciplinae et conuersationis
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admittunt nouitatem correctionis, operante scilicet et proficiente us-
s/,rg
que in finem gratia Dei: ^ Tertullian was attracted to Montanism more
by the enforced rigour of its disciplinary system than by any theolo¬
gical doctrine which he learned frart it. Accordingly, in relation to
questions of Christian flonduct and behaviour, his views were very much
coloured by Montanism. For example, he no longer spoke in glowing
terms, as in ad uxorem,of the beautiful fellowship of married believers
- marriage was not unlawful, but it was not ideal, and it was better to
be continent throughout life. Frequent fasting was enjoined, flight
during persecution was forbidden, and Tertullian assigned a special,
God-propitiating, significance to martyrdom. It was here that Tert¬
ullian was in danger of falling into error - in danger of regarding
fasting as holiness, instead of a means to holiness, in danger of re¬
garding penance as intrinsically meritorious and as having its own
efficacy for the remission of sin and restoration to the favour of God.
Since however, all of this relates to the life-styid of those who had
accepted the Christian faith, its significance for this thesis is
limited, although not altogether irrelevant in one respect.
As noted in chapter VII.1., Nisters made the suggestion that an
unacceptably ascetic emphasis in Tertullian's regular instruction of
the catechumens was the cause of the friction which led to his break
with the Church. While there is no indication, as set out in para¬
graph (A) above, that Tertullian's teaching changed over the years on
the basic doctrines governing the relationship of man to Gcd, Tertull¬
ian's later emphasis on the discipline taught by the Paraclete must
have altered the content of the choice which he put to the catechumens,
on what the implications would be of their accepting the Christian
faith - for example, on their expectation of marriage, on the nature
and severity of fasting, on flight during persecution, and on the
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occupations which a Christian could follow. To that extent, and to
that extent only, his progression toward Montanism is relevant to his
teaching of the relationship pf catechumens to God.
(C) THE CHURCH
Tertullian's later writings reveal an increasingly bitter and
antagonistic attitude toward the Catholic Church, whose members he had
once addressed as 'brothers' but whan he came to think of only as
'psychici'. The more that he leaned toward Montanism, the more he
contrasted the organised Church with the spiritual Church, the Church
of the bishops with the Church of the Spirit. He and his followers
began to form an ecclesiola in ecclesia, to whose group meetings he
openly referred: Est hodie sorer apud nos reuelationum charismata
sortita - an 9.4.24-25. However, Tertullian's views on the episcopate,
on the apostolate and on the work of the Holy Spirit, (the three main
areas where his views altered over the years), must be passed over with¬
out so much as a mention here, because there is no indication of any
basic change in his attitude to infants, to children, to adolescents
or to non-Christians, in so far as their relationship to God was con¬
cerned, at the earlier and later stages of his Christian experience.
It is true that he would have endeavoured to initiate his cate¬
chumens into that exclusive and spiritual group to which he belonged,
but even in his most extrsre ffbntanist days, Tertullian regarded ad¬
herence to the Rule of Faith as an indispensable mark of a Christian -
whether in the "psychic" Church or in the "spiritual" Church; indeed,
he argued that the Montanists' adherence to the Rule proved they were
not heretics. He himself was never excommunicated, although his arro¬
gant attacks on the Catholic Church must have been, as St. Vincent of
Lerins put it, (Camion.18) a severe trial to the faithful. Critical
in the extreme of the discipline in the Catholic Church, Tertullian
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never refused to meet with the "psychics" in cannon assembly, nor did
he refuse to participate in the Catholic Eucharist; many of the pro¬
blems to which he devoted his attention, even as a Montanist, were as
real within the Catholic community as within the IVfontanist. In short,
his definition of the Church may have altered, but the necessity to
accept basic doctrines and disciplines, to be baptised and to receive
the Holy Spirit, were his requirements for salvation at all periods of
his teaching ministry.
(D) PAENITENTIA PRIMA
It may seem unnecessary to include the question of paenitentia
in this Excursus, because in the treatise de pudicitia, which is the
Montanist work especially devoted to paenitentia, Tertullian was openly
and avowedly attempting to transform the Church, not the outsider nor
even the catechumen, into a camiunity of saints. However, into the
dispute between Catholics and Montanists about discipline there came
the problem of the "Power of the Keys", and Tertullian modified seme of
his former ideas about the forgiveness of sin. He turned against both
the "psychics" and his own earlier agreement with them, but he was not
ashamed of his change of mindj as he put it in one of his pertinent
sentences: Nemo proficiens erubescit - pud 1.12.49.
In Tertullian's Montanist work, certain sins were called ir-
remissible, but this distinction of sins (sane of which the Church
could forgive and seme of which were beyond her absolving pewer) was
applied only to those who had sinned after baptism and so is not the
concern of this thesis. As far as the relationship of the catechumen
to God was concerned, there was no doctrinal difference between the
Catholic teaching propounded in de paenitentia and the Catholic teaching
attacked in de pudicitia. In the former, it was no part of Tertull¬
ian's purpose to emphasise the Church's part in paenitentia; in the
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latter, he discussed in detail the extent to which the Church could
effect reconciliation in the case of post-baptismal capital sins; but
these are not the concern of any of the relationships explored in this
study. Here (too) there was no material alteration in Tertullian's
views, as a Mcntanist, relevant to the conclusions reached in the main
thesis.
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